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VOL. n. 


IX.^Orgaaixatkm of Onnmands and Staih.--Field States.. 335 

X. — Organixatioa of Lines of (^mmimicatiaD and Baae^ .. .. 347 *" ^ 

XL — Staff Duties .. .. .. .. .• 367 

X£L — Local Levies and Mounted Troopa 4!^ 

XllL— Artillery 445 

XIV.— Servioes and Departments — 

1. Engineer Servirei!, including Water Sopplj .. .. 45S 

2. Telegraph. Signalling and Postal Scrnces .. .. 477 

3. Supply and Land Transport 4S9 

4. Marine Tranapori, DiKmbarkations and Be-^mbsika- 

tions .S29 

5. Medical and Sanitary Serrioes 57d 

8. Veterinary Department *jg^ 

7. Remount Department 9^ 

8. Ordnance Department 5^5 

9. Accounts Department fsff^ 

X V. — DemobiUzation ^j3 

Index 617 



Xo. of 


. 17. 



» 20. 

• 21. 
. 22. 

, 25. 

V 26. 

- 28. 

• 29. 
' 30. 
' 81. 

• 32. 
' 33. 

- 34. 

' 86. 
^ 86. 

• 39 40. 

- 41. 


^ 61. 

VOL. n. 


Three Sowan of the Somali Camel Corps 

PoDiee giasing . • . . • • • • • • 

Bikanir Camel Corps — Embarking Camels . . 

BeTiew Order 

Full Dress 

Indian and Arab Camels 
Heayy Marching Order 
Maxim Q-on Detachment 
K.A.R. Camel Battery — Draught Equipment 
„ Draught Equipment 

,. Camel in draught and loaded 

, Section readj to march and on 

the march.. .. .. 

Camel in Draught and Camels 

kneeling for *' Action " . . 
" In Action " 
Dam at Upper Sheikh . . 

To face 









> 448 




• • 





Details of the Dam at Upper Sheikli. . 
Sketch of Well at Slumber Berris, with method of "] 
canjing water . . . . I 

Water Supply —Wadamago . . 

Section of Well at Wadamago 

Bohotle Fort •• •• .. .. .. 

Blockhouse, Dubar . . . . . . . . 

Ber Defensible Post V 472 

Burao Defences . . 

Upper Sheikh Post J 

Upper Sheikh Redoubt 473 

Jieruera .. .. .. *. .. ••4/o 

Kimft Post .. .. .• 474 

Ain Abo Post 474 

Halin Post . . . . "^ 

Las Khorai Post • . L 475 

Las Khorai. Plan of Coast . • . . • . . . J 
Plan of Somali and Field Force Telegraphs— 16/1/04 ' 

to 31/1/04 482 

Plan of Somaliland Field Force Telegraphs on 22/8/04 . • 482 
Somali Ponj 590 





Organization of Commands and Stapes.* 

For the period of command of Colonel E. J. Swayne in Knt and 


1901-1902, no documents appear to be available from which expeditioi 
the organization of the forces employed in the first and 
second expeditions can be recorded. Such organization as 
existed is described in the narrative of these expeditions 
given in Chapter III and IV. 

After the action at Erigo and ^ the retirement of the Third 
British forces to Bohotle, Brig.-€reneral W. H. Manning was 
appointed to the command of the troops in Somaliland, and 
in accordance with his plan of campaign the troops were con- 
stituted as the Somaliland Field Force, and separated into 
two parts in January, 1903 (see Chapter V). The commands 
and staffs were : — 

Greneral Officer Com- lieut.-Colonel (local Brig.-General) 
manding W. H. Manning, Indian Army 

(with Obbia force). 

Obbia Fobos. 

Chief Staff Officer .. Major (local lieut.-Col.) G. T. 

Forestier- Walker, Royal Field 

D.A.A.0 . . Major C. L. Petrie, D.S.O., Man- 

chester Regiment. 

D.A.Q.M.G. for I. . . Major E. M. Woodward, Leicester- 
shire Regiment. 

Principal Medical Officer Lieut.-Colonel J. F. Williamson, 

C.M.G., Royal Army Medical 

* The diBtribuiioQ of oflicers to some appointments and of troops to 
commands raried from time to time. Vi 

C.R.E Captain W. B. Leeslie, R.E. 

Chief Transport Officer Captain M. L. Hornby, D.S.O., 

56th Infantry. 

Chief Supply and Captain H. de B. Codrington, Supply 

Transport Officer and Transport Corps, Indian Army. 

Inspecting Veterinary Major A. F. Appleton, Army Veteri- 

Officer nary Department. 

Superintendent, Post Mr. C. W. Wynch. 


Commanding lines of Major W. H. Rycroft, 11th Hussars. 

communication and 

Staff Officer . . . . Brevet-Major A. R. Hoskins, D.8.O., 

North Staffordshire Regiment. 

28th Mountain Battery (one section). 
One company British Mounted Infantry, King's Royal 

Burgher Contingent. 
Bikanir Camel Corps. 
One company Punjab Mounted Infantry. 
No. 17 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners. 
52nd Sikhs . 

No. 15 British Field Hospital (one section). 
No. 69 Native Field Hospital. 
1st King's African Rifles. 
3rd King's African Rifles (detachment). 
5th King's African Rifles, 
together with detachments of the following corps, services and 
departments : — 

Wireless Telegraph. Army Ordnance. 

Marine Transport. Survey. 

Medical. Army Pay. 

Supply and Transport. Remount. 

Army Veterinary. Field Poet Office. 


Bbrbera Bohotle Force. 
Commanding Berbera- Lieut. -Colonel J. C. Swann, 101st 
Bohotle lines of com- Grenadiers, 
munication and base 

Intelligence Officer . . 
Senior Medical Officer 

Chief Ordnance Officer 

Supply and Transport 

Chief Transport Officer 

In charge of telegraphs 


Captain J. H. W. Pollard, Royal 

Scots Fusiliers. 
Captain G. M. BoUand, Indian Army. 
Major W. S. P. Ricketts, Indian 

Medical Service. 
Captain H. A. Anley, Army Ordnance 

Captain L. M. R. Deas, Supply and 

Transport Corps, Indian Army. 
Brevet-Major C. Ballard, Norfolk 

Captain G. B. Roberts, Royal 
Veterinary Lieutenant H. M. Lenox-Conyngham, 

Army Veterinary Department. 
Telegraph Section, R.E. 
3rd Sappers and Miners (detachment). 
101st Grenadiers (half battalion). 
107th Pioneers. 
No. G5 Native Field Hospital. 
2nd King's African Rifles. 
Indian Contingent, British Central Atrica. 
Camel Corps . . ^i 6th King's African 
Mounted Infantry ^ Rifles and 
Infantry . . . . ] Somali Levies, 
tc^ether with detachments of the administrative services 
and departments. 

The principal change made by General Manning from the 

normal Indian organization was that he separated the Supply 

and Transport Services, placing Supply and Transport under 

separate heads. From the time of General Manning's assump- 

(8927a) y 




tion of command a regular staff was instituted, lines of 
communication and bases were established, and services 
and departments were organized. Regular returns were 
rendered (the Adjutant-General having made a request for 
a monthly return on 3rd January), and staff diaries were 
kept. In this matter the task of the Commander was 
made considerably easier by the arrival of officers from 
Great Britain, India and South Africa. Officers of the 
Supply and Transport Corps and Accounts Department 
came from India and of the Army Ordnance Corps from 
England, while the personnel of the medical, veterinary 
and engineer services was largely increased. 

Lieut. -Colonel Swann, though nominally Officer Conunand- 
ing Lines of Communication, Berbera-Bohotle, was actually, 
under General Manning, in command of all troops on that 
side, including flying columns. All combined operations, 
however, were undertaken by the orders of General 
Manning, and were, as far as possible, under his direction. 
When, in June, 1903, the Obbia force was transferred to 
Bohotle, Colonel Swann became Officer Commanding Lines 
of Communication only ; a position which he continued 
to occupy until the end of the fourth expedition. On the 
Obbia side a separate Officer Commanding Lines of Com* 
munication existed until the rolUng up of that line in April- 
May, 1903, while there was a separate base and Base Comman- 
dant ; though, as will have been seen above, the offices of 
Officer Commanding Lines of Communication and Base Com- 
mandant were combined in one officer. 

When Major-General Sir Charles Egerton assumed com- 
mand of the forces in SomaUland, he was accompanied by an 
Assistant Adjutant-General and a Deputy Assistant Quarter- 
master-General together with a Divisional Headquarter 
Staff Office, which was mobilized in India. 

General Egerton submitted for the sanction of Govern- 
ment a scheme of re-organization of the Field Force, based on 
the Indian Field Service Manual and Regulations, for a 
division of all arms. 


In the absence of the fonnal sanction of Government, 
the force was provisionally organized from the 16th July, 
according to the proposed scheme, viz. : — 

Headquarters of a division with divisional troops. 
Two infantry brigades. 
One " lines of communication." 

(Subsequently, on the 8th October, the mounted troops 
were brigaded and formed a fourth command.) 

The commends and staffs were, however, eventually 
constituted as follows : — 

(General Officer Com- Major-General Sir C. C. Egerton> 


A..LF.V/. • • 

U.O.O. . • 




Intelligence Officers . . < 

K.C.B., D.S.O. 

r Captain R. G. Munn, 36th Sikhs. 
. . < Lieutenant J. B. Egerton, 23rd 

L Cavalry 
. . Major H. E. StaAton, D.S.O., Royal 

.. Major R. G. Brooke, D.S.O., 7th 

. • Major C. 0. Swanston, D.S.O., 18th 

Tiwana Lancers. 
. . Major (local Lieut. -Colonel) G. T. 
Forestier - Walker, Royal Field 
Captain R. W. C. Blair, 123rd 

Outram's Rifles. 
Major F. Cunliffe Owen, Royal 

Lieutenant I. S. C. Rose, King's 
Royal Rifle Corps. 


Captain A. W. H. Lee, 10th Gurkha 

Captain G. H. Bell, 27th Punjabis. 
Lieutenant R. D. Marjoribanks, 

107th Koneers. 


\ a 


G.R.E. . . . Major R. F. Allen, Royal Engineers. 

Adjutant R.E. . . Captain W. B. Lesslie, Royal En- 


Superintendent Army Captain H. B. Protheroe Smith, 
Signalling 21st Lancers. 

Provost Marshal . . Conmiander E. S. Carey, Royal Navy. 

Principal Medical Lieut.-Colonel J. F. Williamson, 

QflScer C.M.G., Royal Army Medical 


Inspecting Veterinary Captain C. B. M. Harris, Army 
Officer Veterinary Department. 

Assistant to Inspecting Captain W. A. Wood, Army Veteri- 
Veterinary Officer nary Department. 

Director Supply and Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Yeilding, CLE. , 
Transport D.S.O., Supply and Transport 

Corps, Indian Army. 

Assistant to D.S. and T. Captain H. de B. Codrington, Indian 


Principal Ordnance Captain E. P. Carter, Royal Artillery- 

Survey Officer. . . . Captain G. A. Beazeley, Royal 


Field Controller . . Major T. H. Henderson, Mihtary 

Accounts Department, Indian 

Mounted Troops. 

Officer Commanding . . Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) P. A. 

Kenna, V.C., D.S.O., 21st Lancers. 
Staff Officer, Mounted Captain A. Skeen, Indian Army- 


No. I Corps 

No. II Corps. 

No. Ill Corps 
No. IV Corps 



j^Ist Company 

2iid Company 

3rd Company 

4tli Company 

5tli Company 
L Infantry. 

British Moimted 

British Mounted 

British Mounted 

Somali Moimted 

Somali Mounted 

f6th Company Poona Mounted 

-^ 7th Company Umballa Mounted 

Bikanir Camel Corps. 

Tribal Horse. 
Gadabursi Horse. 

G.O.C. . . 

An p 
D.A.A. and Q.M.G. . . 

Signalling Officer 

Brigade Supply and 
Transport Officer 

1st Brigade. 

Lieut.-Colonel (local Brig.-General) 
W. H. Manning, C.B., Indian 

Lieutenant H. W. Peebles, Reserve 
of Officers. 

Captain J. H. Lloyd, 6th Gurkha 

Captain H. S. Hammond, Dorset 

Lieutenant J. A. Longridge, Supply 
and Transport Corps, Indian 



D.A.A. and Q.M.G. 

Signalling Officer 

King's African Rifles Camel Battery. 
No. 4 Company (Somali) Mounted Infantry. 
No. 5 Company (Somali) Moimted Infantry. 
Indian Contingent, British Central Africa. 
1st Battalion, Song's African Rifles. 
2nd Battalion, Song's African Rifles. 
3rd Battalion, King's African Rifles. 
5th Battalion, King's African Rifles. 
Somali Ijcvies. 

2nd Brigade. 
. . Lieut.-Colonel (local Brig.-General) 
C. G. M. Fasken, 52nd Sikhs. 
Captain P. C. Eliott>Lockhart, Corps 

of Guides. 
Lieutenant A. W. H. M. Mo^ns, 

52nd Sikhs. 
Captain D. G. Bryce, 76th Punjabis. 

Brigade Supply and 

Transport Officer 


28th Mountain Battery. 

1st Battalion, Hampshire Regiment (half battalion). 

27th Punjabis. 52nd Sikhs. 

Lines of Communication. 
Officer Conmianding . . Lieut.-Colonel (local Colonel) J. C. 

Swann, Indian Army. 

D.A.A.G Captain J. H. W. PoUard, Royal 

Scots Fusiliers. 

D. A.Q.M.G Capt. G. M. MoUoy, 34thPoonaHorse. 

Capt. W. F. B. R. I>ugmore,D.S.O., 

North Staffordshire Regiment. 
Brevet-Major A. R. Hoskins, North 
Staffordshire Regiment 
Section Staff Officers. . i B^^et-Major A. W. S. Ewing. North 

Staffordshire Regiment. 
Lieutenant E. C. W. Conway-6ordon» 
. t. 3rd'Skinner'B Horse. 


Director of Telegraphs Captain 6. B. Roberts, Royal 

Provost Marshal .. Brevet-Major A. G. Maxwell, 6th 

Senior Medical Officer Lieut.-Colonel J. W. Rodgers, Indian 

Medical Service. 
Veterinary Inspector. . Captain H. M. Lenox-Conyngham, 

Army Veterinary Department. 
Lieut.-Colonel P. J. H.-Aplin, ICTth 

Brevet Lieut.-Colonel C. J. Melliss, 

rost commandants ..<,,. * t^ a xn i . , ,^/.. 

I Major A. P. A. Elphmstone, 106tH 

Hazara Pioneers. 

Captain P. C. R. Barclay, 120th 

Rajputana Infantry. 

Base Commandant . . - Major E. M. Woodward, Leicester 


Base Staff Officer . . Lieutenant W. B. Roberts, 101st 


Base Medical Officer . . Major F. W. Gee, Indian Medical 


Base Supply and Trans- Captain F. W. Hallowes, Supply and 

l)ort Officer Transport Corps, Indian Army. 

Advanced Base Supply Captain A. R. Burlton, Supply and 

and Transport Officer Transport Corps, Indian Army. 

f Conmiander C. J. C. Kendall, Royal 

Marine Transport j Indian Marine. 

Officers j Lieutenant E. W. Huddleston, Royal 

L Indian Marine. 

Remount Officer . . Captain Hon. T. Lister, 10th Hussars. 

Adjutant and Quarter- Captain C. R. Kelly, Royal Garrison 

master Military Base Artillery. 



No. 17 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners. 
No. 1 9 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners. 
101st Grenadiers. 107th Pioneers, 

together with detachments of the following corps, services 
and departments : — 
Telegraph Section, R.E. Provost. 

Field Park, R.E. Military Accounts. 

Survey. Veterinary. 

Marine Transport. Remoimt. 

Supply and Transport Corps Indian Ordnance, 
(including Army Service Protectorate Pajrmaster. 
Corps). Water Boring Establish- 

Medical. ment. 


Field States. 
As previously stated no strength returns seem to have 
been rendered during Colonel Swayne's period of command 
and therefore no summary of the states can be given. The 
approximate strength has, however, been given in Chapters III 
and rV. More detailed tables are given with reference to the 
strength of the forces under Brig.-General Manning and Major- 
Oeneral Egerton. 

Table I shows the strength during four periods of 
General Manning's command, the information being taken 
from the returns rendered to the War Office. Owing to the 
fact that the original states sent in by General Manning differ 
in some respects from those sent in by General Egerton, the 
first table differs sUghtly in the headings from the second, 
the principal difference being that hospitals and hospital 
assistants are shown under non-combatants in the first table, 
while in the second table hospitals are shown under native 
troops and hospital assistants are shown separately. 

Table II gives the strength at three periods of General 
Egerton's coniniand. Demobilization took place in May and 
June, 1904. 













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During the expeditions under Colonel Swayne tlic lines j-iret and 
of communication extended to Burao in 1901 and were sub- ^®^®^?,. 


sequently prolonged to Bohotle. Posts were established as 
follows : — 

At Sheikh. — ^A small masonry blockhouse in charge of 

police and levies. 
At Burao. — A strong entrenched post with two 9-prs., in 

charge of a detachment of levies. 
At Burdab. — ^A post of observation of 50 Somali rifles. 
At Bohotle. — A strong masonry blockhouse with two 9-prs., 

a maxim with a detachment of Somali levies. 

There was also a blockhouse at Las Dureh held by a 
detachment of levies, but this was off the lines of communica- 
tion proper. 

In the first expedition the ** advanced base " was at Burao, 
and during the second the " advanced base " was first at 
Burao and subsequently at Bohotle. It must be understood 
that during Swayne's operations in the Eastern Nogal, 
he cut himself adrift from his Unes of communication and 
carried a certain quantity of suppUes with him, depending, 
however, largely upon captures and the resources of the 
country for the supply of his native troops. There was at 
this time no regular organization of the lines of conmiunica- 

^ For the detailed organiiatkm of Services and Departments, see 
Chapter Sy. 



tion under a commander, the number of officers available 
not allomng of this, nor was such an organization apparently 
considered necessary for the requirements of the expedition. 
As far as they went the Unes of communication seem to 
have fulfilled their purpose of protecting Swayne's communi- 
cations with Berbera, and of enabling supplies to be 
forwarded when necessary, as for example, on the return of 
the expedition to Bohotle in 1901. 
rhird expedi- But in 1902-03 the larger numbers of the expedition 
under General Manning, as well as the conditions under which 
this expedition was conducted, rendered a more complete 
organization necessary. He therefore constituted two separate 
lines of commimication — one for the Berbera-Bohotle force 
and one for the Obbia force. 

The Obbia Force. — Obbia was made a base in January, 
1903, and Lieut. -Colonel W. H. Rycroft, lUh Hussars, was 
appointed base commandant, which appointment was 
extended on January 26th, 1903, to that of Officer Com- 
manding Base and Lines of Communication. The staff 
under Lieut. -Colonel Rycroft consisted of three officers with 
a supply and transport officer and an inspecting medical 

Subsequently, on the 7th March, the lines of commimication 
was divided into three sections, as follows : — 

Obbia to Lodobal, under Lieut. -Colonel Rycroft. 
El Dibber to Inideenli, under Major Hoskins. 
Rhakn to Galkayu, under Major Brooke. 

Ljcut.-Colonel Rycroft still remaining Officer Commanding 
the whole line. 

The lines of communication consisted of a series of posts 
pushed from time to time further forward towards Galkayu 
troops being sent to the front as required to reconnoitre, 
seize wells, improve water supply and fortify posts. After 
the occupation of Galkayu the principal work consisted in 
sending supplies to the front. 


Posts were established at : — 



El Dibber. 









This line was finally rolled up during April-May, 1903, 
and all lines of communication troops proceeded with the main 
column to Bohotle during June. 

Berberch-Bohode Force. — This line, as well as the movable 
column was under lieut.-Colonel J. C. Swann, 101st 
Grenadiers, who was allotted the following staff : — 

1 Deputy Assistant Adjutant (xeneral. 

1 Intelligence OfiBcer. 

1 Base Sta£E Officer. 

1 Base Supply and Transport Officer. 

1 Principal Medical Officer. 

1 Inspecting Veterinary Officer. 

1 Chief Ordnance Officer. 

1 Chief Transport Officer. 

1 Supply and Transport Officer. 

Posts and garrisons were established at : — 

Berbera . . 60 men, 101st Grenadiers. 

Hargeisa . . 50 men, 101st Grenadiers. 

fiurao . . . . 63 men, lOlst Grenadiers. 

Bohotle . . 100 men, 101st Grenadiers. 

Shimber Berris 26 men, 101st Grenadiers. 



and the flying column consisted of : — 
2nd Battalion, King's African Riflea 
Detachment, Indian Contingent British Central Africa. 
Somali Mounted Infantry. 
Somali Camel Corps. 

The total length of the lines of conmiunication from Berbera 
to Bohotle was 210 miles, along which there existed nothing 
except a camel track, which had been roughly improved np the 
Sheikh Pass. The further improvement of the track was not 
possible on the then existing aUgnment, and it became, there- 
fore, necessary to survey a fresh aUgnment. This work was 
effected by the Pioneers. 

The provisioning of the posts was carried out chiefly by 
hired caravans. 

After the Obbia line had been rolled up, the BeAera-Bohotle 
line became the only lines of communication, and eventually, 
in June, 1903 (see Chapter V), the whole of General Manning's 
force retired on to this line, when, pending the arrival of General 
Egerton and his decision as to future operations, the posts 
on lines of communication were garrisoned as follows : — 

1 Company Sappers and Miners. 
101st Grenadiers. 

3rd Battalion King's African Rifles. 
5th Battalion King's African Rifles. 
Indian Contingent British Central Africa. 


2nd Battalion King's African Rifles. 
50 Somali Mounted Infantry. 

1st Battalion King's African Rifles. 

Lower Sheikh. 
52nd Sikhs. 


The standing orders of the Obbia lines of communication 
were as follows : — 

When thorn bush is avaflable zaribas of not loss than 15 feet in breadth No. 1, 
and interlaced with barbed wire, with a defensible wall inside, will be formed. Zaribas. 
a strong goard being always kept inside, while at night each man will sleep 
at his accustomed place near the defensible wall with rifle beside him ; 
one qoarter of the total garrison always sleeping in a central point as an 
inlying picquet, rifles beside them. 

As the Mullah has a large force of horsemen, said to be capable of moving 
from 50 to 70 miles in a day, special precautions against sudden attack 
must always be taken and garrisons be invariably under arms half an hour 
before daybreak. 

A separate zariba capable of holding 1,000 camels will be made, and if No. 2, Oamel 
ground permits be arranged as below : — Zariba. 


Animal Zariba. 


A zariba capable of holding these must, if square, have each face 75 yards 

This zariba should, if possible, be placed to leeward of the camp. 

Hen while employed on fatigues outside the zariba will carry their No. 3, 
rifles unless a perfectly dear view of the surrounding country is obtainable, Fatigues. 
bat in any case a proportion of them will always be under arms and on the 
alert. Arms never will be piled. 

(a) The greatest care must be taken to see that the surroundings of the No. 4, 
camp are sanitary, latrines for day use being to leeward and not too near the Sanitation, 
camp. These should be moved frequently to fresh sites, and all places 

where latrines have been placed should be marked to avoid the chance of 
troops camping over them. 

All offal should be burnt, and dead animals dragged half a mile to leeward, 
disembowelled and carcases burnt with dry grass. 

(b) Night latrines wfll be formed outside, but near, and to leeward of the 
zariba, and men going out to these will invariably take their arms and warn 
the sentry over the entrance to the zariba. 

On occupying a post, wells will be baled out before the water is used No. 5, Wells. 
in order to get rid of stagnant water, which may be impregnated with 
sulphuretted hydrogen, the presence of which causes diarrhcda. Wells will 


also be improyed, but shoald not be sunk much deeper, as if so water bearing 

stratum may be passed through and water let out. 

If wells are in rock or hard ground they should be hollowed at bottom 

like an inverted mushroom. 

Wells should be fenced in, and, where a sufficient number are available, 

told off respectively for British officers and troops, Mohammedans, Hindoos, 

horses, mules, and camels, and sentries posted. 

Whenever possible reservoirs of water stored in sunken tarpanlina 

will be formed, and troughs made for animals to drink out of. 

Leather buckets wfll only be used in wells set apart for animals. 

No. 6, 'I^o Udm of communication wHl be divided into sections, the sphere of 

Division of each section being notified from time to time, while the sections will, if 

hnei or com- necessary, be subdivided into sub-sections, 

No. 7, Commanders of sections will have sketches made of their section and 

Commanders cQpiea of same will be given to each post commander, and shown and 
facilitate com- ^^P^^^^ ^ ^^^ officers and others passing through, with all information 
munication. about the road to the next post, its compass bearing, &c. 

Wherever possible the road will be marked out by (a) heaps of stones 
(6) posts or branches (e) blazing of bushes, &c., according to local require- 
ments ; while at points where the road can be shortened or improved by 
ramping nullahs, Ac, this should be done. If possible signalling communica- 
tion wiU be established between posts. 

Officers in executive command of posts on the lines of communication 
will not be superseded in command of posts by Transport or other officers 
who may be senior to them who are merely passing through. 

Officers commanding poets will collect and ptore a considerable quantity 
of firewood, both as a reserve for themselves and for use by troops marching 

Officers in command of secticms or posts will keep a record of all Ordnance 
and other material, and be responsible for the same. 

A concise diary will be kept by officers commanding posts and handed 
andnance and ^^^ ^ successor, the duplicates being sent weekly to officer commanding 
other Mnen of communication. Entries hi diary to chronicle : — 

(a) Letters received and dispatched, 
(6) Arrivals and departures of troops, 
(r) Weekly statement of supplies, 

(d) Statement showing expenditure on guides, piurchase of live stock, Ac, 

(e) Any unusual occurrence. 

No. 8, 



No. 0, 

No. 10, 
ity of O.C. 

No. 11, Diary 
to be keptbj 
O.C. posts 

No. 12, Isiiue 
of limejuice. 

No. 13, 

No. U. 

All troops will receive two issues of limejuice per week at scale of 2 ois. 
per issue. Officers commanding posts will see that it is drunk. 

Officers commanding posts will arrange, in conjunction with Transport 
Officer, so that troops detailed to move forward act as escort to convoys. 
This will greatly relieve the permanent garrisons of poets. 

A proportion of native shepherds who have been sent up country in 
charge of live stock will be retained at each post to look after stock. 


CSiagnIs win be inyariably kept filled with water. Some solution of Xo. 15, 
permanganate of potash is being sent up to different posts. Officers com- Chaguls 
manding posts will arrange for all chaguls ben? washed out with water to 
which a small quantity of the tiolution has been added. 

Officers commanding posts will always forward letters which are marked No. 16, Very 
•* very argent " with the greatest despatch, viz., by camel orderly, runner urvrent letters, 
or spare horse, vide lines of communication Order No. 61 of 12th February ; '11^ " **, 
other letters are to be forwarded by first available opportunity. The only 
pers(ms autfiorised to forward " very urgent ** letters are : — 

(1) G.O.G, or C.S.O., 

(2) Officer commanding lines of communication, 

(3) Major Brooke, D.S.O., 

(4) Major Hoekins, 

(6) Officers commanding posts. 

Great care should be taken of all washers for water fantasses, which, No. 17, 
if lost, should be at cmce replaced by new ernes made from goat skin or string. Water 
Also it must be remembered that a full water tank rides well on a camel, '^^tasses. 
whereas a partly full one is a shifting, and therefore very bad, load. 
f? When Somali prisoners are being sent to the base, or from one station No. 18, 
to another on the lines of communication they must invariably be supplied Somali 
wtth rations for journey. pr.soners. 

AH Government horses which are located at posts on lines of communica- No. 19, 

tion are liable at discretion of officers commanding posts to be used for (Government 

carrying despatches, Ac, at times when officers or others in whose charge l^^^^^f^^ 
•^ " X- » » o iines or com- 

they are are not using them for military purposes. muuication. 

Two filters will be issued to each post <m lines of communication. Wherever ^q^ 20, 
there is a portion of a hospital the medical officer or assistant will be in charge Filters. 
of and detail hospital followers to work the same ; while at other posts, 
officers commanding will see that men are specially told off and instructed in 
method of working and cleaning the filters. 

(a) The officer commanding base and lines of communication will, No. 21, 

nnder iniitractioas from the Chief Steff Officer, decide what material is Procedure re 

to be forwarded from time to time, and \iill instruct officers commanding ^^^^.' '^S 

' ° supplies to 

posts on this point. front. 

(6) The Chief Transport Officer, Local Transport Officer, or Non- 
commissSoned Officer will settle the number of animals available. 

(e) Hie frequency of convoys and the hours of starting will be 
settled by officers commanding rosts in conjunction with the local 
Transport Officers who are responsible that due regard is given to the rest 
and grazing of animals. 

Officers commanding posts are responsible for the provision of escorts 
of proper sizength. 

{(i) At ports where there is no Supply Officer, Non-commissioned Officer 
or Agents the British Non-commissioned Officer hi charge of the transport 
of otmraj^ wiD make out the waybills, see that the loads billed are put on 
the traoiiport animals, and check and hand thom over to the supply repre- 

(8927a) z 


No. 22, Pay 
of guides, 
runnerS; &o. 

No. 28, Prices 
of transport 
and supplies 
and table of 

sentatty^ at the poot to wlMcft ^^7 ive h^e4, of in fixB ibtence qi ^ s^^Pply 
reprcflentaiivo, to ih« cjQ&eor Qoiniiiau,<jiog the p.06^ 

GuJdet pemw^pt^y engaged by o^oeis coinxnaading pos^ wjiU ff^jjo 
12 rupees per month (or equivalent), 1 tobe, and rajbions. 

£luide for one mardi, 2 rupees or equiyalont. 

Biumers and spies, according to work 4oiie. 

When carryjbg messages, an individual runner should cover the 
gcoui^ at the rate of 5 miles per hour up to 20 miles, and 4 miles per hour 
up to 30 miles. Should they cover aoy distance at a quickc^r rate, th^y 
are to be rewarded at rate of 2 lbs. of rice or dates for evefy additional 
milo per hour. For instance, the ordinary tiijie allowed between Kl Dibber, 
and Dibit (15 miles) would bo three hours. Shoiild the distance however 
bo covered at rate of 6 miles per hour, viz., in 2 J hours, boarer would receive 
the above reward. 

All transport and supplies bought from this date should be paid for in 
cash or equivalent to the men who produce them. 

The following prices have been approved : — , 
Hi rios 

Camel-load of wood 

40 rupees. 





No. 24, 

The comparative value of animals and articles of trade is .as follows : — 

1 tobe, American, which is 10 yards of white pottQji, oquals 2 rupees. 
3 tobes equal 1 than, viz., 6 rupees. 

.Ghee, per lb., equals 10 annas. 

Dates, pear lb., equals 2 annas. 

Bice, per lb., equals 2 annas. 

20 sheep or goats (small or large) etjual a good baggage camcJ. 

2 cows or bullocks (small or large) equal a good baggage camel. 
20 tobcs equal a good baggage cam^ 

2 good milch cows equal three good baggage caxoejs. 
Herios, viz., Somali camel mats, complete with ropes, &c., equal 
5 rupees or its equivalent. 
These equivalents are only intended as a general guide, and we /ounded 
<m the usual current rates of exchange at Obbia. Up country, a tobe is of 
greater value, while at present the value to us of burdea camels is relatively 
gteater than milch camels. 

In due coarse a retail supply depdt will be opened in each section of 

Betail supply the lines of commw^ication. Supplies lor these depdts will be separately 


No. 25, 

waybilled and stored on arrival All troops in the section will draw rations 
from their respective depdt, while any troops moving from the base or 
from qne station to another must \te provided with Ust r(vtion pectificate. 

If ibe coatktry k nosettled* oopvoys should leave at im^goUr jtim^ 
and the ^route be oocaaionally somewhat varied. 


Wm9mtoM94^ are ^raJMile, piowonMip <w& k^ jrap^y f>uj9yt of ayime, ^o. 26, 
1M9 Mug jcswNBod IfV » blooUioniie V) te^ fqmvre (pvjMIo n^eapu^mP^) B1oo)cJ|;iiqii|j 
and 10 feet high. 

Each blookhoQW wHI be equipped with : — 

2 water f antaaaeB. 

Beeerre ammuiution (200 rounda pfsr nffitLQfit). 

7 days* l e efr v c of ratiooa. 



1 pickaxe. 

None but the most urgent meaaagea ahonkl be aeot thropgh a^pial poafia No. 27, 
OD the Uoea ol commvnioatioii, aa oomjnnnicatjoii ia di9.oii])k and alow. SignalliDg 

AS meeaagea will be hajidod ia on Indian lonn^ (India A.F X 360). V 
no Indian fonna are available the British forma may b^ uae4 and filled in 
■• below: — 

To From 

All measagee, if to be aent by native a^^nallera, riionld be written in 
block lettcfB. 

An measagee must be signed. 

Message books should be inspected by OfBoers Commanding as often 
aa poaaiUe, and rendered in the order in which messages were received and 
aent to the Signalling Officer, linea of communication, who wfll notify 
his whereaboute at the end of each month. 

Any message wl^oh for any r^aaon .i? not p^t by hello sjiould be taken 
to the o^oer commanding post in the evening. JQLa will then decide 
whether it is to be sent on by road or hdio on the following day. 

S%naUera will invariably carry rifles except when actually inside the 

Midday halts are necessary to permit the camels to graze. Strong No. 28, 
mounted and foot picqueta will always be detailed to accompany them Forpiatioi 
wbengraslDg. trooj^ on 

In the thick buah country the advimqe will invariably be in square 
formation, with the traoaport and all foDowera in the centre. The front 
and raar faoea oi the aqnare will move in linea of aectiona at deploying 

TUa formation muat be practised before entering bush conntr^ in order 
lo aeeoatom troops to keep correct intervals betweep aoitions, and to 
deploy rapidly into line. 

Wbeoever a halt ia made the force will halt invjirUbiy in square, trana- 
port in the centre. Strong picqueta will be thrown out to the front, rear, 
and both flanka. Arma will never be piled. In open country the order 
of maroh oaa be modified aa required for such conditions. 

No nativea on any pretence whatever should be allowed to enter a camp 
or to oome within the line of picqnets when halted. 

(8927a) z 2 


No 29, 
Order on 

No, 80, 
on march. 

No. 81, Scale 
of baggtge. 

150 lbs. 
100 „ 





No Somali is to be allowed to carry firearms on the line of maroh. All 
public and prirate followan will march immediately behind the transport 

Men falling out on tho line of march will invariably be accompanied by 

a comrade. 

HoBpitalfl will march at the head of the transport column. 

Transport animals will march in soreral lines. Tho number of lines 
necessary will be detormined when in square formation by the number of 
troops available to form the side facos of tho square, which, when halted, 
should be able to completely protect the transport animals in tho centre. 

Separate orders will be issued by the Chief Transport Officer as to the 
positions of transport officers with transport. 

Should a square or column be attacked, however, all transport officers 
non-commissioned officers, and armed assistants will at once proceed to 
the head of the transport column and await orders. 

The following will be the scale of baggage aliow(^ for all transport 
officers and troops proceeding to tho front : — 

British officers 

British warmnt and N.CO.'s . . 

British and Burgher troops 

Native officers and hospital as^i^tani** 

Native troops and followers 

Rations for ufficars* chargers will be corriod by Supply Department. 
Traiispoit for the carriage of mess utensils, cooking pots, &c., will be 
allowed as follows : — 

Officers •-• . • • • . . . . 15 lbs. 
Rank and file 2 „ 

This will be termed the " Light scnle." 
No. 32, Tents. No tents will accompany the advance force except hospital tents, of which 
a sufiicient number for actual requirements only will be taken. 

All troops moving out will take with them 100 rounds in pouch and 
200 rounds in referee ; maxims, 1,500 rounds per gun. 

All other amuiunition in excosh of this amount will be handed over to 
the Ordnance Dtpartment at the base. 

All unite before leaving the base, Obbia, will store their tents and surplus 

baggage in the base camp. Rvery package must be clearly marked with the 

name of the unit. Any baggage which is likoly to be required again at 

Obbia or at Berbera before the force returns to the coast should be separated 

from baggage which will not be required agahi in ordsr that it may be 

gi>t at quickly. 

jjfo. 85, The telegraphio address of the offi'^er commanding lines of commnnica- 

Telegraphic tion is " Chowder. " 

address of 

O.C. lines of 



No. 88, 

No. 8i, 

storage of. 


On the 4th July, 1903, the lines of communication ex- ITourtli 
tended from Berbers to Bohotle, and comprised the following ®^^ * '*^° 
stations : — 

Lower Sheikh 
Upper Sheikh. 

Garrero and Olesan. 

in the direct line, with Las Doreh and Shimber Berris on the 
east flank, and Hargeisa on the west. 
To these were subsequently added : — 

Kirrit. — As the centre point of concentration area and 

advanced base. 
Wadamago, Eil Dab, Ain Abo. — ^Working out eastwards 

towards the Nogal. 
Dubar. — ^For protection of the Berbera water supply, 
Kalgumrah. — ^Water post for use of buck wagons 14 miles 

south of Berbera. 
Wagon's Rust. — ^Terminal station for buck wagons at the 

entrance to the Sheikh Nullah. 
Dubbar, Gololi, Waran. — Intermediate watering stations 

between Sheikh and Burao. 
Ber, near Elkadalanleh, was occupied during October 

while the water supply was being developed and 

water stored, but evacuated after the tnbal horse 

had gone forward. 

The garrisons originally allotted were reduced as the neces* 
sity for strong escorts diminished with the advance of the 
operating troops. The following table shows maximum and 
nmLmam garrisons at each post : — 


~ 1 






Berbera .' 467 



.; 14 



J 14 



.! 30 



.i 14 


Wagon's Bust 

.! 30 


Lower Sheikh 

.: 68 



J 286 



i 42 



.1 60 

' 6 


.1 60 


Hopesprings . . 

J 12 



.; 343 






.' 26 


Kirrit . . 






Wadamago . . 



Eil Dab 



Ain Abo 






Las Dnreh 



Las Adey 












Shlmber Berris 



. - ■ 


* Also garrisoned at this time by troops of 1st or 2nd Brigade. 

t Abandoned. 

X Includes 100 Somali Leries. 

Note. — Strong parties of Pioneers who were road-maldng in ike vicinity 
of posts, but did not, strictly speaking, form li portion 6f the garrison, have 
been omitted from this table. 

From the 2l8t July, 1903, to the 29th October, 1903, the 
posts south of Burao were occupied by the Ist Brigade troops, 
and the General Officer Commanding 1st Brigade commanded 
the communications from Burao south. Ain Abo and Eil Dab 
were under the General Officet Commanding 2nd Brigade up 
to the 16th December, 1903, when Colonel Swann took these 
posts under his command. 


Tlie following Bta£E was allotted to the lines of communica- Organizati 
tion : — 

Orderly Officer. 

Deputy Afifiistant Adjntant-General and Qvartermaster- 

On 24tli December a Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General 

was appointed and the Deputy Assistant Adjutant 

and Quartermaster-General became Deputy Assistant 

Two Section Staff Officers, subsequently (January 16th. 

1904) three. 
Base Commandant, with Base Staff Officer, and Officer 

Commanding Base Military Depot, with Adjutant 
Commanding Royal Engineer. 
Remount Officer 
Senior Medical Officer. 
Inspecting Veterinary Officer. 
Provost Marshal. 

The Une was divided into two sections, each administered 
by a Section Staff Officer : — 

(1) The Sheikh Section, from Bihendula to Elkadalanleh. 

(2) The Eirrit Section, from Elkadalanleh to Eil Dab, and 

from Kirrit to Bohotle. 

To these was added for operations of the Las Dureh column 
towards Jid Ali and Gebi : — 

(3) The Las Dureh Section, including the following posts 

from Berbera : — 
Las Dureh. 
Las Adey. 

And the Wagon's Rust, Las Dureh road, upon which 
it was unnecessary to place posts. 

Upon the line east of Las Dureh being rolled up, Las Adey 



Defence of 



was evacuated on the 17th April, 1904, and Hagai on the 23rd 
April, 1904, and the Section Staff Officers of that section 
returned to Berbera for employment at Las Khorai. 

The troops placed at the disposal of Colonel Swann 
for garrisons on the lines of communication were : — 

101st Grenadiers. 

107th Pioneers. 

Depot 52nd Sikhs. 

Depot 27th Punjab Infantry. 

Depot African troops of 1st Brigade. 

400 Somali levies. These were disbanded on and after 
17th October, 1903 (Memo. 1026 S.A., dated 
27th October, 1903), 50 only being retained for 
lines of communication work. 

AH posts were placed in a state of defence (for details 
see Chapter XIV). 

The construction of the road from Berbera to Bohotle, 
begun during the previous phase, was pushed forward to com- 
pletion, and the Eal Gumri-Bihendula section was opened on 
the 5th September, 1903, thus giving access to Wagon's Rust for 
wheeled traffic. The upper section of the Sheikh Pass road 
was opened on 9th August, 1903, cutting off the worst part of 
the old road, and the whole pass road was open and ready for 
two-wheeled vehicles and pack transport on the 1st October, 
1903. Roads were also cut through the bush from Kirrit to 
Olesan and Kirrit to Wadamago. 

On the decision to advance via Las Dureh the track from 
Wagon's Rust to Las Dureh, which for the first 20 miles runs 
through rough stony ground, intersected by nullahs with steep 
banks, was improved from an indifferent mule into a generally 
fair camel path, though the time was too short to avoid leaving 
places which were still trying to camels. 

South of Sheikh, as far as Wadamago, the water supply 
was a source of constant anxiety, and it was only by imceasing 
labour in the development of the wells, and maintaining the 


storage in tanks, and the strictest supervision in the distribu- 
tion that it was possible to provide for the needs of troops 
and convoys passing along the line. 

The digging of the wells, construction of storage tanks 
and pumping arrangements were in the hands of the Command- 
ing Royal Engineer, the distribution and the control of traffic 
rested with the lines of communication Staff, and it became 
one of the most important duties of the Section Staff Officers 
to watch the storage and daily output, and so to arrange the 
timing of convoys and troops moving on the line that no 
undue strain should be put on any one post at the same time. 

Fatigue parties were supplied by garrisons both for digging 
and pumping, the latter frequently demanding day and night 
work continuously, involving a heavy strain on the troops in 
addition to guard and escort work. As time went on and 
the Commanding Royal Engineer had more Arab labour avail- 
able, the strain on the garrisons relaxed, but throughout the 
operations the lines of commimication troops at all posts had 
hard and continuous work. 

That cases of dissatisfaction with the arrangements for DigtributU 
distribution occurred was only what might be expected. ®^ Water. 
The individual transport officer, anxious, and rightly so, to 
maintain the efficiency of his own corps, did not like to pass 
a place where water was stored, and find that he was told off 
to water his camels at the next march, and could only draw 
for his men. Not knowing what other movements were in 
progress it seemed to him hard that he should have to leave 
so much water untouched, yet had he been allowed to water 
his camels, the next corps to arrive, probably a day or two 
days longer without water than his, would have suffered. In 
one case it would have been a luxury, in the other it was 
a necessity. 

Apart, however, from a few cases of this kind the water 
arrangements worked smoothly. All requirements of mounted 
troops, infantry, remounts, mules, ekka trains, and camels 
were met» and a reserve kept in hand to meet any sudden 


movement of troops, which might be Oideied to meet an nn^ 
foreseen emergency (for details of distribution see CbAjitei 

•nereof Prisoners of war were received over at the advanced 
posts of the lines of commmiication, and transferred down 
the line to the base at Berbera. 

Specially strong zaribas were oonstmcted at each post 
for their accommodation en route, and a strong enclosure of 
barbed wire, with suitable shelter, provided for their reception 
at the base. 

tired Major G. W. Rawlins, 30th Lancers, was appoint^ to super- 

intend the reception, and tending of captured stock, pending 
distribution or sale. Sales were effected at Eil Dab, Wad- 
amago, Bohotle, Burao, and Berbera, under officers specially 
detailed for the purpose. 

The condition of the animals varied much in different lots, 
and with it both the percentage of loss en route to the market, 
and the ultimate prices realized. 

ens. The greatest benefit was derived by the troops on the 

lines of communication when vegetables were grown at dome 
posts, and it was considered that a Grovemment issue of 
vegetable seeds should always be made on future occasions 
at the commencement of a campaign. 

The cost would be small, difficulty of transport nil, and 
the saving in the better health and efficiency of the troops 
great. This would especially be the case in a country like 
Somaliland where the inhabitants are non-agricultural, and 
raise no crops of any sort. 

The general deficiency of water, of course, miUtated against 
gardens being started at any but a few favoured spots. Indian 
troops are generally drawn from the agricultural classes, and 
where water was available there was no difficulty in raising 
vegetables for the supply of the garrison and the hospitals. 
Burao, on a small scale, Sheikh, Lower Sheikh, and Dubar 
(supplying the base hospital at Berbera) were able to kdep 
gardens going sufficient for their needs, and the issue of fresh 


vegetables was much appreciated by the scorbutic patients 
inyalided from the operating column. 

There was no political officer attached to the lines of Political 
communication staff. Cases which would have fallen within ^ 
Us purview were referred to the Consul, Berbers. 

The advanced depot was first formed at Kirrit, butAdTanced 
subsequently (1st January, 1904) moved to Wadamago. dop^t. 

The extent of the lines of conmiunication (400 miles) Protectioi 
and the long distances between water supplies (e.g., 45 miles ^^^^^ 
from Elkadalanleh to Kirrit and 50 miles from Wadamago to 
Bohotle) would have entailed the use of a much larger force 
than two regiments for the protection of the conmiunicationSj 
but for the following reasons : — 

The exposed (eastern) flank of the line was protected 

at first by a movable column and latterly by the 

operating columns. 
Want of enterprise on the part of the enemy. 
The fact that the tribes on the line were either friendly, 

or at least content to wait the issue of events before 

displaying any overt animosity. 

No attempt was made to molest our convoys passing up 
or down. The utmost vigilance had, however, to be exercised 
to prevent thefts of camels whilst grazing. As, however, 
camel raiding is the national pastime of Somaliland, this 
cannot be regarded as any proof of partizanship. 

Cases of interruptions to telegraph line were not infrequent, 
aometimes doubtless due to karias moving at night and gurgi 
poles on their camels becoming entangled in the wires, but 
often mahcious or mischievous. The latter generally occurred 
soon after construction through a fresh district and yielded 
to measures concerted with the civil authorities or political 

The base at Berbera was organized under the Officer Base 
Commanding lines of Conmiunication, and was provided °'8*'^*«*^ 
with the following staff : — 


1 commandant. 

1 staff officer. 

1 senior medical officer. 

1 base supply and transport officer 

1 assistant for transport. 

1 remomit officei. 

A plan of the base at Berbera is inserted which shows 
fully the arrangements made and the general plan of accom- 

)efuDce. The plan alluded to above shows also the defence organiza- 

tion, and the defence works are described in detail under the 
heading engineering works. These defence works were 
rendered necessary by the fact that the camp was situated, 
within a few hundred yards of the native town which contained 
a considerable population, said at one time to amount to 
25,000 and described as '* seething with discontent." It was 
therefore, necessary to take all possible precautions to protect 
the large accumulation of transport animals and Government 
stores from the danger of being raided by parties of hostile 
natives from the town. 

*obce. At first no poUce establishment was sanctioned, but after- 

wards a provost marshal, lines of communication, was ap- 
pointed with an establishment of : — 

2 British. 
5 Indians. 
5 Somalis. 

The Base Commandant considered this insufficient and 
recommended that : — 

A provost marshal should be appointed in the first 
instance for duty solely at the base. 

A fpecal poUce force, in the proportion of at least 10 
men to every 1,000 natives in military employ at 
the base should be provided at the outset. 

^riaon. A prison was constructed in December, 1903, for the 

« See page 473. 


leceptions of piison^s of war. It ocMisrted ol an endosore 
100 yards by 50 yards with a shelter and space for kitchens, 
infirmary, &c. 

The administration of the base was considerably affected BAerftireelins 
by the curious congeries of races there coUected. At Berbera 
there were always to be found representatives drawn from 
nearly every part of India, besides Kaffirs, Zulus, Arabs, 
Abyssinians, Yaos, Soudanese, Swahilis, and Somalis. 

With such an admixture of races, all speaking different 
languages, and representing so many types of humanity, 
differing widely in customs, religion, and interests, it was not 
to be expected that a certain amount of friction would not be 
engendered. The Somalis were the more troublesome to 
manage than any other race, owing no doubt to their utter 
ignorance of disdpUne and to their ingrained independence, 
and quarrels occurred at intervals between Somalis and Arabs, 
Somalis and Abyssinians, and Somalis and Kaffirs. The 
Base Commandant remarked as a curious fact that the 
Sndu got on better with the Somali than the Indian Mahom- 
medan did. 

In any place, such as a base camp, where large numbers 
of Somalis, Arabs, Indians and Abjrssinians were necessarily 
collected within a limited area, it was advisable to keep the 
Somalis as much as possible together, and at any rate to sepa- 
rate them from Arabs and Abyssinians. 

The trench systems of latrines was adopted at Berbera, Sanitation, 
the soil, however, is practically all coral and very hard, which 
made digging difficult. 

A large incinerator was established for the destruction of 
carcases of animals, and was kept going night and day. 

The Base Commandant foimd that sufficient allowance 
at the outset had not been made for possible expansion of the 
camp, which rendered considerable areas of ground useless for 
campng purposes when additional troops began to arrive. 
He considered that from the very begiiming the strictest 
Tshould have been taken for compelling the men to 


conform to regnlations for sanitation, and that the position 
of all latrines, refuse pits, &c., should be marked. 

Military Base A military base dep8t was established, which relieved the 
Base Stafit Officer of an immense amount of detail, and the 
Commandant considered that without the depdt it would 
have been quite impossible to cope with the large amount of 
clerical work at the base. 

Some difficulty was experienced, owing to the large number 
and the variety of race and language of the component parts 
of the force, in always identifying men who came to the 
depdt. Men frequently lost their service books, and it was 
recommended that the books should be of a stouter pattern, 

Oeneral The appointment of a camp quartermaster would have 

been a great advantage in a large camp such as existed 
at Berbera, where units were constancy arriving and 
leaving for the front. The duties of marking out camps 
and roads, of meeting imits on arrival, and conducting them 
to their respective camping groimds, of arranging for the 
distribution of the water supply, an important item in Somali- 
land, and of generally supervising the camping grounds to ensure 
their being kept in a dean condition, entailed a considerable 
amount of work. A portion of these duties was carried out 
by the Provost Marshal, but they do not fall properly within 
this officer's sphere of jurisdiction. 



In Chapters IX and X an account is given of the organiza- 
tion of the stafib and commands of the forces which took part 
in the four expeditions. In this chapter it is proposed to 
explain briefly the working and distribution of the duties of 
the staff as they were conducted at the headquarters of 
Sir Charles Egerton's command. This period is preferably 
sdected because the organization which previously existed 
was not adaptable to the Field Force as reconstituted for the 
fourth expedition, owing to the varied staff and departmental 
requirements consequent on its increased strength. Moreover, 
as the scheme of organization was based on the Indian Field 
Service Regulations for a "Division of all arms" and a 
" Lines of Gonmiunication," it affords a suitable illustration 
of the working in the field of the staff system which obtained 
at the time in the Indian Army. 

Briefly described, this system included three kinds of staff 
appointments, which may be classified as the Personal Staff, 
General Staff* and the Technical Staff. 

The (General Staff, which included a separate branch for 
intelligence duties, consisted of officers holding the appoint- 
ments of A.A.G. (Chief Staff Officer), D.A.A.G., A.Q.M.G. 
and D.A.Q.M.G., and section staff officers on the lines of 

The Technical Staff consisted of heads of services and 
departments with their assistants, and officers holding special 
appointments, such as Provost Marshal, Chaplains, &c., most 

* TJiis tfiTfn shoul4 i^pt bo couf used with tho '' XjenerfU Staff " releored to 
in llie^Kiog'SjRaguUtiQiiift. 


of whom were generally employed on the lines of commanica- 
tion in connection with the administration and maintenance of 
the force. 

The following extracts from a report of Lieut.-Colonel H. B. 
Stanton, D.S.O., who was Chief Stafi Officer of the Somaliland 
Field Force from July, 1903, to May, 1904, explain the 
working and distribution of duties of the staff : — 

St«ff As regards the organization of the staff, its object was to proTide the 

Drganization. means for Commanders to deal with the principle and policy of maintenance 
and to directly control the employment of the troops of their commands. 

The employment of officers trained to staff duties in India and the simple 
adaption of the Indian system ensured homogeneity throughout, and 
resulted in smooth working. 

The peculiarity of the situation in July, 1903, as regards the work of the 
Headquarters Staff was that the force, consisting for the most part of on- 
brigaded reinforcements, had no sanctioned organization, nor had it any 
authorised mission, nor was it provided with the appliances or material 
to enable it to maintain its position, much less t«) take the field. 

Until October, 1903, while the former matters were nnder the con- 
sideration of the Government, the multifarious requhremente of the Field 
Force were, of necessity, dealt with in detail by the General Officer Com- 
manding in direct communication with the War Office. During this period 
the inactivity of the enemy simplified the questions connected with the 
immediate employment of the force, but the task of the General Oom- 
manding in connection with its maintenance was abnormal. 

Subsequent to October, 1903, the receipt of Government sanction en- 
abled the Officer Commanding Lines of Communication to carry out the 
details of maintenance in direct communication with the sources of supply, 
and the General Officer Commanding was enabled to devote his whole 
attention to the conduct of operations and such matters of principle and 
policy of maintenance as affected the mission of the Field Force. 

At the outset the situation was that of a mobilization on an over-sea 
theatre of war. This was practically undisturbed by the enemy, but, 
owing to the want of a sanctioned organization and mission for the foroe» 
and to tljc absence of local resources, it was subject to the delays arising 
from the incompleted cable communication with army headquarters and 
from the length of the sea journeys between the bases of supply (England 
and India) and the bcLso of operations ( Berbcra). 

Commanding and Staff Officers, both general and departmental, were 
provisionally detailed from the available officers present in the country 
to fill such appointments as were indispensable. Special attention was 
paid to the organization of the Intelligence, the Lines of Communication, 
the Base, the Supply and Transport, and the Remount Departments. 

As all departments except the Ordnance, and the lufitv of the 


units were from the Indian establishment, which, besides requiring Indian 
puttetns of stores, had their aocounts audited on the Indian system, it was 
found that the relief of the Army Ordnance Department by the Indian 
Ordnance and Indian Engineer Field Park and the Indian Supply and 
Transport (already in the country) was desirable upon economic grounds ; 
this was accordingly recommended and eventually carried out. 

The equipment of the force to enable it to take the field was at once 
commenced by all staffs and departments. 

The great value of the Indian Field Service Manual was much ap- A field ser 
preciated during the period of organization. It provides, in a portable u»*nual. 
form, details of organization and instructions for the co-ordination of all 
duties of staffs and departments under a system of mobilization and ad- 
ministration, which, besides being specially applicable to campaigns in 
uncivilised countries, has been constantly tested and brought up to date in 
recent years. No diffioulty was experienced in adapting its provisions to 
the special circumstances of the Field Force and the theatre of operations, 
or in the application of its S3rstem of administration to the various com- 
ponent parts of the Field Force which were not from the Indian Establish- 

A difficulty arose as to the precedence " inter se " of officers holding Procodencc 
local rank granted by the King, viz., whether officers recorded in the Army ^°^^ rank. 
list as holding local rank whilst with the King's African Rifles were entitled 
to the advantages of precedence and command, outside " the command " 
of the King's African Rifles, which was of itself only an integral portion of 
the Somahland Field Force. To obviate the possibility of any doubt as 
to precedence in such cases, it appears desirable that either the wording 
of King's Regulations, paragraph 9 (1), should be amended, or that the 
Army List should define in each case whether the limits, within which local 
rank has effect, are confined to " a command " or " a country."* 

The diff^ence in system of payment of special service officers under Special 
the Allowance Regulations, and of special service or staff officers paid service and 
according to Indian Regulation(>, was found to operate to the disadvantage 
of officers of the Indian Establishment, pending the formal sanction to the 
scheme of organization of the Field Force ; no staff pay is available for them 
till this sanction is received, whereas the grade pay of special service officers 
of the Home Establishment is available in whatever position they are 

The Indian system has the advantage that the rate of staff pay is fixed 
according to the responsibility and importance of each appointment, but 
has a great disadvantage in the restriction it imposes on the employment of 
an officer for various duties according to the exigencies of active service, 
in that he is liable to suffer pecuniary loss unless he is performing the duties 
of an appointment already included in the sanctioned establishment of the 
Field Foroe. 

* This point has now boon rectified. 

(8927a) 2 A 


Th'fl and other anomalies would be avoided were all officers, sent for 
extra-regimental duty from the Indian Establishment, appointed special 
service officers, with graded pay at rates fixed on the analogy of the grading 
under the Allowance Regulations. 
Staif dutiea. The distribution of staff duties was made on the system prevailing in 

India at the time of mobilization. Pending the receipt of general sanction 
for the organization of the force and the scheme of operations, all proposals 
and requisitions were, of necessity, dealt with by the Headquarters Staff, 
and, in addition to the Chief Staff Officer, separate staff officers were required 
to deal with Adjutant-General's subjects and Quartermaster-Generars 

When the general sanction had been received, a considerable proportion 
of these duties became routine, and were accordingly transferred to the 
Officer Commanding Lines of Communication, thus enabling the services 
of a Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General on the Headquarters Staff to be 
dispensed with, but necessitating a second General Staff Officer on the 
Lines of Communication Staff, and a special distribution of subjects between 
the Chief Staff Officer and the Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General. 
These two officers sufficed during operations for the Adjutant-General*s 
and Quartermaster-General's duties of the Headquarters Staff. 

On return from operations there was additional work connected with 
bringing outstanding cases up to date, preparing confidential reports^ and 
making perparations for demobilization, which again necessitated the 
appointment of a Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General. 

The sphere of operations was partly within and partly without territory 
administered under the Foreign Office. It was, therefore, of importance 
that the Headquarters Staff should include a Political Officer with local 
knowledge and experience of the local administration. Captain H. R S. 
Cordeaux, C.M.G., Consul of Berbera, was appointed on the 19th October, 
1903. All duties connected with the civil administration devolved on him 
when, on return from operations, the General Officer Commanding was 
directed to assume the duties of Consul-General of the Protectorate on the 
8th March, 1904. 

The office memoranda distributing and redistributing the staff duties 
are attached, Appendices A, B, C and D. 

Two General Staff Officers for the Headquarters of the Lines of Com- 
munication, and one for each brigade and independent command met all 
Equipment of The equit>ment and clerical establishment of staff offices for tha Field 
staff offices. Army in India were mobilised according to the requirements of the Field 
Force, and proved satisfactory in every way. 

The means of equipping staff offices were not in the country when the 
re-organization of the force took place. Pending the arrival of the additional 
mobilised offices from India, the various staff officers laboured under con- 
siderable disadvantages, being dependent on a very limited supply of 
stationery in Army Ordnance charge. 


Typewriters were found to be portable and invaluable both in standing 
camps and on operations. 

A printing press was mobilised from India and was fully employed to 
great advantage both in saving clerical labour and ensuring a suitable 
circulation of important orders. It is an important adjunct to the head- 
quarters and lines of communication of an expeditionary force. 

The clerks were, for the most part, trained men from the Indian staff 
of military clerks, and performed excellent service. The Headquarters 
Office had the advantage of two clerk? from the permanent establishment 
of the Indian Army Headquarter?, and one clerk from an Indian Command 

Appendix A. 

Oboahization 'and Procedure of Somaliland Field Force, Headquarters 
Offices, as approved by the General Officer Commanding, 30th July, 



1. Disposes of all requisitions and correspondence (both^ 

staff and departmental) for higher authority and for 

other authority outside the Field Force . . • • FT d 1 k d 

2. Disposes of all non-departmental questions which affect ®* ^ ®^ . .*^ . 

*^ .1 A. a oi one assistant 

more tnan one stan omcer . . . . . . . . f ^i i > u 

3. Issues SUnding Orders, Orders of the Day and Opera- J^ l^ ^®** ^* , 

tion Orders ^^® general 

4. Deals with : — 

Discipline—officers . . 
Appointments — staff 
Confidential reports. . 

services of the 

Deals with (B) subjects and returns 1 clerk. 


Deab with (A) subjects and returns, also artillery, and the 

preparation and distribution of orders . . . . 1 clerk. 

A.Q.M.G.— I. 

Deab with intelligence, interpreters, and Press Censor's \ Intelligence 
dotiee .. .. .. .. .. ../Establishment, 

(8927a) 2 a 2 

Appendix B. 

Obqanization and Procedure of the Somaliland Field Force Headquarters 
Staff Offices, with effect from the 23rd October, 1903, and in super- 
session of Memorandum dated 30th July, 1903. (Dated 23rd October, 




I. — (1) Takes G.O.C's orders on all general questions which 
affect the duties of more than one staff officer . . 

(2) Disposes of all the G.O.C.*s correspondence (both staff 

and departmental) for higher authority, and for 
other authority outside the Field Force . . 

(3) Keeps the Staff Diary . . 

(4) Issues Standing Orders, Orders of the Day and Opera- 

tion Orders 

(5) Deals with A.G.'s subjects, except as shown in 

D.A.Q.M.G.*s duties . . 


Head clerk and 
one assistant 
for general 
services of the 


II. — Deals with Q.M.G.*s subjects and the following A.G.*s^ 
subjects : — 

Armament of defences, clothing as supplied by ^ 1 clerk, 
the Supply and Transport, horses, proTOst, 
signalling and telegraphy 

A.Q.M.G.— I. 

III. — Deals with intelligence, interpreters. Press Censor's 1 Intelligence 
duties, and surveys . . . . . . . . . . j Establishment. 

Appendix C. 

Oboanization and Procedure of the Somaliland Field Force Headquarters 
Staff Offices, with effect from 29th February, 1904, and in supersession 
of Memorandum dated 23rd October, 1903. (Dated 3rd March, 1904.) 



I. — (1) Takes G.O.C.*s orders on all general questions"^ 
which affect the duties of more than one staff officer 

(2) Disposes of all G.O.C *8 correspondence, both staff and 

departmental, for higher authority, and for other 
authority outside the Field Force . . 

(3) Keeps the Staff Diary 

(4) Issues Field Force Standing Orders, Orders of the Day }> Head clerk. 

and Operation Orders 

(5) Deals with : — 

Discipline — officers . . 
Appointments — officers 
Confidential reports . . 
Captured stock . . . . . . j 




n. — Deals with A.G.*s subjects other than thoee shown as 

dealt with by aS.O. and D.A.Q.M.a . . . . 1 clerk. 


IIL — Deals with Q.M.G.'9 subjects and the following*^ 
A.G.'s subjects : — 

Armament of defences, clothing as supplied by ^ 1 clerk, 
the Supply and Transport Corps, horses, 
pcoYoet, signalling and telegraphy 

A.Q.M.G.— L 

IV. — Deals with intelligence, interpretws. Press Censor's 1 IntelUgence 
duties, and surveys . . . . . . . . . . j Elstablishment. 

Appendix D. 

Oboanixation and Procedure of the Somaliland Field Force Headquarters 
Staff Offices, with effect from the 18th March, 1904, and in supersession 
of Memorandum, dated 3rd March, 1904 (Dated 19th March, 1904) 


- Head clerk. 


L— (a) Takes G.O.C.'s cnders on all general questions'^ 
which affect the duties of more than one staff officer 

(6) Disposes of all G.O.C's correspondence (both staff and 
departmental) for highw authority, and for other 
aothority outside the Field Force, except as in 

(c) Keeps the Staff Diary 

{d) Issues Field Force Standing Orders, Orders of the Day 

and Operation Orders 
(e) Deals with :-- 

Discipline— officers 

Appointments — officers 

Confidential reports 

Captured stock 


IL — Deals with A.G.'s subjects, other than those shown 

as dealt with by CS.O. and D.A.Q.M.G 1 clerk. 


IIL — Deals with Q.M.G.*s subjects and the following*^ 

A.G.'s subjects ; — | 

Armament of defences, clothing as supplied by V 1 clerk. 

Supply and Transport Corps, horses, provost, j 

signalling and telegraphy . . J 


IV. — Deals with intelligence, interpreters. Press Censors') Intelligence 
■ad smreyB J Establishment, 



V. — (a) Deals with all matters connected with the civil administration 
on behalf of the G.O.C. and in his name. 

(b) Ho will, in the first instance, refer through the C.S.O. all matters on 
which the G.O.C. will need to be advised by staff officers other than himself, 
and, with the exception of routine matters, he will refer these cases, with 
the observations of the responsible staff officer, for the personal orders of 
the G.O.C. before disposal. 

(c) The C.S.O. and A.Q.M.G.— L will keep the Political Officer informed 
of the progress of operations and intelligence matters respectively. 

(d) Copies of important correspondence will be exchanged between the 
Political Officer and the C.S.O. 

(e) The G.O.C.'s decisions will be communicated by memorandum 
between the Political Officer and members of the General Staff. Other 
communications will be in the form of office notes, to be available for 
reference in the office of origin. 

VI.* — General and Departmental Staff Officers will take the G.O.C. 's 
orders direct on all matters which affect their own subjects only, and will 
keep the C.S.O. informed on all important orders received, or decisions 
taken, and of general progress. 

A weekly Field Force Progress Report is cabled homo from the C.S.O.'s 
office by the Indian mail steamer. 

VIL* — All papers put up to the G.O.C. will be either taken personally or 
attested by the initials of the responsible staff officer. 

The working and distribution of the staff duties adopted 
at the headquarters offices of the Field Force were followed, 
so far as they applied, by the staffs of brigades and other 
organizations. The following extracts illustrate the nature of 
the diaries, routine standing orders, Field Force orders and 
orders of the day, the preparation of which formed an im- 
portant part of the work of the staff : — 

• These instructions were also included in the preceding memoranda — 
Appendices A, B and C. 





From 25th Dxcxmbkb, 1903, to 1st Janoabt, IIMXI. 

^11 mmary of Staff Diary, Headqttarters. ( For the period ending I d January f 


Operations. — Secret cnrders have been issued for the future action of the 
Galadi garrison when joined by Major O'Bryen's conyoy escort. 

Convoy. — The convoy, under Major O'Bryen, left Bohotle for GaUdi on 
the 29th December. 

Operations. — Orders issued for the completion of the concentration 
for operations in the Nogal — 

The Ist Brigade, under Brigadier-General Manning, in the southern 

The 2nd Brigade, under Brigadier-General Fasken, in the southern 

A movable column to be formed at Eil Dab (the advanced base). 
Reconnaissance of Jidbali report its reinforcement by the enemy. 
Reconnaissance of Tug Der Valley, east of Bur Dab range, met no 

traces of the enemy. 

PoliticaL — The Consul-General is raising Musa Abukr levies to form 
a nucleus of resistance to raids in the north-east of the Protectorate. 

Diaries. — Staff Diary, Mounted Troops, for the period ending 3 let 

December, 1903 ; Staff Diary, Ist Brigade, for the period ending 26th 

December, 1903 ; Staff Diary, 2nd Brigade, for the period ending 2nd 

January, 1904 ; ^Progress Report, Royal Engineer Works, for the week 

ending 19th December, 1903 ; and Meteorological Report of Upper Sheikh, 

for the period ending 28th December, 1903, are attached, and marked 

A, B, C, D and E respectively. 

H. R STANTON, Major. 

Chief Staff OfTio^r. 
2nd January, 1904. 

Sooroe and Date of 

25th December 


Concentration. — Orders issued for the following :^ 
To Bohotle from Wadamago, No. 5 Company, 

Somali Mounted Infantry. 
To Eil Dab from Burao, Waran and Lower 

Sheikh, 52nd Sikhs. 

• Not printed. 


and DMeoT 


20th December 

27th De^-cmUr 

To ES. Dab fron Lover SlirskK. one aection. 
2nh Mountain Batt4TT. 
'.S>« diarv. 21 <t Decvmbcr.) 
Co-operatkio of oorthem trihea. — ^The CoosQl- 
General vas asked vhat he coold arrange to 
prepare the northern tribes to resist raids and 
attack fogitiTea. 
Operations. — Secret orders nnied for fntme action 
of Galadi garriaon and Major 0*BrTen*R convoy 
escort. (Diary. 24th December.) 

Reconnoitring party of Tribal Uor^ retnmcd 
on the 25th to Badwein after spending the night 
of the 24th in the nei^boorhood of Jidbali. 
Report force there considerably strengthened and 
zariba extending to Chidan, 1^ miles south. Als j 
that Nor Hedig*8 raiding party from the north 
has joined them. 

Galadi. — Report from Galadi, all well. Messages 
received from Munn. Ali Yusuf s men were found 
at Galkayu by Ulalos. 

Naval. — Senior Naval Officer given general 
news, and requested to occupy llb'g about the 
10th January. 
Co-operation of northern tribes. — Orders issued 
sanctioning the raising of foot levies to former 
fetrcngth of 400. The 350 new levies to bo at the 
disposal of the Consul-Gencral. 

The Consul-General will take 50 men and 
rations for 360 for 1 month to Ankor by sea, 
and arrange for establishment of fort by th(t 
Musa Abulo" at Dubbatad to south-east and half- 
way to Wirrig, remainder of new levy to be 
raised at once. 

He considers this will enable Mnsa Abukr 
to hold their own and induce Ali Xalcya to refrain 
from joining the Mullah. 

Lieut. -Colonel Melliss, V.C., the 101st 
Grenadiers, placed at the disposal of the Consul- 
General for the Musa Abukr levy. (Diary, 
25th December). 

Italians. — (Diary, 23rd December.) Intelli- 
gence news from Obbia reports that, beside 
Galkayu and Douilli, Ali Yusuf holds Badwein, 
44 spearmen and detachments at Rohr. Also 
reports abandonment of Illig by Mullah, and 
confirms Italian report of Osman Mahmud having 
moved inland in force ostensibly to harass tho 

Operations. — llio General Oflicer Commandiii|r. 
1st Brigade, reports Illalo reconnaissance in at 
Damot till the 31st, to cover 0*Bryen's advanco 
to Galadi. 


Souroe and Dato of 


28tli December 

29th nccember 

30ih December 

ConcentratioiL — Headquarters Staff established at 

Two companies, 52nd Sikhs; one company, 
27th Punjabis, reach Eil Dab. 

Gadabursl Hoiae reconnaissance from Ber, 
vid Shimber Berria, Waridad and Arregir reaches 
Badwein. (Diary, 21st December.) 

ConBol-Generi^ proceeds in H.M.S. ** Perseus " 
to Ankor. (Diary, 27th December.) 

Operations. — Report received of gallantry of 
Lieutenant H. A. Carter (117th Mahrattas), No. 6 
Company, Poona Mounted Infantry ; and Suba- 
dar Bhairo Gujar (119th Mooltan Regiment), 
No. 6 Company, Poona Mounted Infaotry, at 
Jidballi on the 19th December. 

Operations. — ^The Gadabursi Horse reconnaissance 
to the north and east of Bur Dab reached Bad- 
wein without encoun^ing the enemy. 

A party of Ogaden (Ali Wenak) are due at 
Wadamago to take over the camels recovered 
from raiders at lASakante by Greneral Manning. 
Money compensation is ready for them for camels 
and flocks which have been purchased by the 
Supply and Transport Corps. 

Operations. — Report received at Bohotlo from 
oonvoy camp, 15 miles south, all well. 

Gadabursi Horse concentrated at Ain Abo. 
Major 0*Bryen informed of raiding party of 
dervishes said to be sending in captured stock, 
vid Lasakante and Damot, t-o the Nogal, having 
raided them from Aidagalla section of Habr 
Yunis, near Cronda Liba. 

The report states that the main body of the 
raiders has remained out to continue raids. 
(Headquarters at Hodayuwein.) 
Report from Major 0*Bryen camp, 15 miles south 
of Bohotle, all welL 

Orders issued for (1) 1st Brigade to operate in 
the southern Nogal, leaving Bohotle, vt<l Lassader, 
on the 5th January. 
From Bohotle : — 
I Somali Mounted Infantry, 125 rifles. 

King's African Rifles, Infantry, 550 rifles. 
Ilalos, 150 rifles. 
From Eil Dab, vid Yaguri i — 
27th Punjabis, 200 rifles. 
Gadabursi Horse, 550 rifles. 
Hlaloe, 50 rifles. 
(2) For the 2nd Brigade to operate in the 
southern Nogal, leaving Eil Dab on the 7th 
January, Badwein 8th January. 


Sooroe and Date of 


Deoember — eoni. 

31st Deoember 

1st January, 1904 

Headquarters Bta£f : — 
Mounted troops — 


Nos. 1 and 3 Cos., British Mounted Infantry 201 

Nos. 6 and 7 Cos., Indian Mounted Infantry 262 

Bikanir Camel Corps 183 

Tribal Horse 454 

Halos 80 

Artillery. — ^28th Mountain Battery, 2 guns. 
Infantry — 

Hampshire Regiment 

Sappers and Ifiners . . 

27th Punjabis 

62nd Sikhs • . . . 


. 237 
. 100 
. 307 
. 678 


(3) A movable column to be formed at Eil Dab. 

Raids. — ^The Consul-General reports enemy at 
Dagar in some force, after raid on Protectorate 
tribes. Also refers to raid on Aidagalla to the 
west. He has been informed that present con- 
centration for immediate operations appears the 
most efficacious and only possible action at 

Reconnaissance. — Report from the Officer 
Commanding, Mounted Troops, that Major 
Bereeford, with 260 Gadabursi Horse, recon- 
noitred from Ber Shimler BerriB, Anrgcd, 
Goeawein to Badwein, between the 24th and 
28th December, covering 95 miles. Water only 
obtained at Shimber Berris, 4 gallons per animal 
100 ponies suffered severely. 150 mules seem 
very little the worse. 

No sign of the enemy. (Diary, 30th Decem- 

Convoy. — ^Major O'Bryen reports all well 
from Lasakante. 

Inspections. — The General Officer Commanding 
visited Badwein and Aya Selaloh. Inspected 
the tribal Horse. 

Convoy. — At Dalaat. All weU. 

Galadi — ^Report received. No news. 

Navy. — ^The Rear-Admiral Commander-in- 
Chief, East Indies, does not sanction Senior Naval 
Offioqr*p proposal to land a force at Illig owing 


Sooroe and Date of 


lstJaniiary,1904— oonl. 

to the surf and unsuitable state of the sea. 
Sanctions demonstration, which the Senior Naval 
Officer is arranging. 

Distribution. — One company of Mounted In- 
fantry at Badwein is to be relieved by one 
company of 27th Punjabis from £il Dab. 

Operations. — A party of the Tribal Horse on 
Mayo Hill report that they saw the glow of the 
dervish camp fires at Jidbali last night. 

Jidbali is being watched by our iflalos. 

j^Siaff Diary, Mounted Troops, Somaliland Fidd Force, 

Source and Date of 


Wadamaoo . . 

Saturday, 12th Dec. . . 
Sunday, 13th Dec. . . 
Monday, 14th Dec. . . 
Tuesday, 15th Dec. . . 
Wednesday, 16th Dec. 

Thursday, 17th Dec. . . 

Friday, 18th Dec. . . 
Saturday, 19th Dec. . . 

Sunday, 2(Hh Dec. 

Monday, 2l8t Dec. . . ; 1 

Tuesday, 22nd Dec 
Wednesday, 23rd Dec. 

Thursday, 24th Dec. 
Friday, 25th Dec. . . 
Saturday, 26th Dec. . . 
Sunday, 27th Dec. . , 

No. 5 Company, Somali Mounted Infantry, arrived 
from Bohotle. 


Officer Commanding Mounted Troops left for Eil 
Dab to take command of Badwein Column. 

100 rifles, No. 3 Company, British Mounted In- 
fantry ; 100 rifles, No. 6 Company, Indian 
Mounted Infantry ; 50 rifles, Bikanir Camel 
Corps, left for Badwein with column. 

Above party loft Badwein with 200 of Tribal Horse. 

Above party engaged the enemy at Jidbali. 

Casualties. — 3 IVibal Horse killed, I Mounted 
Infantry horse killed ; 2 British soldiers, 4 horses 
and 1 camel wounded. 

Retired on colunm and marched towards Bad- 

Mounted troops, with Badwein Column, arrived 
Badwein and halted. No. 7628 Private J. Rose, 
1st Bn. Warwickshire Regiment, reported 
missing ; strayed from line of mafch. 


No. 1 Company, British Mounted Infantry, arrived 
Eil Dab from Wadamago. 



' A. — 8ta§ Diary, Mounted Troops, Somaliland Field Force — oont. 

Source and Date of 


Monday, 28th Dec. . . 

Tuesday, 20th Dec. .. 
Wednesday, 30th Dec. 

Thursday, 3l8t Dec. . . 

A reconnaissance in which 100 Tribal Horse, 50 
British Mounted Infantry, 60 Indian Mounted 
Infantry, and 10 Bikanir Camel Corps took part 
went out from Badwein to meet 280 of the 
Gadabursi Horse arriving from Shimber Berris, 
meeting them near Gosaweina, about 2 miles to 
the south-west of it. 

The Gadabursi Horse moved to Ain Abo. 

Headquarters, Mounted Troops ; No. 3 Company, 
British Moimted Infantry, and detachment, 
Bikanir Camel Corps, moved to Eil Dab. 


P. A. KENNA, Lieta.-Colonel, 

Commanding Mounted Troops, 

Somaliland Field Force. 

K—J^ff Diary, Isl Brigade, SonudHand Field Force. 

Sooroe and Date of 

Sunday, 20th Dec. . 

Monday, 21st Deo. . 

Tuesday, 22nd Dec. . 

Wednesday, 23rdDec. 

Thursday, 24th Dec. . 
Friday, 25th Dec. . 


1. Water storage : — 

1,397 large tins, 
57 small tins, and 
14,800 gallons stored in tanks. 

2. Work at wdls continued, 1,300 gallons being 
added to the tanks, giving now total storage of 
16,100 gallons. 

3. WeUs showing a decrease in their yield, only 
900 gallons being stored to-day, and additional 
weUs had to be handed over to 4th Somali 
Mounted Infantry for their daily requirements, 
which will further reduce storage. 

4. 800 gallons stored to-day. Total up to date : — 

1,434 larfl;e tins, and 
17,800 gaUons stored in tanks. 

5. Storage to-day, 700 gallons only, and an addi- 
tional 10 large tins. 

6. Letters received from Galadi : — 

Major Marsh reports that his Illalos visited 
Galkayu on the 19th instant and found the fort 
occupied. Bodies of riflemen were located at 
Beraand Talaad. 

He had received news from Oaptam Munn, who 
wrote from Harradigit on the 10th instant. 


6. — 8ia§ Diary, IH Brigade^ SomalUand Fidd Force. — coat 

Source and Date of 

Friday, 25thDec.— conl. 


Saturday, 26th Dec. 

Munn had heard that Colonel Rochfort was 
in the vicinity of Sesebani with the Abyaainian 

The meesengers passed through Gumburu,' 
where there had been a little rain, and they 
reported good grazing between Galadi and 
Gumburu, and plenty of water at Wardair. 

Major Marsh reports the health of the garrisoli 
as good, but all ponies in very poor condition. 
He had reoeiyed no news from Obbia. 

7. Troops in BohoUe had a holiday, being Christmas 

8. Mail received in Bohotle. 

9. Party of Ulalos left for Damot with orders to 
remain there till the morning of the 3l8t instant, 
when they will return to Bohotle. 

10. A party of Ogaden (Ali Wenak) arrived in 
Bohotle to take over the camels recovered from 
the Mullah's raiding party on the 22nd November. 

The party leaves this evening for Wadamago 
with a letter to Officer Commanding of that post 
to hand over the camels to them, and then send 
on representatives to Kirrit to receive the money 
due to them for sheep and burden camels taken 
over by the Supply and Transport Corps. 

11. Water storage up to date as follows : — 

1,432 large tins, 

22 small tins, and 
19,800 gallons stored in tanks. 

12. Messengers to Galadi leave this evening. 

W. H. MANNING, Brigadier-Oeneral, 

Oeneral Officer Commanding, 1st Brigade, 

Somaliland Field Force. 

Bohotle, 26^ December, 1903. 


C— Staff Diary, 2nd Brigade, Samaliland Field Force. 

Source and Date of 

EiL Dad 
27th December. 
28th December 

29ih December 
30th December 

Slst December 

1st January, 1904 
2ndJanaary .. 



Reconnaissance went out from Badwcin round 

northern foot of Bur Dab to meet GadaburHi 

Horse coming from Shimber Berris. The whole 

returned to Badwein in afternoon. 

One double company, 52nd Sikhs, arrived 

£il Dab from Burao. 
The whole of the Gadabursi Horse concentrated at 

Headquarters, Mounted Troops ; No. 3 Company, 

British Mounted Infantry, and 50 Bikanirs 

returned from Badwein to £il Dab. 
No. 3 Company, Sappers and Miners, left Eil Dab 

for Badwein to develop the water supply at that 

100 rifles, 27th Punjabis, proceeded to Badwein, 

and No. 6 Company, Indian Mounted Infantry, 

was ordered to return from Badwein to Eil Dab. 

C. FASKEN, Brigadier-Oeneral, 

Commanding, 2nd Brigade, 

Somdliland Field Force, 






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'lull I 




lOlA. Hupplioa. — On the reoommendation of P.M.O., S.F.F., the following 
Iknimvi nrti muiotionod for one month from 22nd September, 1903 : — 

For Hrituth Troops of all ranks. 
Scale per man. 

Rum, 2fl i»cr cent. U.P. . . 1 dram- 

himo juice 1 o*» 

Hutfar . . . . J o£. 

Two issues weekly — 
Wednesday and 


Kor Indian and African Troops and Followers, 

Kum. 2fl \w oent U.P. . . 1 dram^ ^p^^ j^^^^ weekly - 
KoralwUlnoniinllouofrum— , Wednesday and 

Tna i^Z' I Saturday. 

Muirar • • • • . . J oz. J 

r Three issues weekly — 

'•^"»'*J"»'^^ 1 1 Monday, Wednes- 

<^«"»'* ^^ [ day and Saturday. 

loan. llonHHi. KMcl Koroo Onlers Nos. 947, 974 and 979 are superseded, 
mill iho fnlluwliitf mil>i«iitut4Hl i - 

(I) Uiiilnr tlm a»th«»rity of the Secretary of State for War, No. 476. 
<UUmI Slitil NniifcoMilmr. UKW. th«^ following free issues wiU be made during 
o|Mtri%tioiiH III HiiiimllUiid 

hUiutiunU^d Oltlo^fM 
I lti«ltiiK niiltiml (|Miii,v itr oaniol). 

1 Hot of lliin ||0ar. • 

1 Ht«t (if Haddtitry. 

1 AtttiiuUiit. with i\w HaiiKt olothing as for transport drivers, with 
the («iio«iptloit «»f I hlouMtt. I fe« and I Somali axe. Pay, 12 rs. per 

Mounted OflloerM -Oftlot^rH of tho (J^iierHl and Personal Staff of Head- 
quarters, Brigades and LineM of ('oiiuiiunioation. including Section Staff 
Officers and Officers of Mounttnl Unitu, are entitled to— 

2 Riding animals (pony or camel). 
1 Set of line gear per animal. 

1 Set of saddlery. 
1 Attendant. 
Except as stated below. 

No officer in receipt of horse allowance, or of pay which includes horso 
allowanoe, or who is entitled to draw forage in kind (or compensation in 
lieu), may draw an animal from the Remount Department, when by doing 
so the number of anhnalw in his possession (including free issues and his 
prhrato property) in excess of two would exceed the number for which he 
diawi hone aUowanoe, or forage in kind. 


(2) Officers in receipt of horse allowance, or of pay which includes horse 
allowance, will not be provided with an attendant at the public expense, 
except for animals drawn in excess of the number for which they draw horse 

Officers drawing servant's allowance may provide themselves with an 
attendant at the public expense for each animal drawn as a free issue, less 
the number of grooms for which servant allowance is admissible. 

(3) Animals and attendants provided free, as authorised above, will 
be rati<med at the public expense. 

(4) Animals and saddlery, &c., will be drawn from Departments of Supply 
eoncemed on the authority of Lines of Communication Orders. 

(5) Attendants will be entertained regimentally. 

(6) An Government animals, saddlery and line gear will be returned to 
the departments from which they were received on the break up of the 
Field Force, or before the officers in charge of the animals and equipmo it 
leave the country. 

1031. Discipline. — (a) The Transport Officer in charge of a convoy, 
when senior in rank to the Officer Commanding the escort, will issue all 
orders as to time and duration of marches, halts, pace and arrangements for 
grazing and watering. 

(6) The Officer Commanding the escort will issue all orders for the 
protection of the convoy and disposition of the escort, both when halted 
and on the line of march. 

(c) In cases where the Officer Commanding the escort is senior to the 
Transport Officer in charge of the convoy, the former officer will issue all 
orders, vide clauses (a) and (6) connected with the convoy and its protection, 
but will seek the advice and, as far as possible, act on the recommendations 
of the Trans]H)rt Officer as regards the matters dealt with in clause (a). 

1084. Correspondence.— With effect from the 26th October, 1903. the 
Officer Commanding Lines of Communication will deal with the following 
subjects : — 

(1) The supply of Royal Engineer stores. 


Ordnance stores. 


Medical stores. 


Veterinary stores. 


Supply and Transport stores. 


Trausiwrt lomounts. 





(9) Marine Transport. 

( 10) Maintenance of Postal Department. 

2. All correspondence on these subjects should be addressed accordingly 
from General Officers Commanding Brigades, Officer Commanding Mounted 
Troops and heads of departments. 

3. All demands for the increase of establishments of the Field Force 
will continue to be dealt with at Field Force Headquarters. 

(8927a) 2 B 

Ut^ SnppBosL—'ne folkmBg wfll be the daify Boale of rations for 
SiMDtati primiefs oi war : — 1 Ib^ nee» | Ib^ dates. 

If ralMBS m knd are aol drawn sobsisleiice aUowaace at the following 
rat«($ will be aUow«d : — 

At Vpper Sheikh and at pc«te to the north at 2 annas per diem. 
At potfts south of Upper Sheikh at S annas per diem. 

The HMie ol rations in kind* or subsistence allowance in lieu is dis- 
cretional with the officer in whose charge the prisoners are. Sums required 
fiv the parment of subsistence allowance maj be drawn from the Supply 
and Transport Agent at the poet or the nearest Treasure Chest Officer on 
a contingent bill, in which details should be giren showing the number of men 
and the period for which the allowance is drawn. The contingent bill should 
be accompanied by the usual receipts for the amount required. 

{,2} The case of refugees will be referred to the Political Officer, Somaliland 
Fieki Force, for disposal. 


1098. Undesirables. — Heads of departments and General Officers 
Commanding Brigades and individual officers having undesirables to report 
should do so direct to the offioer Commanding lines of Communication, 
who will publish a list from time to time for the information of all officers, 
warrant officers and non-commissioned officers, to ensure these men not 
obtaining employment with the force either publicly or privately. 

1194. Reports and Returns. — General Officers Commanding Brigades, 
and other Officers Commanding Columns or Units, should invariably submit 
when leaving the lines of communication for operating zone, to Head, 
quarters, S.F.F., by telegram, a marching out state, which should show the 
numbers of the following : — 

(1) Officers, including medical officers. 

(2) British rank and file by corps, including Supply and Transport 

subordinates and assistant surgeons. 

(3) Native officers, rank and file by corps, including hospital 


(4) Followers, public. 

(6) Followers, private. 
(0) Horses and ponies. 

(7) Mules. 

(8) Riding camels. 

(9) Burden camels. 

(10) Ordnance and machine guns. 

(11) Ammunition per rifle. 

(12) Rounds per gun. 

(13) Ammunition per maxim. 

(14) Water tanks. 


1139. DiBcifdme. — ^No aenteaoe of death passed on a prisoner of war 
ffiAy be carried into effect without the confirmation of the G.O.C., S.F.F., 
unless the officer in immediate command, being out of immediate com- 
manication with superior authority, is satisfied that the execution of the 
•sentence is an immediate military necessity and in accordance with thd 
customs of war. 

1157. Water storage. — An R.E. officer, or, in his absence, the Post or 
Camp Commandant, will be in charge of the main water storage tanks, 
pomps, hoee and syphoning arrangements. He will regulate the supply of 
water to the exf^ense tanks, according to the quantity available. The 
Provost Establishment will furnish the officer in charge with a statement 
ghring the water rations required to be delivered into the expense tanks, 
and will be responsible for discipline at the watering places and for the issue 
of water from the expense tuiks and from water tins on the lino of march. 

(This order to be substituted for for Operation Standing Order No. 12, 

1248. Captured stock. — (1) All captures of stock from the enemy wUl 
be reported by earliest opportunity to the C.S.O., S.F.F., and Major G. W. 
Rawlina, 12th Cavalry, EU Dab. 

(2) Captured stock retained for the use of the troops will bo accounted 
for by receipts countersigned by the officer authoriiing the issue ; that 
otherwise disposed of by a report signed by the officer authori / ing the disposal. 

(3) All stock not disposed of under paragraph (2) will bo sent with the 
vouchers in paragraph (2) to Major Rawlins on the lines of communication. 

(4) Major Rawlins will accoimt for all captured stock. One-third will 
be kept in kind and the rest disposed of under Major Rawlins' orders, in 
communication with Captain Cordeaux, Political Officer. 

(5) Major Rawlins will be under the orders of the Officer Commanding 
Lines of Communication. 

Besides the report to the C.S.O., all other communications from the Field 
Force on the subject of captured stock will be addressed to Major Rawlins 

(6) On receipt of this order. General Officer Commanding Brigades and 
Officer Commanding Mounted Troops and Lines of Communication will 
report (as in paragraphs (1), (2) and (3)), all captures since 1st January, 1904^ 
to date and their disposal. 

1306. Transport. — Officers who have to distribute transport to units 
should bear in mind that Silladar (I!amel Cbrps, Baluch Camel dbrps and 
Indian Mule Corps do not appreciably suffer by being detached from the 
head quarters of their corps or by being split up, as their organizations admit 
of th's, though, of course, it is desirable to keep each unit together as far 
as possible. On the other hand, Somali Camel dbrps, Arab Camel Orps 
and C^mel Cart Train soon go to pieces when split up and withdrawn from 
the supervision of their British personnel, so these units should be kept 
c jmplete wheie it may be possible to do so. Details of any of these units 
should be attached to another unit when employed on detached duties and 
where it may be possible to do so. 

(89z7a) 2 b 2 



During the first and second expeditions no definite system 
of field intelligence as forming an organized part of the duties 
of the staff existed. It was left to Colonel Swayne to im- 
provise, with the assistance of the local civil authorities, such 
arrangements for the acquisition of information about the 
enemy and the country as the limited means at his disposal 
and the composition of his force would allow. 

In addition to the agents employed by the Consul-General 
in Somaliland and the other measures taken by the civil 
authorities in Abyssinia and Egypt for gaining information 
about the plans and movements of the Mullah, the immediate 
source of intelligence upon which Swayne had to depend upon 
for his information were native spies, patrols, and friendly 
tribes. The patrols and tribal scouting work was placed mainly 
in the hands of one of his native officers, Risaldar Musa Farah, 
who, owing to his intimate knowledge of Somali customs and 
his influence with the tribes, was found a suitable agent for 
intelligence services. In addition to his own arrangements, 
Swayne and his officers relied also on captured prisoners, and 
on the native caravans which traded between the coast ports 
and the interior of the country. As regards maps, little was 
known previous to the operations of the topography of the 
country for military purposes, and recourse was had to the 
plans and reports of explorers and travellers who had visited 
that part of Africa, supplemented by sketches and notes 
made by Swayne and his ollieors during the course of the 

During the early part of Cieneral Manning's operations 
in 1902, the Intelligence Service was generally conducted 
upon the lines adopted by SwajTie, but it was not until 
January, 1903, that sufficient officers had arrived from 
England and India to enable the work to be placed on a proper 
footing. In February, 1903, when the headquarters of the 
Field Force was at Obbia, the establishment of the intelUgence 
department consisted approximately of one staff captain > 


SOnialos (natiye scouts, of which about 40 were mounted), and 
20 interpreters. An intelligence officer was appointed to the 
Berbera-Bohotle force, whilst another was engaged in similar 
work up country near Dibit. Majors E. M. Woodward 
Leicestershire Regiment, and 6. T. Forestier- Walker, R.A. 
joined the force from -England, and the former was placed 
in charge of the department, while Risaldar Musa Farah 
was retained ' as special intelligence agent at the head- 
quarters of the Field Force during the operations. A 
small survey party was also sent from India and accom- 
panied the troops for topographical purposes. In addition 
to the work performed by this party, the Intelligence 
Department managed to collect a large amount of information 
regarding the topography and principal routes within the 
theatre of operations by means of Somalia. The following 
method of obtaining information with respect to the routes 
was sometimes adopted and found useful. 

The Somali being thoroughly accustomed to wander 
through the bush guided by the sun and stars, was able to give 
a fairly accurate idea of the general direction of one place 
with regard to another. Two places a considerable distance 
apart were therefore selected, e.g., Galkayu and Walwal. 
Large stones were then placed on the ground as nearly as 
possible in their relative positions, as regards direction, to 
represent the two places. This was explained to the Somali, 
who was then asked to show with a small stone the position 
of the first place at which he would halt after leaving Galkayu 
and so on for all the intervening places between Galkayu 
(starting point) and the ultimate destination. The respective 
distances were roughly obtained by questioning the native as 
to the respective positions of the sun at starting and when 
arriving at the next halting place. The majority of course 
had no idea of measuring time by hours. 

The bearings of the different stones from each other were 
taken by prismatic compass and, in this way, a network of 
routes was gradually built up over the whole country between 




the Haud and Webi Shebeli. A great many natives were 
examined in this way and cross checks taken in every direction. 
Some of the routes from Galkayn were prepared in the above 
manner, and when the Field Intelligence Department moved 
up country from Obbia, the opportunity was taken (-f testing 
their accuracy. 

As regards the collection and distribution of information* 
each intelligence officer maintained a diary, a copy of which 
was forwarded weekly to headquarters, where the informa- 
tion, together with that received from other sources, was 
collated into an intelligence report. 

On Major-General Sir C. Egerton assuming command of 
the Field Force for the fourth expedition, further measures 
were taken to enlarge and develop the duties and organization 
of the Intelligence Department. The number of officers was 
increased and the department was represented by a specially 
selected officer with each brigade or column, and at all 
important posts on the coast or Unes of communication, as 
occasion required. 

The following extracts from the report of Lieut.-Colonel 
6. T. Forestier- Walker, who was Assistant Quartermaster- 
General for InteUigence from 17th July, 1903, to 23rd May, 
1904, give an interesting and instructive account of the 
organization and work of the Field Intelligence Department 
during the fourth campaign : — 

In addition to adminiBtering the usual field intelligence duties I was 
directed to superintend the following : — 

(a) Entertainment, classification and distribution of interpreters for 

the whole force. 

(b) Press censorship. 

(c) Distribution to the force of general information in addition to that 

coming under the heading of " Intelligence of the Enemy." 

(d) I was also directed to act as staff officer dealing with 8ur\'ey section 


On July 17th, 1903, the Intelligence Establishment was as follows :— 
Staff-Captain, Captain R. W. C. Blair, 123rd Biflee, Indian Army. 
Illalos, 150, armed with various weapons. 


Ponies, 66. 

Interpreters, 39 for the whole forca 

The establishment sanctioned shortly after the assumption of the 
command by Major-General Sir C. Egerton was as follows : — 

Assistant Quartermaster-General, 1. 
Intelligence officers (special service), 3. 
nialos, all mounted, 350. 

This establishment was increased in September, 1903, by the addition 
of a clerk and office. In addition to the 350 lilalos sanctioned above I was 
permitted, in October, 1903, to enrol 100 men for employment as guides and 
messengers. In February, 1904, I was granted an additional intelligence 
officer as a temporary measure, owing to officers having been set free by the 
disbandment of the Tribal Horse. I thus had four special service intelligence 
officers, in addition to Captain Everett, 6th King's African Rifles, who had 
been detailed as an intelligence officer without special service grading. 

Intelligence as to the movements, numbers, plans, &c., of the enemy Kotes on tl 
can be gained in Somaliland, as elsewhere, by scouts, spies and deserters. country, an 

Reconnaissance in Force, — Owing to the mobility of the enemy, the lack naethodfl 
of water in the country and the want of precise geographical knowledge of ^^-^Iq 
the theatre of campaign, that source of information which is usually the most intelligeuce 
successful, viz., reconnaissance in strength, carried out by regular troops, 
had, of necessity, to be sparingly employed. 

Indeed, with the single exception of Colonel Kenna*s reconnaissance to 
Jidbali in the latter half of December last, the only reconnaissances in force 
which were undertaken were to reconnoitre routes by which it was proposed 
to move the force, with a view to the water supply being adequately tested. 
The whole of the work of gaining intelligence of the enemy therefore 
devolved on the natives of the country. 

IlkdoB. — Somali scouts, or '' Illaios ** as they are termed, are, withko 
certain well defined limits, very satisfactory intelligence agents, but they 
have their idiosyncrasies : — 

(a) They are practically useless, except working in tracts of country 
with which they are thoroughly familiar. 

As only certain tribes and sub- tribes inhabit specified places 
it is, therefore, necessary that the lUalos employed should be of the 
tribes (and usually of the sub-tribes) which ordinarily frequent 
those districts. 

(6) Illaios are useless unless worked in large numbers, that is to say, in 
parties which are strong enough, or which they themselves consider 
to be strong enough to successfully engage any opposing raiding 
parties which they may meet, or, at the worst, to i)rovide fo^ 
their own safe retirem.^nt. 


In fact, nialo patrols are practically entirely reconnaissances in strength 
conducted by native irregulars and unaccompanied by British officers. 
The usual business of scouts, in the generally accepted meaning of the term, 
is not understood by Somalis. Attempts to send out two or three Illalos 
to any distance in order to gain intelligence always proved unsatisfactory. 
The men will not move boldly and will not go beyond a certain short radius. 
On the other hand, Illalos working in parties of from 25 to 50 frequently 
displayed considerable dash and initiative, when the waterless state of the 
country, involving possible difficulties of return, is taken into consideration. 
As an example of their work, I may mention that a party of 40 moimted 
Illalos left Bohotle in August, 1903, brushed through a fairly strong party of 
Dervish Illalos in the vicinity of the Dehjeuner and reconnoitred to about 
10 miles east of Beretabli, a distance of 140 miles, the first 80 of which 
were waterless. The Mullah and Haroun were at that time at or near 
Gerrowei, but the Llalos managed to penetrate well within the circle of 
Dervish karias (or Nomad villages), and succeeded in securing two most 
useful prisoners, returning with the loss of one man only, having covered a 
distance of 300 miles in nine days. 

Spies and Secret Agenta, — ^Though undeterred by any ethical scruples, 
the Somali does not make a good spy, and the occupation is congenitally 
uncongenial to him. Women and Midgans (an outcast and probably 
indigenous race) are practically the only spies who can be employed, and 
neither are satisfactory. It is seldom enough that spies can be trusted 
under any circumstances, but in this country of double dealing it is practically 
impossible to get a man sufficiently loyal to make his report valuable, who 
is not so well known for it as to make his detection by the enemy a matter of 
ease. Secret agents are difficult to procure. Somalis sufficiently educated 
to bo able to write an intelligent letter in any language are extremely rare, 
and it is rarer still to find one who is intelligent enough to weigh evidence 
ana to separate the grain of really important information from the mass of 
useless chaff in which it is invariably hidden. 

De^cr/cr«.— Deserters and refugees often gave information, but chiefly 
of the corroborative order, and, of course, they could not be depended upon 
to come in with sufficient regularity to keep up a sustained history of the 
MuUah'a dcings. In addition, very few of the Mullah's real fighting men 
came into us (only four men, bringing rifles, deserted), and those who did 
come in were nearly all karia, or poor people, who were not in a iwsition to 
give really valuable information. 

Summary.^From the above remarks it will be inferred that the 
Illalos proved to be the backbone of our intelligence system. Though I 
must admit that they occasionally failed us, and more than once at im- 
portant moments, their work was, on the whole, most satisfactory, and they 
kept us throughout in very fairly close touch with the enemy. When they 
did badly the cause was nearly always either that they had got into a tract 
of country with which they were unacquainted or elae they were not used 
bv the officer commanding the column in parties of sufficient strength. 


^P Intrlli-jrnee Offifnts. — Although alliidaj to Inat, by tar the most im- 1 

^Hnciant {&ctor in nil inlfiUigencc work is the intoUigFtitc officer, and apon I 

Hitl («pabilit; and zeal all information hangs. I confess to a devp [c«ling of I 

^BRtitud? for the Ubersl moimet in which all m; requests for inteUigeoce J 

^Hki<:r« hare boen met. Considering the numb<>r of troops cmployMl, the I 

HMkblithmeot of intelligence officers wag on a moat liberal scale, but I think I 

■Mb TMnlts achieved fully juatified their employment. InteUigenc« duties I 

Hhntand ereal tact and discernment, considerable abihtj in the art of judging I 

^Hwrsi'tcr. much energy and capacity for hard work under (he most trying I 

^MUdiCion*. nnd (what I found to be the rarest gift of all) the patience of a I 

HBbb combined with the cheerfulness of a Mark Taploy. An oMcer who ■ 

Hhm pvrfunn a long and trying march, and thon sit dovn, as nearly all ■ 

H^KVo froguently had to do, to examine and cross-examine stupid or obstinate I 

^MiMnnn for perhaps five honra at a stretch, through the medium of an I 

^B^fTerent interpreter, without losing his temper, in order to gain one I 

^^■all but important piece of information, shows remarkablo endurance and I 

^Hlf control. To unhesitatingly separate the grain of accurate information I 

^■bm the maM ul lies and irroreUnco in the midst of which it is bimed la a I 

H^ From July to Deoembur, 1903, Bobotlo proved lo be the most satis- Sty,,,!,!^- I 
^Hetaiy base from vbivb t« work Illalos, and, consequently, from the work and J 
■Rginning, Lientenont Marjorihanks, lOTth Pioneers, the intelligence oFHoor geoenl 
at Bohotle, had the largest establiahmcnt of lllalos and, on the wholp, the ''^'■>'^- 
pick of the ponies. It would appear from the map that Ulalos might hare 
(■am mopF easily worked from Olcsan or Kirrit and later on from Kil Dab, 

hat the Niaractor of the country through which they would have to acout ■ 

rvi mueh against their useful employment, being particularly bare adU open. ■ 

uul It was found lo be more satisfactory to establish the principal recon- I 

nuilring base at Bohotle, from which place Illalos were able to work through I 

the thick bush as far as the Di^hjenner country, and then move through the I 

frKithilLs between the Nogal plain and the Haud without heralding their I 

afiprnwh from a ifif-nt distance, aa would bav» been unavoidable bad thej I 

KjiwaleJ from Ihp iVin district. In addition to the Bohotle centre. Las Duroh I 

ma made an IlUlo boac, and a party of 'lb Illalos was constantly worked I 

Imm there t>y Limitvnant Baldcrston, attaohnl to the lOlst Urenadiers, I 

inlh most useful results. Tlio grazing at Las Dureli proved, however, to be I 

•o jHMtr that the Illalo ponies had to be eventually withdrawn, and, in con- I 

>n|Beiioc, ibo radius of mconnaissanco was coiisiduiahly rvducid. I 

It was not until October, 1903, that the enrolment and equipment of I 

Illaloa bad mifBeimtlj ]inigros3cd to allow of a body lieing etalloned at.the I 

Ktrrit-Canvro-Olinan Muitre, capable of achieving mon- than the local I 

fmuting noccwaty for the safety of tlic line of communications, iiy this I 

time however, BJ Dab and Dadwein had been occupied by us. and 80 llialoa, I 

■tl mounted, wem ealleetod there, with the idea of reconnoitring the oast<im 1 
.S'ngal and nipMTt«|ly its northern limits from that base. 

I Minrt ooaJosB, however, that until the new year the Illalo work hem | 

WM Mt diiappointing. Tlie ohiel reoaon for this WM, I holieve, Ihu J 


unfortunate necofwily at this juncture of having to employ a number of Inhak 
men not oonveraant with the country. 

The matter was the more unfortunate in that when the MulUh, towards 
the end of November, moved from Adadero to Haisamo and pushed out to 
Jidbali the force which was some six weeks later defeated at that place, we 
had to depend for our information on the somewhat belated news brought by 
the Bohotle Illalos. This was fortunately supplemented by some excellent 
reconnaissance work executed by No. m Tribal Horse, under the direction of 
Major Bridges, 

On the arrival of headquarters at Eil Dab at the end of December, 
the Illalos there were used for the first time in large parties, and the result at 
once proved satisfactory, for although 50 of the men who had been concen- 
trated there for some time without any useful results were sent away to 
strengthen the Illalo detachment of the 1st Brigade, nevertheless the bain nee 
of 110, which had by that time been concentrated, working in two parties, 
nightly visited the Jidbali position some 50 miles distant, at considerable 
risk, and brought in daily most valuable information. 

In addition to the two large groups of Illalos working from Bohotle 
and Eil Dab, and the smaller one reconnoitring from Las Dureh, small parties 
of Illalos were attached to every post on the lines of communication, for the 
purpose of local reconnaissance and for guide and messenger duties. 

A certain number of Illalos at Bohotle and Garrcro were trained to 
mend the telegraph wire when cut, as it several times was, between those 
places, and proved themselves most useful. Instead of having to send out a 
linesman with a comparatively strong escort, a small party of mounted 
Illalos, with the necessary mending material, would be at once despatched, 
and on two occasions a cut 20 miles distant was located and mended within 
four hours of its occurrence. 

Illalos at these posts also proved themselves of great use in tracking and 
bringing in individual soldiers and parties who had lost their way while 
travelling between posts. A small party of 12 Illalos was enlisted at Hargeisa 
for the purpose of collecting information as to the attitude of the Ogaden 
tribes to the south and south-west, and did some useful work. 

After the fight at Jidbali, close touch with the Mullah was lost, and 
the direction given to the movements of our two columns made it at first 
difficult to again get into touch. In fact, it was not until the columns 
arrived at Gaolo and Halin respectively that information from captured 
prisoners enabled us to know that the Mullah had started some three days 
previously to cross the Northern Hand to the north. At this juncture 
touch was again lost, and for a short time there was some doubt whether 
the Mullah had gone to Baran near Mijjarten-Warsangli border, or to the 
Jid Ali district. On the 4th February, reliable information was received 
that the Mullah was near Jid Ali. From that date until he cros-sed the 
Mijjarten frontier on the 27th March, early and accurate infonnation was 
received of his movements. 

As soon as the Mullah crossed into Italian territory the difficulty of 
obtaining information became very great. It was no longer possible to uiM) 


tbe method which had been to sacceMsfnlly employed when the Haroon was in 
the Jid All diatriot, and until it crosaed the frontier. The method alluded to 
waa to peat an intelligaice officer with a scout establishment at the coast 
port neaieat to the Mullah's position. Thus Hais, and later Las Khorai, 
were made b aa eo of information, and finally a military intelligence officer was 
taken on board one of His Majesty's ships, and collected intelligence at all 
landing places in British territory to the east of Las Khorai, and occasionally 
Tisited the Mijjerten (Italian) port of Bosaso (or Bandar Kasim). Some- 
thing more, however, than occasional visits to Bosaso was requisite, but, 
under the circumstances, it was impossible to station an intelligence officer at 
that place. Secret agents, entering Mijjarten territory from Las Khorai, 
proved to be the best means of gaining intelligence, but the delay caused by 
their having to move backwards and forwards between the two places 
Diilit«ted seriously against the freshness of their news, which was, however, 
very correct on the whole. 

Since the Mullah recrossed the Northern Haud to the south we have 
practically completely lost touch of him, and the withdrawal of the 
1st Brigade from Halin makes the distance of his present whereabouts too 
gieat to be traversed by Illalos. Information will, however, come in from 
time to time by refugees and deserters, and Ali Yusuf, of Obbia, should 
have ample news of the Mullah's movements. 

Summing up the results achieved, it may be said shortly that, from 
July to the end of November, we were never for more than a day or two* 
vithoot fairly accurate information of the Mullah's whereabouts and move- 
ments eight days previously. As the average distance of the Haroun from 
oar chief intelligence centre during this period was some 160 miles, this is a 
good record. For eight days before the Jidbali fight the Dervish position 
vas visited nightly by scouts and reported upon. During the o|)erations 
in the Nogal, from January 14 to February lOtb, the enemy wao undoubtedly 
lost touch of by the scouts, who, however, did good work in securing stock. 
The intelligence officers at Hais and Las Khorai quickly took up the running 
after the Mullah reached Jid Ali, and until he crossed into Italian territory 
very cloae touch was kept with him. 

Great trouble was taken to the end that all information of the enemy, piggeniination 
which mi^t be collected, should be fully appreciated and made use of by of in forma, 
officers concerned. tion. 

The Intelligence Diary. — ^The headquarter intelligence diary for each day 
vas prepared and placed before the General Officer Commanding on the 
fbOowing morning. The Consul-Gcnoral was also supplied with a daily 
copy. The week's budget, with a short summary, was sent to the War Offico 
by each mail, together with the wwkly intelligence diaries of each individual 

intelligence officer. 

Summary of Information for Inldligence Ofpccrs.—K&ch week a summary 
of information has bet»n prepared, a copy of which has Un-'n forn-arded to 
each intelligence officer, and to each otHcer performing intelligence duties, 
summaries have been compiled from the headtjuarter staff intelli- 
diary. They have usually been a fairly literal transcript of the 


intelligence diary, ayoiding repetition, and political or international matters 
have been deleted. These summaries have been regularly forwarded to the 
Nayal Commander-in-Chief, to the Senior Nayal Officer on the station, to 
Colonel Rochfort, to the Officer Commanding Lines of Communication, and 
to occasional commanding officers who were unprovided with intelligence 
officers. Thus, every week some 15 copies of the summary had to be made, 
and, despite the invaluable aid of the cyclostyle, very heavy clerical labour 
in the headquarter office was incurred. 

Telegraphic Information. — In cases where the telegraph was available, 
all important information was, in addition, telegraphed between intelligence 
officers and headquarters, as well as directly by intelligence officers to any 
commanding officer whom the information might affect. 

NeiM Bulletins for the Force. — Such information about the enemy as 
could be made known to the force generally, was circulated by means of news 
bulletins, and the same bulletins were made the medium of transmitting other 
items of information which would not appear in orders and which would 
prove interesting to the force. 
Intelligence Employment. — One of these officers (Captain Blair) was continuously 

officers. employed for two months in settling claims for rewards and pay incurred 

during the previous phase of the campaign, and in making up the accounts 
for that period. He was then appointed intelligence officer at Burao. 
One officer. Lieutenant Rose, I was obliged to keep back at headquarters, 
when enrolment and equipment of Illalos and interpreters was being com- 
menced. The remaining officer. Lieutenant Marjoribanks, was appointed 
intelligence officer at Bohotle. 

In August I was given the services of Lieutenant Evans, R.E., and I 
despatched him to Hais to organize an intelligence centre at that place. 
Hais, though a considerable distance from the Mullah's whereabouts at 
that time was an important news centre, and a good deal of valuable 
information of the corroborative order was obtained there. When the 
failure of the Abyssinians made it necessary to call on All Yusuf for sub- 
stantial help. Lieutenant Evans was transferred from Hais to Obbia. 

Officers for intelligence duties, i.e., regimental officers doing intelligence 
work in addition to their own duties, were appointed at Bcrbera, Hargeisa, 
j^as Dureh and Garrero, and subsequently at Wadamago and £il Dab. 
Thus, during the long phase before active operations commenced, a line 
of intelligence officers strotchul from Berbera to Bohotle, with outposts 
at Hargeisa, Las Dureh, Hais, and, later on, Obbia. The value of such an 
arrangement was very great. Information collect<'d at one point was quickly 
corroborated or contradicted through a perfectly independent channel, and 
few men could leave the Mullah and enter our lines without surrendering 
what information they had to an intelligence officer. After o{)eration8 
commenced, special service inteUigence officers were attached to each 
brigade and to Qiounted troops ; their places at the various posts being filled 
by officers for intelligence duties. During the last phase, when General 
Fasken's column ojx^rated between I^as Dureh and I^HKhorai,an additinnnl 

inteOigeiioe offioer was provided and sent first to Hais and then to cruise 
along the ooast in one of His Majesty's ships of war. 

Inetntetion, — The want of a handbook for intelligence duties in the field 
was muoh felt. No handbook can, of course, legislate for campaigns under 
every oonoeivable circumstance, but there are many broad principles which 
do not change, and much valuable help might be given to the examina- 
tion of prisoners, co-ordination of information, keeping accounts, &c. 

I drew up a set of instructions* for intelligence officers, which embodied 
the chief points on which information was required by them. These 
instroctionB had to be hurriedly produced in the pressure of much work, and 
were very incomplete, but they more or less served the purpose for which 
they were intended. 

Cyphers, — ^Intelligence officers were provided witli two cyphers ; one 
a cypher on the Playfair model for really secret use, the other a plain trans- 
position cypher on the well-known South African model, to be used whin 
it was inadvisable to mention the names of certain places of |)eople en elair. 

Establishment. — ^The original intention, prior to commencement of Ululcs, 
operations, contemplated the enlistment of 3^ mounted Ilialos (including the guides und 
100 " scoots ** remaining over from the former force). Subsequently sanction '"^ssenger*. 
was given to increase this number to 450 for various reasons, which will b^ 
stated. Towards the end of October, 20 lUalos, with their arms, ammunition 
and ponies deserted to the enemy. These men were of various sub-tribes, 
bat were all Dolbahantas except four, who were Habr Yunis (Saad Yunis). 
At that period our Ilialos were composed mainly of Dolbahantas in proportion 
of some 85 \iot cent, (sub-tribes Barkat and Jama Siod predominating). 
Dolbahantas had been specially enlisted as lilalos, on account of their 
superior value as Ilialos to Ishak men generally, and their knowledge of the 
country in which it was proposed to operate. As a result, however, of these 
desertions it was decided, with certain exceptions, to replace the Dolbahauta 
by Ishak, and to select such Ishak men from the Habr Toljaalu mostly, 
Saad Yunis being subjected to careful scrutiny. 

The exceptions alluded to consisted of : — 

(i) Men who were known to have a blood feud with the Mullah ; 

(ii) Men who had recognized guarantees in the sha^K) of relations of 
property in our sphere ; and 

(iii) A somewhat large percentage which the intelligence oifii-er ut 
Bohotlo was permitted to retain, in view of the intimate knowledge 
he had of the Bohotle men who had been with him for some time 

When these changes were carried out, the proportion showed about six 
Ishak to four Dolbahantas. 

In October, 1003, sanction was given to increase the number of Ilialos 

* See Appendix I, page 404. 


to 450, the extra 100 men coming under the heading of " guides ** and 
** messengers." The reasons for this increase were as follows : — 

(a) A somewhat large messenger establishment at Hargeisa, hitherto 
under the Officer Commanding Lines of Communication, was trans- 
ferred to the Field Intelligence Department. 

(h) At the same time a nimiber of Ogaden (Ibrahim) men had to be 
enlisted for work in the Ogaden country, namely, for work from 
Bohotle, in connection with the Galadi column, Colonel Rochfort 
and the Abyssinian force and Cajjtain Munn. All these men were 
classed as Illalos, but many were simply utilised as messengers and 
runners, and no extra establishment of ponies were drawn for 

(c) At the commencement of actual 0|)erations it was found absolutely 
necessary for guide work and also for the general efficiency of the 
Illalos, to re-engage Dolbahantas, and no further desertions having 
occurred, some 50 men of this class were added to the establish- 
ment for work with the second brigade and mounted troops. 

For the later operations in the north-east further changes occurred 
Advantage was taken to get rid of a large number of the Habr Toljaala men, 
who had been enlisted during the Dolbahanta scare, and they were replaced 
by Nalcya Ahmed, Saad Yunis, and others with local knowledge of this area. 
Local Illalos were raised concurrently in the same manner for LasKhorai and 
Hais.* While these changes were taking place the necessity of engaging 
men before others were discharged caused the number of Illalos, guides and 
messengers to rise for a short time to 530. 

lilalos worked mounted where possible, but as the number of men was 
augmented without corresponding increase in ponies, a good deal of foot work 
was done, and really great distances were covered in this manner. The men 
are good'* riders," but not** horsemen *' in any sense. Unless watched care- 
folly they invariably give their ponies sore backs, either from galloping about 
barebacked to water or grazing, not using saddle blankets, substituting 
Somali saddles for the proper ones, or not girthing up the animal They 
also try to substitote the Somali bit for the Government one, with the usual 
result of a sore mouth. A great partiality is shown for extrac*ting throat 
lash and any other small straps possible. When any saddlery is brought in 
the former is, without exception, missing. 

The Illalo, like other Somalis, is not a hard worker in the ordinary 
sense of the word. He can, however, be started off to work at a moment's 
notice, can cover comparatively enormous distances, and has some con- 
siderable endurance. 

Amu and Clothing, — ^Practically all men were armed with Martini - 
Henry weapon, with bandolier for 30 to 40 rounds. Clothing issued as for 

* There had been a few men previously at Hais for work under the 
intelligence officer, who was there in the Utter part of 1903. 


■tofpiHen, except th*i the idea was, in the cose of an Illalo, to associate 
the Uankiet with the pony for saddle purposes, and not with the man. 
Tkt men, aa » rule, took great care of their firearms, but not so of their 
oUwr things which might be discarded in any moment of excitability. 

Pag, Rate of pay was 20 rs. ; headmen 10 rs. extra. The original 

intoitioD UmiUsd headmen to proportion of 1 per 20 Illalos, but the number 
of heidmen had to he eventually increased, owing to the necessity for charge 
of detached parties.* In addition to ordinary pay, rewards were given up 
to a liout of 100 rs. for obtaining yaluable information and for special work 

incornng risk. 

EiJUtmeni and Misedlaneous. — ^There was little difficulty in obtaining 
n'sloB, the pay heing good and the service popular. Enlistments were made, 
af a role, through some principal men. This had drawbcicks, as, for instance, 
it cannot be doubted but that some considerable ** dustoorie " was brought 
into play ; hat it is the only practicable method at any rate at present 
and prodaoes mflii who can be known and vouched for. The two men 
thnragh whom the htfgest number of enlistments were made were Hersi Isa 
(Rer Wais Adan), retained as a sort of principal headman to the whole 
Illafe establishment, and Ali Bulali (a Burkat Achil). As in the case of 
interpreters some trouble was caused through want of back records, but 
vhat is being done for interpreters in the way of making lists for future 
guidance Is also being carried out for Illalos, and Illalos are not given to dis- 
appearing in the aggravating manner referred to in the case of interpreters. 

There are two reasons, I think : — 

(i) They do not usually hold projMjrty to the extent of the interpreter 

class ; 
(ii) Being " fighting ** men they have more sense of resi)on8ibility in 

regard to their engagement of service. 

The amount of punishment necessary was, I think, on the whole, 
smalL There was a somewhat serious demand for higher rewards at I^ohotle 
on one occasion, leading to court-martial punishment for eight ringleaders ; 
but fines and such like, except for loss of clothing, were very fairly in- 

EdaUiahmefU and Casualties. — ^The bulk of the Illalo i)ouies were Ponic«. 
practically hard at work from August or Septemlicr onwards. 

The authorised establishment of ix^nie^i allowed 350, i)lus 10 (kt cent. 
i|iarc, equals 385. As a matter of fact, tliis number was at first exceeded, 
but the balance were ponies supplied in such wretched condition that they 
were returned after a while to the Remount Department without having been 
taken up for use. Counting from middle of October, when the establish- 
ment was about completed, the wastage down to the beginning of 
January (just prior to the Jidbali advance) works out at 30 per cent, (three 

* It has been mentioned previously that Illalos were generally con- 
giegated in largo detachments. Various small partieJi, however, had to be 
detached from time to time for lines of communication work. 


months). Subsequently down to the Laa Dureh advance (beginning of 
January to beginning of March), 135 fresh remounts were drawn, and 
the wastage from the beginning of March to April 30th, was 56 per cent, 
(four months). Total average per month, over the seven months, something 
over 12 per cent. 

Some 20 to 30 of the total number of animals were purchased direct 
from owners by the Field Intelligence Department. The rest* were all 
supplied by the Remount Department. All the ponies, except one lot of 20, 
were Somali or Abyssinian. 

Rations, — ^The ration per pony was at first but 3 lbs. grain, in addition 
to grazing. The grain was later, when the grazing became scarce, increased 
to lbs., and cut grass was issued in some cases. On the increased ration 
and cut grass, ponies, with rest and sujjervision, improved. 

Equipment in General. — ^AU Ordnance stores, arms, ammunition, 
saddlery and camp equipment were obtainable on simple vouchers. 

Of the arms supplied to lUalos, 85 ];)er cent, were Martini-Henry carbines. 
The remaining men had Martini-Henry rifles, except a few men here and 
there who retained Martini-Enficld weapons formerly in use. 

The saddlery, yeomanry pattern, with blanket and panel, portmouth 
bit with single rein but two bars. Very serviceable except that : — 

(i) The sizes of bridles were mostly too largo for the ponies ; 

(ii) Some sort of means should be supplied for carrying up two to three 
days* com ration, which the nosebag cannot do. 

Clothing and Rations in General. — ^Practically every lUalo was supplied 
inthe six to eight months with two issues of the authorized clothing ('' first,'* 
and *' replacing*' issue). In transactions with the supply and transport 
corps (both clothing and rations) there ap[)ear, in comparison with the 
Ordnance Department, and having regard to a state (>f active service*, some 
numerous details and fonns necessary to fill in before demands are met. 
Clothing was also not obtainable from the supply and transport corps, 
even with early notice. This was, however, duo, in all probability, to the 
necessity of utilising transport for more urgent demands. 
•pics and Spies, — As mentioned in a previous paragraph, it is difiicult to get 

dcret agents, good spies in Somaliland. Neither the political officer, who, until November, 
had exdoaivo charge of the spy department, nor I, when I started to try my 
hand at it after that date, had much success. On three occasions men wore 
induced by large rewards to penetrate into the Haroun. One was discovered 
•nd killed, and two returned safely with useful intelligence, but neither 
brought news of really first importance. Somalis themselves chiefly use 
women for this business, but though I despatched many women to spy, 
most of them never returned, and the remainder obviously had never been 
where they protended that they had. The fact is that, for this stylo of 

* Ezoept a batch of 00 odd, which were purchased before formation of 
Remount Department, by special purchaKinff officers detailed for the force. 


woric, the advice and afuistancc of a native of high influence, experience and 
intelligence is absolutely essential. 

Stcftt Agents, — Suitable secret agents are also rare birds in Somaliland. 

EHablishment. — ^The Field Intelligence Department was responsible Interpreters. 
for the supply of interpreters to the force. At the period of the constitution 
of the present force, there were 39 interpreters serving, the bulk of whom 
had been supplied by the Political Resident, Aden. To meet increased 
needs the above numbers had to be largely augmented, and the supply from 
Aden giving out early in September, the balance had to be found from that 
time by engagements in the country itself. The first fixed establishment 
for the present force comprised a total of 142. Subsequent additions, 
with replacement of casualties, brought the number of men who have been 
supplied up to a total of 208 (including those left over from previous opera- 

Engagement, — ^Interpreters were either engaged 'directly by the Field 
Intelligence Department or engaged by units subject to following sanction 
by the Field Intelligence Department. In engaging or giving sanction, the 
two chief points for consideration were (apart from question of ca>pability) : — 

(i) Whether the man had previously served at any time and there were 
any reasons against his re-engagement. 

(ii) Whether he was of suitable tribe. 

As regards (i) there was some considerable difficulty. Former records 
were very scanty, and it is feared some undesirable individuals were re- 
engaged. It is hoped that this will be avoided in future, because very 
complete lists have now been compiled of every interpreter employed with 
the present force ; these lists giving full description, with what unit or units 
employed, if discharged, reasons for diHcharge, and so on. In this connec- 
tion it should be observed that, apart from any other faults, a very frequent 
habit of a man of the Somali interpn^ter or servant class is to quit his situa- 
tion at wiU ; in many cases fully intending to return when it suits him, 
but go he will, with or without leave. Many of such men have hitherto 
eeoaped soot free, and have oven been re -employed for want of records. 
Pntting aside any other punishment it is now pretty generally understood 
that no man who has left his employment in the above circumstances will 
be employed again, and this understanding, coupled with the knowledge 
that back leoonlB are now preserved, is already having an effect. As 
v^gazds the qneetion of tribe, there were few cases for rejection, as few men 
of the interpreter olass come from the principal tribes favourable to the 

To torn to the question of capability, the Somali has certainly a 
lingnistio torn, and there are many men engaged as interpreters who have 
m Imowledge of four or five languages. On the other hand, there are a very 
limited number who can put down as really efficient and first rate EInglish 
interpratsfs. Of those who can be classed in this category, the majority 
•le nauaUy engaged by shooting or private parties in and around Somaliland, 
the civil anthoritiea and His Majesty's ships. 

(8927a) 2 c 


At the latter period of the operations the limit of resources was 
practically reached of even the quite inferior men, and to meet demands, we 
had perforce to engage, at the high interpreter standard of wages, individuals 
who had to a great extent merely the English patter of the Aden cook-boy, 
gharry-wallah or boat-boy. 

Pay. — ^As quoted above, the standard of wages (which was 60 rs. 
higher rate and 40 rs. lower rate) may be classed as ** high.** We have 
practically more than doubled former military rates, and have also rather 
disturbed the supply of any even moderate speaking English servants for 
officers (except mere " Chokras '*) at moderate wages. On the other hand, 
however, the standard which obtains was probably unavoidable in the 
circumstances, and it must be remembered that the employers mentioned in 
last paragraph have all along given considerably higher pay than military 
rate at any time, a fact which has secured them the best men. In ap* 
])ortioning the two rates of 60 rs. and 40 rs., our theoretical practice was to 
only grant the higher rate for '* efficient English understood and spoken ** 
the 40 rs. rate being allotted to Hindustani speakers and men of inferior 
English to that considered necessary for the higher rate. Our theory had 
however, to be considerably modified latterly.* In addition to their monthly 
pay, interpreters also received free African rations and the usual clothing of 
tobe, pair of shoes, blanket and ChaguL 
Topography. Existing Maps at the end of Juty^ 1903. — ^The Somaliland maps existing 

at that time were the *' four sheet map,** and I.D. Nos. 1,636 and 1,636a, 
compiled from the four sheets, with corrections embodying the survey work 
executed in the previous portion of the year, from Obbia to Galadi and 
Bohotle. All these maps were on the Tuiruiinj scale. A small scale map 
(luuobuo) ^^ ^^ provided and was much appreciated, as it gave an idea 
of Somaliland in relation to other countries. 

All demands for maps were met with great promptitude, and, in the 
case of the three Nogal maps, which were compiled in the field and sent 
home for reproduction, less than a month elapsed between the departure 
from headquarters of the original and the receipt of from 100 to 200 copies, 
mounted on linen, a good projwrtion also being mounted to fold. As the 
actual time of transit is 24 days, I call that a capital performance. 

Map Compilation in the Field. — It was obvious from the first that the 
main operations would be conducted in the Nogal district. This tract of 
country was very badly and inaccurately shown on existing maps. 

After the operations of Colonel Swayne, which concluded with Erigo in 
October, 1902, Captains Everett and Howard had compiled a map from the 
sketches which they had executed in 1901 and 1902 ; and from it, with the 
addition of some native information (afterwards found to be very inaccurate) 
Nogal No. 1 was compiled in the field and sent home for rapid production. 

Very shortly afterwards another excellent sketch map by Captain 
0*Neill turned up. As this map gave a good deal of information lacking in 

* Now in process of being again possible. 


tlie Ereiett-Howaid map, and as I had got possession of a sun print of Major 
Bejnon's 1901 map, I had Nogal No. 2 compiled from all the above sources, 
with the addition of Wellby*8 route, which had been accidentally omitted 
irom No. 1. 

But the best information of all was still imavailable. This was the 
woriL executed by Colonel Swayne in 1901 and 1902. Directly Colonel 
Swayne arrived in the country, I got his notes and sketches (which had been 
lying at Berbera since he went home in November, 1902), and had a fresh 
map compiled. As Colonel Swayne is an exceedingly good military sketcher 
of greftt experience, besides being a trained surveyor, I had no hesitation in 
making hia work the basis of the new map, Nogal No. 3, and the work 
pferiously compiled in No. 2 was fitted on to it. 

Lackilythe promptitude with which the reproduction was carried out by 
the Intelligence Division, allowed the force to take the field with this map. 

As regards the accuracy of the map itself, as proved by our better 
knowledge now, I consider it to be wonderful. When it is remembered that 
it is entirely a compass sketch, often executed at night, and with distances 
always judged by time and rate of marching, I cannot imagine how it could 
have been as accurate as it turned out to be. 

Colonel Swayne also lent me his notes and field books relating to his 
1903 cxpddition from Las Dureh to the east, and his work was plotted out and 
pot aside. It became, of course, of great value during the last phase of the 
operations. Most of this compilation work was excellently done by 
Lieutenant Davis, 107th Pioneers, who was specially attached to my depart- 
ment for that purpose. 

Native Information Sketches. — ^In addition to the above four principal 
compilations, numerous small sketches, chiefly from native information, 
were made of tracts of country about to be or likely to be traversed, which 
were a blank on existing maps. These sketches hardly ever turned out to be 
accurate, but they proved to be a great deal better than nothing, and fully 
repaid the time and trouble which their compilation cost. One sketch in 
particular, made at Eil Dab, of the country north the Eil Dab-Gaolo line, 
proved to be most useful and really very accurot<». Finally the best maps 
of the period were always kept up to date by the information which was 
being duly collected. 

Map Reproduction in the Field. — ^The want of some handy reproducing 
plant was severely felt, in order that the information which was being 
collected might be made immediately available to the force. Ultimately 
I tried the cyclostyle as an experiment, and, though of course the work turned 
ont was very rough, it nearly answered all the purposes which I required. 
The cyclostyle was also found extremely useful in keeping maps up to date. 

Material for future Compilations. — A good deal of material for future 
complation has been collected. It includes all the stuff used for the field 
compilations which were naturally not as accurately executed as would be 
possible at home. 

Intelligence officers submitted their accounts to the Field Controller Finance, 
through the Assistant QuartenuaKter-Oeneral for Intelligence, and money 

(8927a) 2 c 2 


for disbuFHement was similarly drawn. Considerable delay was experienced 
in receiving the first observations on intelligence accounts, and those for the 
preceding July were received in December last. Accounts of i)ayinent8 
of individual lilalos proved a great source of trouble. Owing, however, to 
the necessity of frequently transferring Illalos from one centre to another, 
and also to the fact that at any time the clerical labour of keeping the accounts 
of from 100 to 160 men is very severe, officers have frequently found it 
impossible to submit all these details. 
Office. The intelligence office was provided from India. It was exceedingly 

weU equipped with nearly everything which was required, and proved to be a 
great boon. It was, however, only equipped for one officer, and consequently 
additional compasses, drawing materials, &c., had to be demanded, in order 
to provide intelligence officers with what they required. 
Survey It is not necessary to do more than mention that I was staff officer 

section. dealing with survey questions. The survey section was not under me in any 

way, and the officer commanding it renders a separate report.** 

Instructions to Intblliobnob Officers, Somaliland Field Forob. 

1. Duties. 

(a) General Duties, — Intelligence officers will collect and collate, as far 
as possible, all important information received from prisoners, spies, de- 
serters and others as to the position, movements, doings and intentions of 
the enemy. They will collect and collate, as far as possible, all available 
information regarding ethnography, topography and geography of the 
theatre of war. They will collect and report all general information of 

(6) Duties as regards the Commanding Officer. — The first and immediate 
duty of frn intelligence officer is to keep his Commanding Officer as fully 
informed as possible as to the movements of the enemy in or towards his 
yicinity. He will give him all the information obtainable regarding the 
topography of the country in his vicinity. He will also give him all the 
details which he may wish to have of the wider infonnation enumerated 
under (a). 

(c) Duties as regards the Assistant Quartermaster -Oeneral for Intelligenee 
tU Headquarters, — ^He will send all information enumerated under (a) which 
he may have collected, to the Assistant Quartermaster-General for Intelli- 
gence, in the manner indicated in para. 2. He will copy and forward 
direct all route reports and sketches executed by officers in the same com- 
mand. InteUigenoe officers will communicate directly with the Assistant 
Qnartermaster-Geoeral at headquarters, but telegrams and other reports 
so snbmitted can only be aeot with the knowledge and consent of the 
Commanding Officer. 

**See page 419. 


2. Collection and Transmission of Information. 

(a) Telegraphic Messages. — ^AU important information should be 
telegraphed direct (with the Commanding 0£ficer*s approval) to the Assistant 
Quartermaster-General. Such information would include news as to the W 
enemy's position, movements and intentions, positions of his Karias and 
scouts, estimates of armament and information about the importation of 
arms. Important movements of our own Jllalos should alfo be telegraphed. 

(6) The Jnielligence Diary. — Each intelligence officer will keep a diar>, 
in which he will enter all the news received in full (notwithstanding that he 
will have already telegraphed the more important items). All topographical 
information gained will be added in the form of appendices. A copy of this 
diaiy will be submitted weekly to the Assistant Quartermaster-General at 
headquarters, in such time as to reach him by Saturday.* 

(c) Transmission to other Commands of Information. — When news is 
received which afifects the dispositions or safety of other posts or commands, 
it is the duty of the intelligence officer to wire the information to the intelli- 
gence officer of the post or command concerned. The fact that he has done 
so should be invariably recorded on the telegram to the Assistant Quarter- 
master-General for Intelligence. 

{d) Arrangement of Headings. — ^The diary of the Assistant Quarter- 
master-General, compiled from the reports and diaries of the various 
intelligenoe officers and other sources, is arranged under the following 
headings: — 

1. Position of the Mullah and Haroun. 

2. „ „ Mullah's Karias. 

3. „ „ Mullah's lUalos. 

4. The Mullah's intentions. 

5. Numbers of his force. 

6. His armament. 

6a. Condition and morale of Mullah's followern. 

7. Number and condition of his (Kinics and stock. 
7a. Attitude of the tribes. 

8. Importation of anus. (All information which can be collected as to 

amounts imported, by whom, and to what |>orts, and by whom 

9. Geographical and topographical i>articular8, not coming under 12. 

10. Miscellaneous information (not coming under the above headings). 

11. Ancient history. (Fresh information as to details of tights, &c., in 

the previous phase of the campaign.) 

12. Appendices. These include : — 

Diaries of intelligence officers. 
Route rc{)orts. 
Re[)ort8 on locaUticji. 

* For a specimen copy see Appendix II (tago 409 


III order to render the tauk of collating reports as simple as possible, 
intelligence officers will please arrange their reports, telegraphic or otherwise, 
under the same headings, prefacing them with a short accotmt how the news 
was obtained, and the degree of reliability to be attached to it. In the case 
of a reconnaii^sance by Ulalos, a short statement of their doings should be 
added to the preface. 

3. IlUdos, 

(a) Control. — Intelligence officers have charge of the Ulalos attached 
to their post or command, for discipline, interior economy, and for employ- 
ment according to the general directions issued by the Assistant Quarter- 
master-General for Intelligence, and the detailed directions issued by, or 
approved by, the immediate Commanding Officer. 

(6) Ponies. — Special attention must be paid to the condition of the 
ponies. Practically the whole of our intelligence depends on ponies, and if 
once allowed to got out of condition, they take a long time to recover, and 
are very difficult to replace. Ulalos should never be sent mounted on jobs 
which men on foot can do equally well. 

(c) Pay. — ^Ulalos are paid 20 rs. a month. Headmen, in the proportion 
of about 1 to 20, may be appointed by the intelligence officers, if not already 
appointed by the Assistant Quartermaster-General for Intelligence, and will 
be paid an extra 10 rs. a month. 

id) Cloihing and Equipment. — Each Illalo should receive : — 

1 tobe. 

1 pair of Somali shoes. 

1 Martini-Henry carbine and 40 to 50 rounds, according to the capacity 

of his bandolier. 
1 bandolier. 
1 ChaguL 

1 bridle, saddle and saddle blanket. 
1 pony. 

(<•) Intelligence officers should see that a reserve of 160 rounds is kept 
ttt their post or with their detachment. 

(/) Bavards. — In addition to the monthly pay as given above, Llalos 
should be rewarded for special services of a dangerous nature. Intelligence 
officers will take the greatest care not to be imposed on, and will generally 
require some evidence of a circumstantial nature before promising rewards 
for dangers said to have been incurred- 

The details of such rewards must be left to the judgment of the 
intelligence officer, but the following rough rules give a guide : — 

1. No risk, no reward. 

2. For a well-executed reconnaissance, well up to the enemy, resulting 

in a fight in which useful prisoners have been captured, and one or 
more of our own men wounded, a reward up to 30 rs. may be 
granted each man. 


3. For speciAlaemoe, such m canying urgent inesaagcs through coimtrj 

in tho oceoptttion of the enemy, special rewards may be given. 

4. Woundad men will be specially rewarded. 

5. Beiwacdi Unt any servioe which, in the opinion of the intelligence 

officer shook! exceed 50 rs. per man, must be specially sanctioned 
by the Assistant Quartermaster-General for Intelligence. 
(y) EiUariainmetU and Discharge, — As the total number of 350 Ulalos 
Bsnctioiied for the force must not be exceeded, intelligence officers should not 
catertain fresh Ulalos without the authority of the Assistant Quartermaster- 
GeneraL They should, however, always report when good men present 
tbemselTes. Itlalos are well paid ; their occupation is looked up to, and there 
is no difficulty in recruiting any number of men. Consequently, intelligence 
officexB will take care to weed out any men not absolutely finit-elass. It is 
impossible to gauge the characters of men when enlisting them, and many 
indifferent men are sure to be taken on at the first, therefore the earliest 
of^nrtonity should be taken of testing their grit, and lazy, cowardly or 
troaUesome men should be discharged at once. The names of the men so 
diflchaxged should be reported to the Assistant Quartermaster-General for 
Intelligence, so that they may be taken off the general list of Ulalos kept at 

** 5. Accounts, 

Intelligenoe officers will submit their monthl> accounts to the Assistant 
Quartermaster-General for Intelligence as soon after the first of each month 
as possible. These accounts will include a statement of all moneys received 
from the field treasury chest officer or other sources for intelligence purposes, 
and statements of disbursements on account of payment of Ulalos and 
interpreters, rewards, &c. A proper cash account should be made out, and 
important disbursements supported by vouchers when possible. Ulalos and 
inter p r e ters, though drawing monthly pay, should only be |>aid at stated 
intervals, such as the termination of the campaign, or at the end of a distinct 
phase of the operations, or on discharge. 

G. Bciurns, 

Intelligence officers will submit by telegraph every Saturday a weekly 
statement showing : — 

Number of British officers. 

„ British non-commis«ioued officers and ui*'n. 
native officers. 


native non-commissioned officers and men. 

interi)rcter8 of Field lutelligener Department {i.e., not on 
the pay hst of a unit or ])OMt). 
Number of pubUc followers (other than Illalos and interpreters), 
private followers. 

horses or ponies (other than lllalo i)ouies). These may be 
described telegraphically as *' staff ponies/' 


NumlxT of I Halo iKniieH. ^ 

mules, riding caniels and burden ctuncls. 
rifles and nature, 
rounds and nature. 




7. Notes on the Preparation of Reports and Diaries. 

The spelling of names of localities should be in aocoidanoe with that of 
the latest map. (The Nogal Sketch Map, F. 3527, is the latest for that part 
of the country.) 

If places mentioned in the report or diary cannot be identified on the 
map, the fact should be brought to notice by the word *' unidentified,** or 
their position with respect to some place on the map should be explained. 

Road reports should be drawn up on, or transferred to, the following 
model (imaginary) : — 

Road. Rxpobt. 

BohoUe to Damoi, 

(Captain Jones, July, 1903.) 


Distance in Miles. 







Road, bearing , through thick 
bush, with open patches, and for the 
last 3 miles over stony ground to 

Four woUs, all of small capacity, giving a 
total daily supply of gallons. Good 
grazing and camping ground 

Opposite to each place should be the description of the place, and 
remarks on water, grazing, camping grounds, &c., in the ricinity. 

Then on a fresh lino, the description of the road to the next place. It 
is a good plan to end up the description of the road with the word *' to," as 
in the model given, in order that there can be no doubt as to which part of 
the route is being described. In nine out of ton road reports it is almost 
impossible to discover between what two places the portion of the road 
dcscriloil hes. 

(Signed) G. T. FORESTIKRWALiKKR, Licut.CoUmel, 

Assistant QuariermasU'r -General for Intelligence 

Sheikh. August, 11N>S. 



Addkbi>um to ** Instbuotioiis to Intbluosmcb Ofitickbs/' F.I.D. 10-19, 

of 22nd AuguBt, 1903. 

Preparation of Intelligence Diary, 

1. The dlary» when sent to the Assistant Quartermaster- General for 
Intriligenoe, should he headed as follows : — 

Djabt of Intklliokncb Ofjiceb. 

(Officer performing Intelllgenco Duties.) 
From to 1903. 

2. £ach date should be entered, and if no informations has been 
received on any date the fact should be recorded, '* No information received." 

3. The diary should bo posted so as to roach me by every Saturday. 

4. Information under each date should bo arranged so far as |X)ssible 
under the headings given in para. 2 of the ** Instructions to Intelligence 


(Signed) G. T. F. W. 
Assietant Quartermaster-Oeneral jor Intelligence. 

Sheikh, 24th September, 1903. 



(26th July to 8th August, 1903.) 

27th July. — Our Llalos returned from Damot. The place had apparently 
been occupied by some poor people for some few days, but these had all left 
for the Nogal about the 20th inst. 

The houses, barbed wire, &c., were all as we had left them. 

SIst July. — 30 Illalos left for the Nogal at dawn. They will be away 
for about 20 days, and will go through VV^aylahed, pass close to Gubli, and try 
to get as far as Gaolo. 

2nd August. — ^A deserter, named Gal Bihyet (Dolbahanta, Samkab 
Ahmed), came into Bohotle. States that ho came from Walwal where many 
poor people, left behind by the Mullah, are living in a state of miserable 
poverty. The Ba Cari have gone to Hundoo, which is unidentified, but 
appears to be near the VVebi, and to be cultivated, jowari being grown there. 
(N.B. — ^This man seems to bo one of the lot who escaiK-d from Bali l)o-oly, 
when attacked by our Illalos last month. Uc stoutly denies thin, but 
prisoners who were captured at that time say that he was with them.) 

4th August. — \ deserter from the Mullah, name<l Abbas Isman 
(Ibrahim), came into Bohotle at 5.30 a.m. His story is as follows : — 


Ho watf captured by the Mullah during the raid ou the Ibrahim ou 
the occasion when Sultan Abdi was killed. He had a French rifle at the 
time, which was taken away from him. He then became a spearman and 
lived chiefly with the Haroun. 

He left the Haroun at Gaolo on the Ist August in the early morning 
before dayhght, accompanied by three other Ibrahim men who had arranged 
to desert with him. After going some way the other three men became 
afraid of being overtaken by the Mullah^s scouts and caught attempting to 
desert, so they turned back. 

He then came along by himself, travelhng very rapidly and passing 
tlirough Dijano and Bali Aat, to Bohotle, where he heard that there were 
men of his tribe in Government employment. 

The Haroun was to leave Gaolo on the Ist August, to go to Kobo, 
which he believes to be 30 miles south-east of Halin, though he has never 
been there. All ponies and any camels were grazing at Halin. 

Before he left the Haroun an Ali Gheri man reported to the Mullah 
that there were 30 Ali Gheri, Rer Gerad, Karias grazing at Myra and Las 

After staying a few days at Kobo, the Mullah proposes to move 
further east, going close to Illig. 

The Mullah never stays more than four or five days in one place, as 
he fears that the British may get to hear of his whereabouts and send men 
to attack him. 

Up to the time Abbas left, the Haroun had only 30 rifles and very little 
ammunition has been received from Nur Isman at Bosaso. This was brought 
by the Isa Mahmud, also called Isa Rioli, owing to the fact that they possess 
many goats. The Mullah sent for the headman of this tribe some time ago, 
and asked them whether they would help him or whether he would have to 
make them help him by first punishing them. They replied that they would 
do what he wished if only he would not loot them. They have since then 
brought him caravans of from 20 to 40 camels every three or four days, 
laden with clothes, food and all kinds of stores. 

The Isa Mahmud and Osman Mahmud act as merchants and receive 
full iNiyment, in camels or skins, for whatever they may bring. None of 
the latter tribe are with the Mullah, and only get at the coast and inland 
whatever he may require. 

Hifles are brought from Jibuti to Bosaso in dhows, being conceale<l 
outside the boats, underneath the gunwale, extra planks being nailed over 
the top to conceal them from view and to protect them from the sea water. 

The Mullah has plenty of rifles, and informant estimates them at 4,000. 
The following are the various kinds of rifles : — 


Kng^sh Name. Somali Name. 

Freach carbine r SCaie. 

French rifle Jikri. 

Xartini-Eiifield carbine . . Sumu. 

Blartini-Enfield rifle Smnu. 

Lee-Enfldd magazine rifle Sumu. 

Italian rifle . . Italian bandiik. 

Rifle loading throagh right side 

(? Remington or Winchester) . . Mescot. 

Houle loading rifle Shoais. 

Muizle loaders are given to Midgani*, and only iiHcd for giianl puriK)8e8. 
The Italian rifle is said to have a very large bullet. 

The Mnllah has very little ammonition, and what he has is -303, 
eaptored at Gumbum. Some men have 50 rounds each, but the majority 
hare between 10 and 30 rounds each. The other rifles are uselesB, as 
there is no ammunition for them. 

As far as Abbas knows, ammunition has only been received through 
Bosaso, and be has never heard of any coming through Lugh or any other 

The Mullah was terribly afraid of being attacked when he crosned our 
line of communications and was at Bali Aat. Since going to the Nogal his 
only thoui^ts have been to get food, clothes, ammunition and good 
for his animals. 

He has always horsemen out to watch lest anyone dcBerts. If any man 
is caught attempting to desert he is immediately killed and his pro[)erty 
confiscated. He has been putting to death a daily average of 8 to 10 men 
who have displeased him by giving him discouraging news, or whom ho 
suspects of disloyalty. He has killed close on 400 men since going to the 
Xogal. In consequence, his men are very much afraid of him and many arc 
eager to leave him but arc afraid to do so. The tribes which ho favoiu-s 
moAt are the Ali Gheri and tho Ba Ararsaina. He has no prinoners what. 
ever, having killed any he may have had. 

Haji Sudi is still his trusted adviser. 

Sultan Nur still lives with the Mullah, but no longer is keen to help him. 

Abbas was with the Mullah at Wardair during the fight. When thn 
fight was over a horseman galloped to Wardair and announced that tho 
English had been wiped out. The Mullah immediately mounted his pony, 
** Dodimer," and rode hard to the field of battle. 

Abbas never heard of the bodies of any British officers being mutilated 
but he was not at the fight itself. 

He was at the fight at Daratoloh, being a s|)carman there. A man 
came to the Haroun some days after the fight and told the Mullah that he 
had discovered the grave of a British officer at Dub Dor, which is half way 
between Daratoloh and Damot. He said that he had dug up the body, and 


produced some cartridges and a bag (probably a haversack) which he had 
taken off the body. (Notjb. — ^"Fhis cannot bo true, as the two officers killed 
wero buried at Damot.) 

There were several dead Sikh bodies found near the scene of the fight 
In the jungle ; their heads were cut off. 

Informant estimates the Mullah's losses at Gumburu at about 1,CC0 
and at Daratoleh at about 300 ; but none counted the dead by order of the 

Nur Hedig (All Naleya, Yusuf AU) visited the Mullah at Gaolo, and 
brought him a present of 10 ponies. He promised that he and his own 
followers should throw in their lot with the Mullah, but Abbas cannot tell 
what the remainder of the Ali Naleya will do. 

The following Ogadens are with the Mullah : — 


Number. ♦ 


Uabr Ali . . 
Ba Geri 
Ali Wanaak 





Mahomed Ali Ck>ra and Jofi Ali Godi 
Abdul Eimi 

Ali Nur Abdi and Weraia Atia 
Abdi Horsi 



Noie$ on the above IfUdligenee, 

There are no karias at Myra or near Lasuban, as our lUalos have 
lately returned from those places and report having seen no signs or tracks 
of anyone haying been there since the Mullah crossed our lines of communica- 
tion in June. 

The following Mijjarten tribes seem to be most friendly with the 
Mullah : Isa Mahmud, Osman Mahmud and Ceshisha. 

The following four Dervishes go to Bosaso, to arrange for rifles and 
ammunition to bo brought to the Mullah : — 

Abdullah Shahri (Habr Toljaala, Adan Marleba). 

Mahmud Narash (Ogaden Abayunia). 

Abdi AliH (Cadain 7). 

Ao Omar (Ogaden, Ali Wanash). 

Bohotle, 4th August, 1903. 

Hth August. — The 30 Illalos sent to theNogalon the 3l8t July, returned 
at 3 p.if. They went to Gumburu (see Nogal sketch), and from there sent 
out HcoutH to Kl Huron which appears to be about \2 miles south of a point 
half way between Las Anod and Hi li Madu. (Note. — ^This is not quite plain 
from the Hkotch.— <J. F. W.) 

The srouts discovered eight men there, opened tire, captured four, the 
rost escaping. The remainder of the Illalos then arrived, questioned the 
prisoners and found that they were the advanced scouts of a party of 128 of 
the Mullah's scouts, mostly spearmen. 


Tbpy then tied up tlieir camels (the prisoners' camols ?), tifd the 
primers to ti«es, removed their enperflaoos clothing and prcparifl for a 

They were in medium bush and the enemy cmfTged from thif-k hiisli. 
ThPT fought for t'wo hours, the enemy losing many men killed and woundt-d. 
the exact number not being known ; the enemy drajrged their woimde<1 and 
dnd avay. One of our men was wounded through the fleshy part (if tlio 
thigh. Eventually the enemy retired into the thick part of the bush and 
waited for <nir men to come on. They, being (omparatively few mid 
winning short of anunuoition, did not follow up, nor did the enemy attack 

them again. 

After the figfht they found that the prifloners whom they had tie<i up 
had e«caped« taking with them some clothes and two camels. 

Thev searched the bush for the camels, and captunnl one of t he eneniy'H 
camels loaded up with bans and also found one of their own. 
Thev lost all their rations. 

During the light one of the Mullah's men named Jama Hasseii (Dolha- 
h^n»A^ Ayak), a brother of Illalo Mohamcd Hassan, recognised his brother, 
speared the headman of the Mullah's Illalos and deserted to our side. He 
gives the following news : — 

On the 29th July, the Mullah sent out threi^ parties of Illalos, one of 
50 nvm, one of 45 men and one of 33 men. They had orders to look for 
psrti*« of English scouts and to bring back any karias found in the Haud, 
whicU had not yet joined up with the Mullah. 

The Haroun was at Gaolo. The horses and camels were at Dumbai, 
some six miles west of Halin. The karias were scattered about at Oermwci 
Kobo (said to be about 18 miles north of (I'lrowei on the direct liiie to 
Halin — there is another Kobo also known as Sorl, said to be nr>rth of Haliu), 
Halin, Dalolo (about 12 nules west of Halin). and Ilaisiuio (a large district 
about 14 miles west of Gaolo). 

There is plenty of green grass everywhere, much rain having falUn 
about six weeks ago. Consequently animals are lit a^ain, and the peo])le 
are happy and contented. 

A caravan which left Galadi some four months ago for the ea«t under 
Abdulla Shahri and Sangoya, a Mijjartcn, in order to get anus and ammuni- 
tion from Bosaso, reached the Mullah shortly after he arrived in the Nogal, 
bringing 160 French rifles, both " Mare *' and ** Jikri " (i.e., carbines and 
rifles), and 14 boxes of ammunition. 

On the 27th, the day this man left the Haroun, another caravan of 
300 camels arrived, bringing great quantities of rifles and anununition. 
He, himself, did not see this caravan but heard the news. 

Morning and night caravans keep coming in from the Mijjartcn with 
clothes and food, and morning and night they leave, returning empty to 

When the Mullah first went to the Nogal, 36 camels were loaded daily 
with the reserve and spare ammunition. 

The Mullah has four machine guns and throe big guns. The former 


are never used and one of the latter is oBeless, haying been damaged at the 
time when Yusuf All's fort was captured, at Galkayu. 

The Isa Mahmud tribe, better known at the Isa Riola, were looted by 
the Mullah, who took all their camels, poniss, and 50 rifles, leaving them 
their goats. Their headmen appealed against being looted, and the Mullah 
finally gave them back all their camels but kept the ponies and rifles. They 
have now promised to join him and help him in any way they can. 

The Osman Mahmud trade with the Mullah, sending him rifles, am- 
munition and stores. They have, however, refused to join him, and have 
threatened that, if he moves into their country, they will go and fight him. 

Islam and the Omar Mahmud are in no way helping the Mullah, who 
has, in consequence, threatened to send a party to raid them. 

The Ali Naleya are not with the Mullah at present. They are living 
near Cuban. (? The Cuban or Maritime Plain.— G. T. F. W.) Nur Hodig, 
with 30 men paid a visit to the Mullah at Gaolo, to come to terms with him, 
nothing further is known about him. 

The Dolbahanta, Mahmud Cerad, Nur Ahmed, moved into the Mij jar- 
ten country when the Mullah first went into the Nogal. They are living 
with the Osman Mahmud and have not joined the Mullah. 

The Mullah sent a letter to Fara Hashi, who seems to be a sort of 
Quartermaster to Nur Isman. On reading it, these two men became very 
angry, cut it up with a knife, and wrote back ordering the Mullah not to 
come into their country, and telling him that they would not join him. 
They also sent round to all the Mijjarten tribes saying that the Mullah would 
only fool them, and telling them not to join him. All seem, however, 
willing to trade with him and get for him what he wishes. 

The Mullah has now plenty of rifles and ammunition, and is quite 
ready for a fight. He does not intend to do anything until he receives 
replies to letters which he has sent to the following tribes : — 

Dolbahanta, Mahmud Cerad, Nur Ahmed. 
Dolbahanta, Mahmud Cerad, Ali Naleya. 
Dolbahanta, Hassan Ugaz. 
Dolbahanta, Omar Wais. 
Mijjarten, Osman Mahmud. 

An Arab named Naaithdone, has been a prisoner with the Mullah for 
three years. His brother arrived in Caolo on the 26th July, in company 
with some prisoners who had eNca]>cd from Berbera. The Arab had a camel 
and a mule, both carrying loads. He l>rought many letters to the Mullah. 
Ho said that he had Rone through Kiirno, and had been given a chit by a 
British officer there. 

On their way back our Illalos met two old men who had been left 
behind by the British force at Badwein. They said that Islam and the 
Omar Mahmud had been at Mudug wells, grazing their animals there. 
A woman had gone to them, telling them of the Mullah being in the Xogal. 


Act ihen inunecliat^ly moved to Grolol and Jeriban, between Galkayii and 

Ali Yiisttf lias 'built a stone fort at Talaat, between Badwein and 


The Illalos BrougHt back 10 shields, 25 spears, and a blue jeTAoy which 
hid eridieatly been taken off a dead Yao. They say that Hc>vcral of tho 
Hm&y wvre wearing blue jerseys, probably those captured at Ciumbnru. 

Tbelllalos report tbat several of the Mullah's karias are at Ana Horigli, 
piarded hv about ^200 spearmen and from 13 to 15 rifles. 

They si^Y that ii tbey were a few more they would stand a good <^hanro 
of niding these karias, and that 30 men is not enoupjh- 

Bohotle, Rib August, 1903. 


Complete freedom of the Press being incompatible witl) a 
state of war in Somaliland, as it is in any other country under 
Uke conditions, it was necessary to establish a censorship over 
the communications of newsagents and Press correspondents 
who were permitted to enter the theatre of operations. It 
was not, liowever, imtil December, 1902, when Press corres- 
pondents first accompanied the force at Obbia, that the 
General Ofl&cer Commanding was obliged to establish a censor- 
ship over Press commmiications. This was eifected by 
appointing officers as censors at Berbera and Obbia respec- 
tively. Subsequently the officer in charge of the Intelligence 
Department was also appointed Press censor at the head- 
quarters of the Field Force, with one assistant upon the lines 
of communication and another at the base. 

Instructions were also issued to j)rovent any person, soldier 
or civilian, from proceeding to the Protectorate during the 
operations unless in possession of an order to join the command. 

Press Correspondents. 

During the third and fourth expeditions a limited number 
of news agencies and papers were permitted, with the con- 
currence of the General Officer Commanding, to be represented 
in the theatre of operations by correspondents. The condition^ 
upon which licences were issued were that correspondent^ 
pledged themselves to transmit all their (communications f^ 


the Press through a Press censor. These conditions were, as 
a rule, observed by most of the correspondents who accom- 
panied the troops or were permitted to reside in the country. 
A few cases, however, occurred of serious irregularities being 
committed by Press correspondents, which resulted in the 
licences of the offenders being cancelled or suspended. 

Survey Secjtion. 

During the third expedition the Obbia force was accom- 
panied by a survey section, which was despatched from India 
and consisted of three native surveyors and 30 Khalasis, under 
the command of Captain G. A. Beazeley, R.E. This party 
was subsequently reorganized in October, 1903, and consisted 

Captain G. A. Beazeley, R.E. (in command). 

Captain C. G. W. Himter, B.E., Assistant Survey Officer. 

3 sub-surveyors. 

21 Khalasis. 

15 porter coolies. 

During the operations in the Nogal Valley in the fourth 
expedition, the party was divided into two sections, one of 
which accompanied the 1st Brigade and the other the 2nd 
Brigade. When the Las Dureh colimm was formed, Captain 
Hunter proceeded with it, while Captain Beazeley continued 
the triangulation and detail survey from Berbera eastwards 
until the close of the campaign. 




Local Lbviks. 

As considerable use waa made of local levies throughout tie 
operations, indeed, diinng the first and second expeditions 
CJolonel Swayne depended almost entirely on these irregular 
troopa, it is necessary to give a short account of the measures 
which were taken to raise them. The tribal horsemen from 
whom the levies were usually recruited were found particulariy 
useful for co-operating with the regular troops, and for pro- 
tecting our tribes from the Mullah's raiding parties. They 
possessed great mxibility, and it was by no means uueonuuon 
tor a Somali horseman, while on a raid, to cover 60 or 70 miles 
a day, and a man on foot to cover 50 miles. 

The system of enlistment, organization, and training of the 
local levies rabed by Colonel Swayne is sufficiently described 
in Chapter III, and need not be referred to again. 

During General Manning's operations, the greater portion 
ol the Somali levies engaged by Colonel Swayne were db- 
banded at Berbera, while the renuunder were reorganized 
into mounted and dismounted companies, and were mainly 
employed as garrisons of posts upon the lines of conimunica- 

Dunng July, 1903, the Mounted Lifantry of the 6th BattaUon 
King's African Rifles was increased from 150 to 300. These 
were subsequeiitly organized into two companies of Somali 
Honiited Lifantry. 

The Tribal and Gadabtirn Hone. 
During the fourth expedition two corps of mounted levies 
were raised in October, 1&03, and placed under the orders oE 
(8927a) 2/ 


the Officer Commanding Mounted Troops. They consbted 

No. Ill, Tribal Horse, recnuted from the Dolbahanta, Ba 
Idris, Habr Yunis, and Midgan tribes, and No. IV, Oadabursi 
Horse, recnuted abnost entirely from Gadabursi men. The 
strength of each corps was 600 horsemen, 550 horses or mules, 
and 50 foot levies. Each man was supplied with a rifle, 
bandolier, blanket, saddle, water-bottle, and one horse or 
mule. A red tobe* was also issued as a distinguishing badge. 
The term of enlistment was for three months from the date of 
commencement of the operations. Pay was at the rate of 
30 rs. for headmen, and 15 rs. for others, per month. 

Blood money was also granted at the rate of 300 rs., paid 
to the next-of-kin of men kUled in action or dying from wounds. 

The organization was based on tribal sections, each section 
being commanded by its own Akil or headman. 

Men who brought their own ponies, with saddle and bridle, 
received 30 rs. per month, and 100 rs. on termination of their 
engagement. Those who engaged without bringing their 
own ponies were supplied with mounts by the Remount 

The following British personnel served with the corps : — 

No. Ill Corps. — Tribal Horse. 

Commandant : Major G. T. M. Bridges, Royal Artillery. 
Assistant Commandant : Captain N. Malcolm, D.S.O., 

Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. 
Assistant Commandant : Lieutenant J. W. C. Kirk, King's 

African Rifles. 
Medical Officer : Lieutenant J. H. Horton, Indian Medical 


No. IV Corps. — Gadabursi Horse. 

Commandant : Major Hon. J. G. H. H. Beresford, 7th 

* Cloth worn as a turban. 



Asrastant Commaadant : Captaia H, W, B, Thorpe, King's 

Own Yorksliire Light Infantry. 
Assistaot Commandant : Lieutenant Hon. A. A. G. Hote* 

Buthven, V.C, Cameron Highlanders. 
Medical Officer: Captain H. E. M. Douglas, V.C, Roya) 

Army Medical Corps. 
Supply and Transport Officer: StaS -Sergeant J. Humphries, 

Supply and Transport Corps. 

After the battle of Jidbalj, both corps were amalgamated 
and called the Tribal Horse, their combined strength being 
reduced to 750 men. Of these, 250 picked men were taken for 
operations with the Mounted Troops, the remaining iJOO 
returned to Ain Abo and Eil Dab, where they were utiiiaed 
for raiding parties, &c. 

Daring February, 1904, the corps was paid ofi, and the 
men discharged at Burao on their arrival there from Eil Dab, 
except 100 who took part in the operations of the Las Dureh 

An officer who served with the corps makes the following 
remarks about these irregular troops ; — 

Uoiluostianabl; the heat mea t>3 rcgarda lighting and horsGnuuisliip 
«n the Dolbftbanta, Habr Yania and Ba Idria tribes. The Gsdaburei ate 
nfj inferior horaemon. more jungly in their wnys, tmd posseaa a siuallcr idea 
ot fighting and, in conBequonoe, are more inclined tu bolt when under fire. 
Soma of the Midgaaa proved very useful. 

Ab regards the fighting power of the Somali. I think he ban plonty oF 

pluck, but when used in Urge numbers the Somali gets bo frightfully excited 

that he hardly knows what he ia doiag. At the first fight at Jidbali aome 

very highly tried, and. after their horsos were stampeded, it ia 

bs wondered at that they bolted from an inFurialiid mob of riltemen 

In aniaUer numbers where they can be controlled, I think 

ireH ; and latterly when they had a small fight at Madeto, they 

ily good work. Their knowledge of the country and of the ways 

of th* Buemy'a SghUog ia a very strong point ; they have wondeKiil sighl, 

and at night, if they want, are very alert ; and, if they know their officers, 

Tery good care of them, and I don't think they would leave tha 

Utier in case of danger. 

In February, 1901, to enable the tribe to hold their 
own and make a " stop " to the north-west of the haroun, 
.) 2 D 2 




Gteneral Egerton sanctioned the raising by the. civil authioriiiies 
of a corps of foot levies for service in the Musa Abukr country. 
This corps was placed under the ccmimand of IiiQut.-Oolonel 
C. J. MeUiss, V.C. The following eidract from SomaHland 
Field Force Orders explains the organization, &o., o{ the 
corps : — 

Organization Levies. — In lieu of the 360 Somali levies diBcharged, the 
General Officer Commanding sanctions the raising of 280 foot levies as 
under : — 

(1) Composition, — ^Three companies, made up of 10 sections as under — 

1 hayildar. 

1 naick. 

2 lance naicks. 
23 men. 

Total 27 (27 X 10 = 270). 

Native officers, colour havildars and ration naicks to be appointed 
in the proportion obtaining in the former levy, vi/^ : — 

2 jemadars. 

4 colour havildars. 

3 ration naicks. 

Total 9 
And one interpreter at 40 rs. per mensem. 

(2) Conditions of Service. — ^The same as for the discharged levies, 
except that the rates of pay will be increased 3 rs. (three) per mensem for all 

(3) Period of Engagement. — ^To be for the present operations. 

(4) Arms. — '303 calibre, 100 rounds and 1 bandolier per rifle. 

(5) Administraiion, — ^The levy will be raised and maintained under 
the orders of the Ck>nsul-(j}eneral. 

(6) Officers. — ^The services of Lieut. -CJolonol C. J. MeUiss, V.C, were 
placed at the disposal of the Ooasul-Greneral for this purpose, with effect 
from the 28th December, 1903. 

(7) Finance. — ^The accounts of these levies will be dealt with by the 
Protectorate's Paymaster. Funds will be drawn from the nearest Treasure 
Chest Officer. 

(8) Equipment and Supply. — ^Departments of the Field Force will comply 
with requisitions on account of these levies. 

Mounted Troops. 

The regular Mounted Troops during the operations in 
1903-04 consisted of the Burgher Contingent from South 


(T../.rrl..3. I--.I., 


Africa, British and Indian Mounted Infantry, and the Bikanir 
Camel Corps. 

The Burgher Contingent. 

This corps was raised during the first fortnight in January^ 
1903, at Pretoria, for service in Somaliland. 
The establishment included : — 

3 British Officers. 

4 Boer Officers. 

9 British soldiers. 
93 Boer rank and file. 

The organization was :— 

Commanding Officer : Captain W. Bonham, D.S.O., Ist 
Essex Regiment (with temporary rank of Major). 

Second in Command : Captain A. A. McHardy, D.S.O., 
Royal Garrison Artillery. 

Adjutant : Captain W. L. Foster, Royal Field Artillery. 

Acting Sergeant-Major : E. May, Bloemfontein Commando. 

Quartermaster Sergeant : R. W. Smyth, Leinster Regiment. 

No, 1 Section, Pretoria Commando. — 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, 
20 rank and file, under Lieutenant Jisager. 

No. 2 Section, Pretoria Commando. — 1 sergeant, 2 corporals^ 
20 rank and file, under Lieutenant Cronje. 

No. 3 Section, Christiana Commando. — 1 sergeant, 2 cor- 
porals, 20 rank and file, under Lieutenant Scott- 

No. 4 Section, Bloemfontein Commando.— I sergeant, 2 
corporals, 20 rank and file, under Lieutenant Scott. 

In addition, there were 8 British soldiers, consisting of : — 

1 lance corporal 1 „^, T^ n «j 1 - " ■ 

1 private I ^^^ ^'*«°°° ^""^ [ SignaUers 

2 privates . . West Yorks. 

1 shoeing smith . . Royal Field Artillery 

1 gunner T 

, ^ . r Royal Field Artillery 

1 private . . Royal Lancaster R^^iment 



making a total of 109 all ranks, with 150 cobs (South African, 
Walers, Argentines, and Russian). 

The t«rm of enlistment was six months, or, if operations 
concluded before expiration of that period, until the con- 
clusion of operations. 

The rates of pay were : — ^British officers (3) graded as 
Special Service officers ; Boer officers (4), £1 per diem ; 
quartermaster-sergeant (1), 10^. per diem; sergeant-major, 
(1), lOs. per diem ; sergeants (4), Is. per diem ; corporals (8), 
fo. per diem ; privates (80), 58. per diem ; British soldiers 
(8), 58. per diem. 

Each man was provided with small pay book (Army 
Book 64) in which entries of each payment were made. All 
accounts were kept by the Chief Paymaster, Cape Town, to 
whom pay rolls were sent monthly. 

EqutpmerU. — ^Each man was equipped on the same 
scale as for British mounted infantrymen in South Africa, 
except that, in addition, 1 extra bandolier per man (carried 
round horse's neck), 1 British warm and 1 mackintosh cape 
per man (no cloaks), 1 revolver and 1 carbine per officer 
were issued. 

SadSlery. — ^Indian Cavalry pattern, no wallets, 1 saddle- 
bag (Mexican pattern) carried on near side of saddle. Rifle- 
bucket (Mounted Infantry pattern) hitched close up to off- 
side of saddle, with outer top half of bucket cut away. 

Signalling Oear. — 2 helios and 2 lamps complete. 

One *303 maxim gun, with tripod stand, and pack 
saddle equipment. 

One light Field Service forge, with pack saddle equip- 

Ordinary camp equipment with tents. 

Ammunition. — 30 boxes small arms ammunition, 1,100 
rounds per box. 

Transport. — ^Provided locally in Somaliland as required 
from time to time, sometimes camel, at others mules. 

The contingent embarked at Durban on January 16th, 



1903, on the eteam^hip " Gaul," and disembarked at Obbia, 
on January 25111 and 26tli, Laving sufEered no casualties on 
the voyage amongst men or horses. 

The men and stores were landed in boats, the horses swam 
ashore. On arrival at Obbia the contingent was brigaded 
with the lat British Company Mounted Infantry, I'unjab 
Mounted Infantry, and Bikanir Came! Corps. 

Durii^t the operations the contingent snilered the following 
casualties : — 1 man lost in the btish ; 1 died in hospital ; 
1 man accidentally shot ; 1 man wounded near GimibnT'ii ; 
56 horeea killed or died. 

The following remarks are extracted from a report on 
the contingent : — 

The time given (14 daja) in which to raiso and equip a contingent pf 
100 Boera Erom tsHoub parU o! the Trtuiavaal bdiI Orange RivOT Colony (or 
servira in a foreign coontry was insufficient. Cooiecquentlj no choicu of men 
could be made, and the first 93 men who presented themaelvea and passed tho 
medical esamination were enlisted. Tho cuntingent waa not coUoeted 
together till the daj ol the embarkation at Durban, January 15th. All 
penonal clothing and equipment wna sorvcd out to tho men, and the unit 
properly organised during tho Toyogo from Durban to Oiibia. During tlin 
disembarkation at Obbia, the Boera were usefidly employed in OHEisltnp to 
land the homn and stores. The month spent at Obbia was occupied in 
nmatont drilL Each man was allowed 100 rounds of ammunition with 
which t<] get thoroughly acquainted with his riflB ; buck shooting oHordod 
axeellont practice. Eieopt tor tho skirniiahes whilst with Colonel Cobbc's 
colinnn on April I*th and 16th. the rontingent saw no fighting. Tho tow 
man who were fortunate enongh to come into contact with the tnemy 
bebaTed well, especially on April 16th, when the patrol of wbii^h they 
farmed part wan surroundod and nearly out up. Tbo nien, howcrer, wero 
not good shots at elose rangcH of 40 yards to 70 yards, and did not inHlct 
the loraee they should have done on the enemy that day. A few cliicf 
points noted with regard to tho men were : — 

The remorkablo way they stood the hardnhipa of intense heat, very 
short rations of food and water, and long ridce through the ^oat of the day. 
The percentage of sich was very smalt 

The knack of finding their way in a flat, (eatureleas country, full of 
thick bushes, by taking the sun as their guide. 

Tho aomowhat surprising difficulty of making tho men taka propw 
care of their horses ; the fact that the horses did not belong to them may 
hsTB been the reason for thi-i- 

Tho amnion each man had to eirhanginj:, even temporarily, bin riSc 
for one he was not thorongbly aaqnainted with. 


In condumon, it may be stated that the men yolunteered for a further 
period of flervioe in the comitry, hot owing to the difficulty at the time of 
sufficient transport for supplies for mounted troops, and also to there being 
no immediate prospect of further operations, it was not deemed advisable to 
accept their offer. 

Mounted Infantry. 

In August, 1903, tbe Mounted Infantry were organized 
into two corps, as follows : — 

I Corps. 

Officer Commanding : Ideut. -Colonel P. A. Eenna, V.C, 
D.S.O., 2l8t Lancers. 

Adjutant : Captain A. Skeen, 24tli Punjabis. 

Ist Company, British Mounted Infantry. — Officer Com- 
manding : Captain G. C. Shakerley, King's Koyal 

2nd Company, British Mounted Infantry. — Officer Com- 
manding : Captain M. G. E. Bell, Rifle Brigade. 

3rd Company, British Mounted Infantry. — Officer Com- 
manding : Brevet-Major J. R. M. Marsh, Lincoln 

4th Company, Somali Mounted Infantry. — Officer Com- 
manding : Captain T. N. Howard, 4th King's 
African Rifles. 

5th Company, Somali Mounted Infantry (in course of 
formation.) — Officer Commanding : Major P, 
Osbom, D.S.O., 3rd King's African Rifles. 

II Corps. 

Officer Commanding : Brevet-Major J. E. Qough,* Rifle 

Adjutant : Captain C. G. Woodhouse, 126th Baluchistan 

6th Company, Poona Mounted Infantry. — Officer Com- 
manding : Captain W. Mitchell, 124th Baluchistan 

* Major 6h>ugh was succeeded by Major B. Brooke who oommandei the 
2nd Ck)rps until it wm disbanded in May, 1903. 


7tli Company, Umballa Momxted In&ntiy . — Officer Com- 
manding : Captain H. B. Foid, Slst Punjabis. 

Bikanir- Camel Corps. — Officer Commanding: Captab 
W. G. Walker, V.C, 1st Battalion 4tli Gurkka Rifles. 

No. 1 Company, British Mounted Infentry, King's Royal 
Rifles, landed in SomaHland as a complete and well seasoned 
unit, having been in the field dunng the war in South Africa. 

No. 2 Company, British Mounted Infantry, was mobilised 
at Fatigarh, India, and landed in SomaUland in July, 1903. 
It comprised detachments from three British regiments. 

No. 3 Company, British Mounted Infantry, mainly con- 
sisted of officers and men who had just completed a course 
of instruction at Bangalore. 

No. 6 (Poona) and 7 (Umballa) Companies, Indian Mounted 
Infantiy, were composed of six and eight detachments respec- 
tively of various native infantry regiments. 

The Punjab Mounted Infantry, which landed at Berbera 
in 1902, was composed of two regiments of two castes, Sikhs 
and Dogras. 

Bikanir Camd Carps. 

In 1889 the offer of the Bikanir Durbar to raise a camel 
corps of 500 Rahtor Rajputs as Imperial Service troops was 
accepted by the Indian Government and its organization 
commenced. The services of two British officers were lent 
to the State to supervise the raising, training, and equipment 
of the corps. 

In India, it is organized in six companies and officered 
entirely by officers of the Bikanir State ; 75 per cent, of the 
men are Rahtor Rajputs, and the balance are Rajputs of 
other clans and a few Sikhs and Mahomedans (Kaimkhani), 
all recruited in Bikanir territory. 

The services of the corps (dismounted) were accepted for 
the China expedition, where they remained from September, 
1900, to May, 1901. In December, 1902, the corps was 
ordered to hold itself in readiness for service in SomaUland. 


It embarked at Bombay on the 10th January, 1903, and was 
on continuotis service in Somaliland until the end of June, 
1904, when it sailed from Berbera, having served with much 
distinction and proved of the greatest value on the waterless 
stretches on the interior. 

Organization. — ^The corps is maintained on the Silladar 
sjmtem. Recruits can either bring their own camels or 
purchase from the Chanda fund, paying in instalments. 
The camel price is 110 rs. Service in the corps is very popular 
in the State, and consequently it gets a class of recruit which 
does not willingly enlist in the Indian Army. 

The terms of enlistment, rules for discharge with gratuity 
and pension, family pension, &c., are drawn up on the lines 
of the regulationiB for the Indian Army, from which they 
di£Eer only in small particulars. The scale of pay is also 
very similar to that of a Sepoy of the Indian Army, with 
this exception, that an extra 10 rs. per mensem is allowed 
to each man for the feed of the camel. 








F! citing men :— 


Mounted OfiUTB— 



• • 

i 1 

Aarirtant CommandAnts 


• • 




• • 


Aasistant Surgeon 


• • 


Ccmpanff Ogieers — 



1 ^ 



1 .. 


1 6 



1 . 


Hospital assistant 


• • 


N.CO.'s and Men— 



Havildar Major . . 


• * 


Quartermaster Hayildar 


• • 


Kote Havildars . 


• • 


Havildars . . 








Lance Naicks 







i 383 



• • 


Salutris . . 












PubUo foUowers :— 

Gomashta . . 





• • 






















• • 




• • 


Ward Orderly 


• • 










Private followers : — 

Officers* personal servants 


• • 

• • 

Hospital Assistant's personal servants . . 


• • 

• • 

Syces (mounted officers) 


• • 

• • 


• • • • • • • 


• • 

• • 

^ Organiied in 6 Companies. 

t Additional entertained on mobilisation. 


Transport. — ^The following scale is laid down in the Field 
Service equipment tables of the corps. The followers are 
all mounted. 

Transport is not kept up for the corps, but can be raised 
at a few hours' notice. 




426 rifles at 80 rounds per rifle, 57 

boxes . . 


12 bhisties and 3 servants 

Spare arm kajawahs 


1 bearer 

IVeasure chest 



Hospital and veterinary equipment . . 


I hospital assistant, 1 ward 
orderly, 2 salutris, 2 

Office equipment 


1 writer 

Signalling equipment . . 


1 bearer 

Entrenching tools 



Quartermaster's stores and armourer's 



2 mochies 

4 guard and office tents (160 lbs.) 

2 ■] 

10 officers' tents (80 lbs ) 

3 y 

11 servants and 2 bearers 

37 N.CO.'s and men's tents (160 lbs.) 

19 J 

Ck>mpany cooking pots 


2 cooks to each camel 

Spare oameb 


6 sweepers 



Kits are carried on riding camels. 

Equipment, — ^The corps is armed and eqaipped from 
Government arsenals in the same manner as the Indian Army. 
At present they are armed with the M.L.E. Mark 11 rifle. 

The Full Dress consists of red turban, with " tura " ; 
white serge " Kurta," red collar and facings ; red " cummer- 
bund " ; white drill pantaloons, Jodhpur pattern ; ankle 
boots ; black putties. 

KJudci Uniform. — ^Khaki turban, coat, pantaloons, and 
putties with ankle boots. Brown accoutrements. 

Camel Gear. — (a) Drill order : — 

Headstall — " Mora "—passes over the ears and round the 
jaws just in front of the eyes and is finished off with one turn 
of the headstall rope and knotted under the neck. A leather 
headstall would be more useful 

Embarking Camels. 


Indian Camel. Arab CameL 


^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H PLATE ^M 


Heavy Msrching Order. ^^| 





HE] _ 



T.. j.,iiu<- rifiit -ly.) 



Maxim Gun Detachment. ^^^^H 



Tofolwr I'InU H^.) 



Necklei — "Kodala" — full dress only — should be just 
toucbing the headstall rope and hang about 12 inches below 
the point of the skull, usually made of cowrie shells, the 
buckle of the necklet should be on the top and in the centre 
of the neck. 

Breast-piece — " Gk)rband "—of red webbing, is crossed 
and buckled to the pommel of the saddle, and should be of such 
a length that the rosette rests on the breastbone between the 
fore legs. 

Oirth Ends — " Loomba " — 44 inches long, red webbing, 
should hang level so that the tassels are just clear of the 
camel's belly. 

Oirth — " Tang " — ^red webbing, the front girth should be 
close behind the pad (" idar "), the rear girth as far back as 
possible, provided it is clear of the penis, both pulled as tight 
as possible and only loosened for watering. 

Saddle Cover — " Gaddi " — ^Large enough to cover the 
whole saddle, made of leather with red cotton buttons. 

Nose String. — ^Fixed with loops on to wooden pegs driven 
through the nostrils. 

(b) Field Service Order :— The " Kodala," " Gorband," 
•* Mora," and " Loomba " are all removed. 

Saddle Bags. — Brown leather, one on each side, fixed 
on to the rib of the saddle under the front seat. 

" Chaguls " or water tins strapped on to the rib, under the 
rear seat. 

Saddle Cover removed and blankets and waterproof sheet 

Kit Bag on rear seat, or behind it, if required to mount 
a second man. 

Saddle. — Of the double-seated Bikanir pattern, to carry 
two men. Three iron arches, 12, 14, and 16 inches wide, 
attached to wooden ribs, leather seat stretched across the 
arches. Pads, leather covered, stuffed with camel's hair. 
Weight of saddle cushions and pads about 60 lbs. The man 
rides astride, using stirrups. 



Saddling. — ^The camel shonld first be well groomed, the 
ssddle-clotli (" mailkooii ") is then put over the hump, so 
that the front ends lie along the Bhoulders, two cotton cushions 
(" gaddi ") in front of the hump and one behind are placed 
on triangularly, so that the points meet on the hump. The 
saddle is now put on bo that the centre arch is over the middle 
of the hump, the front pads (" thara ") should rest over the 
point of the shoulder, the rear pad just in front of the hip* 
bone. In tightening girths, the saddle should be shaken, so 
that it sits well down on the cushions. 

Captain W. G. Walker, V.C. , Indian Army, who commanded 
the corps in Somaliland,* made the following observations : — 

• CapUina E. U. Hughea, H. E. Browno and G. W. Ruwliiu 
Arm7, also aefTed with the Docps. 


Compofdtbn of Corps in Somdiland. 

From — 





British officers . . 



Native officers . . 



Hospital assistants 






Naioks . . . . 



Buglers .. 






Salutri . . 



Ward orderly . . 


• • 

Sowars . . 



Camels . . 



Organized in two companies. 


Kit taken from 

Kit taken from 







Lbs. ozs. 

Lbs. ozs. 


Waterproof sheet 

• • 





. . ■ 

4 4 


8 8 

Great coat 

• . • 



• • 

. . 

Native suits 

. • • 






. pairs 




Native shoes 

. pairs 




Khaki suit 

• • • 


. . 

• • 

Khaki pugree 

• • • 


• • 

• . 

Khaki putties 

. pairs 


. . : . . 

Cardigan jacket . 

• • • 

• • 

• • 


1 8 

Cape, great coat . 

• • • 

• • • 

• • 

• • 




• • 


a * 

20 4 

The second scale (Berbera) was most suitable — a great ooat was not 
required, except on the Golis Range. A second blanket and cardigan are 
preferable for cold weather season. 

Aceoniremenls. — ^The '* liackeaxle " equipment of belts, braces, and 


pouches was brought from India. This was mostly unserviceable at the end 
of the first phase, and was replaced by bandoliers. 

During the fourth expedition each man carried one shoulder bandolier 
(SO rounds) and one waist bandolier (40 rounds and bayonet) ; 60 rounds 
extra were carried in pocket and haversack in action, and the balance of 
400 rounds was carried on the camel in a canvas bag. 
Line C?ear.— Nil. 

SaddUry, — ^The Bikanir pattern double-seated saddle was used through- 
out. The following articles were carried on saddle : — 

Two saddle bags (leather) holding 40 lbs. of grain. 
Three days' men's rations. 
Reserve ammunition — SOO rounds. 
Entrenching tool or axe. 
Picketing rope. 

Ohaguls — two to four — 2 gallon water tins would be preferable. 
Buoket~20 p.c. 
Riding weight just under four maunds. 

Camp Equipage, — ^The usual Indian equipment of 80 lbs. and 100 lbs. 
general service tents were brought from India, but never taken beyond the 
base — ^tents were not necessary, except in the hills. 


In the bush, file or single file was the only possible march formation. In 
the vioinity of enemy, animals were closed up, men dismounted and extended 
on the front and flanks; No. 3*8 led camels. When halted, square was« 
formed, and animals were tied down — one man looking after eight camels. 
In open country, a line of section or half company columns in single file 
Was found to be the best formation to move in, generally at close interval 
(10 paces), opening out to deploying intervals when coming under fire. 

It would not be advisable to bring camels within 1,600 yards of aimed 
fire, unless the ground was favourable. Firing off the camel could, I am 
sure, be used with effect on occasions when it would be inadvisable to dis- 
mount — good shooting was made at head and shoulder targets up to 
300 yards. 

Followers. — The slarength of the followers was 38. When moving fast, 
no followers were taken — they came along with the baggage. 

The corps landed with 26 per cent, spare animals. The casualties during 
the third expedition amounted to nearly 60 per cent. This may be con- 
sidered exceptionally heavy, but owing to the incessant work, poor grazing, 
want of veterinary supervision, and to the fact that all animals thrown 
out of work had to be destroyed for supply reasons, the losses were not 
excessive. Dxuring the fourth expedition, the casualties were about 26 per 

lieut. -Colonel P. A. Eenna, who commanded the Moimted 
Troops submitted the following remarks about thV) equip- 


ment, organization, training, Ac., of the Mounted Infantry 
whicli served under bim in Somaliland : — 


The equipment far man and horse and fint line irnnRport as laid down 
bj me for the previona phase of this campaign and embodied in Sections II, 
ni, and IV of attached Standmg Orders,* printed in July, 1903, answered 
weO. I bfltva nothfaig to alter, and little to add. 

JfeM*« Cioihing. — ^Dnring actoal operations, men of mounted troops are 
generally withont any kit beyond that on their horses, and this must be, and 
has been kept down to lowest limits. The khaki ooat is therefore superfluous, 
and is generally lef twith the baggage, so ii the man's blanket, and every thinq; 
else except change of underclothing and a thick jersey or sweater. 

Skiria. — ^The man's shirt should, therefore, be of stout mater' al — 
**greyb«ckB" do well — and should have two large breast-pockets, with 
buttona and flaps. 

BianixU. — ^The saddle-blanket should be longer ; its present length docs 
not coTer a man, and it is very often his only bedding. 

Combined PanU and Le^ginga. — The latest regulation combined pants 
and loose laggings, with buckle and strap at knee, but with an ordinary scam 
instead of buttons, t.e., an ordinary pair of trousers, looser from knee to 
waist, and tighter from below knee to ankle, with knee straps, is the most 
serviceable, comfortable, and lasting kit for all-round work of mounted men 
in the fielcL The adjustable strap at the knee enables these trousers t-o bo 
used aa pants and leggings, or pants and putt?es, or as ordinary " slacks." 
Even the ordinary thin khaki trousers, without any strap, are preferred to 
pants and leggings, or jNints and puttees, by many officers and men for long 
jannta on which for days and nights together they cannot change their 
clothes. These trousers should be of best stout material. 

Spurs, — Spun should be issued to all men, and taken away from those 
who abuse, or cannot use them properly. They are an assistance, and often 
a necessity, in the field. 

Bit. — ^The ordinary Mounted Infantry reversible bit docs woll, but I 
prefer the bar fixed, and the upper arm of check-piece shorter. The curli- 
chain, like the spur, is an assistance, and often a necessity ; its ahiiso can bo 
easily obviated by adjusting it and putting the rein on tlio check-piece, 
upper or lower bar. 

Trotting Camels v. Mules as First Line TransporL — I still most strongly 
advocate Irott'n; camels as first line transport to mounted troops in 
Somaliland everywhere but in the hills, and our hill work has hitherto been 
limited to lines of communication. 

Mules carr3nng the regulation two maunds in addition to saddle, equip- 
ment, and food, led in strings of three by a mounted man and driven along 
by yet another mounted man, are 20 per cent, slower than mounted troops 
moving at their most economical pace over the long stretches of waterless 

♦ Sec i'a;^e 439. 

(8927a) 2 r 


ooontiy that have to be continually crossed in Somaliland. I have tested 
and verified this, even on the best of roads, such as that from Sheikh to 
Burao, and thence on to Bohotle, in the best of weather. 

I know that these loaded mules can cover great distances in their own 
time, and at their own pace, and with less wastage than horses ; also that 
good mules, even the tiny Abjrssinian, ridden by a fair weight, will accom- 
pany mounted troops at pace described in VI, 3 (Standing Orders, page 441), 
for any distance. But the ordinarily loaded and led mules cannot keej) 
with mounted troops on these marches ; trotting camels can. 

Under " Mobility," I have noted some of the best examples of it, but in 
all the instances quoted, the first line transport of mounted troops was nil, 
or limited to Bikaoir or other trotting camels, and a very few picked mules 
oarrying one maund, and led singly. 

Bof^onet or SubgHitUe. — ^I consider the bayonet at the end of a rifle in the 
hands of a mounted man more dangerous to himself than to his enemy at 
oloee quarters, besides entailing the dropping and probable loss of many rifles. 
This is supported by the trials of the King's Royal Rifles, than whom no 
regiment has had more experience of Mounted Infantry work. If Moimted 
Infantry are to have a weapon for hand-to-hand work moimted, a light 
pointing sword or rapier seems indicated. The ordinary cavalry sword has 
the fonowing disadvantages: — On prolonged operations, scabbard and 
sword drop off the saddle wholesale ; many swords cannot l>e drawn tlirough 
wet and dirt in Boabbards ; the edge of sword gets too blunt to be hurtful ; 
the sword requires far more skill to wield than is generally available, for it is 
at best a clumsy weapon. 

Saddle, — ^The " General Service " or ** Universal pattern " saddle con- 
tinues to be the most satisfactory. Its little extra weight is of small con- 
sequence, provided proper attention is paid to the weight of the rider. The 
se«t should be flatter and not too short. 

ChagtUs, — Ghaguls soon wear out ; their average life is two months in 
open country, and one in the bush. Renewals should, therefore, be kept 
at advanced depdts. The bottle-shaped pattern, to tie at neck, is best. 

Oirtha. — Only leather girths should be issued to mounted troops. 

Bevolvers, — Revolvers were issued to the best and most experienced 
Mounted Infantry company in Somaliland, and on one occasion did goo<l 
work. But it is difficult to confine their danger to the enemy. In theory, 
they are excellent ; in practice, except in the coolest and most experienced 
hands, they are risky. 

Mesa Tina, — ^The British Mounted Infantry had infantry mess tins ; 
they seem as useful and popular as the cavalry tins, though the latter ride 
better on the saddle. Both are good, one or the other indispensable, ren- 
dering each man independent. 

Indian Mounted Infantry want Individual Cooking Kit. — The Indian 
Mounted Infantry urgently require some kind of cooking utensil to bo 
carried and used by each man while away from the baggage. Until ♦v^^v are 
less wedded to their present cumbersome cooking paraphern? ^ 


be «a maob handicapped as mounted troops on really active operations. At 
present^ the men risk unnecessary and avoidable deprivations, and hence 
their efficiency. 

Each man of the Bikanir Camel Corps carries in his haversack a " dnbba,'* 
circular in transverse section, with rounded edges, about 7 inches in diameter 
and 3 inches in depth, with tightly-fitting lid. In this " dubba *' he can carry 
and prepare his day's food at any time, including ** chupattios,** for which the 
lid is used, and for which purpose the '* dubba *' is made of brass, and not of 
aluminium. This brass '* dubba " weighs about 7 ozs., and would bo in- 
va'uable to Indian Mounted Infantry, provided each roan was taught and 
made to use it, when moving light. 

Organization, Training, Efficiency, die, 

1. Original Object of Mounted Infantry. — Mounted Infantry seem to have 
been originally started to give more mobility to infantry, to enable it to 
more closely support cavalry, and reap more quickly tho fruits of advantages 
gained by cavalry. 

2. Mounted Infantry during South African War t*upplements Cavalry. — 
In the late South African War the demand for cavalry far exceeded the 
supply, so large numbers of mounted infantry were hastily raised to supple- 
ment the cavalry, and do cavalry work. At a heavy cost in human life 
horseflesh, and money, this object was gradually attained, and many fine 
battalions of mounted infantry were produced, capable of doing most or all 
cavalry work. 

3. Mounted Infantry in Somaliland supersedes Oavalry. — But now 
mounted infantry seems to have superseded cavalry. For mounted infantry 
alone has been sent to Somaliland to do the work of cavalry, though the whole 
ol the British and Indian cavalry was available for this purpose. 

4. BesulL — ^The result of this was unsatisfactory, and would have been 
more so, but for the three months secured to most companies between 
landing and actually taking the field. Advantage was taken of this time 
by keen and generally capable officers to better prepare their men for the 
many duties of trained horsemen, t.e., of cavalry in the field. 

fi. Oomffosite Oom^panies. — (a) Moreover, all companies but one of this 
mounted infontry were composed of many fragments of various infantry 
regiments. The men of these companies, therefore, met one another and 
most of their officers for the first time just before starting for Somaliland — 
a severe handicap to all ranks, especially in the case of Indian troops. 

The disadvantages of these composite companies are so many and so 
obvioui>, that recapitulation of them seems unnecessary. Discipline, esprit 
de corps, oohemon-HiyBtem, in fact, everything on which the efficiency of 
a unit depends — iM adversely affected by them ; the difficulties of promotion, 
which is only temporary in mixed companies, keep away good men ; the 
work of pay and oormpoodaioe is complicated and increased. 

(6) Many d the mmi tent with these mounted infantry companies were 
apparently taleotcd witbout any consideration as to how or when they had 

(8927a) 2 e 2 


gone tbrcmgh the training of a mounted infantry school ; some had erideiitly 
forgotten what little they had learnt ; while othen bad as evidently never 
learnt anything of mounted infantry work. 

(e) The establishment of officers, non-commissioned officers, farriers, 
salutris, saddlers, Ao,, varied in companies, and only one had a non-com- 
missioned officer to correspond to the Squadron-Quartermaster-sergeant- 
major of cavalry — a most necessary person. 

(d) One, if not the only, advantage of composite companies, is the 
better opportunity they afford of picking light men. But, while much time 
end ingenuity is devoted to lightening our military saddles a pound or two, 
little thought is given to a difference of two or three stone in the weight of 
the rider. I had a man of the 2nd British Mounted Infantry weighed at the 
conclusion of a forced march soon after their arrival in Somaliland. His 
kit consisted of what ho stood in, plus a change of socks and a shirt, no 
blanket or great coat. With saddle and bridle complete, he turned the scale 
at 17 stone 3 lbs. Both nose-bags (two) and chagul were empty, and his 
day and a half rations eaten ; therefore this man had started at the nice 
steadying weight of over 19 stone on an Indian countrybred. 

6. To obviate these drawbacks : — 

(a) Mounted infantry should not be called upon to perform all the 
duties of cavalry while the latter are available. 

(6) When mounted infantry must be used, and selection is possible, 
preference should be given to light efficient soldiers who can ride, or at least 
remain in the saddle at a trot and gallop ; this desirable accomplishment 
Mras by no means universal among the mounted infantry when first landed. 
They should know the rudimentary principles of stable management, watering, 
feeding, saddling, knce-haltering, " ringing,** or otherwise securing de- 
tached horses, &c. ; they should be able to mount and dismount quickly 
on cither 'side, and they should know how to cook and otherwise look after 
themselves in the field (vide Standing Orders, Sec^tion 1). 

(c) The question of weight Ls, if possible, of more importance in Somali- 
land than elsewhere ; for the scarcity and uncertainty of water practically 
compel every horseman to start on almost every occasion with at least 
one canvas chagul, containing 1 to 1]^ gallons of water ; this means an extra 
10 to 15 lbs. Again, the country produces no grain ; horses have, therefore, 
to carry their own for the da3rs they are to be away from supplies. 

(d) Mounted Infantry to come from One Regiment or Battalion, and not 
from Many, — Composite companies should not exist. As mounted infantry 
is becoming so popular and so essential, each infantry battalion should be 
ready to supply one mounted infantry company at any moment. The staff 
of farriers, shoeing smiths, Ac, might be provided from the nearest mounted 
infantry school, where they could always be kept ready and up-to-date. 

(d) Proposed RMttUishmert of Mounted Infantry Companies. — The estab- 
lishment of a mounted infantry com))any taking the field should be the same 
OS thst of 9 squndron of cavalry, British or Indian, according to which Anny 
it belongs, though I would increase the actual number of rank and file by 
about 10 per cent, to counteract the inevitable initial wastage. 

Colonel Kenna lemarkod further : — 

Id spite of the many disadTautages mentioned, and which were chiefly 
ID f ridflooe when these mounted infantry landed, a high state of efficiency 
VM erentaaOy attained hy them. In proof of this, I may quote a few 
euiaplee: — 

(a) On 18th April, 1903, every available man of British, Burgher and 
Ibdian Mounted Infantry marched from Galadi to Gumburu, 48 miles 
Utiough bush, in 12 hours, without a man or horse faUing out ; no water 
M romtef and intense heat during last four or five hours. 

(6) Between 4 f.m. 17th, and 9 a.m. 19th December, 1903, 200 British 
•od Indian Mounted Infantry, with 50 Bikanirs and 200 Tribal Horse, 
ourched from Badwein to Jidbali, 38 miles, engaged the enemy for five 
hours at latter place, and returned to Badwein ; distance covered, apart 
from reconnoitring and five hours' desultory fighting, 76 miles in 41 hours, 
without any water for horses. 

(e) Between 6 f.m. 30th April, and 8 a.m. 2nd May, 1904, some 250 
British and Indian Mounted Infantry, with 150 Bikanirs and 40 irregular 
(Somali) horsemen, marched from Jiiliyu to Kheman and bock to Biliyu, 
thus covering 100 miles of waterless country (the Northern Haud) in 
38 hours on one gallon of water per man and none for horses. About one- 
thizd of these men and horses had done 60 miles in the two previous 
nights, and thus covered 160 miles in 3 days 14 hours. None of these 
horses were in more than moderate condition, having been in the field from 
6 to 12 months. 

The Somali • 

The Somali aa a Fighting Man, — ^The Somali, in some form or other, is 
absolutely necessary to troops operating in Somaliland. For hard fighting 
he is nnreliahley being peculiarly excitable and subject to panic ; for scouting, 
rounding up stock, or following up an enemy whose resistance has been 
completely broken, he is invaluable. 

As a Guide, — ^For guiding he is indispensable. Much of the country 
has never been mapped or traversed by white men, while the difficulty of 
finding one's way about that which is supposed to bo known, is proved by 
the number of officers and men who have strayed or lost themselves, out 
of the very few who have ventured any distance from the known roads 
without a Somali. 

Hie Qftalifieaiions as an Irrtgvlar Light Horseman. — The Somali's 
Intelligence and endurance, his light weight and natural horsemanship, 
combined with all the keen senses of the wild man in his own country 
admirably fit him for the work of an irregular horseman in conjunction with 
regular troops. 

Mobility. — ^I fix the greatest mobility of mounted infantry moving in 
this country, independent of any other source of supply, at two days* 
marching, i.e., about 90 milep from one water and supply dep6t to an other 

• Sac also pago 322. 


or 45 miles out and 45 back to the same depdt, though I have actuaDy done 
50 6ut and 60 back, with 250 horsemen, in less than 40 hours. These rates 
oonld not be kept up indefinitely, and would be only occasional efforts. 
But, apart from the question of supply, I consider that 40 miles a day can be 
maintained for at least four days ; 100 of my mounted infantry recently 
covered 160 miles in less than four days. But, after the first two days, the 
mobility of the mounted infantry depends, in this coimtry, on that of the 
supplies presumably coming up behind it. In March, 1903, during the ad- 
vance from Obbia, I moved out with the mounted infantry from Bera» 
some 10 hours before the main body and supplies, for Galadi. I made latter 
place direct, about 75 miles, but had to live there nearly two days on half a 
biscuit per man and some captured sheep, while the horses had nothing but 
camel mats to eat, there being no grain and not a blade of grass near Oaladi 
at that time. This illustrates the difficulty mounted infantry have in 
subsisting in this country away from their own supplies, and how dependent 
their mobiUty is on that of their suppUes after two days. As regards pace, 
I fix the greatest mobiUty of mounted infantry at 60 miles in 12 hours. 
On the 18th April, 1903, the mounted infantry with me did from Galadi to 
Gumburu, 48 miles, in 12 hours, in great heat, without a man or horse 
falling out. But in all these examples of mobihty the first line transport 
was nil, or done by Bikanirs or a very few picked mules Ughtly loaded and 
led singly. 

The Bikanirs have frequently rendered invaluable aid to moimted 
infantry by canying half a maund per camel of supplies for men and horses 
of the mounted infantry. 

With less heavily equipped men and camels, such as Arabs, who are 
small, on Arab or other trotting camels, with Arab saddles and canvas 
saddle bags, and each man leading a second loaded camel, supplies would 
be pushed on 40 miles a day, and the present mobility of mountcnl infantry 
doubled or trebled. 

An escort of Bikanirs, carrying their own supplies for six or eight days, 
would render such a convoy very independent and detachable, especially 
if the camel men were fighting men, such as Arabs, and armed. 

FoUowetA, other than syces to look after spare and sick animals, are 
out of place with mounted troops on active operations in Somaliland. 
Salutris, Nalbunds, and all other such skilled Indian workmen should be 
fighting men ; many at present are not. 

WcAering Horses. — ^Horses on service in 8omaUlaud are fortunate if 
they get one full drink every day, and do well on that. Even at Bihendnla 
last hot weather I always had at least one-fourth the animals drinking only 
once a day. Horses thus watered drink nearly two gallons less per diem 
than if watered two or three times ; this does not seem to affect their 
appetite or condition, while it prepares them to better undergo the strain of 
watering after working 48 hours or longer in great heat without water or 
even damp grazing. 

The following standing orders and instructions were issaed 
to the Mounted Troops by Lieut.-C!olonel P. A. Eenna : — 


L— Ctorif oj HcTteSm 

1. Ftiedhig^ Waiering, Fitting of ElankeU and SaddUa, Care of Feel and 
BocJfctf, an the chief points to be attended to on Bervioe. The actual grooming 
OQ the line of maioh can be limited to removing tioka and other vermin, 
and pfomptly treating wonnda or skin diseases, sach as ringworm and 

2. Saddle ElankeL — ^Knowledge and application of various ways of folding 
the blanket will save much horseflesh. 

3. Saddlery, — ^Horses <m service, especially if they start on the big side, 
soon alter the shape of the back. However well saddles fit at the start, 
tiiey need constant watching, alteraticm of blanket or stufi^g, or changing 
from one hone to another, as work teUs. 

4. FeeL — ^When a horse loses a shoe that cannot be at once replaced, 
the wan of the hoof must be lowered to the outside level of the sole at the 
first opportunity, and the ground-edge rounded off with a rasp. This will 
enable the foot to stand much work without a shoe. At least one man 
per section should cany a rasp, and know how to use it. 

6. Head CoUar and Bridle. — ^The combined head collar and bridle, with 
head rope, will always be used in the field, and the Gleneral Service pattern 
saddle in preference to Colonial or Yeomanry. The ordinary stable or line 
head collar will not be carried. 

6. Rifle Bucket, — Rifle buckets will be carried, but only as a support 
for the rifle, which must not be used as a prop or rest for the rider — a cause 
of sore backs. 

7. Line of March, — On the line of march, men will dismount at every 
opportunity, off-saddle and grace whenever practicable, and as soon as 
possible after reaching camp. Even (m the move, every opportunity 
should be given to horses to pick up what they can. Grass should bo 
gathered and brought into the lines for all horses at night and for those con- 
fined to camp during the day. When off-saddled, horses should be given 
every opportunity to lie down and roll. 

8. Grazing, — While grazing, all horses must invariably be knee-haltered, 
and at least half the armed escort should be mounted, or ready to mount at 
a moment's notice. The gracing ground should be selected by an officer 
as soon as practicable after halting. Horses grazing must be given plenty 
of room, moved as grass is eaten, and not kept crowded in one spot. Animals 
out grazing are not to be linked together. 

9. Watering, — Fit horses in easy work and in standing camp will be 
watered once a day, between noon and evening, the nearer sundown the 
better. On the line of march they will be watered as opportunity offers, 
and always in the evening, if possible. When on an allowance of water, 
half the ration may be given earlier in the day if horses are too thirsty to 
graie. When water is short, and horses thirsty, the grain being damped 
will sMiBt their eating it. 

10. Salt, — Salt, in any form, up to 1 or 1) ozs. a day, will be givon when 


11. Oraina. — All horses should be accuBtomed to eat oats, ohunna (gram) 
or jowari, any one of which may be the only food procurable (m ooca sio na. 

12. Shoeing. — Except in special cases, at the discretion of officers com- 
manding units, horses will be shod all round, and a spare pair of fore shoes 
will be carried in the men's kits on transport. 

13. Spare Horses, — At least 16 per cent, spare horses should start with 
units or detachments for prolonged operations and parties going oat in- 
dependently for the day on long patrols, &c., should take at least 5 per cent, 
spare. A spare horse should be a fit one, with bridle, head-rope and nose- 
bag on neck, and may carry a saddle, provided the animal is not turned into 
a pack horse. 

II. — Man and Horse, 

1. Man, — Every man should bo able to cook his own meal, load or 
unload camels or mules, knee-halter a horse, mount or dismount quickly on 
either side, and destroy a horse in a humane manner. 

2. Horse, — Every horse and mule should leave the ranks freely, stand 
the ^re of the man on or beside him, sight and smell of camels everywhere, 
and should lead freely with man on foot or mounted. 

3. Passing Infantry and Loaded Camels, — In passing infantry, mounted 
men must avoid going through, hustling, or over-riding infantry, or passing 
close to windward of them, which often smothers them in dust. These 
precautions apply still more to loaded camels, which are peculiarly liable to 
stampede. Mounted men, if obliged to pass close to them, should do so 
at a walk. 

III. — Equipment, d:c, 

1. Equipment and Provisions, — Each mounted man ¥rill always have with 
him on the line of march 100 rounds of ammunition on himself, and 50 on 
his horse carried in a third bandolier ; at least one day's food for man and 
horse — tea, sugar, &c., being carried in small bags of calico, or some such 
material, and which will fit into mess tin or " billy " ; one small axe and 
chaguls, to be full at the discretion of officer commanding unit ; two nose- 
bags, blanket under saddle, whatever pattern, hecul rope and single rein to 
bridle ; magazine charged, cut-off closed and chamber empty, unless action 
IB imminent — the magazine spring can be rested by half -charging or emptying 
half rifles at intervals, under the direction of officer commanding unit. 

2. Wallets, — Wallets will not be carried while a saddle-bag, or spare nose- 
bag is available. Heel rope and heel peg will not be carried ; only a light 
coat or water proof will bo on front of saddle. 

3. Line-Ropes, — In the rocky or sandy ground prevailing in Somaliland 
where, moreover, troops and parties are usually concentrated at night, line 
ropes are better than the made-up ropes ; the former may be carried on muleF, 
the latter on horses or mules. 

IV. — Regimental Transport, 

1. The following will bo carried on regimental mule or trotting camel 
transport* and will accompany units, unless ordered to the contrary t — 


^fffrvt A mMu m Ui on, — ^250 rounds per rifle. 

^oMig Qtar and SnJbrtmMng Tools on two mules, inohiding six leatber 
buckets, 40 fathoms of li-inch rope, at least two canvas troughs without 
voodwoi^ six spades, four picks, 20 " kurpas," if procurable, tor cutting 
gf^ doe hospital and one veterinary pannier. 

^ Trotting CameU (better than MuUs). — Vat carrying the above, a 
trottiog camel will be reckoned as of the same capacity as a mule, i.e,, two 
'"'^uidi. But when mounted troops have to move any distance at a rate 
of OTer 3^ mUes per hour, including halts, say, 40 miles in 12 hours, or even 
^ in nx hours, fully loaded mules are out of the question. Trotting camels 
most be used, or mules dropped behind with an escort The latter course 
■ ffiadvisaUe in an enemy's country, with a small force. 

V. — Beeonnaisaanee. 

1. On recoanainanoe, every precaution must be taken to see without 
heing seen ; showing up <m ridges or heights must be avoided, and every 
advantage taken of cover from ground when operating against the enemy. 
All detached parties will take precautions for their own immediate safety. 

In thick bush country, detached parties of regular troops should close 
ffl to view of their own centre and main body. 

2. Losing Woff, — ^If lost, men will best regain the main body by retracing 
their steps, mounting a tree or eminence, and not by wandering aimlessly 
about the bush. 

The main body will assist those lost by similar methods, by firing shota, 
lighting fires on high ground, fixing a light on a tree by night, fto. 

3. 8un, — ^It is very difficult to work directions by the sun from about 
11 A.1C. to 1 P.K. in these latitudes, especially in the bush. If uncertain of 
the road and direction, and the sun is the only guide, it is better to halt 
between these hours. 

4. OuitUs. — ^In bush country, no regular troops will go far from the 
main body or camp without a Somali guide, until they know the locality or 
tracks. All ranks are warned against ill-treating or unduly hustling guides 
or other natives employed with the troops. 

VI. — Piice, Marchintj, 

1. Oeneral Rule, — ^As a rule, it is waste of time for men of cavalry or 
mounted infantry to be in the saddle, unless moving faster than they could 
march on foot over the same ground. When tied to infantry or baggage, 
they should cover at least half the march on foot, by alternate periods of 
walking and riding. 

2. Halts, — On the march there will be a halt of four to five minutes 
half an hour after starting and at every ensuing hour. If the first halt 
ends within 20 minutes of the hour, the second halt may be deferred to the 
next houTa 

8. Long Marekes, — ^In long marches, the most economic and telling pace 
or mounted troops moving without infantry or baggage animals, other 


Uiao trotting cameli or pock horses, » a Am trot^ jog, ** paee,** ** orawl*** 
" tripple,** ftc., wliieli enaUes taroops to keep togeHier and oofw regolariy 
five to 8IZ milea an hoar, inchidiiig a halt of fortr or fiT« miniites at each hoar, 
without ezhaosting the anhnaJn. This pace woald be modified daring the 
heat of the day, had going, or otiier adverse circnnutanoea. Erea in open 
bush country and fair going, 50 miles can thus be covered comfortably m 
12 hoars, inohiding an hoar's off-saddle, if men and horses are in fair con- 
dition, without efficiency being impaired. 

4. Pace increases from Front to Bear. — Even witii a column of 100 men, 
two abreast, the pace set in front becomes at least two miles faster in the 
rear. When practicable, troops will, therefore, march on a front of mounted 
infantry "sections** and gaps will be kept between companies or units. 
But in thick bush, even by day, on narrow front, all must keep dosed up 
unless units can move independently, each with a reb'able guide. 

6. Detached Parties. — Detached parties going out to take up position, 
such as advanced or flank patrol, will move at a quicker pace than the main 
body, but men will not go full speed, except in cases of the greatest emer- 
gency, and then only for a few hundred yards. 

Vll.— Tactical. 

1. Long-range Firing. — ^Long-range firing is to be avoided ; it is waste 
of ammunition against our present enemy. 

2. PursuiL — ^In pursuing an enemy leaving stock behind him, it must be 
home in mind that the stock first met can be picked up later, and that the 
enemy, with probably much more, is ahead. The strength of the pursuit 
should not bo wasted by detaching parties till the mian object has been 
reached, or the limit of pursuit decided. 

3. Inlying PicqueL—Jn standing camp, if the inlying picquet is not 
required, each unit will leave at least one horse in the lines ready to start 
at two minutes* notice. 

4. Patrols.— DaSij patrols from standing camp should vary the hour of 
departure and return, as well as the route taken. 

\Ul.— Zaribas. 

1. Troops forming camp will zariba, unless ordered to the contrary; 
men in front of their horses and sleeping on the spot they would occupy m 
case of alarm or attack. 

If more than one zariba is formed, the second and third should be 
** diamonded ** on to the first, thus : — 



Eieh win then ayoid firing into its nqjghboor, and will aarfst it'by 
flukiig fire. 

Tlw thorn fence of the lariba should not be higher than neo c s oar y to 
itop msn or beast ; it can hardly be made too wide, but should be low 
enough to admit of defendeis firing over rather than through it. 

2. In elaborate saxibaSy the oorer of the defenders from front Gre m 
hest obtained from earth taken from iHiere the thorn fence of the sariba 
vill rest, if ground admits of digging and stones are not plentiful. 

IX.— TF«/fa. 

1. On approaching wells, sentries will be posted on the most important, 
and water drawn under the direction of the officer or non-commissioned 
officer in command. Whoi men go down wells to clear them, or reclaim 
buckets, &o., a spare strong rope and party should be ready to assist in case 
of accidents, suffocation from fumes, ftc 

X. — Nighl Marching, 

1. Lights and PasHng Orders, — ^No smoking or lights allowed ; no 
talkiog beyond that neoeesary to conduct the march, orders being passed 
up or down the oolamn in a low tone of voice when it is impracticable for 
tny one with orders to pass al<mg the narrow tortuous bush paths blocked 
by troops. 

2. PosiHon of Officer Commanding. — The officer commanding will move 
at the head of the main body of the leading unit. 

3. Haits, — There will be the usual halt at the end of the first half hour 
and at each ensuing hour, as by day. 

4. Touch, — ^Absolute touch must be kept from rear to front ; if the pace 
is too fast in front, or an extra halt is required, the word must be Bcnt up 
quickly but quietly to head of column. 

6. Pact, — On dark nights, in bush country, the pace can seldom exceed 
3} mfles an hour for mounted troopo. Touch once lost is then most difficult 
to regain, and stray parties in the bush without Somalis are even more 
h^ljdees by night than by day. When possible, there should be at least one 
guide to every 150 men. A largo column compelled to move in single filo 
on one bush track becomes imiK>s8ible to liandlc : it nhould be divided into 
parties of 150 to 200. These parties, with their guides, ran march at intervals 
of 5 or 10 minutes. 

6. PonHon of Officers, — An officer, when available, will ride in rear of 
each unit or company, and the last of these officers will, at each halt, move 
up along the column to its head, and report to the officer commanding. In 
addition, an officer will occasionally move along the column under orders 
from the officer commanding. 

7. Adtnneed Guards, — ^Apart from native scouts working independently, 
the only advanced guard practicable in bush, on dark nights, is a few men 
strung out in file or single file, but in olope touch with one another. This 


means that they are generally part of the main body, and in same formation. 
Flankers are out of the question. In fairly open country, on bright or 
moonlight nights, the advanced guard will be slightly more advanced, with 
greater distances between links of connecting chain, and the ** point '* will 
be strengthened ; a few flankers can also be put out» but all must keep in 
sight* or touch, of next link towards main body, dosing in on approaching 
bush, ^ 




Ths small force of regular artillery employed in Somaliland 
was represented by a section of the 28tli (Lahore) Momitain 
Battery and the King's African Rifle Camel Battery. The 
following report of Lieutenant H. E. Henderson, R.A., who 
commanded the section of this Battery, gives an account of 
the part taken by the section in the operations and of its 
organization and equipment : — 

From the 4th July, 1903, till the end of December, 1903, the Section Operationi 
No. 28 Mountain Battery remained in posts on the lines of communication, 
moving from Upper Sheikh to Berbera to refit at the end of August, 1903, 
and proceeding to Eil Dab in January, 1904, to join the 2nd Brigade, Somali- 
land Field Force, of which it formed part during the operations in the 
Nogal, January and February, 1904. The section also formed part of the 
Las Doreh Column, March and April, 1904. 

The engagement at Jidbali on 10th January, 1904, was the only occasion 
on which the guns came into action. On this day the section formed part 
of the infantry square. When the squnrc halted facing east near the 
eoemy*s position, the guns were moved out a few yards ahead of the front 
face and came into action at a range of 1,600 yards on a group of huts. 
Between these huts and the position of the guns was a slight depression 
formed by the " balli ** running north and south, from which the ground 
sloped up gradually to the position of the square. On the west side of the 
*' balli " was a belt of bushes extending to within about 500 yards of the 

When fire was o pened the enemy advancing through the belt of bushes dis- 
closed their position, and the fire was changed on to them at 800 yards. This 
was continued at vari us ranges from 500 to 1,500 yards as opportunities 
occurred. At this time the enemy were well extended, took cover care- 
fully, and did not offer a good target. The best opportunities were 
given when they attempted to screen themselves in small groups behind 

About twenty-five minutes from the time of opening fire the enemy 
broke and took* to flight. Streaming across the open plain on the west of 
the '* balli *' they offered a better target, and several rounds were fired 
at them up to 2,200 yardi) until the guns had to cease fire in order not to 
hamper the pursuit by the mounted troops. 








Altogether 63 rounds were fired. The omqaitiee m the aeotioii 
two men killed and one camel wounded. 

Owing to the fact that the enemy offered no target on which contioi 
fire conld be directed, it was impossible to ascertain exactly the effeoi 
the fire. On examining the ground after the action, however, I came it^._ 
the conclusion that about 30 men were kiUed or severely wounded by ^bm. 
effect of gun fire ; this is excluding wounded men who escaped from the 
field, of whose numbers it is impossible to form an estimate. 

At the commencement of the action the fire of the guns apparent^ 
had the effect of making the enemy disclose their position. 

The seotion was armed with two 7-pr. guns of 200 lbs. 

The following is number and description of rounds per gun carried s— 
Common shell . . . . 20 rounds. . 

Shrapnel „ . . . . 93 

Ovsr ,, «• .. *• •* .. o 

Case shot . . . . . . . . 20 

Fuzes T. and P. Number 66 were used. 

Tlie extra proportion of case was carried in case of fighting in bush 
country ; the charges for these rounds were increased 30 per cent. There 
wore no missfires, prematures, or blinds. 

Besides the usual proportion of followers, the establishment of the section 
consisted of : — 

2 British officers. 
I native officer 
1 trumpeter • 
32 gunner ranks 

drivers (mule) . { 

1 assistant salutri -J 
1 Somali interpreter. 

22 „ (camel drivers). 

22 Somali camels. 

The mules were employed as follows :— 

1 per gun for drawing it in draught. 
1 „ „ ammunition. 
1 spare. 

Of the 22 camels, 4 were spare. 

The Somali camel drivers were sometimes a little difficult to manage 
when halted at or near the base ; on the march they did their work suffi- 
uleiiily well. In aotioo they were unsteady. 

Thti otimel saddlery eont from India consisted of : — 

(«) Pads for oarriage of ammunition. 

(ft) Oailles and pads for guns, carriage, and wheels. 
(m) Thft ffMrmer were leather pads with serge lining, stuffed with cocoa* 
nul fthre. The two sides were joined at the top by leather ; the pads were 
iliua Hlih Itaiber girths, breast-piece and crupper. They were apparently 

» Indians, Sikhs, and Punjabi Mussalman. 


ilndid for & differeot paMem of box to tiia mule pack unmimitloQ box 
VBied, bvt wImo fitted with liook8 for the latter, they proved oatMaotory. 
1W pads w«re In two sizaB. large and small ; the formerwere too large for 

(6) For the oarriage of gun, fto., a pisin leather pad was used, connected 
the top by leather as before. On this the wooden cradle rested, to 
which the girths, breast-pieoe and crapper were attached. The cradle wtm 
Mttttschedtothepadinany way. The saddles were not quite satisfaotor>'. 
» the cradles rocked considerably on their pads when the marching wa<« 
It i& fsst This could be minimised if the pads were separate — not con- 
Moled orer the camel's back — and if they were attached to the cradles by 
rtnpi, ss In mule saddlery. 

The pads should also be fitted with pockets for facilitating stuffing. 
The cradles were not sufficiently rigid, and worked loose at the Jointa. 

The gone were provided with draught equipment aa an altematlve to 
bnig carried hi pack by camels. This was advisable owing to the timidity 
flf the Somali camel, which might have prevented the guns being brought 
rapidly into action in an emergency. In the vicinity of the enemy the 
gm were drawn in draught. The draught equipment wan mad': up 
loeslly, and answered its pnrpoee. 

Special limbeis made in India wore not uned, as they were Unt h«?avy i/* 
he carried in pack over country impossible to wheel traasport. 

The Kino's African Rifle Camel Battery. 

The camel battery used in Somaliland was commandftd 
by Lieutenant J. A. Ballard, R.F.A., and conflistcd of the 
six 7-pr. R.M.L. (180 lbs.) guns and equipment lent by the 
Indian Government, and despatched from Aden to the Pro- 
tectorate for their local expeditions against the Mullah. The 
battery was fonnerly known as the " Aden Camel Batt^-Ty," 
the guns, &c., being periodically taken out for drill by one of 
the garrison companies stationed at Aden, the camels and 
drivers being lent by the Supply and Transport Corps. While 
at Aden the camel battery had, on several occasionSjdone useful 
work against the tribes in the hinterland. No men were, how- 
ever, sent to Somaliland with the guns, which were manned 
by Somalis trained by the Protectorate ofl&cers. 

At the beginning of General Manning's expedition the 
SomaU gimners were disbanded, and only a section of the 
battery was retained for movable column work, the remain- 
ing four guns being sent to strengthen the various posts 







on the lines of communication. The movable section was 
then called the "King's African Rifle Camel Battery." 
Twenty-one men, including a havildar from the Sikh Company 
B.C.A., were selected to form the detachments, the camel 
drivers being Somalis. The Sikhs made excellent gunners, and 
remained with the battery until the end of the campaign. 

A havildar acted as section commander. A detachment 
of ten Sikhs with a Naick was detailed for each gun. Ten 
SomaU drivers, including a havildar, took charge of the ten 
camels of the sub-section. Three camels carried the wheels, 
carriage and gun in the order named, followed by four ammuni- 
tion camels, and three others with the stores, waterproofs, 
tools, spare parts and draught equipment. The detachment 
marched " in order of march.'' In action, the camels were 
made to sit, the gun carriage, Sec, put together, the anmiuni- 
tion boxes taken off, and the empty camels taken to the rear. 
Shells were brought up to the guns in leather carriers. 

For the two movable guns the establishment was : — 

1 British oflScer. 

21 Sikh gunners (including one havildar). 
18 SomaU drivers. 

2 Somali havildars (drivers) (one per sub-section). 
1 SomaU interpreter. 

1 SomaU blacksmith. 
1 SomaU saddle-maker. 

The Sikhs were paid through their company. The following 
rates were paid to the Somalis by the Protectorate pay- 
master : — 

Drivers .. .. .. 15 Rs. per month. 

Havildars 18 Rs. 

SomaU Interpreter . . 60 Rs. 

Blacksmith . . . . 40 Rs. 

Saddlemaker . . . . 40 Rs. 

The carriage was of steel, weight about 200 lbs. ; the 
wheels of wood, weight about 140 lbs. ; the elevating gear 






Camel Loaded. 

Section read J to March. 



Section on the March. 




Camel In Draught. 

Camels Kneeling for " Action." 



.<T<, >»...■ /'to/. 2H.) 


D Uock under breech and «heet in R«r ; thft w&oh 
Mng strapped to wooden cradles on the saddles and carried 
by three camels. 

Two ammunitioii boxes, each containing 10 rounds, were 
canied by each ammunition camel, the waight beii^ about 
200 Iba. including saddle. 

The gun was quite suitable for the country. It was simple, 
accurate, and could not easily get out of order. Its range was 
not great, but the country in which the enemy generally 
attacked being dense bush, this short^-oming was unimportant. 
With well-txained detachments, from the command " Halt- 
Action " to the first shot, less than one minute elapsed and a 
fire of four or five rounds a minute could be maintmned. 

The gun was provided with two sets of sights for the double 
shell with reduced charge, and for the ordinary charge. Two 
chuometers were also carried. 

The saddles and ammunition boxes supplied originally 
were extremely heavy, being intended for Indian camels. 
This defect was overcome by exchanging the old heavy leather 
saddles of the ammunition camels for the light Egyptian 
pattern, which weighed about 20 lbs., and are easily restufied 
and repaired. The cumbersome and heavy wooden ammuni- 
tioQ boxes were also exchanged for the light leather mountain 
artillery boxes, each holding 10 shell and cartridges. These 
two modifications reduced the weight and incteased mobiUty. 
On the two spare camels per sub-section, light tarpaulins, 
spare parts, stores, tools, &c., were carried. 

The guns were supplied from Aden with double, common, AmmunitioD. 
shrapnel, star shell, and case shot. The double tod common 
shell were not carried with the battety, being left with the 
guns at the posts. 

The ammunition was in good condition, and a reserve was 
kept at Bofaotlp, The brass T. and P. No. 5(1 fuzes were new 
and bamt well. The cartridges consisted of 12 oz. black 
pebbl« powder and gave accurate shooting. All shells wore 

IHuiied fazed and set for 50 yards range. Forty rounds per 




gun of reserve ammunition was carried by the columns, 
the small arm ammunition of 50 rounds per man being carried 
in bandoliers. The following ammunition was carried by each 
sub-section : — 

Case .. 
Star .. 






80 rounds per gun. 

Picked SomaU camels only were used. These were found 
to be sufficiently strong for the lighter equipment, and they 
possessed the advantage of being able to live on the bush 
only when forage ran short. The Somali camel being generally 
very nervous and wild, it was necessary to have a driver for 
each animal. 

The kits of the detachments were carried by the various 
camel transport cadres, not by the battery camels. 

By changing the loads daily, watering about every four 
days and covering them at night, the animals were kept in 
excellent condition. Casualties in camels were replaced from 
any Camel Transport Cadre which the guns might be 

The establishment of transport for the two guns was : — 

2 guns 2 camels. 

2 sets gim-wheels 

2 gim carriages . . 


2 draught equipments 

Stores and spare parts 






20 camels. 

One riding camel and one riding pony were issued to tbe 
. ff cer commanding. 

Owing to the thick, dense bush, the columns were some- 
times obliged to march in Indian file formation, so the length 


of two guus and camels covered a distance of over 150 
yards. As the enemy generally made a point of attacking in 
this sort of bush, the chance of getting the guns together was 
remote, and thus all control and conmiand was lost. To avoid 
being surprised in this manner, a draught equipment was 
constructed, so that if the enemy attacked at close quarters 
the gun could be put together and drawn as a field gun by a 
camel, which, when not performing this work, carried the 
light limber, thus allowing all guns to be kept together when 
required. A pocket containing four rounds was carried on 
the Umber when used. 

The Ught limber consisted of a pair of shafts and a swingle- 
tree attached to a Ught wooden structure with a hook fixed 
in the rear for the eye of the gun trail. The wheels were 
similar to the gim wheels and could be used as spare ones, 
and the total weight of this construction was 240 lbs. (see 
Plates 24 and 25). 

The advantages of the draught equipment were : — 

Instant action. 

Guns closer and under better command. 

More guns could be used and less space occupied in column. 

(8U27a) 2 F 2 




1.— Engineer Services, Including Water Supply. 

Q. No organized Engineer services existed under Colonel Swayne. 
A company (No. 17) of Sappers and Miners arrived in 
January, 1903, under Captain W. B. Lesslie, who was then 
appointed Commanding Royal Engineer to the force. This 
company was chiefly employed in road-making, perfecting 
arrangements for water supply and in defensive measures for 
camps. Nearly all the company was with the Obbia force. 

A large increase to the Engineer services took place in 
July, 1903, and another company of Sappers and Miners 
(No. 19) joined the force from India. Major R. F. Allen, R.E., 
was appointed Commanding Royal Engineer to the force, 
with a Commanding Royal Engineer, Lines of Communication, 
ABM) seventeen other Royal Engineer officers, excluding the 
I^Wt^ph and survey services and the deep boring party. 
TW lOTtk Pioneers were also largely employed on Royal 

XW Kv^Y^ Kngineer officers and the men of the Sappers 
MM ^fcw** ^oikI Pioneers were employed on three principal 

>%.^Mi ^«*W^ ^wid storage. 

Water Supply. 

H V^vi^-^^**^ '*^^' l^^visiion of water supply and storage 

X xN'AJmw »wtMt*<MK^, as operations carried out 

.... Av -^^vHf '^ JbfvujlJ''^ between October and April 


held oat the best hopes of a decisive resah. During that 
season the movements of the Mullah could be restricted by 
suitable dispositions to certain tracts of countiy within 
striking distance of the British forces, thus diminishing his 

Consequently, an ample storage of water along our main 
lines of communication so as to admit of the collection of supplies 
for the concentration of troops prior to snj advance, and 
efficient arrangements for watering troops and ar^mals 
during operations, were the primary objects to be attained 
in view of the general strategical situation. 

During the operations under Colonel Swayne and Brig.- Transport 
General Manning, water was generally carried on transport '^^^• 
animals in tins or in copper tanks called fantasses. Their 
capacity was 12| gallons, but it was not safe to reckon on 
more than 10 gallons. Each tank when full weighed about 
2 maunds (160 lbs.). These tanks were also made use of 
during Oeneral Egerton's operations. 

Regarded from the point of view of the water supply Sources o 
question, the lines of communication during 1903-1904 ^*ii^gg"J 
may be divided into four main sections, as follows : — oommuni< 

"^ tion. 

Berbera to Upper Sheikh. 
Upper Sheikh to ElkadalanleL. 
Elkadalanleh to Kirrit. 
Kirrit to Eil Dab and Bohotle. 

Berbera to Ujyper Sheikh. — In this section the supply was 
chiefly from springs. At Berbera there was a large supply 
brought in pipes from the deep and warm springs at Dubar. 
A reservoir was also made at Adhoo Sheikh close to Dubar. 
(For details of water supply see table, page 460.) 

Upper Sheikh to Elkadulanleh, — In this section the water 
was obtained from wells sunk in the bed of the Tug Der. 

Gololi was the only place that ran completely dry after 
months of heavy calls on its resources. This took place in 
December, 1903, but early in March, 1904, the supply was 


r^rivcd bv an opportune downfaD ol niii. (For detaik see 
table, page 460.) 

SOkaialanleh to Kirrit. — In this section there was a water- 
leas stretch ol over 40 miles. Trial bonngs were made at 
DerKeinleh without success. Water was found at Idoweina, 
but this was 6 or 7 miles from the road. At little Bohotle, 
9 miles from Kirrit. a well 66 feet deep was sunk, but no water 
was obtained. There were in this section a few balUs, pans, 
or depressions which would fill with water in the rains. 

Kirrit to EH Dab. — In this section the supply was from 
weDs in the gypsum formation which extends right into the 
Nogal. The Kirrit supply failed on September Ist, 1903, 
and in consequence the advanced depot was moved to £il 
Dab and the demand on the Kirrit wells lessened. By 
unremitting labour the supply was afterwards restored and 
its quality improved. 

Between Wadamago and Bohotle there was no water 

except such as might collect in ballis during the rainy season. 

(For details regarding the water supply in the Nogal and on 

the Berbera-Las Dureh lines of communication, see table, 

pages 466 and 468.) 

'*u»r ttormgt The first points to be determined were the amount of water 

minu!iic». storage capacity required at each post on the lines of com. 

t>n- munication and the method of storage to be adopted. The 

decision on these points would naturally govern the quantity 

and class of stores to be procured for water storage in addition 

^ any provision for active operations. Certain general 

considerations also stood out. Such were : — 

The source of supply and its probable permanence at 
each post. 

The garrisons allotted to each post. 

The possibility of a congestion of transport at difierent 

The average daily consumption of infantry brigades 
and moimted troops excluding transport animals, 
which worked out as follows : — 

i, » 

99 99 


Mounted troops .. .. 18,000 gallons daily. 
1st Brigade (with S.M.I.) 8,000 
2nd Brigade „ 8,000 

The water required for convoys. 

The presence or absence of a civil population drawing 

from the same sources. 
The time available and probable duration of the 

The fact that practically all food materials and toob had 

to be brought up from the base. 
Labour was locally unobtainable, thus entailing im. 

portation from Aden. Military working parties 

had to be kept down in strength so as to admit of the 

accumulation of reserve supplies. 
The abnormal strain brought on the water supply by 

the Field Force. 
The necessity for rapid watering of troops and convoys. 

The capacity for storing water provided after considering 
all the above factors is given below with the actual amount of 
water stored daily. 



Actual Daily SUira^. 


Methods of 


Upper Sheikh . . 
DuolMir . . 
Goloii . . 
Waran . . 
Burao . . 

Elkadalanleh . . 
01e««in . . 
Ain Abo 
Eil Pah . . 
Bohotle . . 
Las Dureh 
Las Adoy 
JjM Khorai 
Yagitri . . 























From — 





















Generally tarpaulin or sailcloths were used for the lining 
to the reservoir tanks, which were in some places excavated 
in the ground and in others built of dry stone masonry. 
Whenever possible the lining was laid in a double layer with the 
tarpaulin underneath the sailcloth. Each tank had a capacity 
of from 8,000 to 9,000 gallons to fit in with the dimensions 
of the sailcloth (30 feet by 30 feet). The average durability 
of a sailcloth or tarpauUn was about IJ months. Many of 
the tanks were grouped so as to be filled from one end by 
syphoning. Tanks of 6,000 gallons capacity sent from 
England wore also used for permanent reservoirs at posts, 
but some of these tanks were rendered useless for a time 
owing to their being painted with lead paints. Evaporation 
caused some loss of water but was checked by grass mats 
laid on wire across the tanks. 

At Upper Sheikh a masonry dam was constructed with a 
capacity of 170,000 gallons. It eventually held a daily 

Dam at Upper Sbeikh. 

^T„ fnre ,, l,"..!.) 


Methods of 


Actual Daily Sllirage. 





From — 





Upper Sheikh . . 

; 266,000 



Dubbar . . 

1 140,000 



Goloii . . 


• m 









1 170,000 










Kirrit . . 




Olesnn . . 







Am Abo 




















Las Dureh 




Tias Adoy 


■ • 


Las Khorai 






• • 

• • 



• • 

• • 


(Generally tarpaulin or sailcloths were used for the lining 
to the reservoir tanks, which were in some places excavated 
in the ground and in others built of dry stone masonry. 
Whenever possible the lining was laid in a double layer with the 
tarpauUn underneath the sailcloth. Each tank had a capacity 
of from 8,000 to 9,000 gallons to fit in with the dimensions 
of the sailcloth (30 feet by 30 feet). The average durability 
of a sailcloth or tarpauUn was about IJ months. Many of 
the tanks were grouped so as to be filled from one end by 
syphoning. Tanks of 6,000 gallons capacity sent from 
England were also used for permanent reservoirs at posts, 
but some of these tanks were rendered useless for a time 
owing to their being painted with lead paints. Evaporation 
caused some loss of water but was checked by grass mats 
laid on wire across the tanks. 

At Upper Sheikh a masonry dam was constructed with a 
capacity of 170,000 gallons. It eventno"" held a daily 

Dam at Upper Sheikh. 


^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ PLATE H 

Dam at Upper Sheikh. ^M 




K- 1 



K/ .''-•' 









-■ /'/„/. 3.1,1 


^ --. 




,'^Oi//r</9^'on if pet- 


Scale /O ' fv /'. 



Comp/ctecf fn October f 903. 


Piatt 33 

bfinifin^ wrftr up to F&rt . 

Plate 33 

fbr brin^'iy wvfer t/p ^ Fart . 

To face page f-57. 

Piatt 34-. 


Feet 100 

I L 

J I I 




ijr^ tron 
±^ Tank 















To follow pUte 33 


Piatt 34- 




















62'. e' 

Sco/e /O to I . 



Comp/efecf in October /903 . 

NW\»T V^t^'ftmwv V* Vx'tiNkX.w 

Tftc water ivas pumped From th« ¥fttl into a sm^ll tank holding 6>bL 
alahe.ghtof 3)ftet. then into ^ second tJink ai^ height cf 40 feet and f 
iiorage tank st the ton Ttvo pumps ivre used in eadicase making s\ 
The irateftras storea in Sail cloths and tarpaulins 30 feet sqi/^reX 
dug in the ground. Th^^ '■anks varied from fjf 6in square t 
io ^f square by f f^ deep an 'i held 3000 ^llons each . The, w^ 
into the tanks nearest the iveJI i, stphanad by pieces of host 
the remainder. (See also plate 34-i 

To Folleyf piste 34- 


avpfage of 80,000 gallons. Photographs and a plan of the 
dt^m WB given in Plates 30, 31 and 32. 

At Eil Dab a 50,000 gallon reservoir was constructed with 
H|ulolnthH and tarpaulins. But it had the disadvantage that in 
eue of leakage repair was difficult. 

At Kirrit an embankment was made to retain 80,000 
g^nopB, but this 'was never filled. 

At Elkadalanleh about 100,000 gallons were held up by 
thB e^zth excavated from the trench weUs. 

Plana of the weUs at Shimber Berns and of the well and 
system of water supply at Wadamago are given in Plates 33, 
34 and 35. 

The storage at each post was reported by telegram daily Report of 
to 0£Bcer Commanding, Lines of Communication, to the ' ^^^' 
C.B.E., and to the C.R.E., Lines of Communication. 

From the main storage reservoirs the issues were made to S.^Btem of 

, - 1*11 distribution. 

expense tanks and to troughs either by pumps or more 
^neially by syphoning. The scale of allowance was generally 
as folJowB : — 

Men : 2 to 10 gallons per day, or more if water was 

Horses and Mules : 6 to 8 gallons per day. 

Indian Camels : 10 gallons every 4th day. 

Somali Camels : 8 gallons every 4th day. 

But this scale was intended only as a general guide. The 
actual quantity required on any given day was estinvated from 
the number of men and animals due to arrive, the number of 
water tins to be filled, and the j>eriod elapsed since the last 
watering in the case of camels, since these last drink more than 
8 or 10 gallons per animal if dr^prived of watiT for longer 
than 4 days. 

Two kinds of pump were principally used* :— PniiipH. 

The Bastier pump, for depths of over (Xi feet. 

The lift and force pump for 'J^) to 2"} f*ret r^pths. 

*The Obbi* force htid alao No'ton tu^e ^*H)l8 tn'i loUry }iiim)<s, I'Ut 
th"ne provp^l of littl ■ us • oM^iuj to y.arcity ot water uo'i th" ex' cs-iivf lilt 
v|iioh w«ft neceasaiy in moBt caae-. 


At Burao there was a windmill pump (sermotor), but it was 
necessarily desultory in its action. The lift and force pumps 
were the more generally used, and delivered from 500 to 600 
gallons per hour. They were considered indispensable and 
the only defect was some trouble in connection with the hose 
which sometimes became choked.* 
On the march. While on the march a sapper detachment either went ahead 
or marched with the advanced guard so as to put in hand 
without loss of time the water supply arrangements in camp 
or on the line of march. With each brigade, two lift and force 
pumps with hose, some sailcloths specially cut to 30 feet by 
20 feet, portable troughs, buckets, rope, &c., were carried on 

A large number of pumps were taken with the various 

operating columns so that in the event of scarcity every 

source of water might be utilised at halts or in camps so as not 

only to secure a sufficient supply, but also to ensure that 

watering might be completed before sunset. 

Labour. Labour for pumping was provided generally by fatigue 

parties from the troops, but this was supplemented by local 

labour from Aden. The Somali was not to be depended on 

for such work. 

Deep boriDg During 1903-4 boring operations were carried on at Hope 

operationi. Springs, Elkadalanleh, Der Keinleh and Kirrit. The work, 

which was under the supervision of Major Joly de Lotbini^re, 

R.E., was carried on by a special party of sappers and by two 

experts who were specially brought from America and England. 

The object of the operations was to discover if an artesian 

Supply of water could be tapped so as to assist the normal 


In the four places where boring operations were carried out 
practically no water was found, but Major de Lotbiniere 
was of opinion that the geological formation was favourable 
to the existence of an artesian supply of water over a con- 
siderable portion of the high tableland of SomaUland. He, 

♦The working parte of theee pumps, being of soft metal, deteriorated 
rapidly, eftpecially when the water carried sand and grit. 

however, consideied that a dropdziil onlTwas snhable for the 
operations, and that the drop drill used was not big enough- 
As it was decided not to incnr the extra expense of porchasing 
and installing a larger diiU, the operations ceased. 
The details of the operations are as follows : — 

At ffope Springs the boring was canicd to 388 feet 
depth. No bedrock or water was met with. The drill 
employed was the Calyx Rotary and time taken 36 days. 

Nature of soil : surface soil and secondary deposits of 
cla]^, marls, sands and conglomerates. 

Elkadalanleh. — ^Boring carried to 464 feet depth. No 
water met with. DriU employed. Calyx Rotary. Timid taken, 
62 days. Abandoned as shot crowns wore out. 

Nature of soil : 70 feet surface soil and clay, 3W feet 
bedrock limestone with breaks. 

Der KeirUeh. — ^Boring carried to 258 feet. No water met 
with. Drill employed, Columbia No. 1 Drop Drill. Time 
taken, 27 days. Abandoned as drill was too small. 

Nature of soil : 4 feet surface soil ; 254 feet bedrock lime- 
stone with breaks. 

Kirrit. — Boring carried to 400 feet. Small quantity of 
water met with in gypsum. Drill employed, Columbia No. 1 
Drop Drill and Rotary Drill. Time taken, 23 days. Aban- 
doned on conclusion of operations. 

Nature of soil, 66 feet bedrock gypsum ; 334 feet blue 
clay with bands of shale and hard limestone. 


N.B. — Dry seasons October to April, This Table was prepare 



Nature of 

Depth of well to 
water surface. 

Depth of water 
before use. 

Aveiage Yield. 




Upper Sheikh. 


(i) Piped from 

(ii) 8 wells . 


2 wells in bed of 

Springs ... 

(i) From wells 
in east nullah. 

(ii) From stream 
in Sama Sabdha 

Wells in the 
river bed sunk 
at various 
p o i n t i« in 

8 ft. 9 It. 
At surface 


9 ft. 

27 ft. to 30 ft. 

At surface 

(i) 12 ft. 
(ii) Pool at in. 


Ka) (b) (c) 

2 ft. ?. ft. ii ft. 

2 ft. 8 in. 

(i) 3 ft 

(ii) 1 ft. to 
in pools. 

2 ft. 

4 ft. to 10 ft., 2 ft. to 4 ft. 
and even over 
20 ft. in some 

(a) 300 gals, per Iioui 
(*) 400 
M 200 

4,400 gals, per hour . 

Ordinarily 100 to 20( 
gals, per hour fron 
each well, after flooc 
3 or 4 times the aboT< 


(i) 2,000 to 5,000 gals 
per day in dry season 

(ii) This is a strean 
with a copious supply 

I 3<)<) ^als. an liour fron 
each well after raini 
but will tall to 5(X 
gullors a (lay undei 
eonttant use. 

See rcinarks opposite 

Yield (le|)endeiit oi 
number of pocketi 
opened out. 



from observations between September 1903 and April 1904. 



.^'»S. ^-«*'- 





Xasyof accew 

Buf offtooeM. Water 
it eolleoted in 
Mttiing tanks. 

Wellt may fill up 
affear flood and re- 
qnro re-excavation. 

Battiar pumps or 

Saay off aooeat, backets 

Baaj of aooesa, L and 
V punip*. 






L and F pumps. 
Wella or piU 
most be dug in 
the pockets and 
tbese will fiU after 
freaheta and re- 
qnira to be dog 



After months of 
use water level 
fell in April, 
1904. Semi- 
permanent sup- 
ply dependent 
on rain. 


(i) Permanent, 
but liable to 
fluctuations in 

(ii) During 
drought water 
•inks into the 
bed and is ob- 
tained by exca- 
vating the eand 
when pools are 

Precarious, liable 
to exhaustion. 

Three wells were dug at Berbera as 
: water supply for animals, they are 

I trench wellt from 80 to GO ft. long. 

I ^^ 

• Water from these springs is at a 
temperature of 104**. 

About 1 ^ miles up the river miming 
8.W. from Kalgumrah there is a 
large pool of water in the bed. 

This is a stream. 

In rains supply is abundant. 



OoloU .... 


Burao .... 




Nature of 

Depth of weU to 
water surface. 

Depth of water 
before use. 

Ayerage jield. 

Weill in the 
hrer bed sunk 
at TariouB 
points in 

Wells in the rirer 
bed sunk at 
Tarious points 
in pockets. 

40 weUs in a pro- 
montory at bend 
of rirer. 

4 ft. to 10 ft. or 
15 ft. 

4 ft. to 10 ft., or 
15 ft. 

50 ft. to 60 ft., 

2 ft. to 4 ft. 

2 ft. to 4 ft. 

2 ft. to 10 ft. 

(i) 25 weUs in the (i) 4 ft. to 10 ft., 

even 35 ft., ac- 
cording to time 
of year. 

nver bed in 
(ii) one well on 

Wells in rirer 

Wells in rirer 
bed. About 1 
mile down 

stream there is 
a pool contain- 
ing about 5,00C» 
j gals, after floods. 

20 ft. to 80 ft. 

10 ft. to 20 ft. 

2 ft. 

4 ft. 

I ft. to 8 ft. 

2 ft. to 8 ft. 

From 8 or 4 well 
8,000 gals. pe 
diem down to nil pe 
diem. Yield depend 
on number of pocket 
opened out. 

6,000 gals, dailj froo 
6 or 6 wells. Yiel< 
depends on numbe 
of pockets opened o ut 

600 to 800 gals, pe: 
day per well up t< 
8,000 (sals. per da; 
per well. 

From aU wells 1,60( 
gals, to 8,000 gals 
'r day after rains 
lut in drought aboui 
40 to 100 gals, pe] 
day from all wells. 


Dependent on numhe: 
of wt-Us ufed, rariet 
from 200 to 2.00( 
gals, per day pe: 

Dependent on numbe] 
of wells used, Tariei 
from 200 to 1,00( 
gals, per day, aftei 
floods 4,000 to 6,00( 
gals, per day fronr 
all wells. 


Aeeessibilitj, best 
method of dnwiog. 



Somali backets, %.e., 
wadans. Well is 
Tery narrow and can 
onlj be cleaned bj 
letting doim a small 


L. and F. pumps. 
The care well as 
indicated by the 
name, is a caTem 
with narrow pas- 
sages leading 
under the gypsum. 
Descent into the 
pasMiges is easy. 

L. and F. pumps in 
treble, lift easy of 
access, water is in a 
large pit. 

L. and F. pumps or 
wa<lan8, eaay of 

L. and F. pumps and 
backets, easy of 

, L. and F. pumps, the 
csre well can be 
entered by the exist- 
ing rough ledges of 





(i) Impreg- 
nated with 


(ii) Fair, 

(iii) Fair, 






Precarious, liable 
to exhaustion. 

Permanent, it is 
possible that 
this water 
comes from an 

Precarious, liable 
to exhaustion. 

Semi-permanent . 


These weUs have nerer bean aiibjeeU 
to ft heavy drain. 

After xain, the cave wtXLt wonld IDl i 
and the yield would be trebled 
quadrupled. In fact, as the care wi 
forms a subterranean reaerroir, yie 
would depend on number of pom 
used untu level reduced. It won 
tiien gradually diminish to vaniahi 
point in tiie dry season. By oonsta 
cleaning of the passages, a small supp 
was kept up during the dry seasc 
The impregnation with sulphurett 
hydrogen is probably due to ean 
droppings having been swept in duri 
former watering by Somalia. ] 
cleaning, the water becomes mu 
better in quality. 

A copious supply. 

In the dry season only 2 or 3 of t 
wells contain water. In rains, th( 
would be a large quantitv of wai 
held up in a hollow in the gypst 
formation which is filled with sand. 

These wells are in a basin, which af 

lieavy rain forms a lake. 
In dry season, only the deep wells g 


2 o 


2 1 3 




8 welU BOO ft. 
bstow camp. 

43 ft. to 45 ft. 

2 ft. 



Tool of hUl at 
whicli i< defmi. 
■ible pent. 

well* about ) 
mile w»Bt of 

(^"Cre weU 

(called tnee' 
iratrr well] 100 
rdi. N.W. of 
now »ell>, 
Tbwj «M in tha 

(i) 15 ft. to BO ft. 

(li) 26 ft. 


(i) 800 U, 1,0U0 g>l, 
per ,liem. 

(ii) 800 g»U. per die. 

(iii) 20 fl. 


(iii) 50 e,U. per dieu 

gypum for- 


1 well in CTP- 
■um fonmtion. 

55 ft. to 60 ft. 

U fl. loSfl. 

12,000 gab. per da; 


SO well* in gjp- 


Uin. tulft. Hin 

aw gal«. per dmj fron 

aii nirell*. 


»um fornutJOD. 

4 (t. to ao ft 

Ferj taniibl,. in 
lin M«M)n. J ft. 

After rain, there i. 
luri-e quantity { 
»«(.r. but afier Ion 
u.a> 2m> gal., pc 

Ti«ell 80 ft. 

2 ft. to ;i ft. B.OOU gain, per day 



I Aooessibilitj, best 
j mflUiod of dnwing. 



Somali bocketo, «.«., 
wad&ns. Well is 
verj narrow and can 
only be cleaned bj 
letting down a small 

I L. and F. pumps. 
I The cave well as 

indicated by the 
I name, is a cayem 
y with narrow pas- 

sages leaoing 

' under the gypsum. 

Descent into the 
I passages is easy. 


L. and F. pumps in 
treble, lift easy of 
access, water is in a 
large pit. 

L. snd F. pumps or 
wadans, easy of 

L. and F. pumps and 
buckets, easy of 

, L. and F. pumps, the 
care well csn be 
entered by the exist- 
ing rough ledges of 



(i) Impreg- 
nated with 


(ii) Fair, 

(iii) Fair, 






Precarious, liable 
to exhaustion. 

Permanent, it is 
possible that 
this water 
comes from an 

Precarious, liable 
to exhaustion. 



These wells have never been subjeote 
to a heavy drain. 

After rain, the cave wells would fill u 
and the yield woidd be trebled o 
quadrupled. In fact, as the cave we 
forms a subterranean reservoir, yiel 
would depend on number of pnmi 
used imtil level reduced. It woul 
then praduaUy diminish to vaniahin 
point m the dry season. By constai 
cleaning of the passages, a small suppl 
was kept up auring the dry seasoi 
The impregnation with sulphurette 
hydrogen is probably due to cami 
droppings havmg been swept indurin 
former watering by Somalis. B 
cleaning, the water becomes muc 
better in quality. 

A copious supply. 

In the dry season only 2 or 8 of tl 
wells contain water. In rains, thei 
would be a large quantitv of waU 
held up in a hollow in the gypsui 
formation which is filled with sand. 

These wells are in a basin, which afli 

heavy rain forms a lake. 
In dry season, only the deep wells gii 


2 o 


1 AooembiUtj, htrnt 
i method of dnwing. 


Permanency. Bemarks. 



8 9 

L. and F. pomps; wellf 
can be entered by 
the existing roogh 
ledges of gypsum. 

Fair, aperient, 
with sul- 


L. and F. pumps 

Ll and F. ; wells can 
be easily entered 
and cleaned. 

L. and F.; wells can 
be easily entered 
and cleaned. 

L. aiid F. pumps 

L. and F. pumps, easy 
of access by digging. 

Buckets or L. and F. 
pumps, easy of 

Buckets, L. and F. 
pumps, easy of access. 

Buckets L. end F. 
pum p», easy of access. 

L. and F. pumps, easy 
of access. 

L. and F. pumps, easy 





Fair, some 
pools, brae- 




Brackish . 
Brackish . 

Precarious, liable 
to exhaustion. 

Precarious, liable 
to exhaustion. 

Probably per- 

Seems to be a 

Liable to dry up 
up in drought. 


Seems permanent 

Seems permanent 


A copious supply. There was a ver 
heavy drain on these wells throughou 
the operations without any diminutioi 
of the level of the wells. 

The water is procured from pools anc 
from a well situated in a large pit. 

Force halted only a day or two ii 
January, 1904. 

Force only marched through an< 
watered in January, 1904. 

The stay of the force in January, 1904 
was not sufficiently prolonged to judg 
of the permanency of the supply. 

Force only marched through an< 
watered in January, 1904. 




Nature of 

Depth of well to 
water surface. 

Depth of water 
before use. 

Arerage yield. 



8 4 


Gaolo .... 

Halin ...^ 

Large poolB in bed 
of nullah. 

Stream .... 

In 6 wells in gyp- 
sum about 1 
mile from post. 

At surface 

O 11. .... .... 

2 ft. to 3 ft 

Inflow probably 200 to 
&00gab. per hour. 

3 to 5 gals, per sec. ... 

About 1,500 sals, per 
hour per wefl. 


Sagal .... 


Las Adey 


•« •• . . . ' 

Las Khorai ... 

niig .... 

In tienches in 
rirer bed lo 
the number re- 

In trenches in 
riTer bed to 
the number re- 

In trenches in 
river bed; to 
the number re- 

Trenches in river 

Pits or trench in 
nullah bed. 

One well on 

8 ft. to 10 ft '2 ft. 

4 ft. to 8 ft 2 ft. 

• •• • ••« 

1 or 2 ft. to 3 ft. I 2 ft. 

1 it* .... ... 

2 ft. 

8 ft. 

12 ft. 

2 ft. 


400 eals. per diem per 
well, but after flood 
probably 3,000 gils. 
per diem per well. 

400 gals, per diem to 
8,000 gala per diem 
per well. 

8,000 gals, per day 
from 6 to 8 pits. 

2,000 gals. i)er day 

500 gals, per hour 

50 gals, per hour 





Aceef sibility, boat 
method of drawing. 








7 8 9 

Bncketa or L. and F. 
pomps, f»j of acoefB 

Budgets or L. and F. 
pumps, eaaj of access. 

Eafj of access, L. 
and F. pumps. 




Bad, yery 

Seems permanent. 




Kmj of access, L. 
> and F. pumps. 


' Easj of access, L. 
' Aod F. pumps. 

Easy of access, L. 
and F. pumps. 

Easy of access, L. 
and F. pumps. 

L. and F. pumps, 
easy of access. 

Easy of access, L. 
and F. pumps. 

Gh>od, dhall 
can be 


Fair, some 
of it brack- 









Seems permanent. 

Floods will fill up the trenches w 
sand, necessitating re-excaration. 

50,000 gallons of water were taken < 
in 4 weeks with reduction of gene 
Icyel by nine inches. 

There is running water at Iga (Shad 
18 miles west of Los Adey. 


Place Nature Depth of well to 

of supply water surfaoe. 

Depth of water 
before me. 

Arenge yield. 

1 2*8 4 

! 1 1 


£1 Dibber 
Dibit .... 



Bera .. 





38 ft. 

Shallow wells ... , 10 ft. 


4 wells 8 ft. 

6 wells .... 

(a) 1 open well.... 

(b) 1 deep well .... 
(e) 1 well 

1 deep well 

Numerous wells 

26 ft. 

50 ft. 


... 20 wells .... 

20 ft. 

Bohr ' Wells .... 

.... 3 wells .... 

15 ft. 

w eiis .... .... 

....j 4 ft. 

..J 4 ft. 

2 ft. 

5 ft. 

...I 2 ft. 


1,000 gab. per day .. 


•..• ..' 


Fair supply .... 


(a) 2,400 gab. a day 
(5) 800 gala, a day 
I (c) 160 gab. a day 
. Limited supply 


Fair supply . .. 

... Fair supply «. 

20 ft. to 50 ft I 2 ft. to 6 ft ' Fair supply .... 

....I Numerous wells. 40 ft. to 80 ft. ... 2 ft. to 4 ft. . . Plentiful 
j all of small 

■ ■ •• •>« 

nelJiod of i;»mg. *5"»''^?- 

1 1 


,: ' ! ' ! • i 


'of communication. 

1 jBMyo(acc«5,bu^keta 


Libet7 to fail if 
much drawn on. 

|Eu7 ot aec«M, L. 


and F. pnmpa. 

1 Em7 of MMM 

Tainted .,.. 

Likely to fail if 

,£•■7 of sooe>, L. 

Likely to fail if 

Mui F. pompt. BUI- 

much drawn OB. 

■ 1 

phu retted 


One doee not 

1 1 


[ Emt of Mccn, L. 


Likelj to faU if 


much drawn on. 

,{.)BMJ0fMCM. .... 


Likely to fail if 
much drawn on. 

1 (i)IlMiDireaL.uidF. 


poiDpi or bucket!. 

j (f J l£»s.r of (Kceu .. . 


' Backet* or L. Mid F. 

Inferior ... 

LikclT to fu] if 

Thi* weU wai large enough to admt 

j ptunpi. 

muoi. drawn on. 

of L, and P. pumpa being lowerw 
on a staging. 
About 2 mite* weat of Galka7u then 

' EU7 of wcait, L. ! Impregn.ted Two of Ihetc 

1 and F. pump* or' wilh aul- ' ncrer failed. 


pburotled though much 

limit*,! supply of eicpUent water 
about 150 ft. below the surface o 


bjdrogen. i drawn on. 


the gwnnd. Aoe«M i* difflcull 

without much labour, since there i 


only one place whence water can b< 


reached, and then the sides at th, 


crater, which are of sand, are rerj 

1 : 


, S—j of Mc«», L. 


Likely to foil if 

1 and F. pump* and 

much drawn on. 

1 j bucket*. 

1 JEaarotaco... 



Ka«7 of aeMM, L. 


NeTcr failed 

. and F. pump* and 

though mucl. 

1 bucket*. 

drawu on. 

,Eai>7 of acoeai, L. 



and F. pomp* and 


Bai7ofaoceaB,buckete| Variable 

and wadao*) impoe- . 
; nUe to use L. and 


Defensible Posts on the Lines of Commxtnioation. 
Defensible posts weie constructed at the following places : — 

Name of Poet. 

Designed for 



Betbera •• 



Dnbar . . 









Lower Sheikh . 



Upper Sheikh . 
Ihibbar .. 



^ Gololi 



Waran . . 



Burao . . 






Elkadalanleh . 






Olesan . . 



Garrero .. 






Ain Abo . . 



Fil Dab . . 



Shimber Berrifl . 



Bohotle .. 



rypes of 

A. — Masonry blockhouses roofed if necessary. 

B. — ^Earth redoubts without special flank defence. 

C. — ^Defensible enclosure, rectangular in plan, with 

flanking bastions. 
D. — ^Non-defensible enclosures for stores, with defence 

from the flanking bastions only. 

The flanking bastions were usually loopholed walls of 
masonry. The obstacle consisted in a thorn zariba with barbed 
wire entanglement and fence. The non-defensible enclosure 
was defined by a thorn zariba. 

An example of each type of defence is shown by : — 

Dubar A. Plate. 37 

J36x .. •• .. .. J3. ,, OO 

Burao C. „ 39 and 40 

Upper Sheikh D. „ 41 








- 1 



P/aU 41. 



Comers ; 

M Os: / i -\ 


/ » 



I : Comeh 

/ / 
/ / 




'>.- ' 

Mute wagon Li nes / / 

/ / Comeh ''>| 



Berber A Fea 2 r^ /304 

» ' .' c/ 

' ■ ' €»/ 


"V.^ / 

/ ' 


4il Oi 

To follow / 


"9 ^ / / V^ / / 




Comeis / / Come/a 

M.Os: / i N 


^7 /^^'-^^^/ 

* » 


' 'I » • ^^, 




> I 
» I 

I I 







Male wa^on 

Lines ! I 


'^_ / 

;' ; Come/s /'^l 


/ / 

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■^» < 



St^sBMA FcB 2 ".' 1904. . 


til »f 



IhJbaT. — The blockhouse was made of mud masonry and Details, 
a roof of 6 inches of earth was provided. The walls were of 
stone laid in mud plaster. The roof was carried on 5-inch posts 
and rafters on which were laid reeds and mats covered with 
6 inches of earth. The blockhouse was surrounded by a barbed 
wiie fence 4 feet high. 

Ber. — The parapet was of earth taken from the trench. 
It was revetted with brushwood. The post was surrounded 
by a double line of thorn zariba. 

Burao. — The sketches amply illustrate the defences at 
this post. 

Upper Sheikh, — Two masonry redoubts at opposite corners. 

The special defences were as follows : — 

Berbera, — The defences were confined to the official Special 
quarter known as the Shaab, which is separated by a distance 
of 1 J miles of open ground from the native town. In order to 
reduce the perimeter to be held, detached entrenchments were 
constructed at certain points along the border of the Shaab 
to command the surrounding country and to flank each other. 
A scheme was also devised for the rapid occupation of the 
line of defence and for loopholing buildings. For details of 
defence see Plate 43, and the following details : — 

No, 1 Post, — An earth breastwork 42 feet long with flanks 
12 feet long. Revetted with a double row of bhoosa bales 
on top of cement casks. Parapet, 4 feet high and 2 feet 
thick on top. 

No, 2 Post, — Masonry wall, 4 feet 4 inches high, 18 inches 

No, 3 Post, — Earthwork, 56 feet long. Parapet, 4 feet 
6 inches high and similar to No. 1. Had two embrasures 
for guns 6 feet 6 inches wide. 

No, 4 Post, — Circular earthwork. 53 feet inside circum- 
ference, 4 feet high and revetted with grain bags, thickness 
asKo. 1. 

No, 5 Post, — Parapet, 170 feet long, similar in section to 
No. 1. Two embrasures. 



No, 6 Post. — Similar to No. 2» Wall of masonry 18 inches 
thick, 6 feet high, with platform on inside 18 inches high. 

No, 7 Post, — ^Flat roof of a house 62 feet long, 15 feet high. 
Low parapet 18 inches high ran all round the roof. 

No. 8 Po«<.— Similar to No. 7, 78 feet long. 

No, 9 Post. — ^Earthwork in two portions. West portion, 
115 feet long, parapet as in No. 1 . Eastern portion, 3 feet high, 

No, 10 Post, — Circular breastwork of double row of bhoosa 
bales 4 tiers high. 70 feet circumference. 4 feet high ; 3 feet 
6 inches thick. 

Nos. 11 d 12 Posts, — C. and D. sections of supplies 
surrounded by a wall of bhoosa 4 tiers high. 

No. 13 Post, — ^Breastwork of 2 rows of bhoosa bales as in 
No. 10. 

The post was enclosed by a loopholed wall 250 feet square 

Two barbed wire fences were erected as shown in sketch 
protecting Nos. 1 and 5 works. Standards 15 feet apart and 
every fourth post was stayed on the outside. 

Kirrit, — An isolated hill was put in a state of defence 
by the construction of a masonry parapet wall conforming to 
the contour of the hill. This wall was flanked by small 
bastions. The hill commanded the water supply imme- 
diately below it, and overlooked the depot of stores located 
at its base. For details see Plate 44, and the following 
details : — 

The wall was 2 J feet thick, 4 feet 3 inches high, and had 
a perimeter of 200 yards. 

The whole was surrounded by a double fence of barbed 

Oarrero, — ^The original fort was a self-contained masonry 
work on a small rise of ground. A work was added to afford 
room for huts and, up till November, 1903, the Field Hospital 
was accommodated there. This post was of small importance. 

Ain Abo. — The post here consisted of a rectangular 
stone breastwork. See Plate 45 and following details : — 



Plate 45 


Scale jies or I0yd5.« I inch. 

lUd €mf/e9 

l^r^e Tree 

\Melter A Graham. L^ LithaLondop 

PUU 45. 

VhllcrACrihat^.LV UtIwLandap 



^ed trees 






/^. teller 4 Cr«!iafnL»- LiCho.London 

To Fa ce p^ge 4 75 


^~ about 2t 


PMt *7. 

5' -,, 

7i /iZ/tu, p/tlt *e 



Plate 48. 


Af9jr of t 


Post consisted of a stone breastwork built round two large 
banyan trees. Breastwork 4| feet high by 2 feet thick of 
dry stone masonry. 

Defensible posts were also constructed at : — 


Designed for 



1 Number. 

Galadi . . 

• • • 





Oaolo . . 


Halin . . 


Hudin . . 

• • • 

Las Khorai 


Tias Adey 
Beyi .. 




Of the above, plates are given showing the defences at Halin 
and at Las Khorai, with a sketch plan of the coast at Las 
Khorai. At Las Khorai the parapets were of sand and un- 
revetted, but were covered with loose seaweed. A strong 
wire entanglement was provided and the outer wires were 
fitted with tin rattles since the sea was so close that a rush 
could be made on the post in the dark. 

Othsb Enqineerinq Wobks. 

Besides the defensible posts and the work on water supply, 
the work of the Sappers and Miners and Pioneers included the 
following : — 

Roads. — (a) The road from Berbera to Lower Sheikh Roads, 
was finished about August, 1903. It was not metalled. The 
maximum gradient was 1/20 and average width 15-20 feet. 
(b) From Lower Sheikh to Upper Sheikh. This road was 
opened in October, 1903. Its maximum gradient was 1/15, 
and width 8-10 feet, (c) A road was cut through the jungle 
from Upper Sheikh to Elkadalanleh, width about 25 feet and 
with easy grades. And the road from Elkadalanleh to Kiir ' 


was improved, (d) Other roads constructed included an alter- 
native route from Upper Sheikh to Burao via Waran. 

Laying of tram lines and the widening of the pier causeway 
to Berbera. 

Temporary shelters of various kinds* 

Mat-walling for E.P. tents at Berbera. 

Adaptations of buildings for base offices at Berbera. 

The construction of an ice machine house. 

Sanitary arrangements. 

Breakwater at Las Ehorai. 
«bour. At Berbera and in the vicinity labour was obtained from a 

contractor who supplied it at rates slightly exceeding those at 
Aden. He also supplied coolies for work on lines of com- 
munication, if required. 

Most of the coolies and native artificers, such as masons, 
blacksmiths and carpenters, who were employed, came from 
Aden, but it was found difficult to obtain local labour as the 
Somali has no liking for engineering work. The men of the 
Porter Corps were also employed for various works. 

The miUtary labour was found by Nos. 17 and 19 Com- 
panies, 3rd Sappers and Miners, 107th Pioneers and by working 
parties from infantry. For native troops, except sappers 
and miners, the following were the daily rates of working 

Subadars . . 
Jemadars . • 
N.C.O.'s and rank and file 
British officers 

Rate o 








The working day was reckoned at eight hours, and to arrive 
at the amount due, the number of hours the men worked was 
divided by 8 and a full day's working pay allowed for e?jch 
of the number of days so arrived at, any balance being paid 
for as follows ;^ 








Names of Places. 

Nature of Tine. 


Date of Opening Office. 

A. Up to 




3rd February 

Julj, 1903. 

Upper Sheikh . . 

»» • • • • • • 


7th February 

Biirao . . 

»» • • • • 


17th February 


»» • • 


4th March (subeequently 
closed and office trans- 
ferred to Elkadalanleh) 

Olesan . . 

yy . . • • • . 


2nd March 

Garrero . . 

»» • • • • • • 


6th 5farch 

Bohotle . . 

»» • • • • • • 


8th March 


Damot .. 

Gable (from Bohotle) 


14th Mltfch (office closed 



10th June) 

B. After 7th 

Kirrit . • 

Gable (subeequently 


31st July 

Jolj, 1908. 


Gable (from Garrero, 
Air Ist November) 


16th September 

Shimber Berris.. 



18th September 

Gololi . . 

»« • • • • • • 


30th September 


Gable (from Wada- 
magu, Air 1st 


8th October 



• • 

22nd November 



• • 

20th November 


»» • • • • 


25th November 


Gable (air 30th De- 

• • 

23rd Decembei- 

Taguri . . 

Cable (closed 9th 
January, re-opened 
air, 21st January) 


6th January, 1904 

Jidbali . . 


• • 

10th January (closed January) 


»» • • • • • • 

• • 

nth January (closed 
14th January) 



»» • • • • • • 

• • 

13th January (closed 
1 4th January) 

Dariali . . 

»» • • • • • • 


18th January 

Gaolo . . 

„ . . 


27th Janufio-y (closed 
9th February) 

Las Dureh 

„ (afterwards air) 


28th February 


,9 . . • * . • 

• • 

28th February 


»» • • • • 

■ • 

]«as Adey 

»» • • • • • • 


13th March 

El Afweina 



2-Jn(l March 

Total mileages erected and laid weie : — 

Air line 432 miles. 

Cable • . . . . . 604 

^ed frees 






S2/ e.oe. teller &Cra!iamL»^ LithoLondon. 

To face paye ^75 

(*- about 2t 



PItU *7. 


22 horiiOnta/ 


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2 H 2 


Wixttlets A Maiooni installation, under lieut. Silvertop, R.N., was 

^^^^^P*"^* attached to the Obbia Force in 1903, and attempts were 
made to utilise it on the lines of communication. Owing, 
however, to the characteristics of the country, it was found 
impossible to arrive at any good results, and the attempt to 
make use of it was abandoned. The party finally left the 
force in May, 1903. 


Orgamsation. ^^^ signaUing services in Somaliland duringl903-4 were 
under a Superintendent of army signalUng, who was 
attached to the Headquarter Staff. When the force 
was organized into brigades, brigade signalling officers were 

The total personnel available was : — 

21 British 

81 Indian 

6 African 

108 Signallers. 

Equipment. The equipment carried consisted of 3-inch, 5-inch, and 10- 

inch heUographs, with flags and lamps. During the latter 
part of the campaign lamps were discarded as it was found that 
they were never used. 

Some confusion occurred owing to the message forms 
used in India and those used at home being diflEerent. The 
Superintendent recommended that they should be assimi- 
Suiubility of It was Considered that all the country traversed by the 
sTTOaUma*!' expeditions under General Egerton was suitable for signalhng, 
but in the Southern Hand, owing to its dense bush, signalling 
was not practicable. On the Obbia lines of communication 
signalling could only be used between Obbia and Dibit. 

A line of signalling stations could be carried right through 
from Berbera to Bohotle and from Berbera to the Anane Pass 


via Bur Anod and Dariali. Some notes on visibility of 
points are given below. 

The best time of day for signalling purposes was found to 
be between 8 a.m. and 11 a.m., and 3.30 p.m. to 5.30 p.m., the 
mirage in the middle of the day interfering considerably with 
signalling operations. 

Signalling was chiefly made use of : — Work done. 

At advanced posts oS the Une of telegraph. 

To keep up communication between the various columns 

when on the march. 
Between picquets. 
Permanently for several months between Upper Sheikh 

and Las Dureh. 
To connect up different points in the Nogal, when the 

telegraph was withdrawn, so as to keep them in touch 

with the lines of conmiunication at £il Dab. 
After the 20th March, 1904, to keep up communication 

between the 1st and 2nd Brigades via Hudin and El 

Afweina, by means of two 10-inch helios. 

1. The following places were visible from Halin Fort : — VisibjUty of 

^ ^ certain pointi 


Mid HaUn 
Lower Halin 

♦Tagabei . . 


7 miles. 


2. The communication between Hudin and Eil Dab wa8SignaUin| 
established via a hill on the Bur Anod range 8 miles froni JhTNog*!. " 
Hudin. From this hill, Eil Dab, El Afweina, Dumodleh and 
Hudin could be seen. Bearings were as follows from this 
hill :— 

• Tn Dagali Ourgur range, water in Talley below, 
f In Shilemadu range remote from water. 
X Pass at the head of Halin Nullah. 


ToElAfweina .. .. 260 degrees. 

ToDumodleh 170 „ 

ToHudin 75 ,» 

3. (i) Eabr Ogaden (water at Eil Dab, 2} miles). From 
here could be seen : — ^MayoHill (water at Gosawein, 3 miles), 
27 miles north-east by east ; Bur Anod (60 miles east-north- 
east) ; Garab Hill (water at Hoftirro, 4 miles), 20 miles south- 
east by east ; Samala Hills (water at Samala, 1 mile), 26 miles 
south-east by east ; Yaguri Hill (39 miles south-east by east). 

(ii) Oarab Hill ; from here the following places were 
visible : — ^Mayo, 21 miles north-east by east ; Bur Anod» 
50 miles north-east by north ; Samala, 11 miles south-east 
by east ; Taguri Hill, 21 miles south-east by east (water at 
Taguri, } mile). 

(iii) From Samala : — ^Mayo, 23 miles north by west ; Bur 
Anod, 42 miles north-east ; Yaguri Hill, 11 miles south-east 
by east. 

(iv) From Yaguri Hill there was an extensive view over the 
plains to the north and north-east. To the south-east the 
hills above the Dehjeuner could be seen, and to the south- 
south-east the hills near Baran on Southern Hand. 

(v) It was beUeved that a station on the hills south of Tifali 
could be found, from which both Yaguri Hill and Dariali were 
visible, but it would probably be necessary to interpolate a 
second station, probably to west of Odergoeh. 

(vi) From Dariali to Halin, communication would probably 
be as follows : — 

A station would be necessary at or near to Aide Jiffifta, 
and another on the Dagah Gurgur hills. From the latter 
station Gaolo and the hills immediately over HaUn were seen. 

(vii) Signalling communication between Dariali and Kallis 
was more difficult. Most of the water places, such as Gubli, Heli 
Madu, Beretabli, and Genowci lie among the foot hills which 
shut out any extensive view from west to east. Short of a 
station well out on the Nogal Plain, from which a view could 


















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2 H 2 


ield post 

On an average mails were received every four days and 
were despatched every three days. On 16th April the base 
office at Obbia was closed and was transferred to Berbers, 
where up to this time the postal arrangements had been in 
charge of the base supply and transport officer. On the 9th 
May a field post office was opened at Bohotle and on 20th June 
at Sheikh. 

The postal service was increased in September by one 
extra field post office and two spare clerks with one Khalasi, 
and in October by two clerks and four followers. 

After July, 1903, field post offices were established as 
follows : — 


Opened on — 


Berbera . . 

April 1903 

Base post office 


3nl Augnst 

Moved to Wagon's Rust 25th 

Upper Sheikh . . 

20th June 

Lower Sheikh. .. 

18th October 

Afterwards 2nd Brigade post office 

Burao . . 

16th July 


7th December 

Eil Dab . . 

7th January, 1904 

Garrero . . 

6th July, 1903 . . 

Moved to Kinil 14th eptember, 
and movc»d to Wad imago 20th 
January, 1904 

Bohotle . . 

9th May . . 

Afterwards 1st Brigade post office, 
moved 4th January, 1904 


July. 1903 

1st Brigade 

January, 1904 

2ad Brigade 

November, 1903 

Las Dnreh 

8th March, 1904 

bnveyanoeof Mails were conveyed almost entirely by camel riders, 
except to Las Dureh (before it became an important line) and 
to Hargeisa, on which services runners were employed. Mules, 
however, were employed between Wagon's Rust and Burao. 
The average time for mails between Berbera and Bohotle was 
66 hours. 

Parcel mails were despatched by convoy, except small 
parcels, which went by letter mail. The mails were originally 
sent once a week from Berbera by boats of Messrs. Cowasjie 
Dinsbaw^and Co., but on August 5th the service was supple- 

inented by two warahipe — H.M.S. " Merlin " and " Porpoiae " 
■^which plied between Eerbera and Aden, On the 14th 
■October the gunboats were replaced by two R.I.M. ships — 
tiie " Dalhousie " and " Mayo," the latter being taken off on 
nth November. On lith February, 1904, a small boat called 
the " Meyun " was chartered specially for mail services, and 
took the place of the " Dalhousie." 

Money order work was performed at Upper Sheikh, Burao, Monoy 
Eirrit, Wadaniago, Bohotle. and Berbers. 

3. Supply and Transport. 
Colonel Swayne in his exijeditions had to contend with 
considerable difficulties in the organization of the supply 
uid transport services, especially as a great part of the country 
waa very httle known and therefore information as to its 
jfcsourcea for water and supply purposes could only be gained 
^um native sources. When General Manning assumed 
IBommand more information was available and he organized a 
regular transport service, while supply was placed under a 
separate head. General Egerton, however, decided to put supply 
fcud transport under one head, and on the 9th July, 1903, 
the entire transport and supply arrangements were placed in 
lAarge of an administrative officer of the Supply and Transport 
Corps (IJeut. -Colonel W. R. Yeilding, CLE., D.S.O.).* 
It was considered that this was — 
Tbn only posnible airangetneiit in tbia uoimtiy where supply U so 
eatly dependeDt upon triuuport. 

The mpply aituatioa would appear to be impouible in SomftHlkod. 
lloiB admiDUtpred by one ofiicer with the int«regls of supply and traoBport 
|ti«Uy «t h*Mt. (Colonel Yeilding.) 

I can only testify to its complete success in the recent operatiana. 
111? cnlj defect I have noljccd is a, tendency to allot troneport for luyply 
foniewbat to thp di'trimeot of other departments, mich as ordnance 
^Dgineerine Blnn".", (General Egerton.) 

• NOTS— Tile 

olonel Teildiog's 

iformatioQ oontainedin this chapter is taken mainly from 
report ; bat conolosiona drawn from the eiperienoe 

jncd in transport and sopply wcaldng and dutiaa apply to tlic whole of tha 
* against the MuUoh. 


Everything, with the exception of livestock and firewood, 
had to be carried up from the base to positions occupied by 
our troops so far distant as 350 miles from the base at 
Orguiizaiion. The personnel of the supply and transport organization 
was eventually (».«., after June, 1903) as follows : — 

f Director, Supply and Transport 
_ _ ^ 1 Supply and Transport Cwpe Officer as Asaistar.t 

Heauqnarters .. ..j for Supply. 

I 1 Regimental Officer as Assistant for Transport 

With each Brigade ..P ^"Pl>ly ^^ Transport Corps Officer. 

I I Regimental Officer as Assistant for Transport 

1 Supply and Transport Oirps Officer as Base 

Supply and Transport Officer, i 
1 Regimental Officer as Assistant for Supply. 
1 Regimental Officer as Base Transport Officer. 

At the Advanced B«« -f ' ^"PP'y *^^, Transport Corps Officer. 

1 1 Regimental Officer as Assistant 

f I Regimental Officer in Supply and Transport 

I charge, with the exception of Kirrit, and sub- 

At each Supply Depdt ^ gequently Wadamago, where a Supply and 

I Transport Corps Officer was in charge. 

At each Stego . . . . -f ^ Supply and Transport Corps Warrant or Non- 

' * I commiasioned Officer. 


General The provision and maintenance of transport for a large 

expedition into the interior of Somaliland was an undertaking 
of considerable difficulty.* 
After the grazing question, the greatest difficulty was that 

At the Base 

* To illustrate the difficulty of supplying long lines of oommnnica- 
tion» it may be mentioned that it takes a camel to maintain a mule or 
pony with grain only at Wadamago, 153 miles from Borbera. Thus— « 
Somali camel carries 240 lbs. Of this ho and his attendant eat 94 lis. 
between Berbora and Wadamago, to and fro. He therefcre delirera 
only 14G lts« A mule cats 146 lbs. in 24 days. The actual number of 
marching days from Borbera to Wadamago and back is 22, so, allowing 
2 days* rest at the base, the camel arriyes at Wadamago again just in time 
to ro-supply the mule. 

of tie water supply, and this practically governed the selec- 
tioQ of s suitable transport animal. 

It is to be noted that there are no permanent rumiing 
streams in Somaliland. The only water supply is contained in 
wella. In the rainy aeaaon, it is true, water is frequently to be 
found in "baliis" or depressions in the ground where it 
would not be found in the dry seasons. But these " ballis " 
often quickly dry up and cannot be relied on. For all practical 
purposes, therefore, wells form the sole water supply of r 
large extent of the country. 

For transport work under such conditions as these the camel 
was the most suitable animal, mules requiring water every 
day, or at least every other day, while other animals require it 
still oftener. Much Jias been written of the tolerance of thirst 
of the camel, and it is sometimes supposed that camels of all 
kinds possess equal powers in this respect. Such, however, 
is not the case. It is largely a question of custom and habit, 
which are the result of local conditions as to water supply. 
The native Somali camel, bred in a country where, as above 
described, the supply of water is diffictdt to reach, can con- 
tinue four to seven days (or at a pinch more) without water 
when working in the dry seasons; but in and immediately 
after the wet seasons, when the grass is green and full of 
moisture, and when not worked under mihtary conditions, he 
[oires water only once in 10 days. 

One difficulty was that of procuring the Somali camel. It 
.s a matter of difficulty to purchase a large number of Somali 
camels under any circumstances, and to do so quickly wag 
almost impossible. The main reason of this wa:s the disinclina- 
tion of the Somali to part with Uvestock in any form. To the 
Somalistockrcpresentswealthand position. Hehaafew wants, 
therefore money has little value in his ejes, except as a means 
of purchasing more stock, The subject of purcbaaing and 
hiring camels in Somaliland is dealt with later. 

Another difficulty which transport officers in Somaliland 
iimtered was that of keeping their animals fit for w 


The grazing dnring the dry season in Somaliland is very poor 
indeed. This shortcoming afEects the Somali camel more than 
other transport animals, for he is ffrass-ied, not grain-fed. 
When in the hands of his tribal owner he subsists entirely on 
trees, shrubs, and grass. But his owner does not work him 
continuously, and it is customary, after a comparatively short 
spell of work (during which, however, the importance of good 
grazing is never lost sight of), to throw animals out of work 
to rest and recover their strength. On active military service, 
however, it is not possible to throw large numbers of animals 
out of work to rest for any appreciable length of time ; con- 
tinuous and hard work is the rule, and this the grass-fed 
Somali camel cannot stand. He rapidly loses condition and 
becomes unfit. This is more especially the case during the dry 
months, when the leaves of the shrubs and trees have died 
and bllen and the grass has either completely died or been 
eaten down, or is so dry as to afford little nourishment. On 
active service, too, work, more usually than not, clashes with 
grazing ; tactical considerations prohibit night marching, 
and the greater part of the day must therefore be spent on the 
road, leaving only a few hours available for grazing. The 
SomaU camel will quickly take to eating grain, and a ration of 
4 lbs. a day is ample. But it takes a long time to get him 
into really good condition for continuous hard work, and 
it was considered that he should be fed on grain for a month 
before being put into hard work on a campaign in Somaliland. 
When this cannot be done, the Somali camel wears out in a 
very short time and but little dependence can be placed on 
him when put to work under hard miUtary conditions. It 
must also be borne in mind that, even when a Uberal grain 
ration is issued, a plentiful supply of grass cannot be dispensed 

The Indian camel, however, though he cannot go without 
water for such long periods as the SomaU camel, is a stronger 
beast and more accustomed to regular hard work. It was 
found as a result of the experience of the campaigns that the 


Indian camel soon assimilated himself to the conditions of 
the country, and it was considered by Colonel Yeilding " that 
the Indian camel saved the situation." 

As the result of their experience of both sorts of animals, 
the general conclusions arrived at by transport officers were 
as follows : — 

That the Indian camel is the better. 

That SomaU camels are more timid and weaker than 

the Indian variety, but that they can do without 

grain or water for longer periods than Indian camels. 
That the best Somali camels come from the Hargeisa 

That the factors which chiefly afEect the usefulness of 

the camel are his age and make, the grazing which 

he gets, and the care which is taken' of him. 
That to depend on local resources for transport for an 

expedition in Somaliland, unless consisting of small 

numbers only, would be to invite disaster. 

Under C!olonel Swayne and General Manning the Tranipoi 
transport on the lines of communication was worked "^ ™* 
on the convoy system. In the fourth expedition the 
system of transport adopted was partly the convoy 
system and partly the staging system, but the former pre- 
dominated. It was found that losses in stores and supplies 
while being conveyed on the lines of communication were 
considerably less when goods were conveyed right through by 
camel coips on the convoy system,* and stores had to come 
from such a distance that the force could ill afford to lose 
any. Complaints were made by the officer commanding the 
lines of communication of the difficulty of providing water at 
a post when two large convoys (one going and the other 

*Oolonel J. C. Swanii, however, disij^Ttod with theeystem of base to 
front coiivoyB, not only on the ground of the diffioulty of j roviding water 
andewort, but for the reason that the saying effected in sup])1y did not 
compensate for the wastage in transiX)rt. 


retuming) met at a post. General Egerton, however, con- 
sidered on the whole that the convoy system was preferable 
in Somaliland. 
Organixation. During the expeditions previous to 1903 the transport on 
the lines of communication was all hired, while the transport 
with the field troops consisted of camels with water tins, 
two camels per company for cooking, &c., and for reserve 
anununition, and officers' camels. All other transport with 
the field troops was obtained from the local tribes under special 
arrangements. But when General Manning took over command 
camels were formed into corps of 200 animals each with 
drivers at the rate of one to every three camels plus 12 per cent, 
spare., viz., 75 drivers per corps. These drivers were formed 
into three squads of 25 men each — each squad being under a 
headman. The command of the corps was vested in a British 
officer or British non-commissioned officer who was assisted 
by one Indian transport assistant (a selected non-commissioned 
officer detached from one of the units composing the force), 
and two Somali transport attendants, speaking English or 
Hindustani, who not only acted as interpreters, but performed 
general transport duties. It was found impossible to keep 
these cadres intact and they were broken up, new imits being 
formed. But the principles on which the original cadres 
had been organized were adhered to. Great difficulty wad 
experienced at this time in obtaining sufficient camels, sinc^ 
most of the camels left over from Colonel Swayne's last> 
expedition were in a very poor condition. In all, 5,108 camels 
were obtained, of which 3,063 died during the operations. 
In addition, between 600 and 700 mules were employed, 
which were obtained from India and South Africa. The mules 
were formed into two cadres, each cadre being subdivided 
into four sections. Each cadre consisted of : — 

1 British Non-Commissioned Officer. 

2 Indian Transport Assistants. 

With 1 headman or 2 duffadars, 25 to 30 drivers, and 65 to 
100 mules per section. 


After July, 1903, 11 camel corps and a camel cart train I<ooal 
were raised locally. The local supply of camels was much ^^ 

affected by the raiding of camels by the Mullah and by the 
demands ol the expeditions under Colonel Swayne and General 
Manning, also by the attitude of many of the tribes, who 
preferred to sit on the fence and watch events rather than 
really help us in transport matter?, perhaps fearing sub- 
sequent reprisals by the Mullah. The Ogaden tribes were 
indeed openly hostile to purchasers in their country. They, 
however, professed no allegiance to the British Government, 
and, though they dread the Abyssinians, they resent their 
authority. The organization of each camel corps is given in 
the accompanying table : — 






a t « 


P nn 



I if3|§ 











^ • 

I ill 

Hi ill 3:9^ 



SS 28 • 


^ ooo 

Si . •- 

• • 

^'^ CO 

»M CO 





^ e 





e c 





As will be seen, each corps had 588 camels with a lifting 
power of 3 maunds (240 lbs.) per camel. When a local camel, 
corps was formed, each camel was branded with a serial number 
and the number of the corps as well as the Government mark, 
thus : — 

On the near side neck S P F 

On the near flank, corps number, e,g, . . 4 S C 
On the off flank, serial number in corps, e,g. 37 

A roll of transport attendants by troops was kept and the 
numbers of the 3 camels of each driver were shown 
opposite his name. 

The camel cart train consisted of 100 carts each of-^^^**""* 

A J • 

which carried 6 maunds in addition to the rations of camel 
and driver. With two camels per cart 8-10 maunds could 
be carried on a hard track. The train worked between 
Sheikh and Burao at flrst and subsequently between Elkada- 
lanleh and Wadamago. 

Gliding camels were preferred for cart work, owing to 
their extra size and weight. The camels received grain and 
grass and worked best when watered every third day. 

The organization of the train was as follows : — 




Tro<jp. ^"*"P- 




At tf maunds per cart. 

Cwrts ... ... ... •'> 

2.') .'>0 


Camels, drmught t\ 

;ui rt() 

(a) 125 

Cameltf riding, ponies or — 

— _. 


1 for Officer, 2 for British 



N.C. Officers, and 1 for 
Transport Vety. Duffadar. 


. - — 


British N.C. Offlcei-s 







At 44) rs. per muuseni. 



M 40 „ each, per menM'ui 




Lance-Naicks (Drivers) ... i 

.'l 1» 


ft *" »» H It 

Drivers dn :. 

(.•)L>:> , Oh .'H» 

if) Hl.T 

II *" It 11 •• 

Broes (Driven*) ... 
Transport Vety. Duffailur 

. - .._ 


l» *" 11 ft •! 



Indian pay andallowanceH 

Palan makers 




ft >i 




't II 



If •■ 




• 1 •• 



II 1 

(a) One spare camt*! per seotioi 

ri. M ith .'i addwl for corps. 

(b) Includes 1 spare. 

(e) Includes u npari'. U 

/) Includes 10 spare. 

(«) Includes 2.S span*. 


2 I 


oamel corps. 

Four Indian Silladar camel corps arrived in July, 1903. 
They had 2,843 camels which carried 5 maunds each and 
grain at 6 lbs. per diem for 5 marches in addition to their 
ordinary loads. 

The organization was as follows : — 








Carrying Power 






81 sections at tt 
Mds. per sectioo. 

British Offlcen 






Natire „ 






Quartermaster DufCadar 

















Lance NalcksCrarwans) 


















For riding ponies. 
Paid for by super- 

vising eeUbliah- 







Veterinarr AMlstanti ... 
FAlan maxen 











Cooka ... ... ... 






Bhi«tief ». 




— . 


Dretaen ... 












81 sections of U 



For Native Offloen 
and Kot*>L»uiia- 

Offioers' Ohargera 



— - 



„ Private Ponr ... 






British Officers' Servants 






Syces ... 






„ „ Grass- 

— > 






Native Offlccrt' Genl. 







camel corps 
from India. 

Army Serrice 

One hired camel corps reached Berbera in October, 1903, 
and consisted of 972 Baluch camels. These animals as they 
came from cold countries and were long-haired, were not 
suitable for work in Somaliland. 

Two companies Army Service Corps, the 15th and 22nd, 
arrived at Berbera from South Africa on 31st July, 1903. 

Their strength was : — 

6 officers. 

2 warrant officers. 
60 rank and file. 


11 civilian conductors. 
217 natives (Africans). 

46 horses. 
900 mules. 

80 buck wagonr- 
4 water carts. 

These companies worked between Berbera and Bihendula 
or Wagon's Rust. Each wagon had 10 mules and carried 
4,000 lbs., i.e., 3,000 lbs. stores to be delivered, and 5 days' 
forage and rations. 

The Natal buck wagon was not considered suitable for the 
country, being found too heavy (1| tons) and not broad 
enough in the tyre. 

Three Ekka trains were obtained from India in July, 1903. Ekka tnint. 
These trains were not a success as Ekka trains^ but most of the 
ponies were subsequently worked in pack. They were 
organized as follows : — 










Lifting Power 






At 6 mda. per Ekka, ex- 
oloalve of ration for 
men and poniea and 
men's kits and water, 
for 2 days for men. 













Includes 32 ponies spare 
and 3 riding. 

British Officer 






British N.C.O 






Native Otticert .. 






Ha' ildars 












Lan-^e-Nalcks (Drivers- 












Include« 32 spare drivers 

Svoea .. 






Veterinary Asalstant^ 












Shoelnit smltba .1 






Sadd era 

— • 





Carpenters ' 


















Bellowshoya i 








Generally speaking, wheeled transport was not found 
suitable for work in SomaUland. 
(8927 a) 2 i 2 


Porter corps. A porter corps was raised at Rawal Pindi and arrived at 
Berbera on the 5th September, 1903. These men worked at 
Berbera in moving supplies, &c. At this work they were 
found useful, but not much good at imloading ships. They 
were also used in well sinking, telegraph fine wock, grass 
cutting and as mule attendants. They were piincipally 
Punjabi Mahommedans and their organization was : — 

1 British Officer. 

1 Non-conmiissioned Officer (Supply and Transport 


2 Jemadars. 
5 Havildars. 

10 Naicks. 
20 Lance-naicks. 
460 Coolies. 
1 Clerk. 

They were divided into five compames and each company 
into four sections. Coolies or porters were paid at the rate 
of 10 rs. 8 a. per month, with rations and clothing. 

An Arab coolie corps came from Aden and other parts of 
Arabia. The men were employed at Berbera in unloading 
ships, unloading cargoes from lighters and in the supply 

For one ship the rough estimate was : — 

140 to unload ship. 
50 to unload lighters at pierhead. 
100 to carry goods from pierhead to head of tramway. 

The strength of the Corps was : — 

Maccadums .. .. .. 4 

Submaccadums . . . . . . 3 

CooUes 350 

jrab ooolie 

under a British officer, divided into 4 gangs. (It was 


recommended that 2 British non-commissioned officers 
should be added). 

The rate of pay was : — 

15 rs. per month for coolies, with rations but no clothing. 
20 rs. „ „ submaccadums „ „ 

30 rs. ,, „ maccadums „ „ ,, 

The Gonmiandant inflicted only two punishments — ^flnes 
and dismissal. 

On the whole, though the Arab coolie under strict super- 
vision was a better worker than the Indian, the Indian coolie 
was preferred, being — 

The cheaper. 

The steadier worker. 

More easily managed, and as he was a native of India, 
officers and non-commissioned officers who under- 
stood Hindustani could understand his language and 
his ways. 

SomaU cooUes were also employed at 12 annas per diem Somali 
without rations. They worked well on piece work, but^^^*^' 
were reported to be lazy, undisciplined and undependable. 

Seventy-five pairs of Kajawahs weighing 37 lbs. per pair Ambulance 
were made up locally for ambulance work, and carried 150 ^^^'po'*- 
sick. Some camel carts were also provided with hoods and 
lying down accommodation. 

The Indian transport mules were orgAni^ed as an Indian Indian mule 
mule corps. Some Abjrssiman muies were added, and though *™'"P0'*- 
only 11} hands high, they carried 2 maunds very well. This 
mule corps was employed in bringing stores up the Sheikh 
Pass, thus saving camel transport at that point, where the 
road was steep. It was not brought south of Burao owing 
to water difficulties, but it was worked up the steep ascent 
from Las Ehorai to save camel transport. 

A Ught tramway was laid along the pier at Berbera and Tramwny 
eventually linked the landing stage with the various supply 
sections at the base. It was considered that this was a 


chase of 

most necessary provision, and that the line should be ft 
double one. 

The total purchases of animals during the fourth 
expedition to the end of March, 1904, were : — 

Number. Average Price. 

Donkeys . . 
Pack bullocks 














The following table refers to camel purchasing only : — 

When Purchased. | 

Where Purchased. 

of Camels 

Average Frioe 




1903— . 


July . . . . , 

Somaliland . . 

673 1 



July . . . . ' 





August . . . . > 

8omaliland . . 




September . . \ 

Somaliland . . 




October. . 

Somaliland • . 








October . . 





Somaliland . . 













Somaliland . . 











Somaliland . . 






Somaliland . . 





March . . 

Somaliland . . 


1 11* 



The best district for purchasing was the western area of 
British Somaliland with the following centres :— 

Hargeisa District 

• • 

Bulhar District 

Zeila District 

• • 

• • 


tJtJOaCn ^-^OHttiTV ^ ■ 

. . Saasamino, 


Burao District 


(For Mass Abukr). 


Coast East of Berbera 

. . Wait. 

The puicliaaiDg officers recommended the foUowing 
procedure in camel purchasing : — 

Agents should be sent in advance to warn the people that 
camels were required The puichasing officer should divide 
hia area into sections with a centre tor each section. On his 
arrival at the centre the camels should be divided into two or 
three classes, and a fixed rate should be paid for each class. The 
purchasing officer must himself divide the camels into classes, 
and the same system should be adopted in each area for divid- 
ing the camels into classes. Centres of purchasing areas should 
not be too close to one another, as they are in that case liable 
to interfere with one another. The Somalisare adepts at conceal- 
ing diseases and weaknesses by making the came'** roll in wet 
mud, by patching old sorca over with hair, by blowing out thiji 
cameiswith water, and by similar devices, therefore each camel 
must be carefully examined. It was found useful to erect u, 
zariba at each place so that only one camel at a time could be 
admitted. Payment should always be made at the end of a day's 
purchases. A good interpreter is a necessity, and when buying 
near the Abyssinian frontier it is advisable that an official of 
the Abyssinian Government should accompany the purchasing 
officer. Grazing guards are also important, and centres should 
be partly selected on account of facilities for grazing afforded 
near them. It is well to let the tribes know beforehand 
that it is no use bringing sickly, weak, or young ciimcls. The 
brands should be carefully selected, as Somaiis copy them easily, 
and besides branding irons a veterinary cheat, headropes. 
mange dressings and a spring balance and scales should be 
[ taken. 

The lofls in camela was principally caused by exhaustioai 


wUcIi was produced by conditions which are the inevitable 
result of endeavours to meet the military situation, and by— 

The natural difficulties of the country. 

The absence of sufficient grazing at times ; 

The deficiency in water and the necessity of getting 

troops at any cost from one waterhole to another 

in the desert. 
The necessity of working the camels at times when the 

sun was up. 
The impossibility of feeding them with grain at great 

distances from the base. 
The impossibility of allowing them sufficient rest. 
Carelessness of attendants unless incessantly supervised. 

Losses were also caused by poison (principally from the 
Irgin plant) and pneumonia. 

9 of The following points represent the result of the experience 

*®^'* of the campaign : — 

Grooming is unnecessary, but backs may be rubbed 
when saddles are taken off. 

Animals should be unloaded at the first, and loaded 
at the last possible moment, and should be kept at 
graze as long as possible. The best hours for 
camels to graze are between 6 and 11 a.m. and 
4 to 7 P.M. The camel is a slow feeder, and should 
have 5 or 6 hours grazing a day if possible. 

On cold nights saddles are best left on, unless blankets 
are provided. 

Grass should be given at night. This can be cut by 
day or on the march. 

Time must be given to transport drivers to cook and 
sleep. Overworked, underfed drivers means bad 

Grazing grounds should be visited by a British officer or 
by non-commissioned officers, otherwise drivers, to 


prevent them straying, are apt to tie the osmelB up ' 
or herd them together, thuB preventing them grazing. 

When grain b given it ahould be given in the evening ; 
4 lbs. per diem is enough for Somali camels and 
6 lbs. for Indian camels Grain-fed camek last much 
longer than those which are merely grazed. 

Hiimali camela should be watered at least every fourth 
day, Indian camels every other day. Camela should 
not be watered immediately before marching nor should 
they be given a big drink on an empty stomach. 

When double marclics arc made the best hours to march 
are from 4 A.u. to 9 a.m. {any i3 miles] and from 
3 P.M. to 5.3U P.M. (say 7 miles). If the march be under 
15 miles, it ts better to start earher in the morning 
and complete the distance in one march. Not more 
than 3 camels should be tied together in one string.* 

All oamels should be inspected sitting down onoe a day, 
so that their backs can bt: seen. 

* Tbe fullowing extract fiom SCajidiiig Orden is givnt t 
iliioi|ilriie on the iiiMrh wtL» miuntiiineil : — 

shuw how 

Hiwipluu nn the ilarek. 

The laooees of s laiirch, from t, traii!i[>oTt loiulr <if view, deiwiidB on the 

npiditf with whk-h it u npoompliahcd without animiilB beiug overdriven. 

Evwy attpuiUiit «houlJ hnvo it thoroughly impressed on Iiim Ibo diinger nt 

deUj^ and of long line, Hu should be tr;iiued lo iuuaediuti^ly eleor to one 

K« ibould ho hnre to hilt. 
Tnnipart «hoa1d move ou the very broodtwt front poBuhle. Il n better 
have Ihf transport of units tui»ed up on h broad fiont than to have it in 
rfeol tutalioii in n single liue. 

II it a loiutd necessary to diminish thu front this ahonld be done before 
arriviog at the obstui'lu. 

At iitl diRiTult puintK it IS the duty r,i the officer hi charge to remaiD 
himself, or to detiiil a amnpeteat siihurd inal«, who will remain there UDliI 
every aniuiBl hu pusaed. The officer should go in advauuo to the ubiitai.'le 
M M to ]utl.inipiite thp action to be lAkFa on the nrrlval of the leading 

The lendeno> \o utriggle «iid tail titf muni bp remedied by nil uooi-erned 
tMogerery endeavour and t^iugevaty opportunity to oioao up. Climingup 
Aanld not be efI«oteil by oTrrHrivIng animal*, but Imlbi and checks sboald bn 
n odvautnjie ol. 



ingof A. warrant officer and interpreter visited the ground 

aelF. where the hired camels were collected, and took the numben 

of the camels presented for hire. The owners came to o£Boe 
about 9 A.M. The names of the head men of the batches 
of camels, their tribe and destination were rei^tered, as ako 
were the advances (Bs.2 per camel) that were given to them. 
The owners then left to purchase food, Ac., for the journey, 
and appeared again at 2 p.m. on the convoy ground, where 
their loads were awaiting them. They loaded up under the 
supervision of the same warrant officer and interpreter, and 
marched off with the stores and way-bills. 

On their return, and on the production of the receipted 
duplicate way-biUs, the owners, according to the names 
entered in the register, were paid. The owners, once persuaded 
to go, carried out their contracts very honestly. 

The hired camels were accompanied by baladiers, i.e., 
armed Somalis, who were provided with arms and ammunition 
by the Base Supply and Transport Officer. 

The scale of baladiers was four per 100 camels, increased 
for a short period during January and February, 1904, to six 
per 100 camels, in order to inspire confidence to induce the 
men to go forward to Wadamago. 

Baladiers were paid 8 annas a day, and received free 

The drlyer should be ordered to always get past any animals halted. 
Obstacles on the road should be removed, if possible, by au advance party f<f 
a few men well m front. 

The duties of the Transport officers and supervising staff may briefly 
be summed up as follows : — 

(1) Anticipating arrangements for passing obstacles by goiug on ahead 

to them. 

(2) Maintaining as broad a front as possible. 
(3) Closing up at every opportunity, 

* Baladiers are a claas of Somalis who at all times earn their liying by 
acting as guides and guards to convoys ; for instance, a Karia marching 
from Berbera to the Ogaden would employ baladiers, three or four to ICO 
camels, and pay them 12 anoas per camel. The Consulate lends rifles and 
ammunition to recognised baladiers.. 


The total number of camels employed month by month 
since November, 1902, and also the various rates of hire that 
prevailed from time to time, were as follows : — 

Hired camels 

November 986 

December 2,901 














• • 

• « 














January, up to 17th 


The rates of hire from Berbers that prevailed from time to 
time were as follows : — 

Garrero, Rs. 

November, 1902, to March, 1903 . . . . 15 

March, 1903, and on .. .. .. 17 

A register is mainteined in which is recorded the names of the men, 
tribe, fto., the number of rifles and amount of ammonitian given to tfaem« 
the date on which they start, fto. 

Baladiers are allowed pay for the number of daya only that are neoaa- 
sary for the performance of the return jouniey to the pkoe to whicli tli^y 
may be sent. 



January, 1903 20 

January, 1903, to 12th March, 1903 . . 22 

12th March, and on 25 


Before August, 1903 15 

August, 1903, to October, 1903 . . . . 16 

October, 1903, and on 18 


November, 1902, to March, 1903 . . . . 10 

March, 1903, to January, 1904 . . . . 12 

January, 1904, and on 14 


November, 1902, to April, 1903 . . . . 5 

April, 1903, to October, 1903 . . . . 6 

October, 1903, and on . . . . . . 7 


December, 1902, to March, 1903 . . . . 7 

March, 1903, to October, 1903 . . . . 8 

October, 1903, to November, 1903 . , 10 
February (Government camels used in 

interval) 16 


Up to March, 1903 9 

Since March, 1903 11 

The natural supply of hired camels, i.e., the supply without 
any pressure being brought to bear, seems to be governed 
by the season of the year. A camel owner owns a certain 
number of burden, milk and eating camels, besides sheep and 
goats. His wife and children look after his herds. 

inty his burden 

hire ; he will 

^^^j^ ^ Ilia hut, &c., and 

••T. ' < 

his animals are 

ut water, the grass 

(ion eaten, and the 

d further away from 

L-s requires his camels 

will not then willingly 

was recommended for use Camel Gkar. 
g universally condenmed), 
on that the material should 

lid be of goat's hair (jutt). 
of good stout blanket. 
f grass, ** punni gas " preferred, 
iieat straw) grass. Wool and tow 
•\.''. of strong elastic wood (shesum, 

e on each side, should be bamboos, 

I bar fitted above them. This extra 

r above the level of the opening for the 

lip, and should project 6 or 8 inches 

others to the front and rear. These 

d always be fixed to saddles required 

ammunition or other small and heavy 

be made of goat's hair or camel's hair, 
on ocnr or hemp rope. 

ch should be carefully rounded so as to 

I he back and sides ever}rwhere, but the front 

hould rest on the sides of the withers only 

;cjt on the top. Less stuffing is required in the 


centre than at the ends. The saddles should not 
touch the camel's hump. No large seam should be 
under the saddle. The rear point of the saddk 
should be 10 to 12 inches above the level of the 
camel's back and 8 inches above the level of ilie 
centre opening of the saddle. In stuffing a saddk, 
it sliould be remembered that a camel's motion is 
fore and ait ; the withers and hips naturally resist 
this motion and tend to keep the saddle in its place, 
assisted by the hump. If the saddle is fitted 
throughout to the camel's back, the friction bean 
upon the ribs, and it is this part of the saddle which 
should be hollowed out to obviate galls over the 
ribs. Camel saddles are generally made too long 
and rub the animals over the hip bones. 

Camel Opinions differed as to the personal qualities of the Somali, 

but it seemed to be generally agreed that, for work in Somaliland 
he was the best camel attendant. He is a magnificent marcher 
and easy to feed and water, and is a natural camel man and 
does not ill-tceat his animals. Both he and the Arab require 
much supervision. The latter is more hardworking and 
quicker than the Somali, but he often ill-treats his animals, 
and overdrives them and ties them up when grazing. Not 
much difficulty was foimd in obtaining a sufficient number 
of capable headmen, who had sufficient intelligence and 
influence to manage their squads and to supervise the animals 
told off to their squads. Only men who were capable of 
acting as interpreters were appointed Transport Jemadars 
or assistants, and they generally proved satisfactory. They 
spoke Somali and either English or Hindustani. It was 
considered that all transport attendants should be provided 
with followers' books on the Indian systeui. 


The rates of pay of Somalia were : — 

Jemadars or Transport Assistants — 
Class I 60 rs. per month. 

.. n 

. . 50 rs. ,, 

» III 

40 rs. ,, 


.. 20rs. 

Lee Naicks 

.. 18 rs. 


.. 15 rs. „ 

The annexed table gives the number of casualties among Casualtiei. 
transport animals from July, 1903, to March, 1904 : — 





1 1 " a s) s 4 s 9 


1 1 1 - * 1 1 1 1 


1 1 I - 1 1 1 1 1 

1 1 1 - £ 3 fi s a 


1 1 - ' s 5 * ~ 3 



WflJOW.0 1 1 1 t 1 1 1 I 1 

-pofanBiiW*!! 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 I 1 

.w-t"n»a ' '•*'- I-- 

vi\n s**««5 




s 1 g i 1 1 g II 


1 1 1 1 £ 1 ^ S « 


1 X 1 1 1 1 1 1 n 



- 2 § IS S 3 M s 1 


M fi i S 1 1 s S 



■ip|.^ 1- iwa 

II -^ 1^ s s 5 a 

. 1 ... 1 1 1 1 

II..' 1.1 


1 1 ■ 1 ,-••'- a 

1 1 \ ' 5 ?. i ^ Si 

1 -iwi 

5 s s 5 S I g 


■Plus JD 1«10 

1 i : - 1 1 ' 

-pi.'LUis JO 1«DT 

. 1 ^ ■-. -^ 

5" 1 -pj-tDJiMn 

~ ~ W »" l""S s i ^. 


_ I ! 1 1 1 1 I , 



The following tables show — Transport c 


(a) How equipment, &c., usually carried on obligatory *^S««o» 
mules in India was carried with the field force when 
operating away from the lines of communication 
between Berbera and Bohotle. 

How Carried by British and 



Native Infantry, including 
Pioneer Regiments. 


Machine gun section 

On mules 


Greatcoats if taken 

With kits on camels 



80 rounds per riile on mules 
200 „ „' camels 


Entrenching tools 

On camels 


Kajawahs, mule, S.A. . . 

On mules or camels 


Water tanks and wat<?r chaguls On camels 


Medical equipment, tentago 1 
and baggage of hospitals 

, 1 mule for medical panniers 

1 1 mule for water for surgical 

ostabiishment . . . . 1 

Remainder on camels 


Pioneer equipment 

On mules 

Signalling equipment 

»» »» 


Cooking \K>ts 

On camel& 


Reserve rations . . 

•> f> 

(b) Scale of personal baggage and tentage allowed to the 


2 K 


(a) Lines of communication scale. 
(6) Operation scale. 

(a) Linea of Communication! 

(6) Operation 







Baggage only. 

1. Oritinh Commia- 

3 Camels (non-Indian) 

2 officers per 


sioned Officers. 

per officer (c). 

camel (c) 


a. OlBceni 

Normal (rf) 

Normal (d) 

i normal 
scale (d). 

a. BritithOmcerswith 

80 lbs. ((•) 

80 lbs. (c) 

80 11)8. (c) 

(c). Includes mess 

Houorary Kank. 

stores, servants' 

4. Warrant Officers and 

70 ll»8. (c) 

40 11)8. (c) 

60 U«. (c) 

' kits and hones' 

Assistant Surgfons. 
ft. BriUsh N.C.O.'s, 

kits in addition 

W) \\^. (c) 


40 lbs. (c) 

to tentage and 
officers' kits. 

cmploytHi as clerks. 

6. Indians employed 

40 U«, (c) 


30 lbs. (c) 

as clerks. 

7. Storekeepers and 

40 Ills, (c) 

4 t U«. 

:H) ll>8. (c) 

8. Native Officers and 


40 lbs. 



Hospital Assistants. 

tf. BriUsh N.C.O.'s and 

40 ll«. 

15 per bell 



tent and 
16 per 
O.S. tent. 

1 Exclusive of cook- 

ing poti. 

160 lbs. 

10. Native N.C.O.'s and 

:V) 11*8. 

20 per G.S. 

15 11)6. 


tent, 160 




15 II16. 

10 1 1)8. 

Inclusive of cooking 

ipatoh and 
9ipt of 

(d) As per P. 8. Equipment Tables, Staff, Section I., Table III. 

The following was the procedure laid down in Standing 
Orders regarding the despatch and receipt of stores : — 

(1) All way-bills will bo marked at the top wit!i the name of deeiwtvhing 
depot aud that of destination, for example : — 

From Berbera. 
For Burao. 

(2) All three forms of the way-bills will be signed aud dated by cousiguor 
immediately below the last article entered on the way-bill. 

(3) In handing over stores to convoy oflScers, the following procedure 
will be adopted : — Store.s to be laid out a.s found most convenient for loading, 
iUid each kind of store separate. Convoy officers will be responsible that 
the number of packagers is correct as way-billed and that bags are intact 
Convoy officers will hand over stores in a similar manner at destination, 
and not simply count the number of packages. 

(4) Despatchfaig supply and transport, officers are to be most careful 
that the bags despatched are of full weight ; they should weigh a percentage 
Ut t^t them. This is most important so as to prevent a lo-ss of carrying 

lK'<^lMitch of Stores on QovtrmncrU Trarmport, — Despatching supply and 
U<u^-'«|K)4't ofGoers will make out way-bills on countccfoil, triplicate, aud 
^Vi;4vU-u(Uk*at« only. 


CoBTOjr otBcen will sign rauuterfoU >uid recoive tripliMte Btid qiudrapli. 
cfttc [omiH. 

TViplirate forms will be rcrpipted by the ooaaignoe nud returued by tha 
traospurt offioec to the despatRhmg aappty and traonport officer, to support 
the " write* off." Tho oonaigupe will note on triplicnte the decade accounia 
in which the atores will be found credited. The qoadmplicat* copy will be 
handed over by the Irnnsport officer to the eonaignee, and aubmitted as 
(I voucher ia support uf the credita. The eouToy officer will obtain from tho 
coosignee n simple reneipt in hb note book, quoting number and date to 
way-bill " contents ro>eived correct," or. «huu1d there be any loeg, the 
wonla " with the exception of " added with the low in detaQ. 

Each reroiviD^ supply and transport officer will keep a convoy officer's 
tHiokt to which should be entered the number and date of each way-bill 
received (detail of way-bQ] i* not necensary). lenving a column for Iob?. Tha 
coDToy officer shonldoi^ to all loaaca, giving a brief explanation of the cause. 

The following was considered to be the beat method o£ Hanugcmi 
managing stores on convoy duty ; — vonro; d^ 

F&r Indian Siliadar Camd Corps — M 

(1) The Commanding OfBcer stated the carrying power J 

of the c^rps after inspection of camels and distributed H 

among the troops. He himself took over the I 

convoy and weighed bags making notes of any damage I 

or shortage. I 

{2) Each native officer then took over the amount to be H 

carried by hia sub-diviaion and handed over to the I 

kote-duffadars, who were assisted by the naicks. I 

(3) On the arrival of the camels each naick showed the I 

exact amount to be loaded by his half troop, and as H 

each Burwan knew the weight his camels had to H 

fc carry, they loaded up at once. Naicks and lance-naicks H 

were responsible that each camel took it« proper load. I 

If possible all packages of the same article were I 

carried by one troop or half troop. I 

(4) Kot«-dufiFadar8 had a list of the articles carried by H 

their troop. They and their naicks explained to every H 

man the contents of his package so that on arrival ■ 

each man could go straight to where his particular H 

load was to be placed. ^^| 

(8'J27a) 3 k 2 ^^^H 


(5) Lance-naicks were responsible to naicks that the 
section handed over its loads complete, naicks to kote- 
duffadars, kote-duffadars to section commandenk 

¥of Somali Camd Corps — 

(1) The Commanding Officer apportioned the maundage 

to be carried by each half troop in accoidance 
with the number of 2-maund or 3-maTmd camels. 

(2) The Conmianding Officer handed over the stores 

to be carried by their several commands to the 
jemadars who handed them over to the duffadars. 

(3) The Conmianding Officer kept a list of the number 

of bags and boxes allotted to each half troop. 

(4) On arrival at destination each duffadar handed over 

his loads to the commanding officer or his assistant 
separately and he was held responsible for deficiencies. 
Sugar was always carried under the personal charge 
of a duffadar. 


Captain H. de B. Codrington, who was Chief Supply 
Officer with the Obbia force, arrived at Obbia on the 16th 
January, 1903. There having been no Supply and Transport 
Officer present, great confusion existed and some time 
elapsed before the department was in working order. Three 
months' supplies had been sent from India for the Indian 
Contingent, and six months' suppUes came with the con- 
tingents from South Africa. 

The state of affairs at Berbera was very similar. 
Captain L. M. R. Deas, who arrived at Berbera on the 
10th November, 1902, brought with him four months' 
supplies for half a native battaUon, but he had to set 
about providing suppUes for the force on the Berbera-Bohotle 
lines of communication, and from the 28th March the entire 
force was suppUed from Berbera. This was mainly accom- 
plished by local purchase. 


Major-Greneral Egerton, on the 26th October, 1903, 
authorized the officer commanding Unes of communication 
to deal with routine requirements of the force and required 
him to maintain a three months' supply. In addition, in a 
memorandum of the above date he informed him that : — 

(1) Demands for requirements other than medical should 

be addressed to the War Office. 

(2) Medical supplies should be demanded from India. 

Supplies were obtained from two sources : — Sources of 


(1) By requisition on the War Office, who gave the necessary 

orders for the suppUes to be sent either from England 
or India. (Heads of departments notified the officer 
commanding lines of conmiunication of their require- 
ments so that he was able to give the War Office 
two months' notice by cable.) 

(2) By local purchase. No supplies except grazing, milk, 

fuel, and animals were available in the interior. 

In 1903, three supply depots were formed on the Obbia Supply 
lines of communication at Lodobal, Dibit, Galkayu, Bera and ^ "' 
Badwein, besides the base depot at Obbia. On the Berbera- 
BohotleUnesof commimication depots were formed at Bihen- 
dula. Sheikh, Burao, Garrero and Bohotle, besides the base 
depot at Berbera. 

The base for supply and transport at Berbera was re- 
arranged in sections on the Indian system by August, 1903, 
and supply dep6ts under officers were formed at : — 

Wagons Uust •• 37 miles south of Berbera. 

Sheikh .. ..47 „ Berbera. 

Burao .. ..87 „ Berbera. 

Eirrit . . . . 143 „ Berbera. (Used 

up to 31st December, 1903, as an 
advanced base, and then aban- 
doned, water having failed.) 



Wadamago •• 

EUDab .. 




Las Ehorai 

• • 

• • 153 miles south of Berbers. 
.. 170 „ Berbers. 
.. 243 ,, Berbers. 
.. 313 „ Berbers. 
..320 ,, Berbers. 

• • East of Berbera (by sea). 

Supply stages were also formed at : — 

Bihendula . < 







23^ miles from Berbers. 













Las Eborai. 

And troops, other than those engaged with the operating 
force under the direct orders of Major-Qeneral Sir C. 
Egerton, were supplied at : — 

Las Dureh . . 

.. 81 

miles from Berbera. 

Uope Springs 

.. 67 



Shimber Berris 

.. 123 




.. 105 




.. 308 




.. 73 



El Af weina , . 

.. 179 




.. 44 


Las Ehorai. 

During the expeditions imder Colonel Swajme, the officers, 
when with the field force, carried rations for four months 
under their own arrangements. The men carried 2 lbs. of 
dates as an emergency ration, and eating camels were driven 
along with the force. After leaving Burao in May, 1902, till the 
return of the force to Bohotle in October, the men's rations con- 
sisted of meat only, chiefly sheep and camels captured from 
tjhe enemy. The tribesmen made their own arrangements 


for water and food, unless captures were made. On the line 
of communication, rice and dates and grain for riding camels 
were sent up by hired transport from Berbera. These articles 
were bought at Berbera, where a reserve was kept. When 
the field force returned to BohoUe, rations for all were sent 
up from Berbera. 

The following scale of daily rations applies to the periods Scale of daU; 
under Generals Manning and Egerton. ^ ^^d 4th 


British Troops. 

Flour, bread or biscuits 1 lb. 

Meat 1 y, 

Potatoes 4 ozs. 

Onions 4 „ 

Jam 4 yy 

Tea, coffee, or chocolate .. .. 1| „ 

Sugar . . . . . . • . • • 2f- ,, 

Rice • . 4f 99 

Salt ^ „ 

Pepper | „ 

Dal 4f„ 

Candle (1 for officers only) 

Driedfruit 2f ozs. 

Firewood 10 lbs. for officers 

„ . . . . . • . • 4 lbs. for men 

Worcestershire sauce . . 1 bottle for 10 days 

Note. — (a) When fractional quantities of jam were indented 

for, a full tin was issued for fractions of 
i lb. or more, but none for fractions less than 
Coffee and chocolate were issued only when 

(6) Worcestershire sauce and dried fruits were issued 
only when available. 

(c) Candles were issued to officers only* 


Indian Troops and Followers. 

Atta or rice 1 lb. 8 on* 

Dal .. 
Ghi .. 
Salt .. 
Gur .. 





•28 on. a week 

Men who did not eat meat received gur instead, on the 
scale of 4:i ozs. a week. 

Potatoes . • . . . • • . . . 2 on. 

Onions or other vegetables 

Dried fruit 









Rum, i dram, 25 U. P., as an extra, was issued on medical 

Limejuice, 2 ozs. per man per week j On medical 

recommendation . 

Gur, J oz. for each J oz. limejui 

n per week r 
. limejuice 1 

African and SomaU Troops and Followers. 

XvlCC .• •• .. .. •• • 

jLiai^es •• •• .. «• « 


Meat (thrice a week in lieu of 8 ozs. rice) 

\jrxu .. .• .. .. •• « 

Ooiiu t. .. .• .. .. « 

Potatoes (at the coast only) 

1 lb. 

8 ozs. 

4 „ 

1 lb. 

2 ozs. 
2 ozs. 


South African Natives with Army Service Corps. 

Biscuit or flour 




Salt .. 


Onions (if avaUable) 


Lime juice . . 

1 lb. 



















Grain (gram, oats, or barley) •• 



Hay (if available) 

• • 

6 lbs. 

2 „ 

1 oz. 

20 lbs. 

Mountain Battery Ordnance Mules. 
Grain (gram or barley) 4 lbs. 


oaiu •• .. •• .. 

Hay or bhoosa (if available) 

2 „ 

f oz. 
20 lbs. 

Mountain Battery Baggage and A. T.* 1st Glass Mules 

and all Ponies. 

Grain (for mules, gram or barley; for 

ponies, gram, oats, or barley) .. .. 6 lbs. 

oaiu •. .. .. •• •• •• ^ oz. 

Hay or bhoosa (if available) .. .• 15 lbs. 

* Army TraoBport. 


M. B. and A. T. 2nd Class Mules. 

Grain (gram or barley) 6 lbs. 

Salt . . . . . . . . . . . . } o£. 

Hay or bhoosa (if available) . . . . 13 lbs. 

Bikanir Camels. 

Grain (gram or barley) 6 lbs. or 12 lbs. if no missa bhoosa^ 
or hay was given and grazing was not available ; with grazing 
8 IbfiL might be given. 

Sak 11 ozs. 

Atom . . . . . . . . 12 ,y 

Gur 1 lb. 8 ozs. 

Mi?^ bhoosa or hay (if available) . . . • 20 lbs. 

Indian Camels. 

Grain (gram or barley) 6 lbs. 

Salt 11 ozs. 

Hay (at the base) 20 lbs. 

Riding Camels. 

Grain (gram or barley) 6 lbs. 

Sak 11 ozs. 

Hay (if available) 20 lbs. 

Somali and Arab Camels. 

Grain (gram, jowari, or barley).. .. 4 lbs. 

Salt 11 ozs. 

Hay (if available) 20 lbs. 


Grain (gram or barley) 2 lbs. 

Stilt 1 oz. 

Hay (if avaihiblo) 13 lbs. 


Milch Cows. 

Hay (if available) 

10 lbs. 


i oz. 

Anny Service Corps Mules. 

Grain (gram, oats, or barley) . . . . 8 lbs. 

Fodder . . . . . . . . . . 12 ,, 

Salt f oz. 

Firewood was not carried with troops, and the resources Firewood, 
of the localities where the troops halt was mainly relied on. 
Troops and followers cut their own firewood, the axes 
provided being used for this purpose. Firewood was, how- 
ever, issued at Berbera since it was not locally procurable. 

The following table shows the average strength of the The force 
Berbera-Bohotle and Obbia forces between January and May, *" 








British . . 

• • • 




Indians . . 

African and Somalis . 

; } 





• • • 





• • • 




Horses and ponies 
Mules and donkeys 

• • • 




• • • 




The following shows the daily average numbers of men and 
animals rationed by the Supply and Transport Corps in 
Somaliland between 1st July, 1903, and 31st Januaiy, 

Fighting men, British, Africans, and 

Indians 7,522 

Followers 9,056 

Total, men 





Hones and Ponies 








Total, animals . . 


For the last two months of 1903 and first month of 1904 the 

average numbers were : — 

Fighting men, British, Africans, 




Followers . • 


vn ^#^k^^# TW ^^*^"* VV "^ •• •■ 

Total, men 




Horses and Ponies 






Bullocks .. 


Total, animals . . 


Romarks mrith 
regard to 

The following suggestions were made by officers with 
regard to rations : — 

1. When animals are driven with the troops they have 
little fat, therefore 2 oz. ghi per man per day, or tinned lard or 
suet should be issued to British troops. 

2. Preserved meat should be in 1 lb. or i lb. tins. More 
mutton should be issued. 

3. Worcester sauce should be eUminated. 

4. Dal was found unsuitable in most parts of the country. 

5. Limejuice was foimd to be of little use. (For sub- 
stitutes recommended by the P.M.O. see " Medical and 
Sanitary Services"). 


C. VegeUMes. — ^Dates were issued instead of vegetables 
but large stocks should not be kept in the very hot weather. 

7. Forage. — ^Missa bhoosa is preferred. The oval shaped 
bale of hay is not recommended, difficult to load and sways 
when loaded, causing sore backs. 

8. The meat supply ¥ras principally furnished by sheep for 
British troops and goats for Indians. Africans received sheep, 
goats, and Somahs sometimes cameU also, as meat rations. 
Cattle were not often available for rations, except near the 
base. The sheep averaged 20 lbs. dead weight, and the catUe 
from 200 to 300 lbs. The Somalis themselves eat camels and 
keep milch camels to supply them with fresh milk. 

In 1903-4 the arrangements for carrying suppUes with Conrejance 
troops when on the march were as follows : — on the^march. 

All troops and followers carried 1 day's ration on Ritions. 

their persons for their own consumption. This was 

consumed on arrival at destination. 
Each corps and imit carried in regimental charge 6 days' 

rations. The following day's ration was distributed 

to individuals shortly after their arrival in their new 

camp from these reserves. 
The Brigade Supply Column carried such number of 

days' suppUes as were considered necessary. The 

regimental reserve was replenished from the brigade 

supply columns and the latter replenished from the 

nearest advanced depot. 
Every animal carried for its own consumption one day's Forage. 

grain (except camels which carried 3 days' grain and 

Army Transport mules which carried 2 days' grain). 

This one day's grain was ordered to be looked on as 

an emergency ration, i.e., only to be consumed when 

local resources failed. 
Each brigade supply column carried 5 days' grain for the 

animals of the brigade. 
A canteen was established with branches at Upper Field Force 

Sheikh, Burao, Kirrit and Eil Dab for the sale of °^^"- 


articles of food supply, etc., over and above those 
allowed as rations. It proved most useful. The 
accounts were audited by the Field Controller. 

Miscellaneous The following general remarks made by officers regarding 
tionswiih * the Supply and Transport Service are instructive : — 

regftrd to 

supply and 1. That a Grovemment agency to regulate and eSeot 

transport. economy in the shipment of locally purchased stores, supplies, 

&c., from Aden to Berbera should have been established at 


2. That a most scrupulous check of stores, &c., when put 
on board vessels at the port of embarkation, was necessary. 

3. That a recruiting section of the base transport should 
have been established through which all men recruited should 
be passed in order to obviate desertions. Corps conmiandants 
should have enlisted their own men, but passed them through 
the recruiting office. The establishment should have been : 
1 warrant officer, 1 sergeant, 1 clerk, 2 specially paid jemadars, 
and a non-commissioned officer of the local police. 

4. That it is desirable in future expeditions that Transport 
officers should be informed beforehand of the difficulties they 
are likely to encounter. 


Statement showing Important Supplies puitihased at Berbara 
through local suppliers for the Somaliland Field Force 
during the i)eriod from 9th July, 1903, to Slst March, 



Axes, Somali 


Biscuits . . 

leaking i)owdc*r 



Bootlaces . . 

i^ags, gunuy 


Compressed vegetables 

Coffee, husk 


(Indies . . 

(.-haguls . . 

Cotton seed 


Dates, in — 

Gosra . . 


Dried fruit 
Discs, cop|x»r 
Ghee — 


Indian . . 
Gram — 


Jowari — . . 


Whole .. 
Kajawahs . . 
Linseed meal 




Loading ropes for — 
Somali camels 
Indian camels 
























































Average Rate 





















1 7 




46 14 


15 10 









56 10 





5 4 

6 12 10) 




1 16 7 



100 lb. 





100 lb. 




100 lb. 








100 lb. 








Statement showing Important Supplies purchased at Berbera 
through local suppliers for the Sonialiland Field Force 
during the period from 9th July, 1903, to 31st March, 
1 904— continued. 


Lime juioe 
Milk, condensed . . 
Mussacks, donkey 
Kerosene, 125'' 


Kerosene, 150° 

Cake, tilseed . . 
Potatoes . . 
Pepper, black 
Packhal mules 
Rice — 

Somali . . 

Indian .. 

Shoes, Somali 

JXmkey, with canvas 
tope . . 

Arab, riding . . 
Spring balance 

Scales, Baniah 
Sheep and goats . . 

Turmeric .. 


Tarbooshes, with tassels 
Tobe, 30-yard piece 
Tobeti, red 
Turkish red 
Water bottles, canvas 

Yards .. 
Gallons . . 

Number. . 

Gallons . . 


(vallons . . 

»» • • 

»» • • 



»» • • 

Gallons . . 



Bottles .. 






Yard* . 

«» • 




Average Bate 









































7 7 






6 8 









2 3 


15 10| 








100 lb. 



100 Ih 







100 Ih. 












NoTi.<— Col. Yeilding reported that Mahomed Ibrahim, of the firm of 
Hajeebhoy, Lalji and Co., of Berbera, rendered the force vahiable 
aaaiafeaDce in procuring supplies at short notice. ** He never failed m mj 


Statement showing Important Supplies purcnased at different 
places in the country, and the Average Eates paid for 
the Supplies during the period from July, 1903, to 
31st March, 1904. 



f» • • 
Pints .. 




Average Rate 




Biilky oow • • 
Sheep and goats . . 


Rs. a. p. 
2 3 6 
5 5 
5 12 3 




4. — Marine Transport — Disembarkations and 

Re -embarkations . 

As comparatively little marine transport work was involved 
in the conduct of the first and second expeditions, the following 
account of the transport of troops, animals and stores by sea 
embraces the period covered by the third and fourth ex- 
peditions from the time when the troops in the Protectorate 
were reinforced from England, India and South Africa until 
the demobilization of the force under Lieut. -Greneral Sir C. 
Egerton in 1904. 

During the perio<l in question, the marine transport service Organization. 
was organized and carried out under arrangements made by 
the Quartermaster-Grenerars department, War Office, and the 
Director, Royal Indian Marine, respectively ; while the 
disembarkation of the force at Obbia, which formed an 
important feature of the third expedition, was conducted 
under arrangements made by the local Naval authorities. The 
disembarkation of General Manning's force at Obbia in 1903, 
although not in chronological order, will be described first, 
in the form of extracts from Field Force Orders and from the 
despatch of Captain Hon. A. E. Bethell, Senior Naval Officer, 
who organized and superintended the landing, assisted by 
Commander G. S. Hewett, R.I.M., and Lieutenant E. W. 

HaddleBton, R.I.M. 

(8927a)' 2l 



ct from The extract from Field Force OrdeTS, dated 7th January, 
^'^ 1903, was to the following efEect : — 

The following orders by the Senior Naval Officer regarding the diB- 
embarkation of troops, &o., are published for information : — 

Order of disembarkation will be — 
" 1st. Troops. 

" 2nd. Officers* and roon*s baggage. 
" 3rd. Stores and ammunition. 
" 4th. Animals. 

Ships that have camels on board will discharge them into the native 
boats while the other disembarkation is going on, and every boat, whatever 
she is loaded with, leaving for the shore, is to tow one horse or mule ashore. 
When the camels are all landed, the native boats will proceed to aoaist in 
the landing of the stores, but troops are only to be landed in ships* boata. 

When the weather is unfavourable for landing the animals, the native 
boats will assist in landing the stores. 

The following will be the duties of the under-mentioned offioers dnring 
the disembarkation of the force at Obbia — 

Commander Jones, H.M.S. * Pomone,* Beaoh-Master. 

He will have under his control all native and ship^* boats at the lifcj^^ing 
place ; regulate the traffic there, and generally order the disembarkatioD. 

He will see that no native boats are used for private purposes without 
his consent having been obtained, and that everything is done to expedite 
the disembarkation as much as possible. 

He will arrange for the necessary men from H.M.S. * Pomone ' to 
assist him (troops being applied for to unload the boats), also for a singalman 
to land with flags. 

Letter ' B * commercial is to be hoisted at the landing place if im* 

Lieutenant Bevan, H.M.S. * Pomone,* Assistant Beach-Master. 

Commander G. Hewett, Royal Indian Marine, will be on board the 
Indian transport discharging, and will see that the ship is discharged accord. 
ing to the attached routine, applying for any assistance he may require. 

Lieutenant Huddleston, Royal Indian Marine, will assist him, and 
take his place in the absence of Commander Hewett. 

^4 Lieutenant E. S. Carey, H.M.S. * Naiad,* will act as Executive Officer 
afloat. He will regulate the order in which the boats are loaded, and 
generally control them, and arrange for their towage by the steam boats 
of the squadron ; and also for the meals and reliefs of their crews, signalling 
to the ships concerned if necessary. He will generally be on board the 
ship that is discharging. When * Perseus * arrives. Commander Pears will 
perform this duty ; Lieutenant Carey doing the duty on board the South 
African transport assigned to Commander Hewett, Royal Indian Marine^ 
on board the Indian transport. Lieutenant Williams, H.M.S. * Naiad,* 
will anchor the transports, and be responsible they are safely berthed. 

Th3 despatoh of Captain Befchell is instmctive as ahow- Doipntoii of 
ing the difficulties invoivod in landing troops under abnormal ^fj^ g s 

oonditiona : — ^_ 

H.M.S. " Naiad," at Obbia, ^^M 

Bt, nth Februvj, 1903. ^H 

X \inve the bonour In report that I Iclt Aden at 10 a.m. on lat Jaauaiy, ^^| 

having oint>Arked ficuerol Manning and his StnfT, and procooded to Obbia, ^^H 

where I furived ot 3 p.m. on 4th January. I found " Poraous" and ^^| 

'' Pomone " hod cleared tbu transport I hod despnt^^hol on !^2nd Deoerabor ^^H 

from Berben undergrrat dil1i>;iilti«i. owing to the bad weather prevuling ^^| 

•nd the few appliances at, tbcir dispesal. " Puraeua" left at G r.M. (or ^^| 

Aden. I ordored Commander Pears to complote with coat there, endeavour ^^| 

to hire a itnun laanch Huitable for tbo work here (General Maiming having ^^H 

Htnetioned thia) and tow her bore afbir the arrival o( the moll at Aden on ^^| 

l^h Janaory, proceeding along the south coast of Arabia to Shugra and ^^H 

>'vikalln, and hoisting on board an many surf boat* as he could carry, and to ^^H 

bring their crews. ^^H 

General Itanning landed at T A.M. on Qth January, I proceeded to ^^H 

Elbur, a place 28 miles south of Obbia, to examine it, and bring away any ^^H 

aurf lioata that might be there. I arrived there at 10.30 a.m., and, finding ^^H 

two anrf boata, I brought them on board with their crews. Elhur is a far ^^^| 

bettor place for disembarking a force than Obbia. ^^H 

Tlw onrhori^c IR much tlie Konie, though I fancy the water is not quite ^^^| 

ao rou(;b ; but the landing is very good. There is a natural breakwater ^^^| 

formed by » barrJcLT reef which runs parallel with the shore, inside of wliioh ^^H 

there is landing loc a large nnmbcr of boats in abaolutely smooth wat«r. ^^^| 

Tliero is a depth inaide the reef of feet at low water and 12 feet at high ^^H 

wator. Theoon^tioni aibore are just as, favourable aa Ubbio, plenty ot ^^H 

uOIcellent grazing and wat<^r, and tlio distance no further from the objective ^^^| 

'lOf tbn expedition. It is a groat pity it was not visilcd when H.M.S. ^^H 

" Pomone" came down to survey Obbia, as there is no question it would ^^^^ 
iuivu boon selected as tbc bsao. At Obbia the landing at this time of the ^^^^^^H 
yr-*r in bod, boats having to pass through the surf to get under the shelter of ^^^^^^^^| 
the reef. 1 left Klbiir at 1.30 c.u. and arrived at Obbia at 5.1G r.M. ^^^^^| 

At g.30 A.x. on Sth January the transport " Nowshera" 
about one hour oflerwardsthelndian marine ship "Canning." 
Ilowett, R.I,M., and Lieutuaont Uuddleatoa, R.I.M., camo on board to m» J 
ins, bringing tbcir orders from the Director, Indian Marine. ' 

itHiant Huddlcston, who bad bcon ordered by the DiroetoT of 
llurine lo report himself to the General DQIccr Commanding for duty 
sburo, wati placed by General Manning undrr my orders. 1 directed him 
tusist Commander Jones as Asctstant Beachmastcr. 
Work was started on " Noa-shcra " about 10 *.M-, and by G.30 r.M. all the 
troops (alMjut 1,000) with tbnr kits and baggage and 2C mules bad been 

January all boats were employed olearing " Nowshora " I 

" arrived, a 


2 L 2 


sea ; 10th January still clearing *' Nowshera,*' sea and wind higli ; at 1 r.M. 

British Indian steamer from Aden arrived with two Italian attaches, four 
military officers, a good deal of baggage, some Government stores, tluree 
cnmcls and four ponies. As she had to shift berth twice, we did not get to 
work on her until 4 p.m. She was cleared by G.30 and sailed for Mombasa. 
** Nowshcra" was also cleared about the same time, and sailed for Aden 
by 8 r.M., but as she touched the ground on her way out, she anchored 
again and sailed at daylight the next morning. She left for Berbera and 
Aden to ship as many camels as possible and return to Obbia. 

11th January we commenced on "Canning" ; 80 mules were landed 
from her and most of her stores. 

12th January the Indian transport " Ikhona '* arrived at 9 a.h. Being 
a large steamer she took some time to berth, and it was not until nearly 
noon that we commenced unloading her. Her troops with their luggage, 
78 mules and some stores were landed. " Canning " with her own boats 
carried on landing her own stores ; a good deal of wind and sea. 

13th January was a very bad day ; wind and sea high. " Canning ** 
carried on landing her stores in her own boats, and finished about 2. p.m. 
AU the remainder of the boats worked on " Ikhona." We were much handi- 
capped by "Canning's" steamboat being under repair. "Pomono's" 
boat also broke down, and was under repair for about 5 hours. This 
made the work for the boats very hard, and much time was lost in getting 
them back after unloading. All the animals were landed (140) and a good 
deal of stores. 

14th January was again a very bad day, and the work of clearing 
" Ikhona " was much delayed. The two troop barges were got alongside 
and filled up with stores to expedite the clearing of the steamer. We had 
again only one steamboat as " Canning's" boat was still under repairs. 

ir»th January was a still worse day. Wind and sea very high. Landing 
stores was impracticable owing to the high surf. As General Manning was 
anxious to get " Ikhona " away, I transferred what stores remained to be 
landed to " Canning." This was completed by 1 p.m., and after the 
"Canning" had weighed the troop boats astern of her, "Ikhona" sailed 
for Aden and Berbera at 4 p.m. " Canning " lost her steamboat, it was 
swamped and sank. 

IGth January was a very bad day, and landing quite impracticable. 
" Ranee" arrived from Bombay with Bikanir Camel Corps at 4 p.m. 

17th January was another bad day, and landing was quite impossible. 

18th January, the weather having moderated, we commenced clearing 
" Ranee." " Canning" with her boats landed the stores from " Dvhona" 
that had been put on board her. " Perseus" arrived at 8 a.m. with a tug 
in tow, hired from Aden. She also brought six surf boats witli their cren'S. 
Commander Pears, with assistance of tug, laid down moorings close in 
shore for " Canning's " troop barges. 

Thirty-three camels were landed from " Ranee," two were drowned owing 
to the men not being used to them ; a largo amount of stores wore also 
landed. Captain of "Caprera" most kindly volunt<»ered t^ His 


steamboat, and she did most useful work for us during the remainder of the 
disembarkation, until she was lost on the night of 3rd February. 

19th January, boats employed clearing "Ranee" and troop barges of 
" Ikhona's " stores. An attempt was made to land animals in troop barges, 
but, owing to the motion, it was found they could not keep their footing if 
crowded, and not enough could be carried to make it answer. No 
difficulty was found in landing the animals. They were pushed out of tho 
barge and taken in tow by boats waiting for them. I decided to continue 
swimming all animals as wc had hitherto done, and to use the barges solely 
for landing stores in. By this mc^na landing of stores is expedited, as the 
(listanco to tho landing place from the moorings of tho barges is short. 
Altogether 40 mules, 8 horses and 2^ camels were landed (one horse and 
Olio camel beini; drowne<l), and a largo quiintity of stores. Both " Perseus" 
and "Pomono's" steam lx)at8 gave a lot of trouble and were constantly 
breaking down. 

20th January was the first really lino day wo had had, and a good day's 
work was done in consequence. Altogether 141 camels and a large amount 
of stores were landed. 

2l8t January, all boats were employed clearing " Ranee." The day was 
a fine one. The rest of the camels (55) were landed in about two hours. 
Tho lighters were found very useful in the smooth water, and were the means 
of landing a largo amount of stores. 

±2nd January, " Ranee " was cleared by noon, and sailed at 5 p.m. for 

23rd January, " Canning" sailed at 11 a.m. for Aden and Berbera, where 
she is to embark camels. " Newark Castle " arrived at 5.30 p.m. from Cape 

24th January was a fmo day, and wc commenced clearing ** Newark 
Castle." 314 animals were landed and some stores. Great difficulty was 
ex i)erionced in slinging the mules who were very vicious. It was necessary to 
tlu-ow some of them in order to get them slung. But for this, well over 40(f 
auimals would have been landed. It was found possible in the fine weather 
to land four animals at a time. 

2oth January, Italian man-of-war '* Caprcra " sailed at 3 a.m. for Klhur, 
as wo had rectal vcd a report that two dhows were landing arms and ammuni- 
tion for Yusuf Ali. She returned at 3 p.m., stating that no dhows wore 
there, and that she had soarcht d on shore and could find no trace of anything. 

248 horses and some stores were landed from " Newark Castle " in a 
rou^h sea. " (iaul " arrived from Durban at noon. Her Captain objected 
to his berth and refused to let my ollicer place him there, but on my sending 
for him he went there under protest. I gave him a \»Titten understanding 
that 1 would take the resix)n8ibi]ity of his safety there. It w^as necessary 
for him to go there, as he had 305 horses to be swum on shore, and anchored 
us he insisted on beiug in 5 fathoms, the distance from the landing place was 
too great for tho animals to swim. We landed 50 British and 25 Boers 
from *' (iaul" to take charge of tho horses already landed from " Newark 
Castle." About 8 p.u. No. 23 Lighter broke from her moorings and drifted 


on to the rooks, her cargo was mostly saved. A special report on this has 
been forwarded. 

26th January, weather was improving. Landed all but five sick horses 
from '* Newark Castle*' and a few stores, also all troops from " GauL** 
Lighter No. 23 was found to be a total wreck. She is over 30 years old I 
am told, and was too rotten to stand the beating about of the surf. 
"Pomone's'* steamboat, owing to her screw getting foul, drifted on the 
rocks about 8 a.m., close to No. 23 Lighter ; Commander Pears with the tog 
made four attempts to tow her off, but failed each time. 

27th January was a fine day. We landed 227 horses from " Gaul " and a 
good deal of stores from ** Newark Castle.*' " Pomone's " steamboat was 
reported to be beyond repair, so I had her boiler and fittings taken out of 
her. The loss of this boat and the lighter have been much felt. 

28th January was a fair day. The rest of " Gaul's" horBi>a (138) and 
stores from both *' Gaul " and " Newark Castle " were landed. ** Nowshera " 
arrived at noon, bringing 193 camels and 42 mules and ponies frcMn Berbera 
and about 200 tons of stores. '* Newark Castle " was shifted at 3 P.M., and 
" Nowshera" brought into her billet, as General Officer Commanding was 
anxious to have her discharged ss soon ss possible. Cavaliere Sola, Italian 
Consul-General at Aden, arrived in "Nowshera" to effect the anest of 
Yusuf Ali and his sons. 

29th January, Yusuf Ali and his two sons were arrested and made 
prisoners on board the Italian man-of-war *' Caprera." 195 camels were 
landed from ** Nowshera," and a large amount of stores from '* GauL" 

30th January, British India boat from Aden arrived at a.m., bringing 
mails, some military oflScers, one camel, four ponies and mules, and a few 
stores. These were landed and she sailed at noon. The rest of " Now- 
shera's " animals (40) and stores were landed by 1 p.m. \ goiid day's work 
wss done on ** Gaul" landing stores. 

31st January, Yusuf Ali and his sons were cmb4irk«-^ on board 
*' Nowshera" at 6 a.m., in charge of an Italian guard. Ilicy will be handed 
over to the Resident at Aden until their destination is decided on by the 
Italian Government. *' Nowshera" sailed at 9 a.m. " Gaul " was cleared 
of all stores and sailed at 4.30 p.m. " Newark Castle " was shifted in for 
disoharging at 2 p.m., and a few stores were landed from her. The wind and 
sea were bad on this day. 

1st February to 5th February, inclusive, were very bad clays ; a heavy 
sea running and blowing hard, and landing was impossible "Ikhona" 
arrived from Berbera with 600 camels and 26 ponies anil mules, and 
some stores, on 2nd February at noon. No work could be done until 
9 A.M. on 6th February, when the surf having subsided, tlie clearing of 
'* Ikhona" was commenced. Camels suffered too much in the rough sea 
which prevailed, four being drowned in the first two hours, so they were 
placed inside the boats with satisfactory results. 15.1 were landed sn'i 
some stores. 

7th February was again a bad day, but 362 camels and some stores wera 
landed from *' D^hona.** The Benadir steamer arrived at 10 a.m. ; aha 


brought wireleiis telegraphy party, 70 tons of coal for ** Caprera," and some 
stores. I lent **Caprera," "Naiad's" sailing pinnace, and three surf 
boats to assist in transferring her coaL " Pomone " sailed for Aden at 
10 p.m. 

8th February was again a bad day. The rest of " Qchona's " oainols (87) 
and 26 ponies and mules were landed, and the ship cleared of stores. She 
sailed for Bombay at 9 p.m. The Benadir boat was also cleared by 4 p.m. 
'* Canning " arriired at 10 p.m., bringing 300 camels and 200 tons of stores. 

9th February was a very bad day, and work had to be suspended at 4 p.m., 
owing to the heavy surf. One of *' Naiad* s " cutters and one steel boat were 
capsized inside the reef. ''Canning** landed 191 camels and a good deal 
of stores were lauded from " Newark.** 

10th February was a very bad day, and landing was most difficult. The 
rest of "Canning's** camels (109) were landed and stores from botn 
** Canning** and '' Newark.** At 5.30 p.m. the transport ** Sirsa'* arrived 
from Bombay with a complete general hospital and 2,250 tons of stores. She 
also brought four Madras surf boats Mrith crews for three boats. 

11th February was again a very bad day, and boats worked under great 
difficulties on *' Canning *' and " Newark.** 

12th February was so bad that work was stopped, and it was not until 
2 P.M. on 13th February that the surf had subsided sufficiently to make it 
possible to land, when boats worked on " Canning ** and *' Newark.*' 

14th February, the R.I.M.S. " Hardinge '* arrived at 8 A.M. ; " Newark " 
was cleared of all stores required at Obbia at 11 a.m., and sailed for Aden at 
4 p.m. " Canning ** was also cleared by noon. 

15th February the weather had much improved, and the work of clearing 
Sirsa** and "Hardinge** was commenced, and good progress made. 
Cenning** sailed for Bombay at 11.30 a.m. 

At <S p.m. on 16th February " Sirsa ** was cleared of all stores requiring to 
bo landed, and that completed the disembarkation. 

17th February, " Naiad ** and " Hardinge " were employed in embarking 
stores on board * Sirsa ** and " Hardinge.** " Perseus *' supplied ** Caprera *' 
with 50 tons of coal. " Sirsa ** sailed at 5 p.m. 

In carrying out the disembarkation, wo have had the following disad- 
vantages to contend against : — 

A. — ^The exposed nature of the anchorage. 

B. — ^The indifferent landing place and its limited space. 

C. — ^The few appliances at our disposal Against these we have had 
only one advantage, and that has been the practically unlimited 
labour the General has been able to supply us with for unloading 
the boats. 

A. — The anchorage, though fairly good holding ground, is mout exposed. 
At all times a heavy swell sets in, which, when the wind freshens, causea a 
breaking sea, very bad for boats. At this time of the year (probably the 
worst of the season) the wind is strong, and is particularly so at the full and 
change of the mooo, a three to five days' blow, during wkidi landing ia 


dangerous, taking plaoo with great regularity. After this is over the wind 
gradually subsides, veering sometimes as much as to E.8.E. when it prac- 
tically dies away for a couple of days. It then backs again, sometimes as 
far as to north, and gradually freshens up till at full or change of the moon, 
it culminates in a moderate gale. 

B. — ^The landing place is a bad one. It is formed by a natural Iffeak- 
water, which runs to the north-east, and is consequently exposed to the swell 
which sets in with this monsoon. It is, however, partially protected by 
some ofiF-lying rocks. A passage is possible through the rocks, close to the 
breakwater. This causes the swell to affect the landing place, and at high 
water and in bad weather, the sea breaks inside the rocks. There is also a 
passage roimd the rocks, but at anything below half tide and always in bad 
weather the sea breaks, and boats have to pass through the surf. 

The usual practice has been for boats going in to go round, and those 
coming out, through the rocks. 

Two boats at half tide are able to go alongside the breakwater, where, 
with careful attention, they can be unloaded; others, by anchoring and 
veering in, can be unloaded by men wading out to them, but the space being 
limited, not more than three or foiur boats can be unloaded in this manner at 
the same time. 

There is so little water inside the rocks that only boats of very light 
draught can be used ; the 30 feet sailing pinnace belonging to ** Naiad *' has 
frequently grounded and been unable to work at low water. 

C. — For the greater part of the time, in fact until 18th January, when 
" Perseus " arrived with a steam tug and six small surf boats with crews, we 
have been entirely dependent on the ships' cutters, assisted by five small surf 
boats. ITiese latter for some time could not be got to work, owing to the 
obstruction of the Sultan Yusuf Ali, and at all times only worked 

The boats available imtil 18th January were : — 


One 30-ft. pinnace, not always able to work 
One 27 ft. cutter. 
One 25-ft. cutter. 


Two 30-ft. cutters. 
One 27 -ft. cutter. 


Two 30-ft. cutters, and occa-sionally a third one, and five small 
surf boats. 

Aft<?r arrival of " Perseus," " Canning " left for Berbera to fetch camels, 
and " Perseus" supplied the same boats as " Pomone." The crews belong- 
ing to the surf boats brought by " Perseus," the boats having been found 
to be useless, were utilised in manning four boats belonging to the trans- 
ports. After arrival of " Nowshera " on 28th January with 100 Aden 


boatmen, ve were able to man more traiia|>orlboate, and Eromtbat tjmo had 
88 many boats working as could be usefully employed. After th» arrival of 
the tug, we were able to make uae of th? two troop barges brought from 
Bombuy by "Canning." TUcy were filled up with storos and towed to 
ntuoringB juiit oulaidc the rocks, and cleared by the surf boats from tbem. 
One of these broke adrift on the night of tbe 26tb January, and was 
wrecked on the rorks. Our greatest want has been capable steamboata. 
" Nuad's" 32-ft. steamboat has done reroarkably well, but "Canning's" 
" Perseiis's" and " Fomone's," being smaller boats, have been a eoQBtant 
sonree of trouble. Their lirea have frcjuentiy been put out by thu sea, 
and they have constantly bad to lay up for repaiis, " Canning's " boat 
was snumiicd and sank on IQth January, and " f omone's " lioal was 
wTccki'd on Ibe rocks on 2flth January. 

The Italian man-of-war " Caprera" moat kindly lent us his steHmbout, 
which, despite hor tquall size, did very valuable service in towing, until she 
sunk on the night of 3rd February. Aft«T the arrival of the tug on 18th 
January the want of steam hoal^ was not so much felt. 

A strong tide setja along the coast, and as all transporU were berthed well 
to windward U> enable boats to fetch, in pulling in, great delay was caused 
when steamboats were not aviuhible to tow the boats back. In moderate 
weather even they were unable generally to gel back by pulling. 

The landing of the animals was our chief difbculty at Grst. Mules and 
horses had to be swum, towed astern of the boata, and it was not found 
possible, until the boats got used to the work, to talie more than one animal 
at B time. liven then some were drowned, and the rate of landing was not 
more than about SO per day. Later it was found two could be token, and 
by the time the South Afriuao transports arrived with, between them, 
l.ieS raulea and horses, the boats were able to take four with ease and 
safety. This I think is about the limit, as with more the men cannot pull 
thi> oars, and tbo animals first hoialcd out ore kept waiting too long for the 
othorH. Our best day was 314 ; this would have been probably increased to 
over 400 had not tbo mules been so dilHcult (o manage on board the trans- 
ports. Some took oviir ten minutes to sling, and bad to be tliroHU before 
the sling could b« got round them, and Bovoral coses of bites and lucks 
omurml amongst the men engaged in slinging them. 

The beat way of handling the animals in the water iron found to bo with 
a toiie round their nm'ks, arranged so that it could not slip over Ouar 
heada and at the oamo tiuiv could not be drawn tight onou^ to choke 
them. A line being attached to tlu nofc band of head-stall to keep their 
noses out of the wat<^. Tbo swimming jiowers of both horses and miiles is 
remarkable. Several at times got adrift and were swimming about (or 
stnno time — one. in particular, was OI minutes Imfore lie was caught, and 

L mint have been nearly l{ hoora in the water; no animal got drowned under 
thcao oircumstonora, the luas of animals was generally due to tlieir being 
citoketl or else licit noses being allowed to got under water. 
Had it been possible to make a lone to the beach by means of larjjc grass 
hawsuts or bamboos lashed to a light grocs rap«, mules and horses eould have 


beoi pot overboard from the transports and left to swim ashore alone. The 
slightest thing in the water will turn them, and with anything to guide them 
they would swim straight to the beaoh. The risk here, owing to the presence 
of rooks, was too great, but had the beaca been a olear one, undoubtedly 
it would have been the easiest and quickest method of landing the animals. 

Camels at first were landed in the surf boats, being tied up so that they 
could not move. This method, though a safe one, was very slow, as with five 
boats not more than 60 a day could have been landed at the outside. The 
Indian camels were too heavy, and surf boats refused to take them. 

Recourse was therefore had to putting them in the water in tow of the 
boats. As the camel is a most helpless animal and will not try to swim, they 
were slung to the boats by two ropes passing under their bodies, a neck rope 
being used to keep their heads out of the water. In this manner they were 
landed quite easily. Latterly camels have been landed inside the boats. 
This was tried on account of the rough weather in which the camels from the 
** Ikhona** had to be landed. By taking out two thwarts from the steel 
bo>tci belonging to the Indian transports, it was found possible to put as 
many as nine camols in some of the boats and five in others. In the shipl* 
boats a pile of herios was made in the stem sheets, and two, and in the larger 
boats three camels placed on the top of them. No diflSculty was experienced 
in getting the camels out, as they were too unwieldy and heavy, but with 
the smaller Somali camel, it is undoubtedly the best and quickest way to 
land them, as they are fit for service much sooner after landing. The jonm^ 
in the water takes a lot out of them. 302 camels were landed in this 
manner in one day in a rough sea, and with four boats away clearing the 
Benadir steamer. 

Though the strain on the personnel has been very great, my chief anxiety 
has been whether the material would hold out. Everything has suffered 
great damage, and the ships* boats have only been kept going by constant 
repairs by the carpenters, who, on occasions, have had to work on them for 
the greater part of the night. Very few of the boats will be worth repairing. 

Three lighters (two at Obbia) and three steamboats have been lost. Two 
of the lighters may possibly be recoveied. 

The men have stood the strain well. They have left the ship at 6.30 A.ll.» 
not returning before 7 p.m. ; and on occasions later had no regular meal 
hours and been wet through all day. 

I think great praise is due to them for their cheerful and willing endoranot 
under those most uncomfortable and trying circumstances. 

Oommander Eugenio Finxi, Commanding His Italian Majesty's Ship 
** Caprera,'* has assisted me in every way in his power. On ISth Jaanaiy 1m 
volunteered the use of his steamboat for towing, and though I 
greatly at accepting the offer, as the boat I was afraid was too small to 
the weather, he insisted in sending her until she was unf ortunatel j i 
and sank when made fast astern of ** Caprera ** on the night of Srd Fall iff. 
She did most Talnable serrioe^ in faot at times " CH>rera*s " and ** NtflA* 
steamboats were the only ones available, the others having hfokw 

has been very good tliToughout, Uis 

and bruines. 
I hnvp, Ac, 

Captain and Senior Naval O^tr, Otbia. 
. Iimry, K.C.S.I., 
.«! Ill aniler- in -Chief. East ladies. 

ii-tter was sent by General Manning to 
, completion of the landing : — 

Obbia, lath February, 1903. 

of diaombarkntian from traiiaporta haa been completed 

stores for tlie Sumaliland Field Farce, I desire to place 

ppTBoialion of the (jood aerviccB rendered by the ofBcers, 

□t Uia Majesty's ships employed in the work of 

t, owing to tbe violcncu ut the monsoon, the work nnder- 
Mua in the eitreme, anil it has been to mo a source of great 
'e the cheerful wsiy in wliich both officers, pcttf officers and 
■ Uajeaty'a ships have caiticd out their duties, in spite of the (act 
mploynd for tbo po^t sin weeks from morning to night in 
n open boats, men ajid stures in a rough sea, which iieceuitat«d 
g continually dreachcil with wuttr, 
K Kaall losses in stores and animabi i^ a proof of the oareful and skilfnl 
b which these duties have been performed. 
■ am indebted to you, yournolf, foe the excellent axrangemente made for 
mbarkation which has been ciuricd out so efficiently under conditions 
oh, as rogorda difficulties, ore probably without parallel in the history ot 
t diBembarkaUon of ou expeditionary force. 
I tiuBt that you will bo able to bring to the notice of officers, petty 

ra and mon my appreciation of thu services they have rendered. 
In conoluAioQ, Irecjuottt that you will bring to my notice the namoe of any 
V officers, i>etty offioera or men who, in your opinion, are deserving ot mention 
' for the duties perfornn-d by tbcm in thi' cniirBo of the disembarkation. 

Lieutenant E. W. Huddleston, who was Marine Transport BepoH of 
Officer during General Manning's expedition, also rendered H„dd]^i^ 
tt report of the marine transport worlt at Obbia, from the date R-IM. 
of arrival of the detachment there on 8th January, 1903, 
until the closing of that base on 17th April, 1903, and, as far as 
the records obtainable at Bcrbera admit, of the work up to the 
3rd July at that port, of which the following are extracts : — 
The actual number of troops, animaU and stores landed Mtd embarked at 
ObUaand Berbers has been tabulated by me tor eMyreferaiae,togetlier with 
a list of the vessels employed, and is betewitli attaehed (iM p^M W^tlojt 


In lat. 5"* W 30 " N., long. 48'' 30' E., is an open roadstead. Tbe 
anchorage for largo ships, though entirely open to the sea, has fairly good 
holding ground, the ships lying from i to f mile off shore. 

There is a small village, consisting of some native huts and tiiree store- 
houses and forts, which belonged to the Sheikh Yusuf AIL 

,g. Landing could be effected at all states of the tide by ships palling boat^ 

and very small native craft. The place for landing being behind a small r ' o 
of sandstone rock, jutting out from the mainland to the north, which, t^ .ogfa 
it did not entirely break the force of the heavy sea that was r unning doring 
the whole of the north-east monsoon, enabled boats to lie in comparative 
shelter when once through the dangerous surf which marked the entrance 
to the landing place. 

r. Tjabour was absolutely unobtainable, with the exception of six small 

Hurf boats, which wore propelled by six native oarsmen, and capable of 
carrying from four to six passengers or 4 to 5 cwt. of stores. This amount of 
labour was oven difficult to obtain, and until the removal of the Sultan, 
Sheikh Yusuf Ali, from Obbia, was uncertain, the boatmen being entirely in 
his power. 

or. The weather at Obbia during January, February, and until the latter 

end of March was decidedly bad, and on many days landing was impossible. 
It was observed that the wind was always strongest at full and change d 
the moon, the wind veering between north and N.N.E., and the regolarity 
of the wind, which with the run of the sea caused a heavy surf at the entrance 
to the landing place, making it absolutely imprsM^ticable for boats to pull 
through it. 

(I of The method of landing men, animals and stores was by ships pulling 

», &o. boats, which were at first towed by the steam launches of the different 
incn-ofwar in port, near to the landing-place breakers. H.M.S " Naiad," 
'* Pomoiio " and *' Perseus," each supplying three boats, and the R.I.M.S. 
*' Canning " and " Hardingc," during the time they were in port, also 
supplying a like number. Besides these boats, four steel boats were taken 
out of the hirt»d transport *' Ranee," and four from the hired transport 
" Ikhona," and permanently attached to the department, the men to man 
the boats being Arabs, who were brought from Aden at my request for 
this purpose. Six ]\fa8Kula1i surf boatu were also sent from Madras by the 
Director of the Royal Indian Marine to assist in the disembarkation. 

Horses and mules wore lowered over the side in a sling ; they were then 
made fast to the boat's stem or gunwale with a short rope tied on to the head- 
stall, the rest of the body being entirely free. By this means two and even 
three horses were towed on shore by one boat, the largest number landed in 
one day being close on 200 horses, and the total number landed Ixung 1,744. 
Camels were at first landed in a similar manner, but it was found that, 
not only was this a tedious method of landing the animals, but the jwrcentage 
of losses was very high. The steel boatB mentioned as taken from the hired 
trans j)orts '' Ranee " and '* Ikhona " were fitted with air tanks ; these tanks 
were cut out and the thwarts for the men to sit on to row were also made 
movable. The camels* forelegs were then tied up underneath the body, and 


the animals were lowered into the boats alongside the ship. On their arriyal 
ashore the boats were turned over on their side and the lashings on the 
camels' legs being cut, the animals were pulled out of the boats. Bj this 
method as many as 10 camels were placed in one steel boat and safely brought 
ashore, 3d5 camels being landed in one day, and no casualties were recorded 
after this method of landing was tried. Another advantage to this form of 
landing being that long immersion in the sea water was found hurtful to the 
animals and was thus avoided. 

When embarking horses at Obbia, Massulah boats were turned on their 
side, the horses were then walked in, and, as soon as two horses were on the 
side of the boat, it was uprighted. By this means the 42 horses and mules 
that had to be shipped were safely embarked without any casualties. 

In addition to the boats already mentioned, two iron lighters were 
chartered by the Royal Navy from Aden, but the extremely heavy weather 
experienced rendered these craft of little use. Two wooden troop barges 
were also brought by me from Bombay, but they could only be used to 
tranship stores into, so as to give the boats less distance to pull» it being 
possible to anchor them closer to the rocks than the ships could possibly 
come ; but, it being impossible to bring the barges through the surf, the 
stores had again to be re-shipped into the boats when the barge was 

The tug ** Dolj)hin *' was chartered from Aden to tow the boats to and 
from the shore, and proved extremely useful, as it was possible to tow by this 
means seven or eight full boats at a time close into the landing place, thus 
lessening the heavy labour for the men pulling in the boats, and cnabUng the 
landing of stores to be carried on far more expeditiously. 

The two iron lighters chartered by the Royal Navy were both lost, one Casualtiei 
at Obbia and one in being towed down to Obbia, but I have no record as craft, 
to dates. 

One of the troop barges brought by me from India carried away her 
moorings during a gale of wind on the night of the 25th January, 1903, and 
drifting on to the rocks at the landing place became a total wreck. She was 
full of stores at the time, but a greater portion of them were recovered. 

A steam cutter belonging to H.M.S. '^ Pomone,*' having fouled her 
propeller by a rope with which she was towing a ship's boat of! to the ship 
drifted on to the rooks and became a total wreck. 

A steam cutter bclouging to the R.I.M.S. " Canning,'* laying astern of 
that ve8st»l was filled by a heavy sea and sunk, and the same fate occurred to 
a Ht^^am cutter belonging to the Italian gunboat " Caprera," which had been 
assisting in the towing of boats to and from the shore. 

One of the steel boats taken from the hired transport " Ikhona/* whilst 
making the entrance to the landing place during a gale, and when there was a 
heavy surf running, touched the rocks and sank immediately, and one Arab 
boatman was tlrowncil. Every effort was made to try and raise the boat, and 
divers were sent down in .search of her, but without being successful in finding 
her ; but I am of opinion that by reason of the strong undercurrent and tho 
shifting of the sand, the boat was swept out to seaward* no traoo of her ever 
being found, although she sank in only 2 fathoms of water. 


Itiefl Notwithstand ing the very heavy sea and the daageroos amf thvoqgli 

, which the boats had to be sent to effect a binding, I am happy to be aUe to 

ls» report not a single serious accident occurred to any of the teoopa. The 

^'^* losses to animals was far less than was at first anticipated, and was ooofined 
to lees than 1 per cent, of horses, mnles, &c., and 8 per cent, of cameto, out 
of a total of 1,744 horses landed and 1,355 camels. 

There were no serious casualties on board the ships to either men or 
animals from the time of their embarkation to the time of their disembarka- 
tion at Obbia. 

The base at Obbia was finally closed at noon the 17th April, 1903. 

ro. The records kept at Berbera on marine transport work until the arrival 

of the department on 21st April, 1903, do not permit of a fidl statement of 
troops, animals and stores being tabulated, as in the case of troops landed at 
Obbia, but as far as possible, from the records obtained, this has been done^ 
and is herewith attached. (See pages 554, 555). 

The harbour of Berbera is protected from all winds except the ;<i'^uth- 
west, and though small there is good anchorage for three or four large 

j^„ There is a small T-shapcd pier, constructed of wood on screw piles, at 

the landing place, alongside of which small vessels of from 300 to 400 tons 
can be berthed. The pier, however, is small, and, owing to the silting of 
the sand at the sides of the pier, boats cannot be brought alongside tiiere, 
there being practically no water at the sides at low water. 

Another small pier, composed of bamboos, with two empty SOO-gaUon 
water tanks to make a floating pontoon at the end, was built by me shortly 
after the arrival of the department to relieve the strain on the larger pier, and 
also to enable animals to be walked straight into the boats when embarking, 
the floating pontoons being so constructed as to be on a level with the side of 
the country craft when alongside. 

ir. Country craft, capable of carrying from 10 to 15 tons of stores, are 

obtainable at a price which varies from 10 to 20 rupees a day, according to 
the size of the boat. Coolies are also obtainable up to about 300 or 400 
per diem, but labour is expensive, and the work done in proportion to the 
number of men employed far from satisfactory. 

,^gj. During the north-east monsoon, from October till the latter end of May, 

the weather is very fine, light variable winds blowing throughout the day and 
night. At the end of May till the middle of September, or during the south- 
west monsoon, the wind blows with tremendous force from the south-west, 
the wind commencing about midnight and lasting till noon of the following 
day ; and during these hours it is practically impossible with the craft 
obtainable to do any work afloat. 

>d of Men, animals and stores were landed in the craft obtainable at the port. 

g, &c. The horses and camels were lowered over the side into the boats, the boats 
were then towed or sailed ashore near to the pier, and the craft having masts, 
a line was attached ^to the masthead and the boats pulled over on to their 
side and the !^"i»"^l« walked out. 

(ties. I There were no serious casualties at Berbera, either to men, animals, or 



Money to meet the expeoBes of the department has been obtained by |f oney. 
me from the Field Paymaster, and my accounts rendered direct to the 
Examiner of Marine Accoimts, Bombay. 

Lieutenant Huddleston also rendered the following report 
regarding the Marine Transport work at Las Ehorai : — 

9th June, 1904. 

In accordance with yonr orders, I have the honour to submit the following 
report on marine transport work at Las Khorai from the date of my arrival 
there on the 23rd March, 1904, until the final closing of Las Khorai as a 
base on the 2l8t May, 1904 :— 

On my arrival at Las Khorai, Captain Grant, R.E., who was in command 
of the post, had commenced building a breakwater for embarkation pur- 
poses, the idea th m being to build a bamboo pier on the lee side of the break- 
water thus formed. This idea, however, was found impracticable, is the 
breakwater was continually being washed away. Finally a pier was con- 
structed of sandstone rock blasted from the beach, strengthened with 
bamboos and sandbags, and projecting about 120 feet from the beach. 

The depth of water at the end of the pier was just sufficient to float 
buggalows at half flood tide. 

Las Khorai is an open roadstead open to all winds from cast to west 
through north. 

The anchorage for large vosivls is from 600 to 800 yards from the beach 
in about 8^ to 9^ fathoms of water. 

l*ho beach itself is slight'y shelving (about I foot ui 40) right out into 
deep water, and dhuws had to anchor about 300 feet to be in 6 feet of water 
at low water springs. 

Weather. — The weather during April and up till the 18th May was 
invariably fine, with light breezes from all points of the compass. 

On the 18th May the first signs of the Khansef was felt, a heavy swell 
rolled in all day, and though the wind was not strong the sea was too rough 
for work to be satisfactorily carried out, and no work was done till high 

I'he pier was considerably damaged and washed away in x>!>'^t and 
had the weather not moderated the pier could not have stood another day. 

I attach herewith a rough sketch* of the pier by Captain Grant, R.K, 
the depth of water at the extreme end being 4 feet at half flood tide and 
6 inches at low water springs. 

Method of EmharkfUion and DisembarkcUion. — The disembarkation of 
mules was comparatively an easy matter, the dhows sent by you from 
IJerbera bci-jg u«ed for this purpose. The mules were lowered into the 
dhows, and un the dhows reaching the beach they were hauled over on 
their side, and the mules made to jump out. One casualty occurred in 
landing the mules and that was caused by a mule trying to jump out of 

• Not reproduced. 


the boat before tbe boat was baoled own on ita tide ; the animal braka 

Ha leg and had io be ahot. 

The embarkation waa more difficult on aooonnt of there not being soiB* 
oient water at the end of the pier at either low water apringa or neapa, and 
only between half flood and half ebb tides. 

The method of embarking camels was as follows ; — ^ 

The camels were broaght to the end of the pier and their foreleg^i then 
tied by a piece of rope on each foot. The dhows for camels were then placed 
alongside the end of the pier, and a few sandbags placed in the bottom of 
the dhow. The men then pulled on the ropee attached to ^e camera feet, 
and its lefi^s consequently slipped off the pier into the boat. 

No causaltiee occurred in getting the camels into the boats, and as 
three boats were uRed at the same time, the average rate of embarkatiun 
was about 30 camels an hour. 

To expedite the shipping of camels, by my request, Captain Grant, R.E., 
constructed three small ramps of stone, sufficiently long to allow the steel 
boats that were sent by you to be brought alongside, the object of these 
ramps being to allow of work being commenced before half flood tide, and 
before the large dhows could be brought alongside. The camels were then 
made to walk up the ramp and into the steel boats. One accident oocorred 
to a camel in getting into the boat, caused by the camel missing ita footing 
and falling into the bottom of the boat, its shoulder being broken. 

The troop lighter sent by you from Berbers waa used for the em- 
barkation of camels, and materially expedited the embarkation. With 
the troop barge and using the dhows and steel boats, 398 camels and 600 
men, with their baggage, were embarked in eight hours. 

The embarkation of mules and horses was carried out in a different 
manner. The inulca being much lighter, it was possible to sling them 
into llu» (IhowH from tho on<l of the pier, the tackle used for slinging being 
mado fiust half way up the mast of the dhow. 

No casualties occmred in the embarkation of mules or horses. Six 
hundred mules being shipped in eight hoiuij, or at an average speed of IR 
an hour. 

I attach herewith a tabulated statement showing the number of men, 
animals, and stores embarked and disembarked at Las Khorai, together 
with a list of the ships that were employed (see Table IV, D'sembarka- 
tions, ;'.nd V. Fc^mbirkatio-.s). 

Las Khorai was finally closed as a base at midnight on the 21st May, 
when imdcr orders from the C.R.K.. Captain Grant havinu undermined the 
pier with 50 lbs. of gimcotton, it was hlovm to pieces, nothing remaining 
except a few broken pieces of woo<l and a large moss of rocks. 

I returned here in the last ship, the R.I.M.S. "Give," unrler yrur 
orders, bringing in tow the troop barge and dhows. 

No casualties occurred to craft* 

Since writing the above Lieutenant Huddleston added the 
following further observations : — 


If Berbera is used again as a base for military operations on a laige 
scale, I would reoommcnd that the officer in charge of marine transport 
arrangements should be provided with : — 

(1) A good steam tug. 

(2) A steam cutter for communication with the transports. 

(3) Two good lighters of not less than 303 tons carrying capacity 
in which ramps could be constructed for horses, and two smaller 
lighters of 100 tons capacity. 

(4) A corps of 500 Arab coolies enlisted at Aden. 

The lighters and tug should be bought outright by the GoTcrnment 
(as was done in the China Expedition of 1900) and not hired. 

In support of my suggestion I would point out that in the Somaliland 

Expedition — 

The tug *' Dolphin " cost for the 3 months* hire, roughly 720 
Midgo" „ „ 10 „ „ 2,200 


Total £2,920 

Further, it is only necessary to point out that the detention of transports, 
loading or unloading, costs anything from £150 to £200 per diem, to show 
the necessity of having good plant for landing, &c., as often there wore 
three or even four transports in the harbour awaiting discharge at one 

Should Obbia or, indeed, any open roadstead on the east coast have to 
be utilised again as a base, at least 20 Madras ma.ssu1ah boats and their 
crews would, I consider, be most useful, as they were found to be the rery 
best boatA for cargo work, being able to take a fair amount of cargo, and 
also being most seaworthy and adapted for surf work for which they are 

Commander C. J. C. Kendall, R.I.M., Marine Trans- Report of 
port Officer, Somaliland Field Force, reported :— KcS'^'' 

Berbera, llth April, 1904. B.IM. 

From 4th to 8th July, the work of the department was carried out by 
Lieutenant E. W. Huddleston, R.I.M. 

I arrived in Berbera on the 9th July in the R.LM.S. ** Hardingc,** and 
assumed charge of the department. 

I found the following establishment and craft availablo :-~ 
1 Officer, Lieutenant E. W. Huddleflton. R.I.M. 
1 Warrant Officer, Mr. C. Perrett, Clerk R.I.BL 
1 1 marine lascars. 
30 Madras surf boatmen. 
1 Arab interpreter. 


3 ntecl life boats. 
1 rv.ttrr. 

(SOJTa) 2 M 




Local labour. 

The fore- 

Shaab Pier. 


Also about 20 sambooks (amaU open dhows) capable of carrying from 40 to 
300 bales, or from 3 to 7 animals, and engaged on daily hire. 

As the Massulah boats employed at Obbia had been returned to Aden 
and Bombay as unsuitable in Berbera, the men were no longer required here, 
and under instructions from the Director of the Royal Indian Marine were 
returned to India, leaving Berbera on the 11 th July. 

The actual number of troops, animals and stores landed and embarked 
at Berbera and other coast ports has been tabulated for easy reference, 
together with a list of the ships employed, and is attached herewith (see 

Berbera harbour is formed by a narrow sandy spit running parallel to 
the coast, thus forming a narrow harbour 1} miles long, running east by 
north and west by south, the navigable channel varying in breadth from 
4 cables at the entrance to 1} cables opposite the Shaab pier, to the eastward 
of which only small vessels should be berthed. The harbour is capable of 
berthing four large ships and two smaller ones, and is well protected from 
all winds, except those from the westward, which blow directly into the 
harbour. The anchorage is safe for steamers, but native craft frequently 
drive ashore. During the Khareof the only safe anchorage for native craft 
being under the lee of the Shaab pier. 

Only a limited amount of Somali labour is available during the Kharetf, 
but is obtainable in considerable numbers diuing the north-east monsoon. 
The Somali, however, makes a very indifferent labourer, being lazy, un- 
reliable and expensive ; he is quite unsuitable for ship*B work. 

Were very limited and quite insufficient to cope with the traffic. 

Is flat and shelving and quite unsuitable for landing stores owing to tlie 
long distance which such stores would have to be carried to a place of safety 
above high water. 

For all practical purposes is the only suitable landing place, it is a small 
T-headcd wooden pier with a frontage of 60 feet, situated on the south side 
of the harbour, connected with the high-water line by a narrow causeway. 
Built during the Egyptian occupation about 1880, this pier has been much 
neglected and is in a very indifferent state of repair ; this and the causeway 
v.'ere the only places where stores could be stacked after landing ; the former 
was unable to bear the strain thrown on it and broke down several timrii, 
Init was repaired and strengthened by the field engineer. The local steamers. 
vesseU of about 300 tons and drawing 8 or 9 feet, are able to come alongsidt* 
and load, but are aground at the low- water spiings. This pier is silting up 
very rapidly and even ship's boats are unable ^o land at the sides imlil half 

It was found necessary to refuse permission for Messrs. Cov^a^jec. 
Dinshaw and Brothers* steamers to come alon^ido when transports wrre in 
harbour, as they blocked the pier and all work ceased. 

A stone causeway, jutting out into the harbour from the Custom-House, 
and dries at low-wAtsr springs. Owing to Iho exposed position of this pier 
it was only ars liable lor a very few huurs daily during the Khareef ; also. 



owing to the lack of eUcking ipooe In lU vicmity and to the dUtftooe which 
all BtoreB landed would have to be transporleil, thia pier waa littlo uned by 
OovemmeDt ; it was. however, very iisctui on the few ocrosions when heavy 
weights bad to be landnl. 

Hub small pier was conBtruct«d under the direction of Ueiilenant B. W. BambiM Pier. 
Hiiddleston, and waa nseFid for landing and etubarking men in Hliipii' 
boats. The hosfutol ship, R.I.H.^. " HartUngD" fretiiiently embarked aick 
and details at this pier, wliith hu now been dismantled for use at. Laa Khorai. 

During the Khoroef the number of native boats isliiniled to tboaeownpd x,oeal cnfl^fl 

locally (about 30), but in the fine weather large numbers enter the port ^M 

[torn bU porta of the coast, and theite are roady and willing to accept work ^t 

on uiy ternia. ily remarks eom^eming the loeal labour refer equally to ^H 

the local boatmen and owners, who arc lazy, worthlcu 4knd ino«t unrrliable. ^H 

The usual Venice Convention Begulationa were in force, but shortly after Quuiantia^H 

my arrival the time was reduced from 10 to 8 days, and later was canctilied ^^| 

altogetluT, except in the case of infected or suapected Bhipa, of which tliero ^^H 

has only been one, the R.I.&LS. " Canning." However, the neoesaary pre- ^^H 

cautions were invariably takcti, and no commimication was permitted until ^^H 

4 medical inspection had taken place and prnclique bod been given. ^^H 

Were not obtjunable in Berfaera and bad to be brought from Aden, anil Coal an^^H 

»9 the treiaht ehar^d by Messrs. Cowosjee, Dinshaw and Brothers was iwy "■'■f''. ^^B 
heavy, sanction was obtained from the Resident at Aden for eoal to be sent ' " ^^^^| 

over in the R.I.M.S. " Mayo," One himdred tons wa^^irought and formed ^^| 

a ducIbub for a coal depAt, and the supply of coal was augmented froni time ^^H 

to time from Aden, and also from hired transports. This depot has succwn- ^^H 

fully oompliod with all demands from tho various military departmentt, and ^^| 

has supplied the launch and tug employed lator by this deportment, also the ^^M 

chartered vessel " Meyun," and on one cx^caninn the Italian corvette ^H 

" Ralileo," thus enabling her to proceed down the coast with urgent ^H 

deA|iat«hea. ^H 

Water is laid on at the end of the Shdob Pier, about GOO at WO gallons ^M 

being obtainable per diem, but as tliis was iosuIGt'ieDt to meet the demands ^^M 

of tho craft of this department, water boa to be carried down from the ^H 

wcUs. ^M 

The coaling and watering of large transports was carried out when ^^H 

ncceaury by the Government AgenU, Meun, Luke Thomas and Conipany, ^^M 

at Aden, and the bills for the same submitli^d to the Marine Transport ^^M 

Officer, Ad«n, under arrangements mode by me. ^^M 

Theni are no skilled meebanics or corpraiters in Berbera, and I am in- g^Qigd ^^| 

dehted to His Majesty's ahip*. the ships of the Royal Indian Marine, and the labour. ^^M 

birnl transporta for their aosistance, which enabled me to keep my craft in ^H 

working condition. ^H 

The only means of signalling on my airivul was by men lent fmtn Ibc Si„nal al^^H 

Various shija for (hat purpose, and as communication with tlie ahlps was ^^H 

frequently required. tnQction was obt.untd for the increoan of mv eslabiisii- ^^t 

Bimt by thr»> aigaalmrn, who arrived Irom India on the 3rd (X'»)t>cr, vsbkb ^^M 

wbirli data a signal station bo* been luaintamed and ha^ proved of great ^^M 
()ff)2rA) 2 M 2 ^M 




(a) Mails .• 

(I) Storo). 


value, messages continually being sent by the military authorities to the 
naval ships, and vice vers^, and also in connection with signals to trans- 
ports, &c. 

There is no telegraphic communication between Aden and Somaliland. 

In normal times communication is maintained by the steamers of Messrs. 
Cowasjee, Dinshaw and Brothers, Aden, which, under an existing agreement 
with the Somaliland Protectorate, leave *Aden with the English mails every 
Monday, arriving in Berbera on Tuesday, and proceeding thence to Bolhar 
and Zeila, returning to Berbera on Friday, and thenoe to Aden with the 
mails, thus entailing a delay of one week for all letters to England and 
the Continent, which to connect at Aden should leave Berbera not later than 
Wednesday during the south-west monsoon, and Tuesday during the north- 
cast monsoon. To keep this connection and also to bring over the Indian 
mails without imduo delay, one of His Majesty's ships of war was placed at 
tlie disposal of the G.0.(7., her primary duty being to leave Berbera on 
Wednesday with the English mails and returning on Friday with the Indian 
mails. She was, however, continually employed carrying despatches to and 
fr>m Aden and Berbera. 

All stores were brought over in Messrs. Cowasjcc, Dinshaw and Brothers* 
vessels, but, owing to the very largo quantity of stores requiring conveyance 
from Aden, the weekly mail was augmented, and frequently as many as three 
of these vessels arrived in one week. Under the terms of their agreement 
with the civil authorities, all Protectorate stores brought over were charged 
for at special rates, wliieh were on an average four times the rate charged 
to local traders ; these rates seem to have been accepted by the Somaliland 
Field Force. In my opinion these rates are unreasonably high, I therefore 
drew attention to the matter and point-ed out that the work could be better 
and more eoonomieally carried out by a K.I.M. vessel, or if no R.I.M. vessel 
was availabl«s by chartering a suitable vesMrl for the pur|K>se, which in 
addition to carrying utored would also f>e available for the duties then carried 
out by His Majesty's ships in the event of their being withdrawn. Sanction 
having been obtained, the R.I.M.S. ** ^layo*' arrived here on 18th October 
and was replaced by the K.I.]^r.S. '* Dalhousie," which was in her turn 
withdrawn and replaced by the liircd transport ** Meyun,** a small steamer 
belonging to the Perim Coal Company, which was chartered on the 13th 
February, 1901, for Rs. 8,000 per mensem, inclusive of all charges, except 
coal and water. 

During the north-cast monsoon, from 15th September to 15th May, the 
weather is uniformly good and marine transport work can, if required, be 
carried out day and night. South-west monsoon, from 15th May to 
15th September, is the bad weather season, and the winds locally known 
as KhareL'f blow with great force and are accompanied by blinding clouds 
ot dust. These winds blow with great regularity, commencing about 8 p.m., 
blow hard all night, increasing to a whole gale about a.m., moderating 
ugsm about 10 a.m., then quickly falling light and drawing out from seaward. 

• rte ft'iu Chapter XIV, 2. 

During this > 
2 l-.M. aadS.P. 

1 flfork i^oat cwi ouly be can-ivd uul boti>-*w» ftboul 

Men, Hnimals and ttotei ivere Uad«d ia aombooks. The aDimula wrro U 
lowered into these boats; which were towed or sailed eihore near the fiat, lai 
the boat won t hen haiiled over on her bilge nith the aaaistance of a muthcad 
tackle, and tho animals made to jump out. This method wB3 continued 
until the arrival of the lighters, which were fitted with ramps, and loircd 
alongside the pier, and the animals were walked out. 

No CRSunlliea to troops occurred dnring tho disembaxkotiun or embarks- Ci 
tion, and only one animal was killed in disembarking. *"' 

Considering the fact thai moat of the camels were brought from India "" 
during the aiiuth-wesC moosooa, Ihe casualties to aniiuala were very alight, 
and only ainounltd to four. 

On the arrival of the hired transport " .Sofala," her master reported the 

coal in No. 4 hold on Hre. At tho time labour wan practically imoblunable 

■Jtom, but with tho oui^tanre of a crew from the R.I.M.S. " Conning," 

V wlucli sliip was ia port at the time, the fire wb« eventually put out and no 

HdHnago wns done. No other eoauatties occurred Ui oraft. 

B As will be seen from tlie foregoing remiu'ks, the conditions on my arrical 

HjllUe wholly unfavourabli' (or workadoal. TheKharcel was blowing in full 

^^orce. and on an averagH not more than six hoin^' work could be put in 

daily, of which only four hours were in daylight. The absence of a laonch 

of «uScicut power to taw dhows to and from the ships was very urgently 

felt. Tlic Ulwur was moat unaatisfactary, and the plant at mj disposal 

tholly inadcciuatc. I reprewoted this to the G.O.t'., and sanction waa 

rciiiicated — 

(1) To hire or pnrvliMc a tug and two Ughtem : 

{■!) To engagr a gang of Arab stevedores (skilled 9liij)'a labourers) from 

(3) To incTfiasa my mtabUsbmeiit by three slgiiolmrn ; 

(t) To rn-laim Uod in tho viciiiity o( the jiicr and cnusoivny foi sln.king 

(•*>! For a tramway lo be construclcd from (ho fier to the high-water 

On the 18th July, Mnclion having been obtained, I ordered Liuutrnanl 
^ Iluddlcston to proceed to Adt-n and make the necctsaiy aiTangemenla 
It the liire of a tug and lighlrTS, and to engage 250 Arab stevedores, also to 
utgo with the Marine Transport OSiccr for the Covemmcnt barge Xo. SS 
l^to be tent over as soon as possible, and also to visit the heads of the various 
with a view to obtaioing information regarding the resources of the 
nrt. Lieutenant Huddloston returned on the 241th July, having satia- 
Mturtly concluded these arrangements. 

The tug "Dolphin" was eharterrd from tho .Alien Port Trust nl » 
mthly hire u( £241 inclusive o( all ehorgw, ciccpl coal and water. SI9 
a Bcrbcta ■» the 34th July. 
Two large Iron lighter*, 4-ach c.ilwblv of carrying NO tons of tturus. were 


chartered firom the Perim Coal Company, at Bs. 10,000 for the first monUi 
and Rs. 6,000 for succeeding months, the company taking all risks of the 
yoyage to and from Berbera and whilst within harbour limits at Berbera. 
These also arrived on the 24th July from Perim. 

On the 28th July the B.I.M.S. " Mayo *' arrived with 150 Arab steve- 
dores (the Resident at Aden having refused to allow more than this number 
to leave the port) as follows : — 

1 head maccadum, at Rs. 40 per mensem. 

3 assistant maccadum, at Rs. 20 per mensem. 
146 coolies, at Rs. 15 per mensem. 

The department now for the first time became self-supporting, and I was 
able to deal with the local labour and boats. The local labour was almost 
entirely discontinued, only small gangs being occasionally engaged to relieve 
the congestion on the pier. Up to this time work has been very seriously 
delayed, oaring to the unsatisfactory behaviour of the boatmen. I was now 
able to alter the conditions of service, and, instead of daily hire, I instituted 
piece work ; a good deal of trouble was experienced from the local boatmen, 
who refused to accept these terms, but with the means now at my disposal 
and also by engaging the few foreign boats in the harbour and also assisting 
with ships* boats, I was able to carry on the work satisfactorily, and sent 
notice down the coast and also to the Red Sea and the Arab Coast, informing 
all that I was willing to employ all who wanted work. Foreign boats 
soon began to arrive in small numbers, and as the weather improved* in 
increasing numbers, until I was quite index)endent of all locally owned boats, 
none of which have been engaged for several months. I am greatly indebted 
to Mr. O* Byrne, the Chief of Customs, for his assistance in forwarding theee 
notices and also in drawing up a tariff based on his knowledge of rates in 
peace time. 

The only cause of delay now was the lack of stacking space near the 
pier, and, owing to the continuous pressure of work, it was not possible to 
begin reclaiming until early in September, since which time every oppor- 
tunity has been taken of the lull in the work to continue the reclamation, 
until now there is sufficient space in the vicinity of the pier and causeway to 
unload at least three vessels uHthout congestion. The whole of this work 
luis been carried out by the Arab Coolie Corps. 

I On the 12th September the Port Trust, Aden, notified the withdrawal of 
the tu£( ** Dolphin *' ; I again ordered Lieutenant Huddleston to proceed to 
Aden an<l arrange for the charter of a suitable tug to replace her. The tug 
*' Midge" was chartered from the Perim Coal Company for Rs. 3,000 per 
mensem, inrlu8i\'e of all charges, except coal and water. She arrived on the 
18th September, and the tug ** Dolphin " left for Aden the same day in 
charge of Mr. Craig, Aden pilot, who was sent over to navigate her. The 
tame day the R.I.M.S. '* Dalhousie *' arrived with Government Troop Barge 
No. 22 in tow ; this barge had been employed at Obbia, but, owing to the 
strain caused by towing and to the severity of the weather at Obbia» tlia 
had to undergo extensive repairs at Aden, so was not available for 


The B.I,M.8. " Hardingc " wan fitted in Bombay M-a bospKBl ship, anil Hojpihil iMp. 
bna carried from here the main portion oE the sick to Bombay. From 
23nl Septtrmber, 1803, to 14th January. 1004, she was required by the 
Govommentof India foe his Excellency the Viceroy's tour in Ihc Persian Guif 
and during thi.* lime the R.I.M.S. " Dalhouae" wan lent for hospital duties. 

The aocommoiUtiiHi tor aick on the B.l.M.B. " Dalhousie" being very 
much smaller than that of the R.I.M.S. " Hardiogc." 40 spare cola were sent 
to lirrbtTiL, and these were fitt«d by me in the hired transport " Islands " ; a 
certain portion of the medical ataJT of the " Dalhousie " voro also 
turned over to the " lalanda," and she woa used as a hospital ship for two 
voyages to India. The R.I.H.S. " Dalhousie" in the mmnlimo being used 
to lake invalids to Aden. 

It has been ncceiaary from liuic to time to despatch small bodies o( Coast p 
ln>o|>s, Htorea aad specie to Bulbar and Zcilo, and arrangements have 
hcootdiugly been madfi by me for the charter of local nalivc craft for this 
purpoio whenever required. 

It being found neceeaary t« transport camels by ecb from Hois to this 
jiort, the hired (raniport " Baneo" «as ordered to proceed there with five 
■mall dhowa in tow, and Ueutenant Hnddleston was sent by me to arranoo 
the cmharkation ; his rcpon on Haia as a place of embarkation hs« already 
bean forwarded to yon under cover of tny No. 963, of 23rd October, ISO.'}. 

At time of writing, Laa Khorai is being used as a base for tlio'ind Brigade, 
Biid 700 animals have already been landed there, bcsidea a considerable 
quantity of stores. As the work of emborkition at Las Khorai is not com* 
ptetvd, I propose dealing with thia in s supplementary report oa completion. 

The .Arabcoolira have been a great success, andindccd.without them the Arab iv 
landing of stores would have been greatly delayed ; they ore indofatigablo 
workers, besides bring eicellent stevedores. 

Tomeet the expeoBcs of my department, money has been obtained by me Honey. 
from the Held Controller and my accounts rendered direct to the Examiner, 
Marine Account«, Bombay. 

In the event of Berbera harbour becoming a base for further operations Suggettio ns. 
nr a trade centre for .Abyminia and Somallland, the facilities for tanding and 
lotwaiding stirrca, macliinery and merchandise should bo very considerably 
improved, and should, in luy opinion, consist of a wharf or iTharres on thu 
notthsrn liiile of tlio hn^Miur capable of berthing at least two ship*, with a 
railway round the village of Berbera to a terminus situated in some suitabln 
{Kisitlou on the Sbaab. The cont«a( of the bottom lends itaelf to the oon- 
almotion of vriuwvea at a moderate oost. Also the 8haab Pier should bo 
eiteadad and improvni. 

Should, however, future operallons Ixi of a temporary nature only, I 
would suggest that tlw !ihaab Pier be strengthened and the rcotamatlon now 
protection i 

I the wind and tide. 

it at present avulable should be purohaawl out> 

[ right (the purchase value of the tug and two lighters hoa already been paid 
re). The Uunch should be m^tained and another boat puruhMtnl ; tba 

> of an additional boat has been greatly felt. 



The leading lights as at present situated are too close together, aad it 
irould bo a great improvement and assistance to navigation if t^e front light 
was placed on the end of the Customs Pier hoisted on • pole, and the rear 
I'ght altered to a suitable bearing. 

The beacon as at present situated is very misleading to strangera ; a 
new and more conspicuous beacon should be erected at the west extreme of 
the spit. 

I have now completed a survey of B^bera Harbour on a scale of G inches 
to 1 land mile. The original, with triangulation sheet and aU necessary 
data, will be forwarded to the Hydrographer, Admiralty, for publication. 

To the Officer Commanding • j 

Lines of Communication, Sheikh. 

Commander Kendall reported further with regard to the 
embarkations and disembarkations at Las Ehorai : — 

In continuation of my Report No. 147, dated ilth April, 1004, I have 
the honour to forward the following report on marine transport work at 
Las Khorai, and also on the embsrkaaon of troops, animals, and stores 
at Berbera. 

On 12th liaroh, I ordered Lieutenant Huddleston to proceed to Las 
Khorai and arrange for the disemborkaticm and embarkation of troops, 
animals, and stores at that place. 

Lieutenant Huddleston reported to me that the place was an open 
roadstead and that the work would be comparatively easy in fine weather 
but quite impossible for animals (at any rate) in bad weather ; also that 
there were no facilities in the place. I therefore arranged for 12 local sam- 
books to leave here, some under sail and some in tow, and also sent a large 
party of Arab coolies to work on the ships and on shore. Later on, on hw 
reporting that ho was experiencing great difficulty in shipping camels, I 
sent troop barge No. 22 and a steam launch. 

His report on the emborkation is forwarded herewith for your informa- 
tion. The embarkation was considerably delayed owing to the transport 
asked for not arriving in time. The R.I.M.S. " Hardinge *' a.ssi8ted by 
R.I.M.S. " Clive," doing nearly all the work. 

Transports for the embarkation of the SomaMland Field Force were 
engaged by the War Office and by the Director of the Royal Indian Marino 
Bombay, under orders from the Government of India. 

A tabulated form showing the total numbers embarked and disem* 
barked is attached herewith. (See Disembarkations IV and Re-embarka- 
tion V.) 

Remarks of 

With reference to the above reports, General Egerton 
remarked : — 

The Marine Transport Officer's duties have been very heavy and con- 
tinuous throughout the operations. At the time of my arrival the facilities 


for lauding troops and stores, and more especially of clearing them away 
when landed, were primitive in the extreme. The report shows how the 
machinery was gradually got into working order, but the defects in the 
earlier stages were productive of delay and increased expense. The present 
Fystem works perfectly. 

Since this report was submitted, the marine transport have done further 
excellent work in embarking a column of troops of all arms and several 
thousand animals at I^ias Khorai, working against time in the face of an 
imminently threatening monsoon. 


The following tables, numbered I to VI, deal with the 
landing of troops, animals and stores at Berbera, Obbia and 
other ports on the Somaliland coast during the course of the 
third and fourth expeditions. 









1 s 

a C 

-M 03 

2 i^ 


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tlisembarked at Obbia, 1903. 














Date of 

departure from 

















• • • 

• •• 





• •• 





• •• 





11th January... 

Aden and Berbera. 



• •• 


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• • ■ 


23rd „ .. 

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• ■• 

• ■• 



• •• 


• •• 




14th February 

Aden and London. 

• •• 


• •• 

• •• 

• •• 




• •• 

3l8t January ... 

tt vt 



• • • 





• •• 

• •• 

Aden and Bombay. 


• ■• 

• •• 

• •• 

• •• 




aoth Janiuu'y. 



> ■ • 




• •• 


8th February... 


• •• 

• •• 

• •• 

• • • 


• •• 


8th ., 




a • • 



• •• 



15th ,t ... 




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17th „ 

Berbera and Bon. bay. 

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Ist March. 

• •• 


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• • • 

17th April. 




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• •• 

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• •• 

6th March ... 


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4th April 


• •• 


• •• 

• • • 


• •• 

• • • 


17th „ 


1MV»4 , 











E. W. HuDDLESTOK, Lieut., R.LM., 

Marine Transpovt Officer, Somaliland Expe^i^nn. 







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DsiAiL of Government Stores discharged from Messrs. Gowasjeay Dinaluiw 
and Brothers* Steamers at Berbera from 1st April, 1904. 

SS. "Falcon" 

. . April 5 

17 p 


SS. " Falcon " 

.. April 12 . 




SS. " Falcon " 

.. April 19 . 



SS. "Falcon" 

.. April 26 . 



SS. " Falcon " 

.. May 3 

. 971 


SS. " Falcon " 

. . May 10 



SS. " Falcon " 

.. May 17 



SS. "Falcon" 

.. May 24 



SS. " Falcon " 

.. May 31 

. 526 


SS. " Falcon " 

. . June 7 



SS." Woodcock" . 

. . June 14 

. 212 


SS. "Woodcock" . 

.. June 21 

. 403 


3S. "Wiflflman" . 

. . June 28 

. 1,012 


SS. " Falcon " 

.. July 6 
Total .. 

m • 

. 4,376 p 



Detail of Government stores sent to Bulbar by Dhows from 1st Apiil, 1904. 

let May 144 packages. 

24th May 125 

17th June 21 



290 packages 

^urani " 


The following documents, numbered I to VII, relate to 
the re>embarkation of troops, animals and stores in 1903, on 
the demobilization of the Field Force in 1904 : — 


Embarkation Report, with Embarkation Diary, of Colonel J. C. Swann, 
Ck)mmanding Lines of Communication, 1904. 


The embarkation oommenced with the H.T.* ** Nurani," which left Bcr 
l)era on 22nd May, taking the 27th Punjabis, 56th and 57th Silladar Came 
Corps and the 28th Mountain Battery to Karachi. 

* Hired Transport. 



The " Harilinge " toUowwl hw on the 33rd May, cleAriag ont Ihc rather 
largo Dtunber of iick accumulated at liecbora. 

The H.T. ■' FuIUla" took tho B-ind Sikha Boluoh ChjhJ Corps besides 
a maO oumbor of othei details to Kv>chi on May 27th. 

The R.I. M.S. "Clive" mndc a ijroliminary trip to Aden on the Slat May. 
with 46 officers, including tieneral Sir C. Egerton and Staff, and Brig.-Ocneriil 
Faoken, who wore transferred to the P. and O. homeward mnil on nrrivsl. 

On her retnm the " Clive " wa» loaded with the nth and 19tli Compaaies 
Sappers and J.'iners, the R.E. Kold Park, Field Hosfitala and ftnnifrous 
other detail*, but wrs delayed three days in Berbers in complianpc with a 
telegram detaining her, which arrived from the Go»emraent o( India within 
half an hour of h«' being ready for sea. 

Tho troopB, with the exception of the Bialc, were left on board, and she 
eventually nailed for Bombay on the Qth Juno. 

(>n June 8th the " Nurani" embarked amtxedcomplnnentotiith K.A-R., 
LC.B.C.A., Baluch, 54th and 65th Camel Corps, Orassouttera and Ho«(rital 
Kaham tor Bombay and put to sea that orening. 

The " FultaloY" returning from Karachi, took on board the bulk of the 
penowwl of the three Ekka trains. No. 1 N. General Hospital, and other 
details, ind sailed for Bombay on June 1 1th. 

the H.T. "Santhia" arrived od tho lUh June, and oftcc embarkii^ 
S23 mtJus and 230 of the In^an Mule Corps, io charge of Captain Ross, 
and In reterinary oare of Veterioary-Captaia UcGowan, sailed on June 13th. 
One aecidenl occurred In tJiis embarkation, a sling bro^ng and the mule 
■uaiionded in it falling and breaking ita back. 

The H.T, "Suratia" was doc ut licrbera on tho Htb June, but encoun- 
tered bravy weather, and did not arrive until the '2nth instnnt. 

The K.F,S.*"Lalpoora" hodsrrivedon tho Iflth, and was dG«patch«l to 
Durban on the 20th with 200 Cape Boya of tliv 15th and 22nd Companies 
A-S-C. under nine cooducton, and commanded by Captain U'Hara, A.S.C., 
with Major Fsrgusson, R.A.M.C, in medical cborge. Tile aixmrnmodation 
retained on this ship was insufBcieot, and the balance of 3 conductors and 
42 Cape Boys nod I sergeant and R privutes of the 0th Dragoon liusrn^ 
had to be doBpat4.<hod by the m. " Mcyun" next lUy, the 21st Jnnc, to 
Aden tor poasagc in the (ii'rman East Afrivu liner to Durban. 

The H.P.S. " Goorkba " was also got away on the 21st June, bavbg 
arrived on the SOth with the British pertontid of the l.'ith and 22Dd Com- 
panic* A.S.C. on board. 

Work was about to oommence of ciiibarking tho balance of the Indian 
mulea on the '" Surodn" when the U.K.B. " Malta" steamed in obout noon 
on the 22nd June. 

Work on tho " Surada " had to be suBprnded as all bargtv and lighlim 
were requu^d for tho embarkation of the 701) perionad of tbu Hants 
Begiment, K.R.R.M.L, and No. 2 and 3 Companiw Br. Mounted Infantry, 
Thieb wa« cfieoted by 6 p.m.. when the ship left lot £nglanij. 

" Hardinge.' 
H.T. " Fol- 
tala" (1). 
"Clive" (1) 




566 • 

a.T. It WM then ponible to tivii atteotkn to tibe " S«ida»* oi wUek 501 

'^Sunid*.'' moic^ and A few officcn* hotaec were cmbsked, togiAtT wiA abovft 5Sb of 

the Fdrter and Mole Corps, No. 2 Gonpnij BJLL, Oni WoqpHrf, Xol 3 

FicU Medical Store DepAi and other detafla. The ihqp left for Sanchi 

on the 24th June. 

'^Ifimuii'' ^^TheNunDii" was the laat transport of the aeriea ptoceefiBg to BidM. 

[3), On her third voyage die embarked the BOcanir Camd Oorpi^ Nol 2 N. 

General HospitaL and soch permmmd of the yanooa departBcnta ^ it had 

been necessary to keep back until the last moment. 

No hitch occurred in the embarkation, and no delay other than in the 
cases of the ** CSiye '* and " Surada" exf^ained on page 

Ships invariably left loaded the day socoeeding thai on which they 
airired. Stores and heavy baggage woe loaded immediate oo arriral of 
the transport, horses next day about 2 p.x^ and purio— sf commeneing 
about 3 F.v. 

The decks of the ship having been prerioosly t<^ off in accordance with 
the strength of units, the latter were timed to arrive at the pier in soch 
order as would be most convenient for berthing them on board and in parties 
of such strength as the capacity of the barges and lifters admitted ol 

Almost every ship took away a batch of invalids in charge of a medical 

The ss. " Meyun ** made a weekly trip to Aden, taking away many officers 
as they became demobilixed, and Arab coolies and camel men on discharge. 

The Khareef added greatly to the difficulties of this embarkation, as the 
sea was far too rough for loading and unloading before 2 p.m. each day, and 
vessels delayed coming in until that hour ; thus half the day was wasted. 

During the period under consideration, 20 shiploads were onbarked, 
comprising a total of 228 officers, 9,941 of other ranks, British and native, 
91 horses and 1,331 mules. 

A board of final survey, which included a veterinary officer in the case of 

the mulo ships " Santhia ** and '* Surada," examined each ship in accordance 

with King's Regulations previous to her proceeding to sea. 

R.I.M.S. The ** Clive " arrived from Bombay and Aden on the 7th July, and after 

Clivo (8). embarking the 1st, 2nd and 3rd K. A.B., proceeded to Mombassa and Chinde 

on 8th Jn^y. 

This completed the embarkation. 

(Signed) J. C. Swann, Cdond, 

Commanding Lines of CommunicaJtion, 
SomalUand Field Force. 


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5.— Medical asd Sxsttaby Sjebvices. 

atioc. Daring the first expedition under Colonel Swajne the 
medical staff consisted of 1 officer and 3 hospital assistants, 
distributed as follows : 1 officer and 1 assistant with the 
column, 1 assistant at Samala and 1 at Burao. This staff wis 
considered dangerously smalL It was afterwards sapplem- 
mented, and under General Manning the Medical Service was 
organized under a Principal Medical Officer (Colonel J. F. 
Williamson, C.M.G., R.A.M.C.), while other medical officers 
were allotted as required. Colonel Williamson later became 
Principal Medical Officer under CSeneral Egerton and then had 
under him a Senior Medical Officer on the lines of communica- 
tion, a Medical Officer at the Base and other medical officers 
attached to the various organizations. 

During General Manning^s expedition the following were 
the medical units with the force : — 

Obbia force — 

1 section British Field Hospital, No. 16. 
No. 69 Native Field Hospital. 

Native General Hospital, 300 beds, with a British 
section of 32 beds. 

Bcrbora-Bohotle force — 

No. 05 Native Field Hospital. 

Native General Hospital, 200 beds, with a British 
section of 12 beds. 
The hospital sliip " Hardinge " alluded to below. 
Post hospitals were established on the lines of conmiunica- 

On the closing of the Obbia lines of communication the 
Native General Hospital was moved to Berbera on the 
*' Hardinge," while the field hospitals crossed the Hand with 
the field force. 

After June, 1903, the following medical units formed part 
of the Fielrl Force :— 

1 Section No. 15 British Field Hospital. 


1 Section No. 18 British Field Ho3pital. 

3 Sections No. 58 Native „ „ 

4 Sections No. 65 „ „ ,, 
4 Sections No. 69 „ „ „ 

No. 1 Native General Hospital, 200 beds, with a British 
Section of 12 beds. 

No. 2 Native General Hospital, 300 beds, with a British 
Section of 34 beds. 

A field medical store depot at the base. 

The field hospitals were distributed among the troops in 
due proportion to the number in each brigade, force or garrison. 

The hospital ship " Hardinge " was equipped on the scale 
of a 100 bed Native General Hospital, with some additional 
accommodation for British sick. Its total carrying capacity 
as a hospital ship was 457 patients (146 cot and 311 con- 
valescent cases). This ship was reported on as a ^' thoroughly 
well equipped hospital ship admirably adapted for the purpose." 

The general hospitals were located : — 

No. 1 at Upper Sheikh 
No. 2 at Berbera. 

The principal diseases contracted during the Somaliland Diseasetf. 
expeditions were : — 

Scurvy. — This accounted for by far the largest number 
of admissions to hospital. The principal causes of scurvy 
were — 

The absolute impossibility of giving a fresh vegetable 

ration ; 
The necessity of often going without snudl luxuries, 

such as spices, &c. 
The poor quality of the meat ration at times ; 
The properties of the water at many places which made 

it very difficult or impossible to cook food properly. 

In addition to the above some of the troops came from 

stations such as Aden, where scurvy prevailed, and in the case 

of followers nostalgia was a cause. 

(8927a) 2 o 2 


Tbe PEizbdpoI Medkal Officer RecHnnieiided tliat in fntaie 
expedrdoos TesetaUe seeds should be snppliecl by the Supply 
and Transport Corps. Vegetables could then be grown at 

pcscs ocL th: Unfis of commnnicatioii. 

Theactoal remedies foand effectiTe were Aeoh milk,* fresh 
meat, dried frmts and a mm raticm bi-iveeUj. Citrate of 
potash was abo given as a preventatiTe. Lime joioe irms found 
to hare " pcactkallj little or no effect in checldiig aenrvy." 
The Prmcipal Medical OfBcer did not reconunend its indnsion 
as a part of the army ration, bat preferred tabloids of citate 
of cakiom or of citrate of potash and calcium chloride, five 

Xon-meat eaters snfiered more severely than meat eaters. 

Mdltmal Ffren. — Many cases were only recrudescences of 
preexisting diseases. But malarial fever was met with, in the 
wet season, at Bohotle, Bihendola and Berbera. At Bohotle 
and Berbera there have at times been virulent outbreaks among 
the native population, and during the first expedition under 
Colonel Swavne there were as manv as 271 cases of malarial 
fever among the troops ; nearly all of these came from Berbera. 

Di/sentery and Diarrhaa. — Dysentery was considered to 
Iv due to the dust laden atmosphere and foul water. 

Diarrhoea was due to similar causes and also to the saline 
properties of the water ; this was specially the case in the 
Xogal, where \'iolent purgation attended with severe vomiting 
occurred at certain camps where apparently only clear sparkling 
water had been drunk. 

Enteric Fever. — Only some 17 cases were treated. It is 
little met with in Somaliland and very probably was introduced 
by some case among the troops from India. 

Conjunctivitis. — Cases occurred among the African troops 
who wore the fez which was no protection against the glare. 
General The Principal Medical Officer considered that many of the 


* Dairies were established at Berbera and Upi^^ Sheikh, where there 
were general hospitals. The cows at Berbrra were purchase<l and thos? at 
Sheikh were hired. 


followers were too old and were already suffering from chronic 
diseases. He thought it possible that impersonation took 
place on a large scale between the place of enlistment and the 
port of embarkation, and to obviate this he reconunended a 
second medical examination at the port of embarkation. 

These were : — (a) Gunshot wounds ; (6) spear wounds. Wouudi. 

Surgical wounds healed well and rapidly, but scratches 
and " field wounds " had a great tendency to suppurate and 
resist ordinary treatment. Some thorn bushes had poisonous 
properties and caused wounds which often passed to severe 
erysipelatous attacks. 

Inflanunation of the exposed parts of the body such as 
hands, arms and face were common, due to the intense power 
of the sun, and often proceeded to ulceration, and an affection 
resembling the South African veldt sore followed. 

In the case of Somalis recovery from bodily injuries was 
remarkably quick. Even penetrating rifle and 4pear wounds 
of the head, chest and abdomen were recovered from rapidly. 

The chief difficulty was the disposal of dead animals. Saniiarj. 
These were alwajrs removed from the vicinity of camps, 
disembowelled and burnt when possible. Transport officers 
were enjoined to open up, and, if possible, burn animals which 
died between posts, dragging them clear away from the road 
first. In the latter part of the expedition it was not always 
found possible to cope with the numbers of carcases beyond 
opening them up. 

Incinerators were established at all standing camps for 
the burning of refuse. 

The ordinary trench latrine was used in camps and posts 
with good effect, as the campaign may be said to have been 
almost wholly free from enteric, dysentery or camp diarrhoea, 
except such cases as were caused as stated above undsr 
Dysentery and Diarrhoea. 

Each unit and transport cadre was responsible in fixed 
camps for the cleanliness of its lines and for the disposal of 
any dead animals, and this was found to work well. 




One hundred sweepers from India formed the consen'socr 
establishment, supplemented at vanous points by locsUj 
engaged Somalis and by the lower grade of prisoners. 

Water in Somaliland has su€h an important efEect on the 
health of the troops that some remarks on the water sopplj 
are inserted here (but see also Chapter XIV, 1). 

(a) At Berbera. — ^The water is brought from Dubar at the 

foot of the hills. The supply is plentiful and the 

water, though slightly saline, is not unwholesome. 
(6) From the Gutihari Pass to the foot of the Sheikh Pass 

the quality is good and quantity fairly abundant, 

especially at Bihendula, where there is a large supply 

of excellent water, 
(c) At Upper Sheikh the water supply is from springs 

in the adjacent nullahs, mainly fed by upland surface 

{d) On the interior plateaux the water supply in the dry 

season is wholly dependent on wells of a more or less 

permanent character, of an average depth of from 

50 to 60 feet. 

In the wells the hardness of the water is excessive. Sulphates 
of magnesium and calcium are present ever}'where in large 
quantities, and in some places these are associated with sodium 
sulphate. Where this is the case, as in parts of the Xogal. 
excessive purgation with severe colic is often experi- 
enced. As many as 300 to 400 cases in a day have had to be 
treated whilst in the Nogal. 

The water of many wells in Somaliland contain much 
sulphuretted hydrogen in solution. This, though at first very 
unpleasant, disappears to a great extent if there is sufficient 
time to expose it to light and air, and does not appear to be 
unwholesome. The best water in the interior plateaux is that 
got from wells in dry river beds. 

The Principal Medical Officer considered the medical 
comforts to have been " uniformly of good quality." He 
preferred the " Ideal " tinned milk to the other varieties. 


A reserve stock (100 per cent., of medical comforts for 
field hospitals) was at all times maintained in the advanced 
depots of the Supply and Transport Corps. 

The main difficulty was the transport of the sick down the General 
long lines of communication to the base. The ambulance the medii 
transport used consisted of dandies, light double kajawahs for ^o'*^**^^- 
camels, camel carts, ambulance bullocks tongas, mules riding 
and burden camels. But in the first expedition under Colonel 
Swayne the sick and wounded were transported on camels by 
means of a sort of couch constructed of sticks and camel saddles. 
This means of transportation was not suitable for badly 
wounded or seriously ill men. 

The light kajawahs have been alluded to under " Trans- 
port." In 1902 camel litters were sent from Bombay, made 
of bamboo, but they oscillated violently with every step the 
camel took, and weighed nearly 100 lbs. Thus it was found 
that the dandy was the only safe means of transport for 
really serious cases, but 10 Kahars per dandy were necessary ; 
six Kahars being wholly insufficient. The marches averaged 
20 miles per day, and at times heavy men had to be carried. 

Generally, the medical equipment was sufficient to deal 
efficiently with all casualties and sickness met with in the Field 
Force. ' ' '.■; 

A Dental Surgeon (Mr. Kenneth-Clark) was attached to Dental w 
the Force on September 10th, 1903, and performed a 
considerable number of operations. He visited all the posts 
on the lines of communication, spending a few weeks at 
each. He considered the dental outfit too heavy for camel 
transport, and in accordance with his suggestions it was 
subsequently altered. 

6.— Veterinary Department. 

The Veterinary Department during the period of (General Organiiat 
Manning's command was organized under a senior veterinary 
officer, Major A. F. Appleton, A.V.C., who accompanied the 
force to Obbia. Another veterinary officer was in charge of 


- a 

the Berbera-Boliotle fines of oommiiiucatiaii, and under etA 
officer were one British non-commiBaioned officer and two to 
four veterinary assistants. The principal sick depot at tbii 
time was at Bohotle, having been moved £rom Olesan owing 
to lack of water. 

With the arrival of GSeneral Egerton and the increase in 
establishment, the veterinary service was placed in chaige of 
an Inspecting Veterinary Officer, Major C. B. M. Harris, D.S.O., 
A.y.C., who had the following establishment under him : — 

5 Veterinary Officers. 

4 Europeans. A Section No. 6 Field Veterinarp' Hospital. 

2 Salutris. 
1 Tindal. 

1 Lascar. 

3 Syces 

Clerk. No. 2 Field Veterinary Office. 
Veterinary Officer (included above). Base Veterinary 


2 Europeans. Base Veterinary Depot. 1 

1 Veterinary Officer (included above). Advanc_^<l 

Veterinary Depot, Wadamago. 
1 Dresser. ,. 

1 Salutri. „ 

The Base Veterinary Depot was at Berbera. Thci Field 
Veterinary Hospital was at Berbera till August 19th, 190.3, at 
Bihendula till the middle of November, 1903, and afterwards 
at Berbera . The advanced Veterinary Depot was at Wadamago 
from November 15th, 1903. 

Veterinary officers were appointed to the various movable 
columns when detached and an inspecting officer was appointed 
to the lines of communication. 



The inspecting veterinary officers urged strongly that all 
veterinary personnel should be mider the Veterinary Depart- 
ment. During the expedition, under the existing Indian 
regulations, veterinary assistants in the supply and transport 
corps were solely under the orders of their commandants. 

The chief diseases among animals were as follows : — Ditaases. 

Horses and Mules. 

Epizootic Lymphangitis. — 12 cases occurred, all of which 
were imported. j 

SlrangkSy also imported. 

Mange, — A few cases. Spread quickly prevented. 

Foot-and-MoutJi, — Among bullocks, probably contracted 

Eye Diseases, — Acute conjunctivitis and ophthalmia 
caused loss of sight and was produced by dust and glare. 
Puncture of the lens also occurred by thorns when grazing. 

Sore Backs, — Chiefly caused by the inadequate amount 
of saddlers and of materials for making alterations. 


Strangles, — A severe outbreak occurred in the Base 
Veterinary Depot. It was an acute contagious laryngitis with 
ulceration of the mucous membrane of the pharynx. If not 
strangles, it was closely allied to it. 

Mange, — Very prevalent among camels. To prevent it, 
it was recommended that mange baths should be constructed at 
the base and at other veterinary depots. 

Poiso)U)us Wounds from thorns in the bush. 

Vegetable Poisoni^ig. — ^Especially from the Irgin bush, 
frequently eaten by camels. It has bunches of long, fleshy, 
peculiar light green stems, like elongated tallow candles, 
radiating from a common centre and curving outwards. 
Usually from 8 to 12 feet high. Poisoning abo occurred 
from the Moh, Boa and Euphorbia. 


Gamd Influenza. — ^Very infectioiis. 

Camd Group. — Contagious. 

Camd Kud Kud. — ^Rather like anthrax, only occurred 
among Somali camels. 

Camd Laryngitis. — ^Very acute. Contagious, not infecdoos. 

Wry Neck. — A large dose of Epsom salts (4 lbs.) generaDy 
cured this. 

Megrims. — ^Animal dashed madly about. It occurred 
when animals were fat or had over-eaten themselves, especiaDy 
when exposed to the sun. Yielded to prompt treatment, 
bleeding, &c. 

Sore Backs. — Chiefly caused by the local saddle or Herio, 
which was considered to be cruel and useless, but sore 
backs were also caused by careless saddling, changing saddles 
and the shape of the back being altered by loss of condition 
owing to long and continuous marching. The Inspecting 
Veterinary OflScer suggested as remedies that : — 

The system should allow of the resting of camels. During 

rests saddles should be refitted. 
Saddles should be fitted to an animal, marked with a 

corresponding number, and not changed. 
Palans should not be removed at night. 

Attendants. The veterinary hospitals suffered at times from shortness 

of attendants. One line orderly per 100 sick animals and 
salutris in the same proportion was recommended. 

7.- -Remount Department. 

Organization. The Remount Department was placed in charge of Captain 
Hon. T. Lister, 10th Hussars, from July 4th, 1903, and after 
that officer's death, Lieutenant A. E. H. Breslin, 4th Hussars, 
took over charge of the department. 

The Remount Department was under the Headquarters 
Staff until October 26th, 1903, from which date it was placed 
under the Officer Commanding Lines of Communication. 


The personnel consisted of : — 

1 oflScer. 

1 warrant officer. 

1 clerk. 

3 sergeants. 

1 farrier staff sergeant. 

1 farrier sergeant. 

3 privates, 

8 shoeing smiths. 

With the following native establishment : — 

1 Somali interpreter. 

1 Duffadar. 
6 Nalbunds. 

49 Syces. 

2 sweepers. 

The native attendants were distributed as follows : One 
Indian syce to three horses ; two Somalis to seven ponies ; 
two Abyssinians to seven mules. Some men were lent from 
the Indian Porter Corps and some Moimted Infantry syces 
were also added. 

Depots, — Depots were located : — First at Bihendula, but in 
October this depot was moved to Berbera, where it remained 
till December, 1903. After that date an advanced depot was 
formed at Wadamago, consisting at first of 215 horses, 80 ponies 
and 105 mules, subsequently increased to 474 horses, 292 ponies 
and 1 20 mules ; a small depot was still maintained at the base. 
In February, 1904, the advanced depot was closed and the staff 
returned to Berbera. In 1904, an establishment from the 
Indian cavalry was employed to take the remounts from the 
depots to the troops in the field. 

The following estimates for remount requirements Estimated 
were made in July, 1904, to provide for the contingency of "^"*'*"^ 
three months' active operations after September, and to meet 
them 900 remounts were ordered from India, and local pur. 
chasing was adopted :— ' 


135 ps cent. Okkbcs to moiiiited men) to be in tlie ranb 1^ 

Aupst Slst. 
35 per cent, at tbe depot for September issue. 
35 per cenL at tbe depot for October issue. 
25 per cent at the dep6t for November issue. 

1 10 per cent, to be in tbe lanks by Aogost 31st. 
10 per oent. at tbe depfit for September issue. 
10 per cent, at the depot for October iasoe. 
10 per cent, at the depot for Xovember isBoe. 

One poor per officer throo^ioat the force. 

The aboTe caknlation was taken from the figores of the 
pre vioQs five months^ and aimed at the Regulars having 100 per 
cent, fit horses after three months* active operations^ and the 
Inegnlais 40 per cent, fit after three months* active opera- 
tions ; 50 per cent, still moulted, but horses not fit for 
further work ; 10 per cent, dismounted. As the following 
table shows, 3,785 animals were required to carry out the 
arrangement : — 















'** *« ftl 

S ^S| 
" «- a fc fl 

5. fss 


1 3 


!$ i 


S <2<5« 



M> 00 QQ 


ill-" § 2 


S S 



o 3 a *k ® i. 

*i CO >* 







a ^ 

O CO 00 



S 1 



m ^ 

CO M ;0 



S (X4 


^ 1 








s;: IS 

S 1 



?• a • • • 

* IV4 * 





. • • 

.5 . 

^ 1 . 

e • d • 


• • 



^ 1 




•is • 


•3 a t« 



X --3 

Iff! i*^ 



2 « 


from India. 


Remarks on 

The actual number of remounts received into the depdt 
was 4,605, including mules, of which a certain number was 
handed over to the Director of Supply and Transport, and 
these were not included in the above estimate. 

The estimate made proved correct, and all demands for 
remounts were complied with. 

The remounts from India arrived in three batches, viz. :— 

October 14th, steamship "Ula," with 251 remounts. 
October 17th, steamship " Santhia," with 394 remounts. 
October 24th, steamship " Nankin," with 250 remounts. 

Of these 10 per cent, were found useless. Those from the 
" Ula " were considered best, consisting mostly of Arabs. 
The price paid to regiments (300 rupees) was found in- 
suflBcient to get good class Arabs. 

Purchases were made at Harrar, Jig Jiga, Hargeisa, Burao, 
Zeila, Waran and on the Lines of Communication ; of these 
the ponies that came from Harrar and Jig Jiga underwent 
such hardships on the road that they were practically useless. 

The Officer Commanding the lines of communication made 
the following observations regarding the remounts : — 

1. Arabs, — The ideal remount for this country. 

2. Somalis. — A hard, wiry, little beast, stands a lot of hard 
work and knocking about. Can travel in most parts without 
being shod. Can go without water for a day or two. Not 
used to grain, and thrives on grazing that most other ponies 
will not look at. Can carry a lot of weight for its size. 

3. SoiUh Africans {including a few Argentines), — ^They 
stood the want of grain and irregular intervals of water very 

4. Indian Country-breds. — Mostly indifferent. Chief 
defects : too big, too long in the back, badly ribbed up and 
washy. Those sent from India were not representative of the • 
best class of Indian country-bred. 

5. Abyssinian Ponies. — The majority were no use, badly 
made, no size and totally unfit to go any distance. 

' 591 

6. Abyssinian Mules. — Good. Sound, stout-hearted and 
full of endurance. Will thrive on grazing where other animals 
will starve. 

It was reconunended in case of future operations that all 
heavy weights should be mounted on Arabs and light weights 
on Somalis, if procurable, but there was a great dearth of the 
latter at the close of the operations. 

All remounts were shod in front and the larger horses were Siiocing. 
shod on all four feet. The English shoes were much preferred 
to the Indian, though rather heavy. 

The scale of rations at Kemount Depots was : — Ratione. 






At Bihcndvla- 


( iram . . 

• ■ 

• • ■ • 



])ran . . 

• • 

• • • • 


■ • 

• • 


to grazing) 




At Bcrhera — 

(jram . . 


• • 

. * 

Oats . . 

3 1 

• • 

• • 

Bran . . 

o ' 


• • 

Grass . . 

20 1 


• • 







• • 


Except on the march from Elkadalanleh to Kinit (45 miles water, 
without water) remounts did not suffer from want of water on 
the lines of communication. But from Hairar there was a 
stretch of 90 miles without water and about 10 per cent, died 
on the road, and all arrived in a very bad condition. 

The subjoined tables give details regarding the purchase Purciiaiei of 
of remounts during the fourth expedition : — 































00 09 

a'"i'S' I 2 

I I !• J-^ I 

ooooo oo 


) rj a CD >9 BO Q 

Oi 00 





_ 00 O iH 

40 :f eo fH 

^ oooooo 

■ I S Q ra S M S 

IH M •♦ ^ •-• 




CO i-i 00 ;o ^ ^ 

I CO i-i 00 

§ I 





Statement showing Animals Purchased in Abyssinia and 

Somaliland, in Dollais. 








September, 1903.. 
October, 1003 . . 











St&tehent showing Total Ezpendituie. 

Class of Animals. 


Total Amount 

Average Cost. 





Rs. a. 

4,74,119 8 

1^487 8 








SUTiHENi ahowing the Nnmber of Ponies PnrohMBd hj 
Nos. 4 and 6 Gompanies, Sotnftli Mounted Infantry, ont 
of Piotectoiate Eiisds. 

Mouth of Purchwe. 





July. 1003 . . 
August, 1003 
SepUmber, 1003 . . 

(Jotobcr, 1003 
November, 1003 . . 














W. Pratt 18 nppokted Oomnuadut at Uw OhmI 

h will be eatobli^lied ia the neighbourhood of Oolol^ I 

In addition to the work of the Remount Department 
proper a Camel Eemount Depdt was established near Gfololi by 
circular memorandum dated 7th October, 1903, whioh nui 
aa follows : — 

1. Captain H 
Remount Depdt, 
OQ the Arori plain. i 

2. The Remoiut Depdt will receivb over, with their oim corps atteodoiitB 
in charge, an; tompororil]' nafit camels uf Camel Corps working ai far soulii 
at) Burao, and will endeavour to meet Iho indents ot Camel Corps OanunHl* 
dnnts for replacement of unSt camels. Xo camels will bereceired' 
branded with the numb« of the corpn to which the; belcmg 
number in the corps. This is Decessai'; 
in regard to unfit camels. Id forwarding indi^nta 
Corps Commandants will intimate the aerial ni 

3. Camels sufFering from eerious ailments, 
treatment should be sent to the Basi 

4. OfBcers in charge of Camel Corps paid 
communication should give timely notioe to 
uf any oam*b whioh they may wiah to amd t« 


to graze and rest, and the number cf fit camels required in replacement. 
They will also have to provide attendants to take over the latter. 

5. The Camel Remount Officer wfll, as far as possible, replace the unfit 
camels from the remount stock purchased by him, or received from Hargeisa 
and elsewhere. These camels will form part of the corps to which issued, 
and will be supernumerary to the corps' strength, and wiU eventuaOy 
be absorbed in replacement of casualties. 

6. The unfit camels sent to the Remount Depdt will, when fit, be sent 
back to their corps on whose returns they will continue to be borne. 

7. The establishment of the Camel Remount Dep6t will be as under : — 

1 Officer (Captain E. G. W. Pratt). 

1 transport veterinary dufadar (with a small stock of medicines). 
1 interpreter, 1 headman, 12 Somali drivers, 3 riding camels and 

8. The Supply and Transport Officer, Burao, will afford every assistance 
to camel corps commandants in getting their camels sent to or brought from 
the Remount Depot. 

8.— Ordnance Department. 

Major H. A. Anley, Army Ordnance Department, assumed OrganixatioE. 
charge of the ordnance service during January, 1903, and 
until it was handed over to the Indian Ordnance Department 
the service was conducted entirely in accordance with 
the system of the Army Ordnance Department There wert) 
in January, 1903, two ordnance officers, one, the chief, 
at Berbera, and another at Obbia. These officers were 
placed directly under headquarters. The Obbia detachment 
which had originally come from South Africa with a quantity 
of stores, moved to Berbera during April, 1903, and a base 
depot was formed at Berbera, whilst an advanced depdt was 
opened at Bohotle on April 18th, 1903. 

In July, 1903, the advanced depot was moved to Kirrifc, 
and a depot was opened at Sheikh. At this time the strength 
of the department was : — 

(8927a) 2 p 2 












• • 







• • 




• • 

Bohotle (Kirrit) . . 

• • 



• • 




• • 

• • 


• • 

• • 

• . 

On Lines of Communi- 


• • 

• • 

• • 

• • 

• • 

This establishment was supplemented by local labour. 

The ordnance workshops were at Berbera. 

The Indian Ordnance Department took over the ordnance 
services of the force on October 4th, 1903, and Captain E. P. 
Carter, K.A., was appointed Principal Ordnance Officer on the 
Headquarter Staff. He also fulfilled the duties of Ordnance 
Officer, lines of communication, and while the Headquarter 
Staff were at the front he was attached to the staff of the 
Officer Commanding, lines of communication. 

The strength of the Department after the Indian Ordnance 
Department took over was : — 


Officers •» 

Warrant Officers 







First Party. 




• • 









• • 












36 . 


also 11 Somali coolies who were employed at 12 annas per 
diem, and four Somali cooks at 6 annas per diem. 

Ordnance Depots were established at :— 



Kirrit (moved to Wadamago, February 7th, 1904). 

Bohotle (closed November 17th, 1903). 

Eil Dab. 

Yaguri (closed February 3rd, 1904). 

Las Dureh (March 8th, 1904, to April 11th, 1904). 

Arsenal at Berbera. 

All ordinary replacements were demanded through Sjstem. 
the Officer Commanding, lines of communication, any extra- 
ordinary requirements being sanctioned by the (Jeneral Officer 

The issue of replacements was not large after corps had been 
refitted in October, 1903, and the equipment lasted without 
many exchanges or condemnations. 

Clothing and necessaries were issued free on certificate by 
Commanding Officers that the articles were required to replace 
others worn out, lost or damaged, through no fault of the men 
on active service. 

During the advance from Obbia the scale of S. A. ammu- Scale of 
nition was 100 rounds in regimental charge and 200 in Brigade '^"^^'""ition. 
Reserve, while 200 rounds were held in charge by the A.O.D. 
After July, 1903, the scale was 400 rounds in regimental charge 
and 200 rounds in post charge, reduced in the second phase 
of the campaign to 300 rounds in regimental charge and 100 
rounds in post oJiargft.* 

The scale of ammunition carried by artillery was : — 

Per gun. 


r Common shell 


With guns -< 



Star . . 


^ Case shot . . 


In post reserve 


Carbine ammunition (carried 


person) . . 

. . 

100 per carbine. 

* See also page 331 



G^enerai At the beginning of Greneral Manning's campaign snffioient 

^^^^^ "' stores were taken from South Africa to meet the reqniiementB 
of the force for four months, but the conditions of this campaign 
were so altered by its duration that further provision had to 
be made after the two depdts at Berbera and Obbia had been 
established. G^ar for camel and mule transport, for which 
no provision had been made, had to be provided locally in 
A.O.D. workshops, and a considerable quantity of rope was 
obtained by local purchase from Aden. Ropes were also 
urgently required for wells, &c. These were supplied from 
Aden and from home. Grenerally there was a sufficiency of 
stores as supplied from home to meet demands, and local pur- 
chases were few as the resources of the country were small. 

The following remarks on stores and equipment were 

made by various officers* : — 

Remupkson Packing. — For Somaliland, packages require to be of 

menu' ^c^*^ * ®^^^ ^^^ Weight Convenient for pack transport ; for this 

P.0.0. purpose a convenient weight is 80 lbs., or sub-multiples of 

80 lbs. Contents of packages should be marked on the 


The one-ton vat was considered unsuited for rough usage, 
and for the country. Woollen clothing, horse rugs, &c., 
should be packed with some preventive against insects. 

Clothing. — Boots require screw nails and toe plates. 
The tins of grease for boots require a bettor fastening. 

Tents. — Circular tents and hospital marquees of the 
English pattern were found to be useless. Two hospital 
marquees at Upper Sheikh were blown to rags in less than 
three weeks. At Berbera the khareef vnnd blew so strongly 
and continuously that only E.P. tents with sides stiffened 
with matting could stand it. The Indian IGO lbs. G.S. tent 
and E.P. tents are the best. 

Troughs, Waterproof, 600 gallons. — These should be 
attached to the posts by hooks. The posts should have a 

See also remarks by Lieut. -Colonel Konna in Chapter XII. Remarkfl 
on artillery equipment arc given in Chapter XIII. 

second loop about one foot he\aw the top one, and should be 
3 ft. 6 in. long. 

Pumps, Lifts and Force. — A length of spare hose should 
be supplied with each pump and spare parts. 

SwMfcri/.^Jenerally found too big for ponies. 

Covers, Sail Cloth, Waterproof, 30 by 30.— Very useful, 
but should, if possible, be so treated as to be proof against white 
, antfl. The tarpaulins are too heavy for pack transport. 

Tcmha, Camel, I^i gallons. — " An excellent store stand- 
I ing much knocking about." They should be supphed 
with leather washers, of which a spare supply should be 
arranged for. Stores should also be supplied for the solder- 
ing and repairing of the tanks themselves. 

It was recommended that in future expeditions ice 
machines should be provided. 

Two sorts of labels were required, one for public and 
' one for private followers, 

It was also suggested that the unit of the Army Ordnance 
I Department should be the section, viz. ; — One officer, one 
r Warrant officer, one staff sergeant, six sergeanta, 17 rank and 
* file. 

At Sheikh, specially during the winter months, jerseys, P.M.O. 
Woollen drawers, extra blankets and warm coats were very 
necessary. As regards headgear for Europeans the Cawnpore 
pith hat (tent club pattern) was considered by far the beet. 
The S.A. Slasher hats afforded quite inadequate protection to 
the head. 

The most suitable clothingwa? good milled khaki, the serge 
coats being too heavy and hot for laarcliing in Somaliland 
though well adapted for men at posts such as Sheikh, Shimber 
Berris and Burao in the winter months. 

10-inch and 5-inch heUos were considered to be the most Sij^slli 
suitable for use in Somaliland, but the 10-inrh should be "^'"P""" ■ 
packed in leather oases. 

The 4-galloo tins of oil v/eie found unserviceable. Oil Veicrli 
J^_shouId be made up in 80-lb, loads. 







The thermometeis were reported on as indifferent. 

The scalpels wore away easily and the saws for post- 
moitems were quite useless. The Inspecting Veterinary Officer 
was strongly of opinion that the contents of the veterinary chest 
required serious and comprehensive attention, and recom- 
mended the inclusion of a microscope and a " Diagnostic." 
He also considered that a set of hobbles for casting should be 
included in the equipment of a field veterinary hospital. 

Wheel clipping machines were preferred to hand clippers, 
as the former work much faster and only require a new knife 
when out of order. 

Typewriters were found to be invaluable, and a printing 
press was considered an important adjunct to the headquarters 
and lines of communication of an expeditionary force. 

9. — Accounts Department. 

Organication. The Accounts Department was under a Field Controller 
belonging to the Indian MilitaryAccounts Department, assisted, 
after July, 1903, by two paymasters (one belonging to the 
Indian Military Accounts Department and one to the Army 
Pay Department) by a Protectorate paymaster and by a 
Treasury Chest Officer. 

A Field Audit Office was first opened at Berbera in 
February, 1903. 

All the accounts, except those concerned with officers of 
the Imperial forces, went through the Field Controller. The 
Paymaster of the Army Pay Department was responsible for 
the pay and accounts of all troops paid at Imperial rates of 

The currency used was Rupees, except in the case of 
remount purchases in Abyssinia, for which purpose two 
consignments of Maria Theresa dollars were obtained. The 
Field Controller, however, recommended that in future 
Abyssinian currency should be used for such purposes. 

The following remarks were made by the Chief Staff Officer 
in the fourth expedition ; — 


Remarks bj 

V. finance. 

1. The scconnta andei the Indian BTrtom of audit irwe at a diaad- 
vantage from the ou(«et, in July, 1903, awing to the Htrean which bad 
Accni^ during the previciuB seven months, both in their proparation and 
audit. The inelaflticity of tho syBlem and the labour it entaila on staff 
auditing and nocounting establish men ta are in marked oODtraM to the home 

2. Complaints were general by officers acooimting nnder the Indian 
■yrtem of the numerous Touchers and counter-signatures required, of the 
minute Bubdivisions of covering orders to be obtained aad Babniitt«d with 
their accounts, also of the Toluminous objection statements to which they 
had to reply under alt conditions of active service ; as the audit was not 
up to date the objections inToIved reference to records, generally spcalung 
tome months old, which, consequently, hod to accompany the offlcerti 
on the march. 

:l. Afield force order ia sufficient authorityto po-is any expenditure of an 
exceptional nature that may be incurred, and the military accounts rules 
provide For a free relaxation of audit to meet the exigencies of war. They 
vf down no limit to the snnctioning power of tbe Chief .Supply and Trana- 

t Officer of the forre in respcut of supply and transport storca. 

Except in amaU matters of ordnance stores, there is no delegntioti 
of powers to General offiecrs commanding brigade?, to officers in indo_pendent 
cnmmand, or tn accounting officers, the result being that the accounting 
ofioen were required to obttin na vouchers for their noeounta multitudinous 
sanctiuna by officers in independent eommsnds, which, for purposes of 
final audit, required covering sanction in Beld force orders. These varimu 
otdeta iMtify to the laborious doplieation and, in some caaea, triplication 
of work entailed on staff establishments, and reveal a portion only of labour 
of aocounting and audit. 

6. The Indian sj-stem as compared with the home system undoubtedly 
tends towards economy up to a certain point, but, as the chief port of tho 
Iftbour involved is in duplication and triplication, and iu adjusting small 
detail*, it appears that in this respect the economy is false. 

6. Absolute accuracy on field service is unattainable and it would appear 
that by a very small reduction in the percentage of paper accuracy aimed at, 
A great lavlng might be effected in tlio valuable time and energies absorbed, 
both of the Accounte Department itself and of the staffs, departments nnd 
units concBTned, and in a corresponding reduction in tho establish to en ts. 
stAtfonery, Ac. , maintained for accounting purpusea. 

7. From a nan -departmental point of view, it appears that U> facilitate 
» anftAblo relaxation of audit tbe following stops are desirahle in tho interests 

(a) A del^ation of sanctioning powers to oIBcers in independent o 

ji expenditure up to a certain peicenti^ 

write off unareoimtod j 
of the total of eaoli j 


Remarks by 



acoount. In this oaae it has been pointed out by the Field Con- 
troller, it might be advantageous to vary the peroenta^ aooording to 
the officer's rank or position. 

(c) A careful elimination of the duplication of work to ensure that one 
signature to each transaction covers all the responsibility of each 
officer concerned in that transaction, whether sanctioning, iasalDg, 
receiving or demanding. 

(d) The auditing officer to be responsible to the General Officer Command- 
ing for the review of unaccounted balances, and for the adjustment 
of the whole of any such balance as exceeds the authorised peroentage. 

VI. Officers. 

The difference in the S3r8tem of payment of special service officers under 
the Allowance Regulations and of special service or staff officers, paid accord- 
ing to Indisin regulations, was found to operate to the disadvantage of 
officers of the Indian astablishment, pending the formal sanction to the 
scheme of organization of the field force ; no staff pay is available for them 
till this sanction is received, whereas the grade pay of special service offioecs 
of the home establishment is available in whatever position they are em- 
ployed. The Indian system has the advantage that the rate of staff pay k 
fixed according to the responsibility and importance of each appointment, 
but has a great disadvantage in the restriction it imposes on the employ- 
ment of an officer for varioas duties according to the exigencies of active 
service, in that he is liable to suffer pecuniary loss unless he is performing 
the duties of an appointment already included in the sanctioned establish- 
ment of the field force. 

This and other anomalies would be avoided were all officers, scmt for 
extra regimental duty, from the Indian establishment, appointed special 
service officers with graded pay at rates fixed on the analogy of the grading 
under the allowance regulations. 

General Egerton remarked on the above : — 

Greater latitude should be allowed to general officers in the field as to 
the employment of staff officers in other capacities than those they are 
officially filling. The centre of gravity is continually changing, but to shift 
an officer from a billet in one place under the existing Indian regulatioiks 
requires not only special sanction of Government, but entails heavy loss of 
pay on the officer during the interval between his relinquishing one appoint- 
ment tni he takes up another. Such complications are altogether avoided 
by the graded system, which only needs to be a little elaborated to meet 
all the requirements of the Indian system. ^ . 



The substance of Qeneral Sir C. Egerton's telegrams of 
the 9th and 15th April, 1904, to the War Office, recom- 
mending the reduction and demobilization of the force, is 
given in Chapter VI, and on the 18th April the Secretary 
of State for War stated in the House of Commons that it 
had been decided to discontinue the military operations and 
to reduce the field force in Somaliland. The Secretary of 
State for War had, however, on the 15th April informed 
General Egerton that previous to the actual demobilization 
being taken in hand the operations against Ulig were to be 
carried out. Illig, however, was captured and destroyed on 
the 21st April, and on the 10th May the Secretary of State 
for War telegraphed to the Qeneral Officer Commanding as 
follows : — 

His Majesty's Goyemment have decided that the whole of the troops G-eneral 
now in Somaliland, excepting only local levies, are to be placed under arrangements 
orders to return to their permanent stations, two companies Indian Mounted 'O^.'*®™^"*^* 
Infantry and two Indian battalions being, however, temporarily detained 
to hold the Burao-Bohotle lino and the Ain Valley, pending the completion 
of the necessary arrangements for the organization of local forces. The 
remainder of the Indian troops will return at once to India ; British troops 
to be sent home ; African troops to proceed to their own Protectorates. 
Colonel Swaync is returning to resume civil and military charge of the 
Protectorate, and organize the future defence arrangements. His arrival 
will set you free to return to India. Detailed orders as to troops and stores 
will follow. 

On the 18th May the Secretary of State for India informed 
the Viceroy of India of these arrangements and stated that 
the selection of the native infantry battalions was left to 


and that the troops and followers who were returning to 
India were to be moved under his directions, except that 
the 101st Grenadiers and 107th Pioneers were to remain in 
SomaUland for not more than four months. 

On the 21st May Greneral Egerton reported that arrange- 
ments for the transfer to Colonel Swayne of the civil 
administration and of the temporary garrison and local levies 
were complete ; also those for the demobilization of the 
Field Force by Colonel Swann. He also stated that the 
concentration of the troops at Berbera would shordy be 
concluded. The General therefore requested permission 
to leave Somaliland and hand over the conmiand tempo- 
rarily to Colonel Swann. Sanction being given for this course, 
General Egerton left Berbera on the 2nd June, handing 
over the demobilization arrangements to Colonel Swann, and 
the civil administration to Captain Cordeaux, pending the 
arrival of Colonel Swayne from England. 

On the 4th Jime the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
telegraphed to Colonel (local Brig. -Greneral) Swayne : — 

Man of con- From the date of your assuming civil and military charge of Somalilaiid 

entration of the administration of the troops remaining in the Protectorate will be trans- 

poops. ferrod from the War Ofl&ce to the Foreign Ofl&ce, but you are autboroed 

to communicate direct with the War Office on all questions connected 

with the clearing up of stores surplus of your requirements, and with the 

Government of India with regard to any minor details as to Indian troops- 

Consequent on these instructions, the concentration at 
Berbera was carried out in accordance with the following 
plan : — 

1. On the 19th April orders were sent to the Officer Com- 
manding 1st Brigade to withdraw from the Nogal by the 8th 
May and to report to headquarters the route by which he 
would withdraw. 

2. On the 22nd April orders were issued for the disband- 
ment of the Musa Abukr levy under the orders of the 
Political Officer. 


3. On the 25th April orders were issaed for the formation 
of a movable column at Elil Dab.* 

i. On the 1st May orders were issued for the movement of 
the 27th Punjabis and the 52nd Sikhs to Berbera, the posts 
they were holding being relieved by the lOUt GrenadiBTs and 
the 107th Pioneers. The posts at Olesan, Garrero, Kirrit and 
Gerloka were abandoned. 

5. On the 16th May it was decided that : — 

1(1) On the arrival of the 1st Brigade at Eil Dab the whole 
of the Brigade, except the Somah Mounted Infantry, 
were to proceed to Berbera for demobilization. 
(2) Pending the formation of a movable colunu, Eil Dab 
was to be garrisoned by — 
100 rifles, 107th Pioneers. 
2 companies Somali Mounted Infantry. 
The actual embarkationf of troops began on the 23rd May Kmburkrt 
by the hired transport " Nurani," which sailed for Karachi 
on that date, having on board the 27th Punjabis, 28th Mountain 
Battery, and details. The R.I.M.S. " Hardinge " sailed on 
the same date with invalids and officers. 

The transportation of troops to India was continued by 
the " Fultala," which sailed on 27th May, by the B.I.M.S. 
" Clive," sailing on the 6th June, and by the transports 
'' Santhia " and " Surada " ; the " Fultala " and " Nurani " 
doing several voyages to and fro. 

The British troops were conveyed home by the transports 
" Malta " and " Goorkha," which left Berbera on the 22nd 
June and 2l8t June respectively. 

African troops were moved to Mombassa and Chinde by 
the R.I.M.8. "Clive" on the 8th July, and South Airican 

. of truOjra. 

* Thia moTkble column «m aTentoallyorgkii' Colonel A plin 

Bm'uptUiic«*ilb onion iMued oti '--ns,' laptuniM 

di>n MuuuUd tuIwilrj.SUa 1' otrj, 
p lUulM, 2 mtxinu. 


details to Durban by the freight ship ^^ Lalpoora " on the 
20th June. 

Thus by the 8th July the demobihzation of the force was 
complete as far as regards personnel. 

In Field Force Orders of the 22nd May a provisional scheme 
was pubUshed for the future garrison of SomaUland. The 
orders also laid down that '' the scheme will be carried out 
under the orders of Officer Commanding Lines of Communica- 
tion, who will also carry out the demobihzation of the 
remainder of the force in communication with the Officer 
Commanding 1st Brigade, and (General Officer Commanding 
2nd Brigade." This scheme is inserted at the end of this 

)i8po8al of On the 30th April .General Egerton telegraphed to the 

torwric. Secretary of State for War as foUows :— 

Request instruction by telegraph as to disposal of all clothing, equip' 
ment and transport gear supplied by Supply and Transport Corps. Suggest 
troops and followers being allowed to retain clothing in use, as is custom 
under Indian Regulations. Clothing, equipment and transport gear in 
stock being retained for issue to permanent garrison hereafter ; unservicc- 
able articles being sold by auction. 

The Secretary of State for War repUed on the 12th 
May : — 

Your proposals approved. Send in due course priced list in detail of 
the articles of clothing, equipment and transport gear retained for the 
X)crmanent garrison, stating to whom articles hnnded over. 

And on the 19th May he telegraphed : — 

Arrange for all stores, Protectorate property, to bo separated and 
collected from various posts, to await further instructions as to disposal 
on arrival of Colonel Swayne. It is imdcrstood that Indian troops retained 
in the country will be left complete with their own supply and transport 

On the 13th June the Officer Commanding Lines of Com- 
munication asked the Secretary of State for War for more 
definite instructions as to the disposal and handing over 
of stores, and on the 17th June he was informed in reply : — 

The following is the procedure for the disposal of stores and animals z — 
(1) Stores, &c., for the use of temporary garrison to be handed over 
free of charge. 


1 f«r Itw nw of the nonnal Protootarate torce to t 
handed ovar on payment of their value, after deducting the eetimatod 

ooat of removal to India or this countr;. Sl^ues, &c., not worth 
the cost of removal to be charged to the Prol«ctorst« at the price 
thej would fetch In the muket locally. 

In order to assist in the transfei of stores, &c., to the Foreign 
Office an Army Service Corps officer was sent to Sooialiland in 
June (see page 609). As a result of his recommendations some 
stores were taken over by the Protectorate, a few were locally 
loid, and the remainder (chiefly equipment and ammunition) 
B sent back to England. The water tanks were taken over 
the Egyptian Goveniment. 

On the 1st May orders were issued for all engineer stores Knginfm 
to be returned to the Engineer Field Park, Berbera, and on 
6th May it was decided that :— 

Ordnance establishments, before retunmig to India, were Ordnant 
to return to Ordnance charge all equipment and stores 
which were — 

(a) Not of Indian patterns. 

(6) Not on Indian equipment tables. 

Ill a simitar manner, estabhshments, before returning 

to England, the Colonies or Protectorates, were to 

return stores and complete equipment according to 

the patterns and equipment tables in force at their 


The General Officer Commanding 2ud Brigade, and Officers 

Commanding 1st Brigade, Lines of Communication 

and Mounted Troops were to dispose of all cases of tost 

or damaged stores belonging to units under their 

rcajiective ooniniandH, the value of which did not 

exceed 1(X) rs. A Board, other than a Regimental 

Board, was to be held on all lost or damaged stores, 

the total value of which exceeded 100 re., and the 

decision of the Board, after approval by the offic«i8 

above mentioned, so far aa unitsunder tbwi- respective | 

oommonda mn ooncemed, was to be (I 


Disposal of 

Disposal of 



The above orders also applied to individual oSBoeD 
whose equipment was not borne on the books of any 
unit or department, and who were to be called upon 
by the Field Controller to account for such stores as 
were not returned nor accounted for. 

As early as the 15th March General Egerton had written 
(S.A. 2235) to the Secretary of the Army Oounoil submitting 
proposals as to the disposal of transport ftnimiLlg and vehicles on 
the demobilization of the Field Force. He suggested that the 
camels should be disposed of locally, after the requirements 
of the Protectorate and the Aden garrison had been con- 
sidered ; that the Indian Qovemment should be given the 
option of purchasing the mules ; that the buckwagona should 
be returned to South Africa ; and that the ekkas and ponies 
should be disposed of at Aden. 

On the 7th April the Secretary of State for War telegraphed 
approving generally of the above suggestions, and after some 
further correspondence he telegraphed to (General Egerton 
on the 9th May : — 

Camols should be disposed of as suggested in your letter No. S.A. 2235 
.... Bullocks and donkeys disposed of locally. ... 60 traof- 
port ponies should be sold locally. . . . 

On the 19th May the Indian Government notified their wil- 
lingness to take 1,200 to 1,500 selected mules, and finally 1,200 
were sent to India, and 50 to Malta, while 500 Abyssinians 
and 90 Army Service Corps mules were handed over to the 
Foreign Office, 419 were retained for the temporary garrison 
and the balance was disposed of locally. 

The Bikanir riding camels were sold to the Protectorate 
at 250 rs. each, and remounts were disposed of locaUy, 
the Protectorate being given first offer. 

As regards transport animals, it was decided that aU 
mules, exclusive of Army Service Corps and battery mules, 
then with the force, but including regimental gun mules with 
Pioneer battalions, mules with sappers and miners, and mules 
in remount charge and riding mules, were to be handed over 


to Supply and Transport Officers of the nearest posts for 
despatch to the officer in charge of the Indian Mule Transport, 
Berbera, who was to grant units receipts for mules and mule 
equipment received by him. 

The gear of the mules was to be survoyed by units before 
being handed over to Supply and Transport Corps, and only 
gear in serviceable condition and suitable for transport pur- 
poses was to be accepted. Unserviceable gear and gear of 
special pattern pecuUar to Pioneer battaUons was to be disposed 
of under the orders of the Principal Ordnance Officer, Somali- 
land Field Force. 

The attendants accompanied their animals, but those 
attached to the 52nd Sikhs and Sappers and lliners were to 
return to India with their imits. 

As regards vehicles, eight buck- wagons were retained for Dispoml of 
use in the Protectorate, the 90 Army Service Corps mules 
referred to above being retained for use with these vehicles. 
The remainder of the wagons (77) were returned to South 

On the 13th May General Egerton telegraphed to the l>i»po»l of 
Secretary of State for War suggesting that all surplus articles 
of supply should be offered to the Egyptian Government at 
book value. This was approved on the understanding that 
the Foreign Office, as represented by Brigadier-General 
Swayne, should first be able to select what they required. 
General Egerton wished also to dispose of any balance to 
India and Aden, but neither the Indian Government nor 
the General Officer Commanding Aden required these supplies, 
and the correspondence continued with a telegram from 
the Secretary of State to the Officer Commanding lines of 
Communication on 10th June : — 

Report by poet quantity, deBcription commissariat sapplies, suridas 
to requirements, and your recommendations as to disposal, stating if any 
can be advantageously sold locaUy. 

Finally it was decided to send Major G. Paul, C.H.G., 

Army Service Corps, to Somaliland, to advise Brig.-General 
(8927a) 2 Q 


Swayne as to the dispoeal of snridiia storeB, mpplies, Ac., sod 
to represcDt the War Office. Major Paul arriTed at Berbeia 
in July, 1904, and, as a reault of his tecommendations, some 
supplies were locally consumed, being handed over to the 
Protectorate ; some (chiefly forage) were sold locally, and 
others (tobacco, preserved meat and vegetables, Ac.) were 
sent back to England. 

M»cbuie There were 21 machine guns in the country when the 

operations ceased. Of these 15 accompanied corpa leaving 
Somaliland, 2 belonged to the Protectorate, and the other 
4 were handed over to the Protectorate for the military 
occupation of the country. 

Demobllia^ With respect to financial arrangements, G«neral Egerton 

■nd doling of telegraphed on the 22nd May : — 

BCOouiiU. Please telegraph iiutraotioiu up to what date and of what moath aoMNUitt 

will be audited bj Field Controller. Contiollw niggeibi that Bomb*; 
Command should undertake audit of estiblithmeDt billB, supply, traniport 
and all other accounts ezoept those of oorpa. Acoonnts of ootpa to be 
submitted to commands on which depecideat. One offiosr. Supply and 
Traoaport Corps, with neceoarj eetablishment, to pcoeeed to Pocn*, whwD 
field a idit office should be located and adjust all supply and tranaport 
accouiite. Instructions also requested regarding payment of troopi and 
establinhmenta farming temporary garristm, and for tlw dsmoMiMtfan id 
the Army Pay Depactncab 

These snggestions were sanctioned aod the Ann^ Bqr 

Department estabUshment WM sent home as soon as all t 
troops drawing pay from that source had embarked. 
stafTofflcm. Ab to the stftfF offices, it was arranged that on demoll 

Itzation all permanent records uid books of r«gu]ationa J 


staff offices were to be 
mandant, while office equipm 
tents were to be returned ti 
Berbera. These last were s 

Oroanizatidh of Local 1 

On the 19th Hay the Seciv 

informed Brig.-Qeneral Swftyn 


desired that he should take charge, civil and military, of the 
Protectorate, and arm and organize the protected tribes in 
such a manner as to enable them, after a time, to protect 
themselves. Lord Lansdo¥me remarked that the two 
battalions of Indian troops which it was proposed to 
retain temporarily would assist in inAJntiuning order 
while the new arrangements with the tribes were being 
matured, and added that it was contemplated that a 
small nucleus of regular troops should remain permanently 
at Berbera as before the war. It was also pointed out that 
His Majesty's (Government did not desire that any fresh 
troops should be raised in Somahland until they knew the 
cost and had issued instructions. 

Lord Lansdowne again telegraphed on the 8th June asking 
that, before deciding on the manner in which his instruc- 
tions of the 19th May were to be carried into effect, he might 
have a report of the conclusions arrived at by Qenend Swayne 
after inquiry on the spot. He also asked for the proposed 
distribution of the 1,300 men demanded* and stated that 
the two Indian battalions left in the country could not 
remain more than three months. Greneral Swayne was, how- 
ever, informed that he was at hberty to proceed with the 
organization and arming of the tribes. In reply to the above 
(General Swajme telegraphed on the 15th June : — 

I deprecate departure of regular troope until i% becomes clear whether 
the Mullah is able again to combine the large number of hostile riflemen 
who are now divided into tribal groups. If the Mullah advances soon in 
force, the tribes, at present having no cohesion, could not face him, and 
arms in issue may fall into ihe Mullah*s hands. 

\ s Th^ Greneral also stated that he proposed increas- 
ing 6th King's African Rifles to a total of 500 mounted men, 
and raising 800 infantry as temporary troope for one year 
"to hold strategical posts Berbera to Burao, with posts 
covering flanks at Las Dureh and Hargeisa, thus supporting 

* Qeneral Swayne had previously estimated that a force of 1,300 
men would be required, %,€., 600 Camel Corps (6th King's African Billet 
(and Soudanese and 800 infantry (Somalia). 

(8927a) 2 q 2 


Increase to 
6th K.A.R. 

Proposals of 
Swayne to 
raise troops. 

the tribes until they have estabUshed cohesion and are in 
a position to ward off attacks. . . • Our tribes, when 
furnished with ponies and rifles, would take over Bohotle 
and Eil Dab on the understanding that we leave four months' 
supplies for 200 men in each post, and give assistance by 
subsidy — total, £3,500 a year." 

On the 17th June authority was given for the increase 
of 6th King's African Rifles to 500 mounted men, to be 
ultimately employed for the protection of the coast, and the 
proposal in the last paragraph (above) of (General Swayne's 
despatch, regarding ponies, rifles, supplies and subsidy was 
also sanctioned. 

On the 17th June, General Swayne renewed his proposal 
to raise 800 infantry, but now proposed that they shoidd be 
composed of Punjabis from India. He estimated the cost of 
these troops at £50,000 a year. This proposal was approved, 
but as the men could not be raised and trained in so short a 
period as one year, it was finally arranged with the Indian 
Government that one battalion of native infantry should 
proceed from India for service in the Protectorate. 




Provisional Scheme for the Garrison op Somaliland on 
Demobilization op the Somaliland Field Force. 

L Under orders from His Majesty's Goyemment, His Majesty's Com* 
missioncr, Consul-General and Commander-in-Chief of the Somaliland 
Protectorate will, on arrival, assume military command of the garrison 
of the Protectorate. 

II. The garrison will consist of : — 

(a) Regular troops, imder orders to return to their permanent stations 
but temporarily detained to hold the Burao-Bohotle line and the 
Ain valley, pending completion of necessary arrangements for 
organization of local forces. 

(6) Local levies : — 

6th King's African Rifles, 2 companies of Somali Mounte<l Infantry. 
Illalos, 60. 
Temporary levy, 20. 

III. 1. Command and Staff, 
Commanding — The senior combatant officer. 


Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-QeneraL — Captain 
G. M. Molloy, 34th Poona Horse (Special Service OfiScer). 

Royal Engineers OfiScers.^1) To be detailed by Commandant Royal 
Royal Engineers ; (2) Lieutenant K. K Edgeworth, Royal Engineers 
(for special duty with deep boring operations). 

Chief Supply and Transport Officer. — Captain E. A. Swinhoe^ Supply 
and Transport Corps. 

Assistant Supply Officers. — (1) Captain H. D. Foulkes, Royal Artillery 
(Special Service Officer) ; (2) Lieutenant J. G. Lyons, 76th Punjabis 
(Special Service Officer). 

Assistant Transport Officer. — Lieutenant J. G. Craik, Seaforth High- 
landers (Special Service Officer). 

Indian Camel Corps. — Commandant — Lieutenant H. H. Syer, 31st 
Lancers (Special Service Officer) ; Assistant Commandant — Lieu- 
tenant P. C. Hampe- Vincent, 129th Baluchis (Special Service Officer). 

Senior Medical Officer. — Major G. B. Irvine, Indian Medical Staff. 

2. Troops: — 

No. 6 Company, Indian Mounted Infantry (Poona). 

No. 7 Company, Indian Mounted Infantry (Umballa). 

The 101st Grenadiers. 

107th Pioneers. 

Section D.18 British Field Hospital. 

Sections A, B and C-58 Native Field Hospital. 

One section. No. 65 Native Field Hospital 

Native-General Hospital, 100 beds. 

Indian Camel Corps. 

3. Subordinate and Clerical Staff. — ^The Deputy Assistant Adjutant and 
Quartermaster-General will take over the Brigade Staff Office of the 2nd 
Brigade on demobilization, which should be completed in stationery, &c., 
from the Ordnance Department. Sergeant H. CL Brook, now with the 2nd 
Brigade Office, will join Captain MoUoy. 

The Royal Engineer officer will require no clerk, but should indent 
upon the Ordnance Department for any stationery he requires. 
The Chief Supply and Transport Officer will have : — 

4 warrant Officers. 
11 non-commissioned officers. 
13 clerks. 
11 agents. 

Subordinate estAblishment. 
and wHl complete his stationery requirements. 

The Senior Medical Officer will require no special clerical establishment, 
but should indent for stationery if required. 

4. Ammunition, — (a) Service ammunition will bo maintained in the 
country at the rate of ; — 

600 rounds per rifle. 
30,200 rounds per maxinu 


Rifle ammiinitkm wfll be Mark 11, Indian pattern (as far as aTaflable). 
For maxim guns, Mark U, ordinary pattern. 

Of the above, 300 rounds per rifle and 12,600 rounds per maxim wfll 
accompany units. 

The balance will be stored at Berbera in the Fort. 

(() Praotioe ammunition will be drawn by units at the rates ai 250 
rounds Mark V per rifle, 1,700 rounds Mark 11 per maxim. 

5. EquipmerU. — (a) £Iaoh infantry battalion and company of mounted 
infantry will obtain sufficient articles of ordnance supply to meet require- 
ments till the end of the year and will complete their other equi^nnent and 
establishment of followers from the departments of supply. 

(b) Each infantry battalion will retain the maxim guns now with them, 
any weak gun detachment mules being replaced. 

(c) Obligatory mules will accompany units and, except- during operation?, 
will as heretofore, be employed under the orders of the Chief Supply and 
Transport Officer. 

6. Medical. — ^The necessary orders for the medical arrangements men- 
tioned in para. Ill (2), and for those required by units will be issued by the 
Principal Medical Officer, Somalfland Field Force. 

Six hospital assistants to be detailed by the Principal Medical Officer. 

7. Veterinary, — ^The Officer Commanding Indian Mounted Infantry 
companies will indent for any requirements of equipment or medwines 
from the Indian Veterinary Office, Soraaliland Field Force. 

8. BemourUs. — The Officer Commanding Indian Mounted Infantry 
companies will indent on the Remount Officer, Somalfland Field Force, 
for the necessary remounts to complete requirements, including 15 per 
cent, spare. 

9. Postal, — Postal arrangements will be made by the Superintendent 
of Post Offices, the balance of the present postal staff with the Somalfland 
Field Force returning to India. 

10. Telegraphs. — The field telegraph line wfll be maintained. The 
Director of Telegraphs will arrange for the necessary staff, the balance of 
the present staff with the Somaliland Field Force proceeding to EIngland. 

11. Concessions and Privileges. — Concessions and privfleges, such as 
pay, field service batta, free rations, field service clothing, &c., wfll be as 

ition. IV' 1 . The garrison will be distributed as follows : — 

_, , ^, r 107th Pioneers, 1.V com imnios. 

Bohotle . . i „i 1 ^rv .« 

1 Slalos, 20 rifles. 

Wadamago . . 107th Pioneers, | company. 

Poona Mounted Infantry, 1 company. 

Umballa Mounted Infantry, 1 company. 

107th Pioneers, 5 companies. 

6th King's African Rifles, Somali Mounted Infantry, 

2 Companies. 

l^Illalos, 20 rifles. 






Hkadalanleh } "W* ««»«« 1 o<m»P«y- • 
Burao. . . . The lOlst Grenadiers, 3 oompaoies. 

The lOlst Qrenadien, 2 companies. 

The 101st Ghrenadiers, 1 company. 

The lOlst Qienadiers, } company. 

The lOlst Qrenadiers, 1} companies. 

Various. — 

Detachments from the above for other posts as required. 
Illalos, 20 rifles. 
Temporary levy, 20 rifles. 

2. Movemenls in Relief. — The movements will be carried out mider the 
orders of the Officer Commanding, Lines of Communication, Somaliland 
Field Force. 

Pending the completion of these movements, Eil Dab will only have 
a garrison of 100 rifles, 107th Pioneers, and the Somali Mounted Infantry. 

V. The Chief Supply and Transport Officer will arrange to (dace supplies Supplies, 
to the end of the year at posts for the garrisons allotted to each post. 

VI. The Chief Supply and Transport Officer will organize and maintain Transport. 
sufficient transport at £il-Dab to enable a movable column consisting of : — 

2 companies, Indian Mounted Infantry, 
300 rifles, 107th Pioneers, 
150 rifles, Somali Mounted Infantry, 

to move with 10 days* supplies and 1 day's water in tanks for men. Ho 
will also maintain at posts what is necessary for water and other duties. 

Should the reserve of supplies as in para. V be completed, the CSiief 
Supply and Transport Officer will arrange for the disbandment of the 
transport other than that mentioned above. 

VIL The Royal Engineer Officer will rrrange to maintain, where neoes- B.E. stores 
sary, a complement of civil labour at posts. He will also indent upon the &nd works. 
Field Park, Somaliland Field Force for the requirements of the foroe In 
pumps and other stores, for whose maintenance in repair the necessary 
civfl labour should be entertained. 

The Field Park at Berbera will be in the charge of the Protectorate 
Staff, as also any engineering work required at Berbera, and betweeo 
Berbera and Lower Sheikh. 

The Chief Supply and Transport Officer will mdent upon the Director, 
Supply and Transport, Somalfland Field Force, for his requirements in 
water tanks, pakhals, &c.,',both for the posts and movable column. 

VIIL 1. Records. — The Assistant Quartermaster-Qeneral, IntoUigenoe, Intelligenoe. 
will plaoe in charge of Captain L. W. D. Everett, 6th King's African Rifles, 
the Intelligenoe reoords which are to be left in the oonntry. 


2. InUrprders, — The AssiBtant Quartennaster-General* lotdligeooe, 
will arrange for interpreters as follows : — 

Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General 1 interpreter. 

Royal Engineer Officer 1 „ 

Supply and Transport Cknrps 6 interpreters 

Senior Medical Officer 1 „ 

Mounted Infantry (per company) 1 

Infantry Regiments (per battalion) . . . . 1 

Poet duties 8 

H. E. STANTON, Major, 

C.8,0„ SomalOand FiM Font. 
Bbrbkra, 20th May, 1004. 





Abanabro, Kanyasnaoh, commands AbyBsinian forces 85 

Abyniniani, co-operation of, first expedition 53, 59, 63, 74, 82 

third „ 115,128,138,181 






205, 212, 220, 232, 251 

expedition of, against Mullah, 1900 60 

proposal of, for combined expedition against Mullah .... 51 

Abyssinian Somaliland, area of 

Aoconnti Department, demobilization of 

„ organization of 

remarks on, by C.S.0 , 

„ remarks on, by Lieut-General Egerton 

„ of Intelligence Officers 

Administration of British Protectorate 

Afdaldanshe Monntaini 

AidagaUa, expedition against 

Alexandria. Convention of (1877) 

maAA a IA9UA ■••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •■•< 

Allen, Major .... .... 


Animals, disposal of, on demobilization 

juiiey, diajor .... .... .... .... .... 

Area and Population of British Protectorate 
Area of Somaliland 

mmmmMUm •••• •••• •••• •••• ••*• •••• 

„ orders regarding, by Lieut. -General Egerton 

pp VAO^Aw AmM •••• «••• •••• •••• •••• 

mmmMMMMM UA Wal •*•• ••■• •••• •••• •••• «••• •••• •••• 

Army Service Corps .... .... .... .... .... .... 

^aAwAA a^A4UAA ■••• •••• ■••• •••• ••■• ■••• •••• •••• 

mmmwmMmVm^ •••• •••• •••• ■••• ••■• «••• •••• •••• 

Attendants^ camel .... .... .... .... .... .... 

9 p T \? \ASX»\Xmmtjf •••« •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• 

Atkinson- WUte Rear-Admiral, co-operation of, fourth expedition 
M »» in command of niig expedition 

M »» orders issued by, at niig 


.... 610 

336, 344, 600 

.... 600 

.... 602 

.... .... .... vvv, 4V# 

■••• ••«• ■••• •••• ^B«# 

•••• •••• •••• •••• mtS 



«•.. .... .... .... Av^ 

.... .... .... loV, A£Zp 2S25o 

.... .•>. .... 0*vF, ikOJi 

59, 331, 356, 446, 449, 597, 613 

• ••• •••• •••• •••• ^/v\# 

•••• •••• •••• dOfp vVO 


.... .... .... .... 9 

.... .... .... OV, oiXl 

.... OvU 

37, 104, 107 

.... o^ 

.... 4iXl 




... 279 

... 280 

... 281 



reports to 

271, tl% 276 




BamM Male of .... .... .... .... .... .... ..„ jm^ fU 

JDSMHUOCv •••• •••• •••• •••• -••• •••• •••• ...• •••* OMw 

BaUwein, skirmiBh at ^ 96 

Banflar won ..•• ..•. .... .... .... .... .... .... 29 

fi J^nBllBI ••«• •«•• ...• .... ...■ .... .... .,,. ZV 

Bate depot military 366 

Baie» organiaation of, flrat and eeoond expeditions $47 

M ft third ezpeditioii .... .... 348 

M M foorth ezpeditioiL .... .... ,^ 368 

Battery, K.A.B. Oamel 117,160,164,222,224,228,247,249,203,342,445,447 

Battery, 28th Mountain 218, 222, 223, 226, 238, 239, 342, 445 

Beaieley, Captain 340, 416 

Benadir Company 43,46,113 

„ settlements .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 122 

^VVrOvBw •••• •••• •••• •••• •••« •••• ••»« 2ff 

„ arriyal of ships at .... .... .... .... .... 5d3 

pp KMH^O Ow •■•• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• 2X fftt epO% 

„ disembarkations at 642, 640, 664, 668, 600 

„ embarkations at 667, 670, 671, 673, 674, 676 

Berbera-Bohotle foroe, operations of 146 

BetheU, Captain, R.N., report on disembarkations at Obbia 631 

Beyan, lieutenant, R.N., capture of dhows by 269 

Bikanir Oamel Oorpi 135, 425 

Blockade of ooast .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 104,112,266 

Bohotle, concentration at, third expedition 187, 192 

„ „ loiirui „ .... .... .... .... c£ii 

„ „ „ „ orders for 222 

return of force to, second expedition 107 

Botanqnet, Rear-Admiral 267 

^BWVVVV •••• •••• •••■ •••• ■••• ••■• •••• M>W 

Borinf, deep water, operations 458 

Boundaries of Somaliland.... 7 

Brif acie, lit ••>. •... .••* .... •*■• •••. ..•. •-.. 2sio, «7vi 

,} AuQ .••• ..•• .*•• *••• .•>. ••.. ■-.. ^lo, «7v2 

British Qoyemment, treaty with tribes 45 

Protectorate, administration of 42 

„ „ transferred to Foreign Office .... 47 

„ area and population 7 

„ defence of .... .... .... .... .... .... 201 

„ divisions of .... .... .... .... .... .... 10 

„ establishment of .... .... .... .... .... 46 

„ land forces in .... .... .... .... .... 47 

^|^Q%1Q9 •••• •••• •••• •>•• •■•• •••• "•«• Om« 

Brookib Major 141, 142, 150, 254 



^VlUaUlK •••• •••• •••• «••• •••• •••• ■••• •••• •••• Jtfv 

Burgher Oontinffent 120, 127, 140, 145» 107, 200, 421 

BnrldDi, engagemeQt at, between AbyasiniaiiB and Mallah 181 


Cabinet deeJiioB^ second expedition 89 

„ wilUvl ,, •••• •••• >••• •••• •••• XXO 

Oablei, submarine .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 33 

Cables telegraph, laying of 482 

Oamel cart train, organization of 497 

„ Oorp% Bikanir 135, 174, 425 

pp pp *aEA*^A •••• •■•• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• <KwO 

„ „ Indian Silladar, organization of 498 

„ „ local, organization of .... .... .... .... .... 495 

,, MkaEQIBB .... .... .... .... .... .... .... v2V, OW 

Camelry, remarks on, by Brig.-Qeneral lianning 329 

Cameli, attendants.... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 510 

Cameli, branding of 497 

pp WVV& \^ \^m •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •«•• ^^^^B 

„ casualties among .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 512 

•• Vll P ^yCi^ys^O \/» •••• •••■ •••• •••• •■•■ •••• ■••• •••• A^^^^M 

„ embarkation and disembarkation of 537, 540, 544, 549 

yy ^3^^^^ •••• •••• •••• •••■ •••• ■••• •••• •••• ^^^^^^ 

pp aAaa U.UC VX •••• •••• •••• •••« •••• •••• •••• •••• %^\^%M 

y^ a\^v0^^9 UX •••• ■••• ■••• •••• •••• ■••• •••• •••• ^r^M# 

„ purchasing of .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 502 

„ remount depdt for 594 

„ want of, at Obbia .... .... .... .... .... .... 132 

Canteen, Field Force 525 

Captnred itook .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 81,362 

Carter, Captain 340,596 

Carter, lieutenant^ awarded Victoria Cross 234 

Caraaltiei of British at Daratoleh 177, 178 

«* •• £iftll£v •••• •••• •■•• •••• •••• ««•• A^/w 

„ ,t first expedition .... .... .... .... .... 80 

yy yy xjiUlUDUxU §••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••« * W 

99 99 XUliL •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• ^oo 

99 99 vlUUcUl •••• •••• ■••• >••• •••• •••• m^mJm 

„ „ Lieut -Colonel Kenna*s reconnaissance to Jidbali 234 

99 99 cvv OwUUUA •••• •••• •>•• •••• •••• •••• vO 

„ „ third expedition .... .... .... .... .... 196 

M of enemy at Daratoleh .• 178 

„ „ £tflKw .... .... .... .... .... .... AVV 

,, „ ferviMiuin .... .... .... .... ..•• §9 

M M Giunburu .•— .m« ...« ...• »— 1^1^ MB 



Casualties of enemy at Illig 287, 2»5 

vluD&ll .... .... .... .... .,., .... Z41 

Pf SftDdftlft .... .... .... .... .... .... o9 

w&yi&iied.... .... .... .... .... .... §Q 

in transport animals * 503,511 

vwUOrBIlip .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ...a .... vlO 

Clerical einipment 60) 

Climate of Somaliland 36 

Coast, blockade of 101,112,266 

„ naval reconnaissance of 114 

Cobbe, L'eut. -Colonel 03 

„ advance of, from Galadi 152, 154 

„ awarded Victoria Cross 08 

„ instructions to 154 

reconnaissances by 133, 139 

report by, on action at Gumbora 160 

Cobbold, Captain, accompanies Abyssinians during first expedition .... 83 

„ accompanies Abyssinians during third expedition .... 128 

Comforts, medical .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 582 

Commands, organization of, first and second expeditions 335 

third expedition 335 

fourth expedition 339 

Commmiicatioiis, inland 33 

Commimication, lines of, third expedition .... 134, 137, 141, 190, 336, 337 

fourth expedition 219, 342 

garrisons of posts .... 347, 349, 350, 358, 360, 472 

Obbia, standing orders .... 351 

organization of first and second expeditions 347 

organization of third expedition 348 

organization of fourth expedition 357 

posts on 

BvwU Ol .... .... .... .... 


f» ff 

>f >» 

»f »» 

»» »» 

ff >» 

tt ft 

tt t» 

tt tt 

ft >» 

»» »f 

Commnnications oversea 

Concentration of troops on demobilization, plan of 

Convoy doty, management of stores on 

Coolie Corps, Arab 

Coolies, Somali 

Cordeanx, BIr., Acting Consul-General 

Correspondents, Press 

Conrgerodf first expedition at 

^U&rOUwy •■•• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• 

Daba Debba Valley 


Pajdawfui Plaip ...; 


349, 357, 359 

• • •• 

348, 349, 359 

• • •• 

.... 33 

• ••• 


• ••• 

.... 515 

• ••• 


• ••• 

.... 501 

• ••• 

.... <9U 

• ••• 

.... 415 


.... 74, 78 

• ••• 


• ••• 


• • •• 

.... 580 

• ••• 




Damot. arriyal of Swayne at 97 

Daratoleh, action at, report of by Colonel Gough 173 

„ description of .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 326 

Dftrror Valloy ..*• ...* .... .... .... .... .... .... 10, lo 

DufliiOM^ typefl ot .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... v7^ 

D0f0iiiibl6 poftf .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 472, 475 

D€nioDiliiAtio& .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 603 

„ general arrangements for 003 

„ organization of local forces after 610 

„ provisional scheme for 612 

A^^hAImU ^vUcA •••• •••• •••• •■■• •■■• •••• •••• •••• 4#Ow 

A^w& Jb im( •••• •••• •••• •••• •••■ •••• •••• •••• ••■• XV 

A#^NivC vVKv •■•• •••• •••• ••»• •••• •••• •••• •••• OvOT 

DUrj, inteUigeiioe 3d5, 405, 409 

Diary, itall extracts from 375, 379, 380, 381, 382 

ArisosMi numaQ .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... o/v 

f, oi animais .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ooo 

DiMmbarkationf at Berbera 542,546,554,558,560 

„ Las ELhorai .... 543, 552, 562 

„ \/DDia .... .... .... .... .... 04A/, OOO 

„ „ report of Captain Bethell on 531 

Disembarkatioiif, orders regarding 530 

DiTisioiial troopi .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 217 

DoIbahanU tribes 40, 41, 62, 75, 77, 89, 91, 206, 212 

„ tribe, chief of, murdered by MuUah 50 

Drainage lines of, in Somaliland 8 

Dorbo^ landing and action at 271, 275, 276, 278 

A^Vva^M^ DlAbAX •••• ■••• •••• •••• «••• •■•• •••• •••• v\/v 

Dweh, Laa, advance of column from 256 

„ concentration of column at 255 

Dyiaiitflfy and Diarrhoaa .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 580 


Egerton, Lieut. -General, Sir C, appomtment of 195 

correspondence of, with His Majesty's 
Government before fourth ezpedi- 

uOn .... .... .... .... .... ZNhL 

recommends cessation of operations 204 
>t n standing orders by, fourth expedi- 

>f >» correspondence of, about demobiliza- 

tion .... .... .... .... .... uUtf 

EfTpt, connection of, with Somaliland 44, 45 

BU Dab Oolnmn 254 

n >f 

»» »f 


Ekka traini 

EmbarkationB at Berbera .... 

Las Khorai 
Obbia .... 




>• •••• •••• •••• ^B^^v 

.. 667, 670, 671, fi73, 674. 576 
.... 643, 662, 672 


••■• •••• •••• %M^^^y 

Brigo, action at 
Ezpeditioii, lint. 












oasualties in 

final report on by Colonel Swayne .... 

movement begun 

organization of base 

oommands and 8ta& 
lines of commonioation 

plan of operations for * 

preparations for 

proposed by Gonsul-Qeneral 

strategy of 

termination of .... 



^BAAA •••• •••• •■■• ■••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• 

Bnoampments, orders regarding, by Lieut. -General Egerton, fourth 

vALM^XlVlwXA .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ^FvA 

jsngineer nef vioos •••• .... .... .... •••« .... .... ..«• 4oz 

Rngineering worki .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 476 

Kanipment .... 400, 428, 431, 433, 446, 448, 460, 480, 484, 613, 683, 608, 


< • • ■ ■ • • %M^ 

»•• •••• OI\M 

'•• ■•«• Ov 

'•■ •••• V^v 

»•« •••• 09 


>•• •••• W^B # 

>• • •• •• 4^V 

»•• •• *• %^%M 

)•• ■••• vA 


• • . > • • O V 

a • •• VS 


.. .... tf2 

• • • • •• CF^F 

• ••• »^^^9 


• • ■ • vxM3 

• • ■ ••• iTv 

...• lilv 


.... izv 

.... 1 1 V 

• ... ik^^E^y 



• • • • • • %^^K^7 


• ••• M \Fv 

Expedition, second 













Expedition, third 











operations began 

organization of base 

commands and 8ta£b 
lines of communication 

plan of operations for 

preparations for 

KvO Ul Us \3L •••• ■••• •••• •••• 

return of force to Bohotlo 

strategy of 

strength of forces in 

■••• •••• ••■• •••• •••• ••■• 

advance from Galkayu 

commencement of operations 

Italian co-operation in 

organization of base .... 

commands and staffs 

force during 

lines of communication 

plan of operations for.... 

preparations for 

strategy of .... ..•. •••• •••• 






Expedition, third, strength of forces m 118, 345 

„ supplies during 137 

„ termination of .... .... .... .... .... .... 196 

Eipedition, fourth .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 199 

„ advance to Halin 244 

„ concentration of force 234 

„ organization of base 363 

„ organization of commands and staffs 339 

„ f, lorce...* .... .... .... .... Jilt 

„ t* lines of communication 357 

plan of operations 208, 209, 210, 21 1, 213, 214, 247, 253 

„ preparations for advance 231 

„ result of operations 264 

„ sanction to advance given 214 

,, siTaiiogy oi .... .,., .... .... .... .... «>14 

„ strength of Field Force .... 346 

M termination of operations 263, 264 

Ezpeditionf, imall 47 


« flftA «••• •••• •••• •«•• •••• •■•• ••«• •••• •••• •••• v« 

« flkAAIA «■ U^ ••■• •••• ••■• •••• •••• «••• •■•• •••« •••• OA 

Fftiken, Oeneral, arrival of, at Qalkayu 148 

„ commands 2nd Brigade, fourth expedition 218 

„ in command of Los Dureh column 255 

„ operations of, fourth expedition 257 

Fgrdiddin, action at .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 75 

mm ^r V ^^KS •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• ^^^9^9 

Forage on the march, conveyance of 525 

p^ I^V^wK V \#& •••• •••• •••• •••• ■••• ••«• «••• •••• %MwU A 

FoodJ^ staple, in Somaliland ^ .... 38 

Foroeik loeal, organization of, after demobilization 610 

„ reorganization of, before second expedition 89 

„ „ „ third „ .... .... 116 

Foreign OfBoe takes over administration of British Protectorate .... 47 

Foreitier-Walker, Lieut. -Colonel 335, 339, 390 

Fofmatioiis, march and fighting .... 334 

Fnnoe^ settlement of boundary with 46 

Friedriohs, Captain, death of 77 

9 VbVB •••• •••• •••• •••• ••■* •■•• •••• •••• •••• %9%^A(a %Mmt%9 

yy aU OvIUSUUh1U>*«* ••■• ••>• •••• •••• •••• ••«• •••• Q^ 


Oabri, Fitanrari, commands Abyssinian forces, third expedition .... 182 
Gadabwii Hofie .... .... .... .... .... .... .... Sa7» 417» 418 



Oaladi. garrison of, fourth expedition 228 

,9 „ „ withdrawal of 235 

ff occupation of .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 151 

„ withdrawal of Brig.-General Manning to 159, 171, 184 

Oftlgudan Plain .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 15 

Oalkayu, arrival at, third expedition 143 

„ „ advance from, third expedition 149 

„ „ of Brig.-General Manning at, after Gumbum .... 184 

OalloleBiver 17,283,285,296 

Vi Ms U vUS •••• •••• •■•• •••• •••• •••• •••« •••• vV vy 4JOV 

Gaunt, Captain, R.N 271, 273, 276, 277, 278 

wOftFf C&Iu61.».« •••• •••• •••• •••• •••« •••• •••« 4Z<ff Ovlf 

%M VAwUa •••• •••• «••• •■•• •••• •••• •••• •••* wv 

Oeography, phygioal, of Somaliland 8 

Oeroliniato^ BIr .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 84, 87 

^mjUUvWot •••• •••• ■•■• ■••• ■••• •••• •••• •■•• •••• v& 

VlwAA9>*«« •••• •••• ••■• ••■• •••• •••• •■•• •••• A^^a m^m Av 

^mV* amU aMUKv •••• •••• •••• •■•• •••• •••• •••• •••• mV 

Gongh, Lieut.-Colonel, despatch of column commanded by 146 

„ operations of 172 

„ report by, of action at Daratoleh 173 

„ return to Bohotle .... .... .... ...• 181 

„ awarded Victoria Gross 180 

Grenadiers, lOlit .... 110, 116, 124, 194, 219, 256, 337, 344, 349, 350, 360 

• A a^/wMAlA ••■• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••« •••• •«•• A JlxF 

VfUlrttAA ■••• •••• •••« •••• •••■ •••• •••• •••• •••• X\/y KK 

OumburUf action at .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 160 

arrival of Lieut. -Colonel Cobbe at 156 

narrative of action at, by survivors 169 

Gurgis, definition of .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 31 



JjUKiAU •>•« •••• ••■• •»•• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• i0<fli 

XXAU •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •■•• •••• •••• 4VV 

Halin, movement of Colonel Swayne to 96^ 100 

„ advance to, fourth expedition 244 

Hampshire Regiment 201, 218, 222, 223, 236, 238, 239, 241, 242, 247» 2561, »Qp 

286, 287, 289, 290, 291, 292. 208^ 2M» 242 
Hanbnry-Tracy, Major, appointed to accompany Abyssinians 

departure for Harrar 

reporv oi.... ...• .••• .... .*. 

Hans, definition of.... 

Harakatis Plain 

.*■. .... 

.... .... 

SarrioftoD, ColoDBl SI, 104, lie, ISS, 2S0 

Hubonn. piincipal 26 

Hbidoi), deGnitioD of .... IBS 

HMrii, Major 3«0,S84 

H»na, Th« 10.17 

„ area of IS 

„ Northern „.. 17 

„ Sonthem _ 19 

Hv«»4mdl«t, Consul -Oeueral, eetimBte by, of Mullah's foroM .... 19 

„ „ expedition proposed bj 40 

„ „ inatmctiooB of, to Colonel Synjne .... 54 

„ „ proclamatioD of, before 6nt eipeditioD 62 

Hendenon. Haj<v 340 

Hlting of oamela SOS 

Hiie, ratoe of 607 

Hiftorr of British oonnection with Somoliland 44 

Hood, Captain, B.N 286, 2SS, 287, 2SS, 2B9 

Hon*, akdabnnl 237,417,418 

., TrlbU orgaiiiuUoii of 231,230,417 

Honai, allotment of, to corps and nails .... 689 

„ care of 439 

„ diaoasee of 6S5 

Bovilalilib 661,679 

Hnddlerton, Uentenaot, B.I.M., reports of, on marine transport work 

fiSB, S4S, 646 
Bofsl PUb, The 14 



India, arrival of contingent from, third expedition 137 

,, despatch „ „ „ .... .... •-•• *27 

„ ,, of transport from, fourth expedition ■ • 216 

„ „ „ troops from, fourth expedition 200, 208 

Indian Qovemment, correspondence with, on demobilization.... 603, 609, 612 

InteUigence 59,61,332,388,615 

accounts 399, 407 

diary 395,405,409 

officers 335,339,393,396,404,407,409 

organization of, fourth expedition •.-. 390 

returns .... .... .... .... .... .... — 407 

Interpreten 401,616 

Italian Somaliland 22 

Italy, negotiations with, before third expedition •.-. IH 

„ „ during fourth „ 254, 259 

„ Protectorate of, establishment of 46 


Jaokflon, Lieut. -Colonel, account by, of capture of Illig 291 

„ „ in command of Hampshire detachment at 

^ "^ If ••■• •••• ••■• •••• •••• ■■•• mt C^\* 

IP A V «bV* ■••• ■■>• •■•• ••■• •••• •■•• •••• ••■• »•>• ^^\M 

„ railway from, to Harrar ... 47 

Jidbali, battle of 238 

casualties at 242 

of enemy at 241 

reasons of Mullah for fighting at 250 

„ result of engfikgement at ... 25! 

Jnba River .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 3^S 

»♦ »» 

>» }) » 

Karias, definition of 73 

Kendall, Commander, reports by, on Marine transport .... 545, 552 

Kenna, L'eut. -Colonel, commandR mounted trooi*, foiu-th ex|)cdition 217 

instructions to, at Galadi, fourth expedition... 227 
„ on proceeding to Obbia .... 129 

operations of, in Darror Valley 260 

reconnaissance by, to Jidbali 233 

casualties during 234 
remarks by, on mounted troops .... 432. 437 

.standing orders by, for mounted trooiw .... 438 

Khania buih 15 

i»Aora* <uas .... ••** ••.. .... .... .... .•.. .... .... mV 

disembarkations at 543, 552, 562 



>» »» 





Khorai Lai. embarkations at 643, 662, 572 

formation of post at 264 

Marino transport work at 643,662 

naval reconnaissance of 263 

Kob Faradod, burning of 64 

•^•^•^k^H mAAm^w •••• ■••• ••«• •••• •■■• •••• •••• a4^ 


Lftbonr 468,476,540,642,646 

Lanidowiie, Lord, correspondence of, with Bris;. -General Swayne after 

conclusion of operations 604, 611 

„ correspondence of, with Italian Government 111, 119 

Leviei; Somali 56,67,80,91,108,231,323,417 

LUter. Captain 242,343,586 

LoTfttelli, Ck)unt 133 


llolleil]. Captain, appointed to command at Samala 66 

„ at Ferdiddin .... .... .... .... .... .... 77 

,, report ot .... .... .... .... .... .... oo 

Maili, conveyance of 33, 488, 548 

Manning, General, appointment of, to command third expedition .... Ill 

commands Ist Brigade, fourth expedition 218 

despatches by 148, 171, 184, 188, 193, 196 

final report by, third expedition 196 

instructions to 126, 144, 149, 187 

letter of, to Captain Bethell 539 

march to Galadi, fourth expedition .... 224, 226 

operations of, in the Nogal 258 

plans of .... .... .... .... ■•.. •••• 144 

remarks on cam«*lry by 329 

by, on tactics 326 

return to BohoUe from Galadi 228 

report by, from Galkayu 143 

Kapi.... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ■• 402, 403 

■arohw in Somaliland 36 

Xaroh discipline 332,356,441,605 

„ fonnationB 324,327,328,332,355,356,441,443 

■arooni telegraph! 147,197,336,484 

■arohan Plateau 21 

Medical arrangements, landing at Illig ^^ 

„ „ on demobilization ^1* 

. comfort. «M 

(8927a) 2 B 2 


♦ ♦ 

♦ ♦ f» 




Medical servioes, first expedition 82* 578 

M „ organization of 336, 678 

f> ,f remarks on .... .... .... .... 583 

Melliss, Lieut.-CoIonel 231, 257, 420 

Meteorological 383, 540,542, 548 

Mijjarten, co-operation of, third expedition 113 

M „ fourth „ 258, 319 
„ Sultan, treaties with 46 

JHAAA 0%^ A aM V >•«• •••• •••• •••• ••-• •■•• ■••■ ■>•• •••• & V 

Money order work ••» ..•. .... •... .... .... .... .... 489 

Mounted infantry* organization of 424 

Mounted troopi .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 420 

„ command of, fourth expedition 340 

„ remarks on, by Lieut. -Colonel Kenna .... 432, 437 

„ standing orders for, by Lieut. -Colonel Kenna .... 438 

Mndog oasis 20, 83, 95, 99, 103, 117, 119, 122, 124, 125, 126, 132, 136, 140, 

144, 186, 203, 208, 213, 214, 230, 310, 312 
suQug, weiis 01 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... iv 

Mullah, dealings of, with tribes 41 

Mnllah, history of .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 48 

„ letter from, to the English people 191 

„ movements of, first expedition .... 52, 54, 60, 63, 69, 70, 73, 74, 77 

„ „ second „ 90, 91, 93, 95, 97, 102, 108 

third „ 117, 122, 124, 143, 146, 148, 153, 154, 


fourth „ 202,219,230,231,232,234,244,246, 

247, 252, 257, 260, 261, 262, 264, 316, 318, 394 

„ terms offered to, by General Egerton 253 

Munn, Captain, mission of 229 

Mosa Farah. Risaldar Major 71,93,95,96 


Ilayal operations 266,270 

Navigation .... •••• ••■• ... .... .... •.-• -.• .... 552 

Hegegr plain . ■. ■••• ... .... .... ..■ . .... 15 

Night marching 64,82,443 

Hogal The, 10, 16 

„ Lieut.. General Egerton*s advance into 203,204,244 

„ evacuation of .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 604 

„ held by Brig.-General Manning, fourth expedition 247, 253, 258 

„ Mullah's retreat into 190 

„ Colonel Swayne's advance into 100 

Aur, ouiian ..•• ..•• ..*• .... ...• .••• •••* .... 4{f 





\^001w •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• >••• Ow 

„ advance from, begun 140 

„ disembarkation at 131, 531 

„ disembarkation at, report on by Captain Bethell, R.N. .... S31 

M embarkationB at 668 

t, naval demonstration at 229, 270 

„ naval reconnaissance of 270 

„ selection of, as landing place, third expedition 115 

Ogaden oomitry .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 21 

^^^^%# •••• •■•• •••• •••■ •••• •••• ■••• •••• •••• •••• ^\0^ A^V 

Ogo GrQDan .... ••.. .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 10, 13 

Operationi, combined naval and military 266 

Orderly Field Force, example of 384,386 

■ • ACvUi\AAJiA^C •••• •«•• •••• •••• •••• *••• •••• •••• m^O A 

operation 222, 237, 238, 246, 249,. 263 

standing, fourth expedition, by Lieut. -General Egerton .... 330 

by Colonel Kenna, for mounted troops 433 

„ „ Obbia lines of communication 351 

Ordnance depots 595, 596 

„ services, demobilization of 607 

„ „ organization of 336,595 

fy yy FODicuaS Ou •••• •>•• ..•• .••• ..•• •••« OVo 

ff Oy9l^7lLa •••• •••• ■••• ••■• •••• •*•• •••• •«•• ^r V # 

Otbom, Captain 94,95,99,101 

Oaman Mahmnd, Sultan 50, 95 

„ M action of, first expedition 71 

„ ^y „ seoonQ „ .... .... .... 1\m5 


Park FieUu B.EL .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 344^607 

Jh SW^W L^AJLUUX LfCU •••• •••• ■••• •••• ■••• •■•• •••• •••• v«B 

Pay, Army Department 336,610 

Pear^ Commander, R.N 267, 271. 272, 274, 276, 278 

Phiffipg, Major 61, 76, 98, 99, 101, 102. 103 

Pioneers lOTth, 137, 146, 218, 222, 236, 256, 337, 344, 360, 452 

Plnnkett, Colonel 147, 149, 152, 153, 163, 164, 179 

Jb %r ■• W^r •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •■•• •■•• •■•• •••• ^V^^TB 

„ reorganization of .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 48 

Political ofllcsr .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 363, 374 

Popiilation and area of British Protectorate 7 

Porter corps .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 500 

Ports on eastern coast, survey of» before third expedition 114 

^^ LICUUJALNU •<•• ••■• •••• •••« •••■ •••• •••• •••• mtRm 


M l^Bv«U V^Kvlw^W ••>- •••• .«•• .••• >••« ...• •••• vvOa 49 1 

Foiti. defence of .... ^ .... 360,364,472.475 

Port offlOM, field, number opened 488 

PoweD, lieutenant, R.N., reports of action at Durbo 274, 278 

Prat coKrwpondcnti .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 415 

Prisoners of war 353,362 

Proteetorate British, administration of 42 

„ „ transferred to Foreign OflSoe 47 

M area and popolation of 7 

9, defence of .... .... .... .... .... .... 201 

„ divisicms of .... .... .... .... .... .... 10 

„ establishment of 46 

„ land forces in ... 47 

Provost Marshal 344,367 

^k vaaaaj^s •■■• •••• ■••• •■•■ •••• ••■■ ■•■• ■••• •■•• /K^m w 

Punjabis, 27th .... 218, 219, 222, 233, 230, 238, 239, 241, 255, 256, 342, 360 

Purchase of animals 502 

„ remounts .... .... .... .... .... .... 590, 591 


Railway, survey for, from Berbera to Bohotle 217 

Ranges* maritime .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 12 

Routes, principal .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 35 

Rations ■■•• •••• .... .... ■••• -••• — •••• olS 

„ remarki? with regard to .... .... ... .... .... .... 524 

Re-embarkations 564, 605 

Reinforcements, third expedition .... 110 

fourth „ 199,205 

Remount department, organization of 336,586 

depots .... .... .... .... ... .•• .... 587, 594 

requirements, estimates for 587 

Remounts from India 590 

„ purchase of 590,591 

„ remarks on 590 

., on demobilization .... .... .... ... ... ... 614 

Rifles, King's African 1st HO, 117, 123, 129, 134, 140, 145, 149, 150, 

152, 164, 160, 163, 166, 172, 184, 193, 195, 

218, 222, 224, 244, 245, 263, 336, 342, 350 
2nd 47, 48, 57, 105, 106, 107, 110, 117. 123, 
147, 149, 150, 152, 154, 159, 160, 163, 165, 
166, 169, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 184, 
193, 194, 218, 222, 226, 239, 242, 244, 337. 342, 350 
3rd 110, 129, 134, 140, 145, 153, 159, 172, 
184, 193, 194. 218, 222. 224, 239, 242. 244, 

245, 336, 342, 350 


»» tt 




Biilei, King's African, 5th 110, 129, 134, 149, 151, 153,'107, 184, 193, 

194, 218, 235, 336, 342, 350 
6th 48, 105, 110, 118, 154, 160, 174, 176, 180, 

219, 337, 417 

Biflei; King'i Royal 127, 161, 165, 168, 425, 434 

RUlei; 128rd Ontram'i 110 

Koaos •••• •••• .••. •••• •••• .••• ■-•• .••. vfOU, 4 f o 

Roberts, Earl, Commander-in-Chief, advice of 199, 212 

„ „ instructions by, to Hriir. -General 

Manning 126 

„ „ questions by, addressed to 

Lieut. .General Egerton .... 200 


Roohfort, Colonel, accompanies Abyssinian forces, third expedition 


report of 

Rodd, Sir R., negotiations by, with Italy 
RolUnd, Captain, awarded Victoria Cross 

„ ft „ AUtUVU „ 




Saddlei; camel 429,509 

action at .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 66 

advanced ^ase formed at 65 

Sanak plain 15 

Sanitation 351,365,581 

Sappers and Kinen 122, 140, 141, 145, 146, 149, 150, 184, 193, 194, 

218, 222, 223, 224, 236, 238, 239, 240, 248, 249, 251, 256, 336, 337, 344, 452 

i^K^^^VAwBflB^B •••• ••■• ■■•• >••• ■••• •••• •••• %W'^^^9 

^pVIvC Vy •••• •■■• •■•• >•■• ■■>• •■•• •••• •••• •*•■ %# 4 ^F 

Berricei and departmenti 452 

Settlementi, permanent, native 31 

„ temporary 32 

Seyla Ban plain 15 

Shaab tank 28 

Shakerley, CiipUin 155,156,165,168 

Sharp, Major 150, 173, 177 

ShebeUWebi 25,38 

Sheikh Upper 32 

Shilemale plain 15 

Shoeing ..•. .••• •.•• • •• ■ •• •••• ■•• •••. ..-. 591 

Signalling 82,340,355,484 

„ equipment 484,599 

Sikhf. 52nd 110, 122, 134, 140, 145, 149, 150, 166, 172, 193, 195, 218, 

222, 223, 236, 247, 248, 255, 256, 336, 3i2» 350, 900 
Smith, Lieutenant, awarded Victoria Cross S41 




t» »f 







Somali afl a soldier 322,437 

levies 56,67,80,91,108,231,323,417 

w&CmCS .... .... .... .... .... .... .,.. .,^, 321 

wAii,nn .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 40 

dispoeitaon of 40 

wartare .... .... .... .... .... .... 320 

SomaUand, Abyssinian, area of 20,42 

area and boundaries 7 

British connection with, history of 44 

ciiroai© 01 .... .... .... .... .... .... 3o 

drainage in, lines of 8 

French, administration of 42 

4UwX XXJia*** ■>•• •■•• >••• ■■•• ■■•• ■••• •■•■ Vw 

garrison of, provisional scheme for, on demobilization .... 612 

Italian 22,42,46 

physical geography - 8 

staple foods in 38 

water in 38 

*T w aAO XXJl •*•• •■•• •••• •••• ■••• ■••> •*■« ^^ i# 

South Africa, despatch of contingent from, third expedition 127 

Spies and secret agents 392, 400 

Staff duties 367 

diary, extracts from 375^ 379, 380, 381, 382 

offices, equipment of *.. 370 

organization of .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 368 

Staffs, organization of, first and second expeditions ....59,33o 

„ „ third expedition .... .... 335 

„ „ fourth „ .... .... .... .... .... 339 

Stanton, Major 339,368,616 

0^^^Q|| UvAU ■••• •••• •••■ •••• ■■■• .... .... .«•• ■•■• l9^B^K 

Stores* despatch and receipt of 514 

disposal of, on demobilization 606 

landing of 542,544,648,564 

on convoy duty, management of 515 

„ remarks on .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 598 

Stratecj .... .... ■■.. .... .... ... .... .... ...■ 305 

Strenffth of Field Force, third expedition 345 

„ „ fourth „ 346 

O^^Ql AAAJI ••■• •••■ ■••• •••• ••»• •••• ...a .■•• ...a «C4^ 

Suleiman Mountains 24 

Supplies, conveyance of, on the march 625 

disposal of» on demobilization 609 

important purchase of, statement of 527 

first expedition .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 61 

third „ .... .... ..•• .... .... .... 137» 363^ 364 

orders regarding, by Lieut. -General Egerton, fourth ezpeditionl 8S2 



»» >» 




Supply dQK>ti •— ^ — • •— •— •— •— — • 354, 517 

organizMtion of .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 510 

•KJUfvwSf wX •••• ••«• •••• •••• •••• ••■• •••• •••• O&f 

JUA V^V V •••• •••• •••■ •••• ■••• ■••• •■•• •••• %^mi%^ 

Femarks on .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 526 

and transport, organization of 336, 489 

Suffty Motion .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 336, 404, 416 

Swmnn, Colonel, in command of Berbera-Bohotle force .... 136, 337, 349 

lines of communication, fourth ex- 
pedition .... .... .... .... 342 

instructions to, by General Manning 136 

report by, on re-embarkations 564 

Swayne, Colonel, appointed to take charge of Protectorate after opera- 

* Iv&^/aAO* ••• •••• ■••• •••• •••• •••• •••• ^^ &^^ 

„ appointment of, to command first expedition .... 51 

,, ,, ,, „ second ff .... tfu 

„ departure of, to England Ill 

„ final report of, on first expedition 80 

„ instructions to, by Consul-General 54 

„ proposals of, for organization of forces after opera- 

w«^/X&A9*a*« ■••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• \^ m m 

„ punishes the tribes 73 

„ report of action at EIrigo 104 

„ „ October, 1902 102 

„ „ to Consul-General, before first expedition 56 


A flVWw^W ••■• ••■■ •••• •••• •••• •••• ■••• •••• %Mmt\^^ ^trW^m 

P9 ^^X m IAB JU •••• •••• •••• •••• ••■■ •••• •■•• •••• Om^B 

f y iJW M mi a •••• •••• •••• •«•• •••• •••• •••• •••• Om & 

AflftSB^^flsS •••• •■•> •••• •••• ••■• •••■ •••• •••• %P & 

Tdegraph communication opened 138 

cable, laying of.... .... .... .... .... .... 482 

equipment .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 480 

messages, summary of 483 

line, interruptions to 363, 480 

yy ^v wf KAUjC vX •••• •••• •••• ••«• •••• •••• 4 f V 

OuiCCo OpOnOQ ••■• •••• •••■ •••■ •••• •••• •••• 4/o 

section, R.E 138, 223, 387, 344, 477 

Ow& vXv^XI •••• ••■> ••■• •••• •••■ •••• •••• Ovva 4f 9 

Tetographi^ Marconi 147,107,336,484 

,, method of construction .... .... .... .... .... 481 

„ fourth expedition 231 

A opvacapny • . • . .... .••• .... •*.. •••• ■... .... .... 4v« 

(8927a) 2 s 


Towns •••• •••• 

TramliBe at Berbera 
Traniport ambulance 

„ animals, casualties among 

••■• •••• 


•••• «••• ^^^ ^1 

.... 206, 476, 501 
501, 583 



land 36, 132, 185, 196, 202, 212, 215, 308, 354, 356, 428, 450, 490, 526 

marine, organization of 336, 529 

„ remarks of Lieut. -General Egerton on 552 

reports of Commander Kendall on 545, 562 

„ Lieutenant Huddleston on .... 539, 543, 545 
Truutpor^ mule .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 501 

„ on demobib'zation 608, 615 

„ orders regarding, by Lieut. -General Egerton, fourtii expedi- 

VftwZX •••• •••• ••■• •••• ••■■ •••• ••»• ..■ vOv 

„ organization of .... .... .... .... .... .... 494 

ff ovsvoiu ox •••• •••• •••• •■■• •••• ■••• •••• 4«^9 

f f Jnf Or l^7& •••• •■•• •••• •••• •••• ■••• •••• •••• %9^ 

Treatiei with Mijjarten Sultan 46 

treaty with tribes by British Government 45 

Mbal Horsey organization of 231, 236, 417 

•iXlDwS, gKHIUUI .... •... .... •••• .... .... .... .... 4v 

„ Qisposiuon OI .... .... .... .... .... .... 4v 


Vehiclei^ disposal of, on demobilization .... 

„ use of, in Somaliland 

Veterinary attendants 


department, organization of .... 
Voltumo, captain of, action of 



... GOO 

... 499 


. 599 

. 254 


Walker, Captain, awarded Victoria Cross 

WaUace^ Lieut.-Colonel, in command of movable column 

„ reconnaissance by 

War Office, control of third expedition handed over to 
Warsangli Mountains 

,, JrUlfcvAU .... .... .... .... .... .... 

Water as affecting health of troops 

„ boring, deep 
„ distribution of 
in Somaliland 
on the march 




... 180 

. 219 

. 232 

... 118 



... 582 

.. 458 



... 40o 

orders regarding, by Lieut. -General Egerton, fourth expedition 331 


IVhWk awlfSf^ •••• •••• .... .... .... ..•• .... IVif 9«Slf 40v 

Buppijr •••■ .... •••• .... .... .... •••• oUf y wOvy 40i5 

during third expeditaon 135, 358 


»» »» 

f» n 99 fourth ,, .... .... .... .... 243, 360 

f, », datA, abstract of .... .... .... .... .... .... 460 

t, transport of.... .... .... .... .... .... .... 332, 353, 453 

WtflahedL skirmish at 69 

W6b1 BAOvSll .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ^O, wo 

Wells in Somaliland 39 

WiDiaiiiion, Colonel 335, 840, 578 

wVwilBllS •••• •••• •••■ •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• 00& 


TeUding; Colonel 340, 489 

TntotAIi 46,71,112,129,132,133,180 


AIHCaUBV •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •■•• •••• tTmtJrm OvXa 9I%« 

Mi^^mmt^ ••• •••• •••• •••• •••• ••■• •■•• •••• •••• • • • • otV 

ff »M9kmMm •••• •••• •••• •••« «••• •••• •••• •••• •■•■ A m 

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